AAR released for an extreme fire behavior event on the Station fire

The Station fire approaches the safety zone of OCFA's engine strike team in Bib Tujunga Canyon
The Station fire approaches the safety zone of OCFA’s engine strike team in Big Tujunga Canyon. Photo: Orange County Fire Authority

On August 29, 2009 two strike teams of engines were forced to retreat to a safety zone in Big Tujunga Canyon on the Station fire near Los Angeles as a massive convection column collapsed and sent strong winds and a flaming front through the canyon, leading to the loss of about 35 structures and burn injuries to three civilians who had refused to evacuate.

On January 7 the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center posted an After Action Review of this event written from the viewpoint of an engine strike team, number 1400C, from the Orange County Fire Authority. The AAR documents the preparation before the fire approached, the safety zone experience, fighting fire and saving structures after they could leave the safety zone, and the treatment and extraction of the burn victims.

The entire document is very worth reading, but below are the lessons learned:


ST-1400C personnel gathered on Sept. 3 in a staging area and conducted an after-action review of the Big Tujunga structure protection assignment and extreme fire behavior event on August 29. The following lessons were learned:

Fire Behavior

a. The fire exhibited “plume dominated” fire behavior which included multiple episodes of extreme fire behavior. This behavior was fed by a heavy accumulation of chaparral, drought, and steep terrain. This kind of extreme fire behavior is rare in Southern California.
b. Convection columns built by the fire would reach altitudes of 20-40,000 feet. The columns would then collapse and push high winds to the surface much like a thunderstorm. Extreme fire behavior including long flame lengths, heavy spotting, firewhirls, rapid rates of spread, and long fire runs would develop, often with unexpected trajectories.
c. The collapse of the convection column above Vogel Flats caused a reversal of fire trajectory and drove the fire down-canyon into the community.
d. As the fire front approached it’s sound was described as the “roar of a freight train”.
e. The width, speed, and intensity of the fire front posed life threatening conditions to firefighters and civilians in Vogel Flats.

Escape Routes and Safety Zones

 

Photo: Orange County Fire Authority
The fire moves around the safety zone. Photo: Orange County Fire Authority

a. The designation of a safety zone was critical to ST-1400C’s survival when they were threatened by a rapidly approaching fire front. Most other positions in the canyon were untenable during the fire’s passage.
b. The call to enter the safety zone could not have been delayed. The fire front approached the safety zone shortly after all units were assembled.
c. Movement to the safety zone was nearly compromised at one time by panicked and fleeing civilians.
d. A plan was made to place civilians who might arrive in the safety zone inside a masonry restroom. None arrived and this was not used.
e. Another previously identified safety zone was abandoned for insufficient size to provide protection.

Local Knowledge

a. The use of the local knowledge in advance of the fire’s assault to identify defendable vs. non defendable positions, identify water sources, inspect structures and bridges, and identify safety zones, and helispots was important to the effective deployment of the strike team. This local knowledge was chiefly provided by the Forest Service Big Tujunga station crew and the ANF Safety Officer.

Contact with Residents

a. Experiences by OCFA firefighters in their own “Ready, Set, Go” hazard area inspections proved valuable. ST-1400C members used this experience to quickly advise and assist residents in preparatory steps. Most residents had two hours lead time before the fire approached.
b. One resident communicated with the Strike Team Leader after the fire and thanked OCFA firefighters for the pre-fire advice provided, crediting it with the saving of her home, one of two that survived on her street of 13 homes.
c. Some residences based their judgment to stay with their homes on a prior and much less aggressive fire experience. The worst-case fire behavior developed and was much more severe than anticipated.

Re-engagement

a. The Strike Team Leader prioritized search and rescue of likely sites where civilians might be located following the fire front passage. Firefighting was only authorized after primary search had been completed.
b. Some members of ST-1400C felt they were retained in the safety zone after the fire front passage for a protracted period. However others reported that as they engaged after this period that they still found conditions to be very hot.
c. The aftermath of the fire’s passage included many structure fires, burning and exploding propane tanks, downed power lines, heavy smoke, 7
landslides, and burning trees on the road as well as a still active fire front. This condition prevented reinforcement and access to the area by additional resources, the group supervisor, or the branch director. ST-1400C and the Santa Barbara strike team were forced to deal with all contingencies with only their available resources for hours. This required continuous prioritization of targets, selection of targets offering the “best results for the effort” and an intense focus on safety.
d. Numerous structures were saved by direct action. Had firefighters not been present these structures would likely have been lost.
e. An emotional attachment developed among strike team members for one “fire-safe built” large house in particular. A very taxing and prolonged firefight was necessary to save it. A determination developed that “this house wasn’t going to be lost”. In retrospect this may have driven strike team members potentially to the edge of safety, and members felt we should guard against that in future commitments.
f. Sharp shale rock on the roadway from landslides caused a tire on the Strike Team Leader’s vehicle to be damaged and deflate during the transport of burned civilians.

Treatment

a. The resource requirements for treatment of the burn victims was extensive and caused a redirection of most resources from firefighting. Some additional structures were likely lost during this period.
b. Officers in ST-1400C felt a better organization for the burn victim issue would have been to identify a medical unit with designated resources as a sub-set of the strike team. It was felt some supervision over on-going firefighting was lost as team leadership focused on the burn injuries and their evacuation.
c. Morphine drug resources were exhausted in the treatment of burn victims. Re-supply was necessary for the safety of strike team personnel. This was handled by the OCFA Medical Director traveling to the incident with re-supplies.
d. Treatment practices were followed like we were at home, yet the conditions probably should have demanded expedited paperwork and less personnel commitment.
e. Patients and care providers were required to be transported significant distances to helispots and ambulances in the back of a pickup truck. This was problematic from a safety point of view.
f. Later it was learned that the Sheriff’s helicopter that assisted in the rescue suffered $250,000 in damage during the event, chiefly thru intake of products of combustion into the aircraft engines.

Safety and Performance

a. Use of full personal protective equipment was essential to individual safety.
b. Hydration in 100+ degree weather was essential. At times on this day, firefighters had to pause during the 6-hour firefighting operation to re-hydrate and cool down as a medical necessity. A mix of water and Gatorade was preferred.
c. Crew continuity became a problem as multiple tasks of firefighting, medical treatment, and helispot preparation were engaged in simultaneously. Crews were required to be split to handle various functions. This should be avoided whenever possible.
d. The members of the strike team possessed diverse and exceptional skills which contributed significantly towards the team’s success. Empowerment of these individuals to provide their expertise was important.
e. Team briefings and direction was cited as being complete, clear and succinct, and of great assistance in preparing for mission engagement.
f. Flexibility, adaptability, and constant observation was critical to the safety and effectiveness of the strike team.
g. This was a very hazardous situation demanding aggressive yet defensive actions and conservative judgment to ensure safety.

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Author: Bill Gabbert

After working full time in wildland fire for 33 years, he continues to learn, and strives to be a Student of Fire.

2 thoughts on “AAR released for an extreme fire behavior event on the Station fire”

  1. Hi,
    This is the first time I have been on your blog.
    Thanks for the info!!
    Great stuff you have on here.

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  2. This entire situation was one big clusterf@*k from beginning to end. Plenty of blame to go around, lots of back-peddling, lying, and white-washing. In the end, the forest is still mostly gone. I keep hoping I will wake up and find it was all a bad dream, but alas, it was not. No way to rewind and undo it.

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