Investigative Media explores decisions made on Yarnell Hill Fire

Yarnell Hill Fire
Yarnell Hill Fire. Photo by Joy Collura.

John Dougherty of Investigative Media has been following very closely the developments surrounding the deaths of 19 members of the Granite Mountain Hotshots June 30 on the Yarnell Hill Fire in Arizona. After spending a couple of hours with him in Prescott before the crew’s memorial service, I became convinced that he truly wants to determine the facts — exactly what happened and why.

John’s latest article about the fire, on his website and at the Phoenix New Times, lays out the decisions that were made during the first three days of the fire. He interviewed several wildland fire experts who questioned the findings of the official report which concluded no mistakes were made. His article also includes video interviews with Sonny “Tex” Gilligan and Joy Collura who were in the fire area from 4 a.m. until about 2 p.m. on June 30 and talked with the Granite Mountain firefighters.

Mr. Gilligan and Ms. Collura have been very generous with us, providing the information they know about the fire and sharing the photos she took that day.

The article is a must-read if you are interested in the fire. Below is a short excerpt:

Wildfire experts interviewed for this story identified key inadequately analyzed factors in the investigation that may have contributed to the tragedy, including:

–The state’s failed initial attack on the fire created a situation that later placed hundreds of firefighters at risk to put out a fire that could’ve been controlled easily.

–Once the initial attack failed, the state dispatched a skeleton management team to direct firefighting operations, but the team didn’t have sufficient resources to adequately fight the blaze. When it assumed control, the state’s “Type 2 Short” incident-management team lacked “safety officers” and “division supervisors” whose absence may have contributed to a breakdown in communications during the crucial 30 minutes before the hotshots died.

–The investigation report didn’t thoroughly examine the mental and physical condition of the Granite Mountain crew on the day it was dispatched to Yarnell — its scheduled day off and the 28th day it had worked in June.

 

Typos, let us know HERE, and specify which article. Please read the commenting rules before you post a comment.

Author: Bill Gabbert

After working full time in wildland fire for 33 years, he continues to learn, and strives to be a Student of Fire.

13 thoughts on “Investigative Media explores decisions made on Yarnell Hill Fire”

  1. For me John’s article is trying to tie together how the state engaged the fire and the decisions that the crew made. The state’s decisions weren’t out of the ordinary. They had a fire that wasn’t showing allot of potential at first. If they had put firefighters out there the first night and a firefighter got injured and the fire never did anything. People would be questioning why they sent people out in the dark for a fire that wasn’t doing anything. If the ICT4 had used the VLAT and the fire was resolved people would talking about the government wasting money, because that fire was just skunking around up there in boulder patch and there were SEATs available. We suppress 98% of fires in initial attack, only 2% escape to become extended attack fires. I don’t know what percentage of that 2% are fatality fires, but I know it’s not 2% and I would bet it is not a tenth of one percent. No one knows what fires in the 98% have potential because it didn’t happen. They got behind on a fire that evolved and fell into the 2%. What company or business wouldn’t accept a 98% success rate? Of course firefighters don’t accept it. It’s the 2% that cost us the most.
    None of that had a direct cause or effect on the decision that either Eric or Jesse made. More than likely both were together with the squad bosses when they decided what they were going to do. Hotshots make decisions that way when there is time, everyone is looking for the weakness in a plan. I honestly believe that they were moving to get into a position to be able to engage the fire and help after the fire passed through the structures. I think that they watched that fire pushing east and believed that they would be in no trouble moving to the ranch before that south flanking fire was ever close. They would have been watching the fire and conditions as they walked down the two track. They made a decision to drop off into that drainage, got behind the ridges where they couldn’t see, and the fire behavior and direction of spread change shortly after that. No one knew where they were and they didn’t think there was a problem with where they were going. There is a ridge to either side of that drainage if they had dropped down on either one they would not have lost site of the fire. But they didn’t.
    The mistakes are that they moved without communicating their intentions and getting confirmation and they dropped down into a drainage where they couldn’t see. None of that was influenced by the previous decisions about suppressing the fire, they were independent. The towns were threatened and the fire was running, but that didn’t require or force those decisions. I don’t think for a second that those decisions were made believing that there was any risk. They may have been made but not communicated so that they weren’t told “no”, but we don’t know that. Radio traffic was busy so we don’t know if they tried to communicate. They had been watching the fire, weather, and monitoring conditions all day, they had recieved the weather warnings, so I believe that they made a calulated decision based on their observations and the input of the crew overhead. I don’t believe that one person made that decision, they thought they were good. The decision to drop into the drainage was a bad decision that was only a deadly mistake because of the outcome and that was followed by a change that I don’t think they weren’t aware of. If they had stayed on the two track or one of the ridges they more than likely could have corrected, but not in the drainage where they couldn’t see. People make bad decisions all the time, but the majority aren’t couple with a terrible change of events and we’re OK. I’m not saying that this is an excuse or acceptable, but it happened just like the space shuttle disasters or SEAL 6’s helicopter being shot down.

    0
    0
    1. “People make bad decisions all the time, but the majority aren’t couple with a terrible change of events and we’re OK.”

      I think this is very much spot on. We all know that we can be complacent at times, and we don’t always make the best/safest decision on the line. But, just as you said, coupled with the series of unfortunate events prior to what happened in that box canyon (starting ignition), that one decision that may not have led to anything else on any other day, ended in tragedy.

      0
      0
      1. I learned a lot from Rick Gale who was a Type 1 Incident Commander, Area Commander, and IC on a National Park Service All-Risk Incident Management Team. He would tell his Command and General Staff to “play the ‘What-If’ game”. Consider what COULD happen, and what is the worst case scenario. Be prepared for it. Mitigate it before it happens, or at least be able to deal with it.

        For example, if I decide to walk over a mile through unburned fuel from point A to point B with the fire on my left and with it moving in the same direction, what COULD happen? Is the strong wind that is already pushing the fire guaranteed to remain constant? Or could that approaching thunderstorm that I see change the wind direction?

        Consider the worst case scenario in every fire situation.

        We all occasionally make bad decisions. Some have greater potential negative consequences than others. The more bad decisions a person makes, the chances increase for one of them resulting in a very bad outcome.

        0
        0
  2. The 10 Standard Fire Suggestions, and the 18 Situations that, when they occur, you are quietly and subtly reminded to “Watch Out” if you feel it’s necessary and falls within your comfort zone.

    0
    0
    1. Emmit The 10 standard ORDERS are not suggestions. The 18 situations that shout watch out are to remind you of FATALITIES caused by the situation that firefighters put themselves in. If one of these situations is in front of you fall back to the 10 standard orders and proceed accordingly. Again I am amazed at the concept that the 10 standard orders is just a simple suggestion.

      0
      0
        1. Emmett Sorry I realized it was a sarcasm statement after the fact us old fire dogs sometimes get ahead of ourselves.

          0
          0
  3. The fact that one man – John from Investigative Media – can provide far more clarity on the few pages of his blog than the 54 “investigators” could provide in their 119 page SAIR is disturbing. With all due respect, that SAIR does a disservice to the memory of the men who died, because it fails to help prevent a future similar tragedy. God bless John and all others out there (e.g. Sonny and Joy) who are trying to find the whole and complete truth.
    Transparency and disclosure are the only things that are going to halt the second-guessing and questioning.

    0
    0
    1. How could a crew, on their home turf, in a fuel type they know so well, not recognize the fire transitioning from backing to running head fire. C’mon, someone messed up r oyally….

      0
      0

Comments are closed.