Report released for dozer operator who went missing

He deployed a fire shelter on the Pleasant Fire in California.

Above: photo from the CAL FIRE report.

The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) has released a “Green Sheet” preliminary report on an incident within an incident that occurred on the Pleasant Fire north of Nevada City, California August 30, 2017.

About half an hour after beginning work constructing fireline downhill, increasing fire activity forced a contractor-owned dozer to disengage. The operator walked the machine through unburned vegetation to a small cleared area near a greenhouse but after arriving, a burst hydraulic line leaked fluid which ignited, producing smoke and flames in the cab. He attempted to extinguish this new fire with an extinguisher, but failed, then exited the dozer and deployed a fire shelter as the main fire approached.

For about an hour no one on the fire knew where the dozer and operator were, in spite of numerous attempts on the radio to contact him and aerial searches by Air Attack and a helicopter. After an hour the operator used his hand-held radio to announce that the dozer sustained a hydraulic failure and he deployed a shelter, but he was unable to describe his location. Eight minutes later a helicopter spotted him and led ground personnel to the scene.

The operator complained of coughing, dizziness, and weakness. After being assessed by medical personnel, he walked downhill to an ALS ambulance for transport to a local hospital where he was treated and released.

Thanks and a tip of the hat go out to Tom.
Typos or errors, report them HERE.

Report released about wildfire that burned into Gatllinburg

Gatlinburg fire reportOn August 31 the National Park Service released the long anticipated report (12 Mb file) about the wildfire that burned from Great Smoky Mountains National Park into the city of Gatlinburg, Tennessee. Five days after it started on November 23, 2016, the Chimney Tops 2 Fire spread into the eastern Tennessee city killing 14 people, forcing 14,000 to evacuate, destroying or damaging 2,400 structures, and blackening 17,000 acres.

The strategy used to manage the fire was controversial because very little direct action was taken to suppress the fire during those first five days until a predicted wind event caused it to spread very rapidly out of the park and into the city.

The report was presented to the public during a live Facebook feed which you can see below.

One of the first speakers was Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke who reminded the audience that he served in combat and then mentioned some recommendations:

  • The National Park Service should be more proactive about removing “dead and dying timber”;
  • The dozer lines built during the suppression of the fire could be put to good use, possibly as bike paths;
  • The interoperability of communications systems needs to be improved so that firefighters from different divisions within the NPS and also between other agencies can more easily communicate during an emergency.

Joe Stutler, qualified as a Type 1 Incident Commander and Area Commander, positions at the pinnacle of the incident management structure, read a lengthy statement that included what he and his team of investigators deemed to be the pertinent facts of the fire and the investigation.

Gatlinburg fire report Joe Stutler
Joe Stutler presents information in the report about the Chimney Tops 2 Fire that burned into Gatlinburg, Tennessee.
Mr. Stutler began by saying the report was intended to not place blame on anyone, and would “avoid should have, could have, and would have, statements that frankly inhibit sensemaking and also inhibit continuing to learn from the event.”

Describing the actions taken or not taken on the fire, he said, “the review team found no evidence of negligence of anyone at the park. They did the very best they could when it came to their duty. They did the very best they could based on what was loaded in their hard drive”, he said as he pointed to his head.

Chimney Tops 2 Fire August 27, 2016
Chimney Tops 2 Fire November 27, 2016. Photo by Brett Bevill.
“Never in the history of this park or even in the surrounding area”, Mr. Stutler said, “had anyone seen the combination of severe drought, fire on the landscape, and an extreme wind event” occurring at the same time.

Combined with a wildland/urban interface, it was the “perfect storm”, he explained. The review team concluded that the fire management officials did not see the potential for the low-frequency, high-risk event.

The report made recommendations, including:

  • Revise the park’s fire management plan to reflect more aggressive strategies and tactics during extreme fire weather conditions.
  • Expand communications capacity to allow interoperability with responders outside the federal system.
  • The Fire Management Officer should be supervised by a single individual, not two.
  • Since no Red Flag Warnings were issued around the time of the fire, evaluate current Red Flag Warning and advisory criteria to reflect conditions experienced during the 2016 fire season.
  • The National Park Service leadership should embrace and institute change to create wildland fire management organizations that have the capacity and resilience to meet the realities of this “new normal” fire behavior.
  • Institute formal fire management officer and agency administrator mentoring and/or development programs.

Report released on dozer burnover in Florida

Dozer burnover Okeechobee County
Dozer burnover in Okeechobee County, Florida. April 16, 2017. Florida Forest Service photo.

The Florida Forest Service has released a report on the burnover of a dozer that occurred April 16, 2017 in Okeechobee County. As you may remember from our April 17 article, the operator, who was not injured, became entrapped while constructing fire line with the tractor plow and was overrun by the fast-moving fire.

You can read the entire report HERE, but below are some excerpts:

****

Contributing Factors:

  • Initial tactics deployed by the first arriving units were based on limited knowledge and experience.
  • Incident Commander having minimal initial attack experience.
  • Operating equipment beyond its capabilities
  • Leaders intent, was not made clear.
  • Ineffective transfer of command to experienced leadership positions.
  • Loss of situational awareness with crews.
  • Lack of effective communication.
  • Minimal staffing in Communications Center during high fire danger.

Lessons to Share:

  • It is imperative to speak up when you are feeling uneasy, uncomfortable, or unsure.
  • Experienced firefighters should be mixed with those who are less experienced. This will necessitate a thorough briefing, ensure instructions are clear and understood and to keep firefighters from working alone when additional units are on scene.
  • Personnel accountability is extremely important, especially in complex initial attack circumstances that often require unique tactics and strategies. This helps ensure safety of all crews.
  • Operate equipment in appropriate speed settings (1.7-1.9). This will reduce equipment fatigue and failure.
  • Turn off air-condition unit if caught in flame front or heavy embers. This will help reduce the likelihood of the filters and cab catching fire.
  • Establish properly qualified and experienced leadership.
  • Incident Commander should limit his/her hands-on fire suppression activities to maintain effective situational awareness.
  • Limit radio traffic to the extent possible. This will improve the possibility that emergency traffic can be transmitted and received successfully.
  • Increase staffing in Communications Center on high fire days to help with the additional call volume and radio traffic.
  • Know and follow established policy and procedures for emergency radio traffic.

Thanks and a tip of the hat go out to Rob.
Typos or errors, report them HERE.

2016 Southwestern U.S. wildfire report now available

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Above: Engine 337 of the Tonto National Forest monitors the Juniper Fire, which started by a lighting strike on May 20, 2016 approximately 10 miles south of Young, Arizona. Photo courtesy of USDA Forest Service, Tonto National Forest.

Wildfires burned nearly 600,000 acres last year in a three-state region of the Southwest U.S., more than double the number of acres burned in each of the previous two years, according to a new report published this week detailing the 2016 fire season.

The report is the fourth in a series of annual overviews made available from the Southwest Fire Science Consortium and the Ecological Restoration Institute intended to serve as a summary for past years and allow for a comparison with previous fires.

Specifically, the report describes effects from the 12 largest fires — each larger than 8,000 acres — in Arizona, New Mexico and western Texas.

Twelve fires are examined in detail. Four occurred in New Mexico: the North, Dog Head, McKenna and Clavel fires; seven in Arizona: Cedar, Jack, Juniper, Brown, Fuller, Rim and Mule Ridge; and one in Texas: the Coyote Fire.

These 12 largest fires represent nearly half of the acres burned by wildfire in 2016.

Report released on fatal BLM engine rollover

BLM Unimog Engine 2410 when it was new in 2006. BLM photo.

The Bureau of Land Management has released an Accident Investigation Factual Report for the July 10, 2016 engine rollover north of Winnemucca, Nevada in which two firefighters were killed and a third was seriously injured.

Jacob O’Malley and Will Hawkins lost their lives in the single-vehicle accident on Nevada State Route 140 when a rear tire suddenly and catastrophically failed. The truck only had four tires, there were no duals on the rear. When the right-rear rim dragged along the pavement the left-front was in the air, eliminating any possibility of control by the driver. The 33,000 pound GVWR engine fishtailed and then rolled several times.

The cab was higher than the water tanks and pump package, so it took the majority of the impact as the top of the vehicle struck the roadway during the rollover. All three occupants were wearing seat belts but with the top of the cab and the A pillar being damaged or sheared off, the restraint system failed to operate as designed. Mr. Hawkins was ejected from the cab and then was hit by the rolling wreckage.

Below is an excerpt from the report:

Finding 3.1 (Material): During the rollover, the upper cab structure (made of reinforced carbon fiber) sheared away from the truck frame, exposing the vehicle’s occupants to a hazardous environment. The disintegration of the cab compromised the driver’s and right side passenger’s seatbelt systems.

Discussion 3.1: The lack of cab crashworthiness did not cause the rollover; however, it contributed to the fatal conditions which occurred during the crash. The reinforced carbon fiber cab on the Unimog was manufactured in France and was built to United Nations Code ECE r29 (commercial vehicle occupant protection), which exceeds U.S. cab crashworthiness standards. The U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) submitted a report to Congress in 2015 on the need for improved heavy truck crashworthiness standards; however, no action has been taken on this report as of February 2017.

There are 41 articles on Wildfire Today about the rollovers of wildland fire apparatus.

We still stand behind what we wrote in a 2015 article about the many firefighter fatalities from rollovers:

The wildland fire agencies should fund research conducted by engineers to determine how to prevent the passenger compartments in their fire engines from collapsing in accidents.

Thanks and a tip of the hat go out to Eric.
Typos or errors, report them HERE.

Two reports released on the same day about the escaped prescribed fire near Carson City, NV

Above: Map of the Little Valley Fire at 9:23 p.m. PDT October 14, 2016.

On February 15 two reports were released about the prescribed fire that escaped, burned 2,291 acres, and destroyed 23 homes northwest of Carson City, Nevada on October 14, 2016. The first report about what became the Little Valley Fire included the results of a months-long independent investigation by the Reno Gazette-Journal (RGJ). The other, released a few hours later, was the product of the official investigation requested by the Nevada Division of Forestry (NDF), the agency responsible for conducting the prescribed fire.

Hours before the fire escaped, all eleven firefighters that had been mopping up the prescribed fire left the project and returned to their stations between 1:30 p.m. and 4:45 p.m. on October 13, 2016. During that day there were a number of smokes that received the attention of the firefighters. During the last two hours before the seven-person helitack crew departed they noticed the wind increasing — trees were blowing down and branches were falling.

The RGJ reported on the reason the firefighters were ordered to leave the burn site.

Gene Phillips, NDF forest health specialist and burn boss for the Little Valley Burn, made the decision to pull crews from the burn site after discussing the high wind forecasts for the evening with a burn boss trainee, according to the review.

The decision not to staff the site on the evening of Oct. 13 was made, according to NDF, “based on the limited amount of heat near the control lines, success of the current mop-up effort, and the risk to firefighters working in timber during high winds.”

escaped fire map
From the NIMO report.

At 5:38 p.m. the Little Valley weather station recorded sustained winds out of the west at 15 mph with a maximum gust of 39 mph. By 12:38 a.m. on October 14, about the time the fire escaped, the wind was at 19 mph with gusts up to 87 mph. The relative humidity was 32 percent.

A Red Flag Warning for gusty winds and low humidity was in effect from the morning of October 11 through 5 p.m. on October 14. Strong winds persisted until mid-day on October 17.

The NDF’s report was written by the U.S. Forest Service’s Phoenix National Incident Management Organization (NIMO), a team that usually manages fires and other incidents that are often of longer duration than a typical wildfire. The team was supplemented with a Fire Behavior Analyst, a GIS/Fire Behavior Analyst, a Public Information Officer, a Fire Investigator, and others for a total of 10 personnel that were listed in the report.

The NIMO team concluded that the fire escaped when embers from a burning stump hole were blown 34 feet and crossed the fireline at a corner, or “dog leg” in the fire perimeter.

According to the RGJ there was confusion in initially responding to the fire after it escaped at around 12:38 a.m. on October 14:

Response to the fire was delayed, affecting how fast it could be contained: A call at 1:23 a.m. about smoke at the burn site was later dismissed as “unfounded,” causing a TMFPD [Truckee Meadows Fire Protection District] fire engine to return to the station three minutes after it left. After a second call about smoke at the burn site, it took TMFPD more than an hour to get to the site after crews were dispatched, according to 911 transcripts.