A group of five retired wildland firefighters has formed an organization called “Safety Matters”. Their goal is to “call attention to deficiencies in wildand firefighter safety presented by current wildland fire management systems.”
Since they came out in January, they have been soliciting input from individuals interested in wildland fire, and have been studying fires that occurred between 1990 and 2013 where firefighters were killed. Their most significant product to date is a 16-page report released Monday, titled Safety Matters Forum Briefing. The document identifies some commonalities in the fatality fires and provides suggestions for improvements in the areas of fatality investigations, the role of the Agency Administrator, fire program leadership, emergency communications, and mapping. They did not take on the issue of fire supervisors knowing the real time location of their firefighters and the fire, what I call the Holy Grail of Firefighter Safety.
Monday morning they sent the report to all members of the National Wildfire Coordinating Group. Some of the best stuff in the report is in the Executive summary. Here is an excerpt (emphasis added):
…Safety Matters feels that the lack of participation by management in the fire management decision process is a major failing in providing for firefighter safety. A majority of firefighter fatalities in the last 20 years have occurred after a fire has escaped initial attack and before a full incident management team has assumed management responsibilities for a fire. Given this situation we do not feel it is ever the sole responsibility of firefighters to assess the values at risk and determine the appropriate action. Investigations of firefighter fatalities due to burnovers or entrapments seldom look at management involvement, but rather focus on decisions made by the affected firefighters. It is time to quit blaming firefighters for the lack of management involvement.
We further believe that the current system tasked with protecting firefighters is seriously flawed. There are several National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) committees that are tasked with addressing the issue of firefighter safety, but there is no clear or obvious path for an identified problem to be brought forward and be addressed through a change in policy or procedure. Additionally, the current system staunchly supports the idea that only those within the system are qualified and experienced enough to provide credible input.
Safety Matters believes that the current approach needs to change both procedurally and behaviorally in order to truly make firefighter safety the first priority. A comprehensive review by a diverse and impartial group of experts would help clearly identify the shortcomings of the current system, and help craft a revised system that would best ensure that firefighter safety is the first priority.
One of the more interesting recommendations is about the structure of fatality investigations:
….We believe that a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) model of accident investigation would better meet everyone’s needs in investigating wildland fire fatalities. This approach would allow a single independent investigation of the accident by an impartial group of specialists. The advantage is that this model is not constrained by time, agency agendas or associated politics, or public pressures.
Is Rod talking about City FDs assigned to structure or point protection? Maybe some folks might or might not have some wildland training but lack the experience to be comfortable or feel safe outside their usual structure environment? Or is this about other kinds of crews?
City, County & Fire Districts that are even located in wildland areas. They have the training & experience but resist or don’t want to lay hose on any type of attack, IA or extended suppression. Yes, they would rather do structure protection or standby. And I’m talking about extended hose lays of hundreds of feet.
Well maybe they really really want to help, but have to get an OSHA/industrial hygiene sign-off before they can lug pumps and hosepacks up and down rough terrain.
Firewatchers has a point & liget beef! As a USFS type 1 Ops Chief I had a difficult time getting most if not all non true wildland fire agencies to aggressively suppress the fire laying hose, even in a mop up operation. No excuse! If you send them home with follow up documentation & a poor performance rating you will get action. Stand your ground, require & expect good performance in all suppression tactics, lot of $ are being spent for this work.
Why is it that we only get excited and talk about action when somebody dies? That’s too late. I’m tired of all the maudlin comments and hand-wringing when somebody gets killed, because more than likely there were incidents that preceded those where there was a near-miss or a minor incident where a good review could have held people accountable and corrected behaviors early on, but instead we get cursory reviews or whitewashing by buddies in the fire world. We need an independent group to do ALL reviews and catch the problems BEFORE people die. I’ve seen too many sloppy Rx fires where big problems were narrowly avoided but nobody wanted to deal with the behaviors that could very well have led to big problems. People have to be held accountable in these incidents so they can be “fixed” and go on to do things correctly. That is how these fatalities will be avoided. Instead, if you raise safety issues where things clearly went wrong but disaster was avoided, you get the finger pointed at you, and you are called the problem. That’s a big problem in the fire world.
Overpaid Firewatchers, I live in Malibu Ca. And every time I see a Fireman (usually hanging out at the beach or getting coffee at star bucks) I feel like asking them if (they think they may actually have to work this year?) or if it is going to be another free ride. A few of my friends and I have put out more structure fires than all of the Malibu fire fighters put together. Firefighters in rural areas are an extreme waste of money! Paid to sleep! The average rural fireman fights a fire on average of every five years…. Well he stands and watches the fire due to the fact that there is usually very little they can or will do because there is no water, no access in mountainous areas and most often refuse to place themselves in danger. What should be done is to fire these overpaid unionized paid to sleep pretenders and buy the biggest fire fighting airplanes made, then deploy them immediately without having to wait for a declared state of emergency. That is how you fight and win against wildfires. Furthermore When every state in the union does the same firing of these money draining useless non firefighters and has their own planes they can have mutually beneficial assistance agreement with each state so 100s of real firefighting airplanes could converge on any fire within the USA. Wildfire problem solved! –
Well…. that says a lot. Problems are solved.
Like WOW dude, chill out and head down to the waxing salon! And oh yeah, don’t call a fire department for help with out telling them your true feelings about how worthless they are: they’ll likely still do all they can to help (even if it’s only once every 5 years!), and maybe you’ll still be alive to bitch and have a roof over your head, in spite of your attitude. Or better yet – vote out the paid fire department and start a Volunteer Department: I’m sure you’d be #1 on the sign-up list of new members, and willing to spend the hundreds of hours yearly to become qualified on structural and wildland fires, hazmat, auto accidents, and medical emergencies? Ain’t America Great? Everyone can have an opinion, just like we all have arse holes – and some of those opinions are hard and firm while others dribble out like dirreaha.
Ain’t the Internet a wonderful thing? It allows someone to question absurd statements, and then back up their response with specifics. Now, I don’t know how many towns are named “Malibu” in California, but the attached link shows an interesting fire history that would seem to disprove the comments made by “Firewatchers”: http://www.malibucomplete.com/mc_hazards_fires.php
Planes don’t put out fires. They can (in the right conditions) slow the spread of fire, or make it more safe for crews and engines to fight the fire more aggressively. And while planes and choppers are very good and useful in many instances, they are very expensive to buy and operate.
Fire fighters aren’t super-beings, though occasionally they seem that way. They have their liimts and they have to face fire on its terms. Sometimes that means waiting for a safe, practical opportunity to fight the fire with a chance of doing some good rather than walking into a death trap or pissing away resources on a hopeless situation. “Risk a lot to save a lot…”
True, it takes all resources, aircraft, engines, hand crews, dozers & incident managers working together to quickly & aggressively suppress a wildfire especially when offensive operational periods allow it, IA, evening shifts, higher humidity, calm winds.
I applaud the efforts of the Wildland Fire Associates and Neill (who make up Safety Matters), although I wish they could have delayed issuing their memo so that they could have done more fact-checking and gotten some feedback on their draft. This is not a sprint, despite the upcoming June 30th anniversary. Accuracy matters. For example, the suggestion on page 15 that the VLAT could have done a drop if only someone knew where GM was (which people did) is factually inaccurate and therefore needlessly upsetting because it makes people agonize and wish “what if” about something that likely never could have happened.
Specifically: GM/DivsA had conveyed where they were, so people (obviously not everyone) knew where they were. The problem was the SMOKE/ash column that was huge and prevented both the VLAT and the lead plane (which was required) from getting into where GM was.
EXPLANATION: In order to make a VLAT drop that does not dissipate (rendering it totally useless) before it gets even remotely close to the ground, the VLAT has to fly relatively LOW over its target. The area in which GM was known to be located was mountainous and hilly. So even if the lead plane and VLAT were comfortable flying through smoke and ash that were so thick that multiple aircrafts were damaged that afternoon after the deployment, they needed to be able to SEE where they were going in order to be safe in the mountains and hills while getting low. They couldn’t do it with the smoke.
The VLATS are, in my experience, generally willing to get really really low to the point of brushing needles on the trees to try to help, but they need to be able to SEE to do that, particularly when carrying a full load (which is insanely heavy), such that pulling up at the last minute is not a safe option.
I applaud the efforts of folks like WFA or Safety Matters or Neill, but, in order to avoid making a bad situation worse, they need to try hard to be as accurate as possible. That takes time and painstaking fact-checking. There are people available who can help, if only they ask. Godspeed as they keep moving with their efforts.
Correction,
I agree with most of your central point. As regards GM having told people where they were, though, I think there is some cloudiness surrounding that. All I’m aware GM relayed is that they were heading down the (an) escape route, that was mid-slope, cut vertical. While they had been seen before they dropped into the bowl, to my knowledge they’d never said with clarity what their route was or, when they later indicated they were facing entrapment, precisely where they were. So, in addition to smoke, it is also accurate that their precise location wasn’t known at that point (unless I am missing something, which is quite possible).
The catch-22 is that, had they conveyed with specificity what their intended route was, it’s my subjective belief that they would have been advised against it. There was already concern from some people on seeing them up on the shoulder before they dropped down. So, clarity of communication would have had multiple benefits.
I don’t think the type of aircraft (VLAT, helicopter, SEAT, etc); the proximity of the fire or the column isithe central issue. The point is even if all the elements had aligned so that an emergency extraction or drop could have been pulled off nobody knew the crews location! Did eveeryone involved at the site do the best they could under the circumstances? Absolutely! While firefighters are indeed ultimately responsible for their own safety the system from top to bottom,, onsite ond off should always be working togetrher to make sure that firefighter safety is ALWAYS the first priority.
Is there anything new here?
I can’t think of very many instances where more agency administrator involvement has led to better, safer decisions. In fact, it usually the opposite. They are usually more influenced by politics than our fire management folks.
This statement really hit home for me:
“As wildland firefighting has evolved in the 20 years since the South Canyon Fire,
firefighters receive far more training and information in order to effectively fight fires.
The negative effect of this evolution is that under the banner of effectiveness,
firefighters often prefer to work independently and view participation by others as
interference. Program leaders, with notable exceptions, are content to let firefighter
take this approach and are reluctant to provide the direction and leadership they are
charged with providing. This only becomes readily evident after an accident.”
I have seen many firefighters who did not know basic tasks and made poor decisions with no corrections from their leaders, due to the fear of the dreaded label “micro-management.”
We as leaders need to get past what others think about us and do what’s right. Get involved with your folk’s training. Visit your folks in the field. I you see them making mistakes, CORRECT THEM. Ensure they know what they need to know to do their job safely. It’s your job.
I just had a 6 year engine crew member tell me that he had never done an engine protection drill in his career, until this year. He didn’t even know what it was.
When you retire, know body will remember how many fires you put out, but they will remember what you taught them. Okay, I’m done ranting, stay safe.
Jeff,
Very sound and good practices to follow.
The other obvious un-written common denominator is unburned fuel between you and the fire. Minimizing this aspect of firefighting would go a long way towards improving safety. I am a firm believer in going direct when you can, and having a sound plan in place when going indirect. Walk through the black when you need to get from point A to point B. All seemingly simple and fundamental tactics, but unfortunately continue to be neglected during tragedy fires.
Jeff, just a quick question for you. You state up above that WFF should walk “through the black” in order to get from point A to point B, to avoid having unburned fuels between “you and the fire.”
But how should the Granite Mountain Hotshots and Blue Ridge Supt. Brian Frisby (and Captain True Brown) have even gotten to the heel of the fire in order to start their work if you did not want them moving in a manner that would put unburned fuels between them and the fire? You feel that helicopter in and helicopter out is the only acceptable option? Or am I missing something?
Since I was not there, I cannot offer an acceptable alternative for their situation. In general, anytime you can minimize the time spent with unburned fuel between you and the fire reduces the risks associated with being in that situation.
Certainly I agree that firefighters on the ground should be able to say no. But, a fair percentage of WFFs are lowly compensated, often seasonal employees with little experience and, on a given fire, very limited information. Task-wise, it is even difficult for roles such as sawyers to maintain the same SA as others, and while swampers act as surrogates to a degree for awareness, again their view of a fire is of necessity limited. It is reasonable to ask for accountability on the part of management, and also that management not be allowed to in essence investigate themselves. We have seen recently what neglect of certain standards and a casual approach to communication can result in, and if management realizes that their own livelihood can be at risk if these are neglected, they are pretty easy to get to happen.
I totally agree on the NTSB-style independent investigative body. Police departments don’t investigate incidents in their departments.
I believe the greatest wisdom concerning wildland fire safety was the observations of Carl C. Wilson in his paper titled “Fatal and Near-Fatal Forest Fires – The Common Denominators”, 1977. The International Fire Chief 43(9): 9-10, 12-15. I hope firefighters are familiar with this short, elegant work, but I suspect it may have been forgotten. Look at the entrapments since 1990 through the lens of his findings:
1. “Most of the incidents occurred on relatively small fires or isolated sectors (today’s division) of larger fires.
2. Most of the fires were innocent in appearance prior to the “flare-ups” or “blow-ups”.
3. Flare-ups occurred in deceptively light fuels.
4. Fires ran uphill in chimneys, gullies, or steep slopes.
5. Suppression tools, such as helicopters or air tankers can adversely modify fire behavior. (Helicopter and air tanker vortices have been known to cause flare-ups.”
Note: Wilson was on the Loop Fire Investigation Team and there was suspicion that a helicopter may have been involved in the flare-up)
Wilson concludes with, “most of the generalizations made concerning fire behavior apply to near-fatal fires as well as to fatal fires. The hairline difference between the two groups of fires is determined by the individual’s reaction to his suddenly critical situation.”
Bill much thanks for covering this and many conversations need to occur because there is no single fix — technology or human factors.
The “Safety Matters” report and follow-up discussion are very interesting, but once again we are putting 90+% of our focus on 20% of the problem. Since 1990, about 80% of wildland firefighter fatalities have been caused by aircraft accidents, vehicle accidents, medical events and other causes like falling snags and electrocution; only 20% of the fatalities were caused by burnovers. Multiple fatality events like Dude, South Canyon, Thirtymile, Esperanza and Yarnell catch our attention, sometimes causing us to miss the common-place everyday events that take a greater toal.
In my 2007 NWCG report on wildland fire fatalities from 1990-2006, I offered some “21st Century Common Denominators” to supplement Carl Wilson’s originals: mine addressed aircraft use, driving practices, firefighter fitness issues, and those “unexpected events” like falling snags and downed powerlines.
Safety does matter in all phases of wildland fire operations, so let’s keep our situational awareness high for all risks, not just the fire weather and fire behavior aspects of our jobs.
If you look closely at the NTSB Investigation teams, they include members of Boeing Aircraft and the jet engine manufacturers on their teams. Technical specialists can be just that – Technical, not managerial or counter productive to the Investigative process. Who know more how a B-777 should fly than a Boeing Flight engineer? In our world, how many Ops or Fire Safety folks are out there that have not trained and/or worked together across the US with others that might have been involved in a fatal fire? The Military model seems to work well too, and those folks all have similar backgrounds and training.
The firefighters are the ones who do the dying. Not that management errors or deficiencies should be tolerated or overlooked, but they will always occur and firefighters still want to come home. Firefighters need to be responsible for their own safety. I agree with Jeff.
Have to disagree. Managers need to be responsible for firefighters safety as well. Line officers who make the decision suppress B.S. fires need to be held accountable for the outcome.
Everyone on a fire should prioritize firefighter safety, and all should be accountable for unsafe practices. But when it comes to matters of safety, someone has to have the ultimate call. If you are a HS boss, with you and your crew the ones to face the consequences, do you want it to be you or some line officer who might be 2-3 miles away and unable to truly see your situation and the state of your crew? With the authority of that “final call” unfortunately comes the responsibility.
See, I think more personal responsibility for firefighter safety is what we need. All of the tools are in place for firefighters on the ground to make the proper decisions, sometimes they just aren’t used. After 36 years on the ground, I always encouraged our folks to speak up if things didn’t line up or feel right, and sometimes they did. In aviation, it takes two yes’s to make a decision. Maybe we need more of this way of thinking.
I fully agree with a independent investigative team approach to fatalities and serious injuries. Such teams would conduct investigations free of agency interference and cover ups. Like the NTSB use proven techniques, science and a systematic and structured approach to investigations.
Over my career I saw many investigations and findings squashed or hidden away by the agency to prevent bad things from being found or creating embarrassing situations involving the agency or employees. More then once I saw good accident investigative reports disappear into the black hole of managements office never to be mentioned again.
Using a team of professional investigators is a great idea and I’m sure there is a huge pool of retired individuals with good skills who could be found to form on-call teams.
On the signature page of the SAIR for my son, Caleb Hamm, 5 of the 7 investigators are employed by the BLM, of which my son was an employee.
Need I say more???
Yes, you do need to say more! Are you alleging that these individuals falsified their findings, or participated in a cover-up? More importantly, can you provide any credible evidence of such activity? Casting doubt on the credibility and professionalism of these individuals without offering proof doesn’t work for me.
I have lots of proof. You can email me directly at lhamm@republicservices.com.
Have presented my proof, of course BLM won’t respond. They will not come to Texas and let me show them how their timeline can be proven innacurate at best.
I have also met individually with one of the investigators. He could not answer my questions, just sat like a bump on a log. Others were present and know I am telling the truth. Name can be supplied to you. Also, an employee of the Utah BLM was present at that meeting. My questions go unanswered, because it is better for the BLM if I simply go away……….