The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection has released what they call a “Green Sheet”, a summary of the burnover of an engine that occurred as it was making a mobile attack on the Pacheco Fire, which eventually burned 341 acres in Calaveras County south of Valley Springs.
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“SUMMARY
On July 12, 2016, a CAL FIRE Type 3 Model 34 engine (E1) attempted to start a mobile attack toward the head of a vegetation fire. Firefighters deployed two lines, but before they could anchor and start the mobile attack, the main fire and several spot fires converged on the fire engine. One firefighter took refuge in the engine, and one firefighter ran into the green. The engine sustained damage from the fire. Neither firefighter was injured.
CONDITIONS
- Weather: 89°, 21% relative humidity, winds 9 mph from the west and shifting, taken from the Campo Seco RAWS at 1400 hours.
- Fuel Type: Approximately two feet tall grass.
- Topography: Southeast aspect, rolling topography with multiple draws
- Fire Behavior: Sheeting, fire whirls, spotting
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
On July 12, 2016, at approximately 1314 hours, CAL FIRE and local government resources were dispatched to a vegetation fire in the vicinity of Langford Pacheco Road and Milton Road in Calaveras County. The initial report on conditions given by the Air Attack at 1329 hours was 15 acres of grass woodland and spotting out in front of the main fire. At 1356 hours, the fire was reported to be 100 acres in size and spotting under the column.
A CAL FIRE engine (E1) arrived at scene at 1345 hours and was assigned Division R, the right flank of the fire. The crew met with a Battalion Chief (BC1) and came up with a plan to create an anchor point and start a mobile attack toward the head of the fire. A second CAL FIRE Engine (E2) and Dozer (D1) were just behind E1.
As E1 crossed through a gate to make access to the fire. E1 stopped in the green and deployed a one inch THY-600 Angus line manufactured by Rawhide Fire, with a 3/8 inch tip for the mobile attack and a reel line to pick up any spot fires. The Captain (FC1) on E1 saw the engine was between the main fire and multiple spot fires. Winds were shifting and the fire behavior was erratic so FC1 from E1 gave the order to pick up the lines so they could move to a better location. As the two firefighters (FF1 and FF2) began to roll up the hose, the main fire and spot fires converged and burned up to the engine. FF1 jumped into the engine while FF2 ran away from the engine into the green, losing his helmet. FC1 lost sight of FF2, and seeing only flames, announced on the tactical frequency that a fire fighter had been burned over. Engine E2 radioed to E1 that they were heading toward them. A large fire whirl was between E2 and E1.
Uninjured, FF2 looked back toward E1 from the green and saw the under carriage of the engine was on fire. FF2 contacted E1 on the radio and told them the engine was on fire. FF1 exited the cab and used the reel line to extinguish the fire under the engine.
Flame impingement caused the airlines above the frame rails to burst. When the air pressure dropped below 60 psi, FC1 was unable to release the spring brake. FF2 ran back to E1. A helicopter dropped water around E1 while D1 constructed line around a portion of E1 to protect the crew. FC1 notified the Incident Commander that all personnel were accounted for and in a good location.
There were no injuries. E1 sustained heat damage to the tires, fenders, lens covers, air brake lines and pump panel.
SAFETY ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND LESSONS LEARNED
STANDARD FIRE ORDERS
- Base all actions on current and expected fire behavior.
WATCH OUT SITUATIONS
- Wind increases and/or changes direction.
- Getting frequent spot fires across line.
LESSONS LEARNED
- Consider topographical features and fuels, no matter how minor, in relation to you and/or your vehicle’s location to anticipate fire behavior.
- Base actions on current fire situation and activity potential.
- Properly wear your PPE”
The four men ran to a fence, climbed over it and raced toward a steel garage on the property in the 15100 block of Bottle Rock Road near Cobb, deploying their portable fire shelters near the metal walls. The captain put out a mayday call over the radio. In vivid detail, the report — called a green sheet — describes how one firefighter had to remove his gloves to tear the melted plastic covering away from the aluminum shell of his shelter. Another firefighter couldn’t get his shelter out of its case because the plastic cover had melted and fused to a white plastic protective sleeve.
You are confusing the incident on this fire, the Pacheco Fire, with an entrapment that occurred in September, 2015 on the Valley Fire.
One of the problems is that a lot of training seems to always only talk about how dangerous high winds are, which of course is true, however from personal experience I can tell you that much more attention should be paid to winds under ten miles per hour in grass. Grass is one of the most dangerous aspects in fire fighting most notably in low wind. Higher winds in grass will flash over very quickly leaving blackened area rapidly exposed and not creating this sheeting effect that is being talked about, of course high wind fire in grass will kill just the same as low wind occurrence however they need to be addressed separately because of the difference in fire behavior between the two. The first point is that higher wind driven grass fire in known terrain in your area tends to be more predictable, yes if you’re to far ahead of it you are going to get burned probably quickly and that’s predictable certainly, however if you’re behind and flanking that grass is burnt to ground no stalks. Low wind grass, the wind is flicking the tops and the seed in all directions similar to pop corn popping throwing embers over and around and under fire vehicles and of course moving to rapidly in front to create a wet line is disastrous because in our minds low winds and low grass means easier and quicker to cut it off. Much more training needed about low wind grass fires or at least equal amount of emphasis on just how dangerous these low wind fires are thus eliminating the myth that they are less dangerous that high wind occurrence, they are not and in reality are probably more dangerous. David Ream Sr. Retired ff
My experiences of sheeting usually involved a gust of wind where a fire with low wind and taller flame lengths gets a sudden gust or sustained increase in wind velocity. The fire lays down creating a sheet of flame with a broader depth of flame front.
Didn’t the issue of loss of air pressure rendering an engine immovable come up within this last year? Is this an inherent and dangerous weakness in many IA firefighting rigs? Something that can be remedied through modification or redesign? Or does an agency just accept it, not considering the ultimate consequences some day?
Yes, there have been several engines immobilized by loss of air pressure due to plastic or rubber air lines burning thru.
We had such an incident last summer here in westerns Oregon; luckily no serious engine damage or injuries .
However, loss of air pressure not only locked up the brakes, but caused a tank drain valve to open resulting in loss of all the water.
The cure: reroute or replace all vulnerable air line with Airquip style hoses.
Also as I learned with a similar incident, was to cover the lines with old fire hose! When will CDF learn? They have known this for years!
I TOTALLY AGREE WITH YOU about plastic air lines! Who in their right mind thinks plastic air lines are fine on a fire engine, especially wildland engine??!
The term “sheeting” is used to describe fire behavior, which i cannot find any definition. The use of non standard fire terminology (sheeting) can make these after action reports confusing
It’s not in the NWCG Glossary — even though it has many obscure terms, such as: “Shoulder Carry: Method of carrying hose on the shoulders.”
I’m going to take a stab at a definition of “sheeting”:
where i am here in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada in Northern California,there is an area we call the “Thermal lands” not sure why,but its right at the little area where the flats of the Sacramento valley meets the start of the foothills.was on a fire there in the early 1980s and experienced what i believe to be the “sheeting” of fire.the grasses were about the same as in this case,2 to 3 foot tall.to me it seemed like a crown fire,just not in the tree tops,but rather it raced across the tops of the grasses/weeds and it was in a big hurry,it ran across several hundred yards of grass in less than a second,and then seemed to burn down the stalks,as i stated,it was like less than a second,but it seemed much longer,and it was just after dusk ,we all commented later how beautifull it was,not exactly the words used..but yall know.
the wind was light id say…but it moved so fast across that area it seemed like the wind was 2 or 300 miles per hour.