On May 24, 2021, Smokejumper Tim Hart was severely injured while parachuting in to the Eicks Fire in southern New Mexico and passed away on June 2. Today the US Forest Service released a “Learning Review — Technical Report”. Until now the only information officially released about the accident was that he suffered a hard landing in rocky terrain at the fire.
The 55-page report gets heavily, necessarily, into smokejumper technical information and jargon, but does a pretty good job of explaining so it is fairly easy for non-jumpers to understand.
The fire was in a very remote area on private land in the boot heel of New Mexico seven miles north of the US-Mexico border. Ground resources on initial attack included a couple of engines that were hours away and eight smokejumpers dispatched from Silver City, NM.
This is how the report describes the moment the hard landing occurred:
With Jumpers 4 and 5 on the ground, attention focused on Tim. He was still 200 yards southeast of the jumpspot and three-quarters of the way up the boulder-strewn ridge south of the bowl. He was flying up drainage 200 to 300 feet above the drainage bottom, hands positioned at quarter-brakes to full run. Those who could see the flight remember him flying in this direction for one to three seconds before the canopy turned 90 degrees to the left towards the center of the drainage. The cause of the 90-degree turn is unknown, as no one witnessed a left toggle input initiating the turn. At approximately 200 feet [above ground level] the canopy increased in speed and “came out of the air super-fast, like he got caught in a burble.” The Jumper in Charge (JIC) turned to Jumper 2, who had a streamer held high as a wind indicator for the other Jumpers, and exclaimed, “Are you seeing this right now?” Tim’s hands were on the toggles, and the JIC thought, “You need to turn, anywhere but where you are on final,” and waited for a turn at the last second. The JIC said he had “never seen an angle of attack on a Ram-Air like that before.” The JIC and Jumper 2, without another word, began running towards where Tim was going to land, calling to him without hearing a response. Tim had landed on the side of the drainage, uphill into “rocks the size of garbage pails.”
Thankfully, four of the seven jumpers assisting Tim were EMTs. He had a head/neck injury, was unconscious, had a weak pulse, and other injuries. The jumpers on the ground called for the trauma bag to be dropped from the jump plane. The EMTs stabilized his head and neck, administered oxygen, and splinted what was described as “secondary injuries.” Within 15 minutes of the patient being ready for transport and the landing zone being established, a medivac helicopter arrived on scene. He was extracted from the site one hour and 15 minutes after the injury.
Tim passed away nine days later.
The report describes how increasingly turbulent winds on the lee side of a ridge resulted in very complex wind patterns at the jump spot. Two subject matter experts, W. Kitto and M. Gerdes, wrote in Appendix D:
The accident pilot flew into an area where the conditions were not only challenging, but most likely intolerable (turbulence in excess of the parachute’s limitations), i.e. any pilot of any skill level on any similar equipment would likely have been unable to prevent a hard landing, due to rotor. Mechanical rotor turbulence alone or combined with thermal turbulence can easily create “unflyable” conditions.
From the report:
“Tim began as a smokejumper rookie in 2016 and was trained on the Forest Service Ram-Air parachute system. He was beginning his sixth season as a smokejumper, with a record of 95 jumps (73 proficiency and 21 fire). In 2021, he was on his third stint as a Silver City, NM, Smokejumper detailer. Tim had two previous fire jumps out of Silver City, one each in 2018 and 2019 on the Gila National Forest. Over that same time period, he had three proficiency jumps out of Silver City, all at the Fort Bayard practice jumpspot, the most recent on May 22, 2021.”
Thanks and a tip of the hat go out to Ben.
you get the call, you do the jump. Jumpers have been parachuting into that country since the ‘50s. Hart made some bad choices driving his chute and became the first jumper to die on the Gila in 70 years. No disrespect but he is culpable.
My reading so far (not having completed the report) is that the down air, which wasn’t present when they threw the streamers, is the primary factor here.
Sunil, (nice to reconnect),
Hart was way off the line of the jumpers who had gone before him. Eyewitness accounts said he was driving his chute with a tailwind, uphill, with no braking. I still contend that we’re he piloting a round, he might have been hurt, but survived.
Wasn’t made clear in the report about if a helicopter was seriously considered to fly the jumpers in, and why one was not used, given that most making decisions about deploying the jumpers had known and discussed the added risk of jumping in that country at that time of day. Maybe I missed it?
Very interesting commentary, I guess I have never given the technical aspect of jumping much thought…… Thank you.
I used to ask my self many times why we are going 100% all out on Nickle an acre desert scrub, and we all know why we do it, because it’s what we do, no matter where the fire is, our job is to put a knock on it…
I recall many times telling my boys and girls, not worth getting hurt over Nickle an acre desert scrub land, not even good for growing potatoes , and yes I know the ranchers need to have their graze…..
Bottom line this was a tragic loss for a great many folks, I hope folks can learn from this……Rest in Peace…..
Obviously I didn’t see the full report. Thanks for your response. I shall get back to it.
I would be interested in hearing the jump plane’s pilots perspective of atmospheric conditions during SMJ jumps, cargo runs, smoke column activity, etc.
Jim, there are good observations from jump pilots, spotters, SEAT pilots, and medevac helicopter in the report. (pg. 19) All accounts pointing to deteriorating conditions from Tim’s jump onward. Also in the report is a good graphic from wind modeling based on observations from the day.(pg. 38) If you stare at that and the the other chute patterns, you can see where Tim would have some pretty difficult air conditions to contend with over the terrain he ended up over. No matter his skill or canopy, he was not in a position for success. No one would train him to be on the flight path he was, but no one knows why ended up there either, so it isn’t worth second guessing too hard. If it was a choice among other options, hopefully no one will make a similar choice again. If the canopy truly added 20 m.p.h. to his forward speed, as one poster stated, imagine that is also a contributing factor to the severity of the unintended outcome, but not likely “the cause.” All of those factors to me, are rather small compared to the factor of mother nature. Air at 1400 on an exposed and complicated piece of terrain on a hot day, in the SW, seems to be the big wild card to me. One that all of us “RESPONDERS” should contend with… Any level of us involved in firefighting should be able to take away some learning from that. (I understand why others may focus on other pieces, but having no expertise in those areas, as few of us do, I find it best to take the piece I can do something with. Which for me, is to order jumpers earlier in the day (as a D.O. or I.C.), or offer options to jump less complicated terrain in the heat of the day as an I.C.)
Some will remember, as I do, my complete streamer in 1963 into The Gila. It was the 28′ round; I opened my 24′ reserve low, landed on a rock slide, and walked to the fire. I had 16 fire jumps that year out of Silver and 8 more after returning to MSO.
old salt points, brother
I would be interested in hearing what some of the suggestions that came out of the after action review that the other jumpers and spotter on that fire had. Particularly in addressing : What went wrong and what may have mitigated this.
Necessarily, this after-action report engages in some armchair quarterbacking. With that caveat stated clearly, let’s take a look at the real meat of the report — the initial decision to take a “sharp departure from the typical response in this area” and fully suppress this fire with “every tool in the toolbox.” This would be the FIRST full suppression response in over 25 years in this area; a response the report headlines as an “Atypical Plan to Suppress.”
The report attempts to explain this “atypical” response with “drought” and “10,000 cattle” needing forage. Maybe. Maybe not. Southern New Mexico’s Bootheel is chronically dry. Cattle grazing is the only (barely) economic use of this desert landscape, so that’s nothing new either.
On the other hand, the report highlights what the state’s duty officer and Gila forest supervisor were doing when they first learned of the ignition — they were in “a meeting with a Congressional Delegation” regarding a different fire. Hmm.
This wouldn’t be the first time that political pressure has changed a wildfire response, if that’s the case as the report hints. Here, however, a smokejumper died because of the “atypical” decision to go full-suppression with “every tool” in a treacherous landscape where fire had previously been allowed to burn within containment boundaries.
Solid, yet sad commentary, Andy.
It’s easy to dismiss the potential to burn up a bunch of forage for livestock as “not worth the risk” of full suppression, but then where do you draw the line? Is the economic livelihood of a rancher in the bootheel “worth” less than someone’s summer home outside Lake Tahoe? Is a climate change-driven, high frequency fire regime outside of the historic range of variability for the Chihuahuan sky island landscape? Those are questions that are frankly not ours, as firefighters and even duty officers, to decide. We show up and do the job, and it’s a risky job. Tim’s death was horrible. Knowing him though, I think he would disagree that we should simply stop putting fires out because there’s always a chance someone will get hurt.
“Is the economic livelihood of a rancher in the bootheel “worth” less than someone’s summer home outside Lake Tahoe?”
What? How is this even a question that needs to be asked? They are both worth the same – Zero Lives.
Interesting perspective.
The politics of initial attack fully suppressed again? Why does this not surprise me.
I don’t know, but I say the primary course of the jump’s horrific outcome, was the uncontrolled, very uncomfortable, instability of the atmosphere. I am relatively sure the jumper understood, and reacted instinctively, but unanticipated conditions can not always be rectified.
This smokejumper survived the landing.
I don’t mean to be coy; but betting on the politics of fire is usually more flammable than the fire that burns within.
R.I.P. Brother.
Silver City has always had some of the most challenging, dangerous jump country, outside of Redding. High altitude, rocky terrain, high temps. Smokejumpers have been jumping fires there since the ‘50s. One has to wonder if there would have been a different outcome had he been jumping the round FS-12 instead of a square Ram-Air. The insistence of the USFS to convert to squares is almost certainly contributory.
The fs-12 hasn’t been used since the 90s, and even on the fs-14, landing with a tailwind into rising terrain filled with refrigerator sized boulders would certainly end poorly. The fact is, atmospheric conditions at the jump spot changed rapidly, quickly becoming unpredictable and turbulent. Yes they used to jump rounds on the Gila, but they also flew fires much earlier in the day when the atmosphere was more stable. Waiting until the most turbulent time of the day to order aviation resources is more of a relevant discussion point here than rounds vs. Squares, in my opinion.
I would contend that the difference between landing with a tailwind in a round than with a square is probably 20 mph or more
Having lived through as bad a jump as Tim’s, it’s regard to turbulent winds and severe injury on the rocks – I agree that this discussion is not about type of canopy, but conditions.
– thanks for sharing your thoughts.
I am sure there will be more learning. B safe.
but it is…landing with the wind at your back, uphill, on either canopy is a pilot error. The lethality comes from how fast you were going. On a square, you are rocketing to your death. On a round, much less so. There has never been a death on landing on rounds. There have been many on squares.