1:30 p.m. MST Nov. 18, 2021
Weather data from Estes Park RAWS, ESPC2. The last observation shown is at 2224 MST Nov. 16, 2021. The observations at the arrows were 12 minutes before the last detected location of the aircraft.Around the time Single Engine Air Tanker 860 crashed at the Kruger Rock Fire in Colorado at approximately 6:36 p.m. MST on November 16, killing pilot Marc Thor Olson, the Estes Park ESPC2 Remote Automatic Weather Station recorded sustained winds of 13 mph gusting to 32 mph out of the west. The station is 3.7 miles northwest of the fire at 7,892 feet and its anemometer is 20 feet above the ground.
N802NZ, last 10 minutes of flight tracking data, Nov. 16, 2021. Note that the times are CST. FlightAware.Looking at the flight tracking log from FlightAware above, the wind appeared to be much stronger at the plane’s altitude, which was 8,950 to 10,450 feet while it was over the fire. The highest peak just south of the fire is at 9,400 feet.
Map of the Krueger Rock Fire, Nov. 17, 2021. Colorado’s Multi-Mission aircraft and crew.As it made four orbits near the fire during the 10 minutes it was in the area, the ground speed of T-860, an Air Tractor 802A (N802NZ) varied from a low of 82 mph while flying west to a maximum of 200 mph when east-bound. These shifts in ground speed were consistent during all four orbits. This indicates a very strong wind out of the west, a direction that is consistent with the data from the weather station.
The last flight of Tanker 860, N802NZ. The flight originated at Northern Colorado Regional Airport. Note that the times are in CST. FlightAware.There are two reasons that fixed wing air tankers avoid attacking wildfires during strong winds. One, the wind makes it difficult or impossible for the retardant to hit the target, getting blown horizontally as it falls from the aircraft to the ground. Second, flying low and slow, as air tankers have to do, is difficult in mountainous terrain with calm winds, but it can be extremely hazardous during strong winds.
When you add a third complexity of dropping at night using night vision goggles, something that has been done very little in the history of fixed wing aviation, and never before in Colorado, the pilot had the deck stacked against him. With the strong wind, the chances of stopping or slowing the spread of the fire with retardant, water, or any other suppressant, were very, very slim. (There is a report that the operator of the aircraft, CO Fire Aviation, experimented with night drops in Oregon in 2021.)
NEW: CO Fire Aviation confirms the pilot killed in the air tanker crash last night was Marc Thor Olson. He told me most people called him Thor.
This is a picture I took of him last night as he was prepping his plane. The crash happened about an hour later #9News pic.twitter.com/uEOO4tbXwK
— Marc Sallinger (@MarcSallinger) November 17, 2021
The weather forecast available from the National Weather Service that Tuesday afternoon called for continued very strong winds until sundown and a chance for snow Tuesday night. It predicted dry weather on Wednesday and Thursday with high temperatures in the 30s and 40s under mostly sunny skies with the relative humidity around 20 percent. The wind chill was expected to be below zero from Wednesday afternoon until Thursday afternoon. The actual low temperature Tuesday night turned out to be 11 degrees.
Risk vs. reward
With 20/20 hindsight looking at risk vs. reward, this was a very high risk mission. The potential reward was little, considering the likely effectiveness of 700 gallons of suppressant blown off target by strong winds and the weather forecast of a chance of snow in a matter of hours and wind chills the next day below zero.
Who decided to attempt the night flight?
The short answer is, the Larimer County Sheriff’s office ordered the aircraft to respond to the fire, using a “verbal call when needed contract”, an arrangement that was first agreed to on October 5, 2021.
A preliminary map appears to show that the fire was just inside the boundary of the Roosevelt National Forest. The Larimer County Sheriff’s office said on Wednesday Nov. 17 that as of 7 a.m. that day the fire was being managed by a unified command with the US Forest Service and the Sheriff.
In Colorado, Texas, and Wyoming the local county sheriffs are given the responsibility for suppressing wildfires outside of cities unless they are on federal land. The Kruger Rock Fire was in Larimer County.
As Wildfire Today reported November 16, before the fatal flight, T-860 departed from the Fort Morgan, Colorado airport, orbited the fire about half a dozen times, then landed at Northern Colorado Regional Airport at 4:38 p.m. MST. This flight is listed in the image from FlightAware above as one of two flights that day for the aircraft. It turns out that on the first flight it dropped water on the fire, which the pilot reportedly described as “successful”. After it landed at Northern Colorado Regional Airport it reloaded with “fire suppressant” instead of water, and by 6:13 p.m. MST was airborne returning to the fire.
Sunset that day was at 4:44 p.m. MST. The air tanker disappeared from tracking at 6:35 p.m., about 1 hour and 49 minutes after sunset. Air tankers working for the U.S. federal government are allowed to drop only as late as 30 minutes after official sunset.
The Denver Post reported that CO Fire Aviation said in a statement, “There was no aerial supervision or lead plane required for the mission and weather and wind conditions were reported to be within limits of our company standard operating procedures.”
In the video below Juan Browne has strong feelings about this incident. Shortly after posting it, he wrote a comment saying, “GROUNDSPEED NOT AIRSPEED!”
Below is an excerpt from a statement released November 17, 2021 by the Larimer County Sheriff’s office:
“On the morning of November 16, 2021, the Larimer County Sheriff’s Office and many partner agencies responded to and began fighting the Kruger Rock Fire southeast of Estes Park. The terrain where most of the fire was burning made it too dangerous to insert firefighters to battle the fire directly. The gusty winds, higher than normal temperatures, and low relative humidity suggested great potential for the fire to grow quickly. Incident Command knew the best chance of getting ahead of the fire was with the use of air drops from aviation resources.
“Around midday, LCSO reached out to CO Fire Aviation (Fort Morgan, CO) and asked if they would be able to assist with air operations. CO Fire Aviation said they were available, had a plane, a pilot, and were interested in assisting. They also discussed the fire and weather behavior as LCSO wanted to make sure CO Fire Aviation was aware of and comfortable with the conditions.
“A few hours later, CO Fire Aviation said they were checking the weather and crosswinds at the fire and were comfortable making air drops. The plane left Fort Morgan and headed to the fire with a load of water. With LCSO resources on the ground communicating with the pilot, the water drop was successful. The pilot reported the wind was not too bad at the fire and said he would head to Loveland to get a load of suppressant to make a second drop.
“About an hour later, the plane returned to the fire and the pilot told ground resources it was turbulent over the fire, conditions were not ideal to make a drop, and that he was going to make one more pass and then return to Loveland. Moments later, at approximately 6:37 p.m., ground resources heard the plane crash.
“LCSO’s relationship with CO Fire Aviation began earlier this year when CO Fire Aviation invited LCSO, several fire departments, and other counties to a demonstration they had planned in Loveland. LCSO representatives attended the demonstration and were interested in the services CO Fire Aviation were offering, including night air operations.
“In recent years, we have experienced the severe fire behavior in Colorado as demonstrated by the 2020 Cameron Peak Fire. Recent advances in technology to achieve night air operations already in use in other states has proven to be an effective tactic to help prevent medium-sized fires from exploding and making large runs like we saw last year.
“LCSO also knew that air resources are often stretched thin and sometimes not available when needed. After the Loveland demonstration, LCSO continued talks with CO Fire Aviation to learn more about their services, response times, costs, etc. CO Fire Aviation offered the capability and LCSO was willing to give them the opportunity if it would benefit firefighting operations.
“LCSO entered into a verbal “call when needed” contract with CO Fire Aviation on October 5, 2021 in lieu of an exclusive use contract. A written contract is still being negotiated. LCSO had reached out to CO Fire Aviation about their services during other fires this year, but they either did not have the availability, or it was decided air operations were not needed on those fires. The Kruger Rock Fire is the first time LCSO used the services of CO Fire Aviation.”
15 Comments
…So were the bad decisions
Bingo. The winds. Risk vs Reward. I have been teaching aviation safety and managing fire aviation operations for over 25 years for the feds. We teach and emphasize recognizing unreasonable risk, and to not assume them and put yourself and others in jeopardy. Unfortunately in this case, the holes in the Swiss cheese model lined up for tragedy. Although the pilot has ultimate say about whether he accepts a mission, we have to look at other factor such as the company’s culture towards safety and whether they became too mission focused and tunneled in on achieving a “first” in fixed-wing air tanker operations. And we need to look at the level of fire aviation training and experience in the Larimer Sheriff’s program. All three levels could have pulled the plug on the mission if they had recognized the extreme flight environment caused by the winds. Anyone who’s flown or manged aviation operations in the Estes Valley will tell you it is one of the most challenging flight environments in the lower 48, even on a good day in the summer.
Bingo indeed…
“Who decided to attempt the night flight?” It wasn’t the Sheriffs office. The airplane had only one seat.
Additional reading for those who care:
We’ve all been there and done that with a customer asking, begging, yelling, threatening (often in that sequence all within the same breath) but the only time I’ve felt compelled to go is with the ol’ “We really need this buddy. Do it for the company”. Often implied rather that stated out loud. I feel for the guy, truely, and maybe he didn’t have the fire experience to make the proper decision or maybe he did as actual time on fire is left out when they just assume the military time is a catch all for expertise. When I say no it is always with a reason why and usually with some alternate suggestions although I am also lucky where the company I work for doesn’t need a qualifier as they abide by the old adage “Why would we hire the best people in the business and then tell them how to do their job?”
Under the article heading, “Who decided to attempt the night flight,” the reporting sounds as though this was the decision of the Larimer County Sheriff. This is not correct.
Under all circumstances, without exception, the pilot decides to attempt the flight. The final word always rests with the pilot in command, who holds final authority for the conduct of the flight. The decision to make that flight is his, and his alone. No resource order in the nation can force him to do it. A resource order is nothing more than a request and a preliminary authorization to pay.
The decision to accept a fire dispatch rests with the pilot. There is only one exception to that, it being that the government can stop flights, even if the pilot elects to go. No one can order the pilot to go; no one has that authority. The decision to attempt the flight was the pilots, and he believed in the decision enough to bet his life on it, as every one of us does when we accept a dispatch to go to a fire.
Doug,
Your comments are thoughtful and obviously come from much experience.
In this case, your “exception” is the fail point. There seemed to be an extreme lack of operational supervision to help determine the risk/reward/operational success of this mission.
I have hung up my spurs, but with 45 years of fire and 20 years of atgs, asm and hlco experience, along with fire aviation management,I can comfortably say that the dispatch of any aircraft is a team effort and if done right, allows for a high probability of safety and success.
Yes, the pilot ultimately has the right to deny the request. There are other key individuals in the generation and execution of that dispatch request.
I won’t bore you with the details, but I had many instances of turning aircraft around/cancelling missions, etc. Occasionally, the relief in the pilots voice at being cancelled/turned around was palpable and obvious.
This tragic event is so much more than one pilots decision, in my opinion.
I will add this to my earlier comment….
I don’t have enough fingers and toes for all the pilots that I have known, who have died on fire missions. Some were very good, dear friends.
Some were just guys I had flown with, such as Matt Miller from this summer.
The first 2 helicopter pilots I flew with and got to know real well, went down with their aircraft.
Too many losses. We have got to do better
Decision making resting solely with a pilot or aircrew to take a fire fighting mission is a problem. Pilots having final authority to accept or turn down a mission is not. How an organization can justify ordering aircraft for missions without oversight by educated, competent aviation personnel is naive and dangerous. Yet it happens. I have witnessed many times and in many places, ground personnel ordering aircraft for a fire when they have no clear plan for using aircraft, or ordering aircraft when poor weather (visibility, lightning, high winds, etc) exist at or near a fire. Their knowledge of a safe and effective aviation operation is usually negligible. Aviation Officers are aware of these conditions (and with the exception of a few that I know), typically allow questionable flights to occur. They default to “it’s up to the pilot to decide if he/she wants to fly”. What kind of application of risk assessment and aviation program management is that?
I say again . . . all after . . . as we flew night ops off the One-Nuthin’ Maru decades ago . . . DI always said:
“Night Air Hath No Lift . . . !”
(that’s pretty obvious on those really quick orbits so near that high peak while flying ‘heavy’ with a GS differential of 118K?) , Did he squawk IFF to track (or on radar?)? His last arc looks like a final ‘try-it’ . . .
It shouldn’t have been requested in the first place. Unified Command? Someone should have had the knowledge and experience to step up and say no. Don’t put the pilot in that position in the first place.
Not sure if there were folks on the ground to support the drops, winds too erratic, how can you see if your drops are effective at night, no aerial supervision (although not required), etc. Put a stop to fixed-wing retardant/ suppressant drops right now. You want to drop water at night (I’m not a big fan), get a helicopter. Another tragic loss for a bunch of bushes.
Exactly!!!! Is nobody willing to step up and speak truth to power? You could tell this was a bad idea from 50 miles away. It was wholly avoidable and will forever remain an incomprehensible series of atrocious decision making. Another fine aviator lost over some bushes and grass.
Excellent point. We are very good at saying I told you so or making observations in hindsight. I have lost count of how many times I’ve been guilty of mumbling to a coworker about a bad idea and wishing good luck and a “Better them than me” to boot. We have been beaten down by customers and by extension The Company so much so we(the collective we not Royal) are willing to allow the almost inevitable to happen. Why was this pilot even allowed to be in the position he was in without outrage from the rest of us BEFORE the fact not after? GRRRRRRRRRR!!!!
Verbal contracts and SEATs do not have a good track record:
https://apps.usfa.fema.gov/firefighter-fatalities/fatalityData/detail?fatalityId=714
How does this brief summation of a single 21 year old mishap demonstrate that verbal contracts are a bad idea, SEATs are a bad idea, or a combination of the two, unwise?
The airplane struck a wire on a tower. Would any manner of contract changed that wire strike, the damage it did, or the subsequent ability of the pilot to fly or land that aircraft?
Thanks Boas!
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