Kruger Fire (in red) 3-D map, approximate location. Looking north.(Note from Bill: Bean Barrett, a frequent contributor to Fire Aviation, spent a career in U.S. Naval Aviation as a fighter pilot and served on the Navy Staff as a program sponsor responsible for planning, programming, and budgeting. He was also a Naval Aviation Safety Officer trained in mishap investigation. Here are some of his thoughts about the fatal crash of the AT-802 single engine air tanker on the Kruger Fire July 25, 2021.)
A blinding flash of the obvious to an old Naval aviator.
Having been in the business of personally flying and ordering flights in marginal conditions over my flying career, I offer the following observation derived from thinking about the mishap involving the SEAT at the Kruger Fire: This mission represented a near first for fire aviation in a very difficult environment. There is little community experience to bolster command and operational decisions by IC’s and pilots operating in this environment.
From personal experience, flying in extraordinarily bad conditions at night at sea is only possible to undertake and successfully accomplish because there are thousands of hours and sorties worth of community experience that helps those responsible know when and where to draw the line.
In this case, regardless of the NTSB/FAA mishap findings, without a significant background of fire aviation community experience to draw on for a particular situation or environment, it is always best to operate conservatively and approach any new environment in steps, never do the hardest one first if at all possible.
I would hope that the mishap SEAT flight was the culmination of a “work up” from simple to complex tasking and flying over hundreds of hours of use of night vision goggles and night drops with the aircraft.
This underscores the requirement for the fire aviation community to develop/ expand standard training and operations procedures both for general ops and by specific aircraft type and mission. If everyone trains and operates to the same standards, community experience is more relevant, experience can be accumulated and shared, procedures modified and improved, and training requirements adjusted resulting in improved flight safety and operations.
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How many folks in the IMT/ IC business are aware of the AT-802 flight safety record when they order a SEAT?
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/type/AT8T/1
Over four mishaps a year since May, 1997. This should have set off alarm bells a very long time ago except there isn’t any agency “keeping score” for type aircraft mishap rate and mishap cause that then ties the information and “lessons learned” back to mandated changes in training, maintenance, and ops procedures. It is very apparent from looking over the reference that the mishap rate is unacceptable and it isn’t getting any better.
Absent mandated standardized training, maintenance, and operations procedures for the AT-802 (and all other fire aviation aircraft), unacceptable mishap rates will continue. Since the US government is the largest contracting organization, it would seem logical to mandate a comprehensive Federal standardization program for AT-802 SEAT’s and other fire aviation aircraft that will operate under government contract.
To expect a loose confederacy of contract aviation companies to cooperatively develop a program is wishful thinking.
Some may say that such a Federal program already exists but my reply would be “where is the dash 1 or NATOPS flight manual for each type of aircraft, how is it revised, and what single agency is responsible for the manuals, standardized training, standardized operations, and standardized maintenance?” It is obvious that today’s chop suey of regulatory agencies, regulations, requirements, and instructions is not working for fire aviation.
There will be complaints about the additional cost to institute a consolidated comprehensive standardization program that will save fire aviation lives, aircraft, and improve effectiveness but my answer would be … the option of continuing with business as usual is obviously unacceptable.
Until fire aviation has a comprehensive aviation program as good as the US military aviation programs, we can expect little change in the fire fviation mishap rates or in operational effectiveness.
14 Comments
This is not a criticism, just an observation from an “old guy”. It’s quite interesting, in the 1960’s the USFS moved from single engine retardant aircraft (Grumman TBM’s), with tank capabilities of 500-800 gallons, to multi-engine aircraft. One of the reasons stated was “increased safety” based upon multi-engine capabilities.
After returning from the service, I found myself calling retardant loads for converted aircraft, like Denny Lynches Douglas A-26 Invader, Hawkins & Powers C-119 and PB4Y, Minden’s P2V Neptune and others. All multi-engine with larger pay loads. With retirement came the newer jet powered LATs and VLATs for the reported need of larger loads and a need to retire Legacy aircraft.
Our latest transition takes us a step back in time as we incorporated the single engine air tanker (SEAT) capable of 800 gallons of retardant. With four recent air crashes involving SEATs, doesn’t this hint of taking us back to the ‘60s and the reasoning used of multi-engine aircraft. It could also add to air space congestion. Just wondering!
A well thought-out, yet highly inaccurate summation from someone with zero understanding of SEAT operations in the fire environment. I tire of military aviators with no experience in type or in these operations, who feel they have a handle on flying fire, or flying SEATs.
The use of the aviation safety net database to attempt some parallel to US SEAT operations is a fallacy on multiple levels. That link (https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/type/AT8T/1) applies Air Tractor 802 mishaps in a myriad of environments, using numerous operators globally, including some military operators, but of the 112 mishaps cited, only 36 were in the USA, and of those, 13 were involved in fire operations.
Included in these red herring and straw-man associations are operations by the US and Colombian government against armed rebels growing cocaine in Colombia, flights ferrying fuel in the jungles of Indonesia, numerous ag operators including private operations, military operations against armed factions using armor plated and armed aircraft in the middle east, and numerous incidents completely unrelated to fire operations both in the US, and abroad. These are used to demonstrate the unsafe state of the 802 in fire operations in the United States?
Of those fire operations cited, most had nothing to do with the fire, and include a float equipped 802 that struck a submerged object in a lake while scooping, fuel exhaustion, an unlocked tailwheel landing incident, and a ferry flight into bad weather. These have zero bearing on the training, preparation, or even the resource ordering process for fire aircraft, let alone SEAT operations. Only a few of the total listed had anything whatsoever to do with drop operations, and yet everything in the database is used to create a very different, false picture.
I’m quite tired of hearing proud military aviators say, “it’s a shame that you never had the level of training (and support) that I had.” Especially those aviators who aren’t flying fires. Especially those aviators with no experience in type. To make non-sequitur comparisons to irrelevant data and aircraft, especially those operating under different systems in other countries, is dishonest and irresponsible. Mr. Barrett is attempting to draw a picture of that which does not exist. His suggestion that IMT’s or IC’s should be aware of the 802 “safety record” as he’s falsely illustrated it, is to ask a misleading question. No one is aware of that safety record, because IT DOES NOT EXIST. In fact, just 6% of those cited by Mr. Barrett have anything to do with dropping retardant on fires by SEAT aircraft, and 94% of it is irrelevant distraction used to cloud the issue.
To use those issues to suggest four mishaps a year is a lie. Not a shade of gray, but a lie. What has an aircraft that went down in the middle east, armor plated, fighting counterinsurgency warfare got to do with carded 802 SEAT aircraft, flown by carded SEAT pilots, under a US government contract on a fire? Nothing. Neither does an armor plated 802 spraying Roundup on poppy and coca plants in Colombia, yet Mr. Barrett has included these, and scores of ther irrelevant mishaps, along with the few, isolated 802 mishaps in the US that had anything to do with fighting fire.
At this stage, WE DO NOT KNOW why the 802 in Colorado crashed, and it’s far too early to point fingers or engage in speculation.
Mr. Barret appears to assert that the night flight by this 802 was a knee-jerk action by the pilot and by the Sheriff’s office, who ordered the resource. In fact, the pilot of that aircraft gave an interview earlier that day, advising that he was looking forward to a flight that night, and noted that the flight has been five years in the making.
Mr. Barret’s chutzpah is summed up in his final assertion that, “until fire aviation has a comprehensive program as good as the military aviation programs, we can expect little change in the fire aviation mishap rates or in operational effectiveness.” It’s hard to overstate the arrogance and the errors in this statement without unpacking it for an entire chapter, but it’s a straw-man argument with no basis in fact, nor a sound conclusion that can be supported by any fact. Mr. Barrett’s irresponsible attempt to fiat false, misleading statistics invalidates any of his commentary, and credibility on the issue.
I appreciate that this is his point of view, but it is neither correct, nor based on relevant data, nor based on fact. Mr. Barrett asks where is the NATOPS manual or USAF -1 manual standardizing a fleet. He asks this as though civil aviation has any obligation or need to conform to the USAF or USN aviation practices. I’ll ask where is the universal manual for the B767, or B747? Boeing writes a Flight Crew Operations Manual for each aircraft, and each operator modifies it according to their practices and policies, because that’s the way things workin the real world. I can tell you I operated the 747 as a captain internationally, and with a mixed fleet from various sources, the switches in some aircraft moved forward for ON in some airplanes, and aft for ON in others. As someone in the training department commented, “We used to have a standardized fleet, and then we got the second airplane.” Welcome to reality: Mr. Boeing and his minion built airplanes to suit customer needs and requests. As for military manuals and following military programs, the aircraft lost in 2002, from whence sprang the Blue Ribbon Panel and the circus that followed, were maintained according to the military maintenance documents, as they were military aircraft. Go figure.
Standardization exists within companies, such as airlines, corporate flight departments, etc. Fire aviation is made up of companies, because with a few isolated exceptions, the government prefers to contract aircraft rather than own and operate them. All those contracted do conform to government contract requirements, and in general there is a lot of standardization throughout the industry, but each operator does conform with the FAA approved manufacturer data, flight manual, and maintenance documents for their aircraft, as well as company policies and procedures, IN ADDITION TO government memos, requirements, operational procedures, and practices.
I have flown SEATs for several operators in the US; four aircraft models, five different engine types, (seven counting the variations), as well as heavy tankers, air attack, point to point, fire patrol and a number of years on the ground fighting fire. I’m not an expert, but not entirely a novice, either. One of the best operators I’ve flown for, in fact one of the best employers I’ve ever had, was one of those SEAT operations. A policy there, found nowhere else that I’m aware, had very conservative fuel requirements, and in fact required a written report to the Director of Safety, and to the Company President if one flew with less than a quarter tank. No launching on less than half. Fill the tanks when the aircraft is stopped. I agree with those policies, and I followed them. Simply because other operators may take a different approach, however, and that may not be a universally applied standard, does not mean other operators are doing it wrong, unsafely, or that this “non-standard” practice is right or wrong for a given operator, or pilot.
Operators comply with the government requirements for carding, maintenance, pilot qualification, training, aircraft operation, equipment condition and standards, support equipment, safety, and numerous other metrics, and aircraft and pilots are inspected annually, and during the season. Dailly briefings are held. Pilots are given time off that conforms to the same standard as Part 135, including flight limitations, rest, and mandatory 24 hour rest periods. Flight time and operations are limited during times of high activity. Pilots attend annual refresher training put on by the company, training put on by the government, and training through the years has included online, written, and other forms of training and checking, and various schools which go on to this day. The current safety rate for SEAT operations is FAR, FAR better than Mr. Barrett falsely implies, largely due to changes made some years ago with the SEAT school and inclusion in the NAFA training at Mather today.
We don’t know what happened in Colorado. Mr. Barret intones that he doesn’t need to know, he can see this coming a mile away, and why can’t we all be like the military? Having flown military missions in peace time and war, including a fair amount of time in Iraq and five years in Afghanistan, let me say that military aviation isn’t the epitome of safety, and the pot attempting to call the kettle black, when the pot has yet to see the kettle, is arrogant and presumptuous. It’s inappropriate and unprofessional. Wait for the facts to come in, then have a rational discussion of the facts. Chicken-little knee-jerk commentary about the sky falling, 802’s with a dangerous track record, and other ridiculous banter, coupled with self-promoting “why can’t you all be like us?” commentary does no one any good and quite frankly is offensive.
This is fire aviation. Not military aviation. It does not need a retired military aviator demanding that the industry be molded into military aviation. In any segment of the aviation industry, there is always room for improvement, and that includes fire aviaiton. Most of the policies and procedures to which we adhere today, including the use of the fire traffic area, are written in blood, just as many military practices are also. These policies, practices, and procedures came about based on hard lessons learned. Corporate aviation continues to learn them. Airlines continue to learn them. Fire aviation continues to learn them. The military continues to learn them. Arguably, one of the safest setments of the industry are airline operations, and corporate flying. It would be ridiculous to assert that combat operations should be conducted like a corporate flight department, or like an airline. It wouldn’t work, any more than an airline should be flown like a combat unit at war. Neither should we attempt to re-shape fire aviation to conform to naval aviation. Apples and oranges, different missions, aircraft, pilots, practices and procedures, and simply because not every pilot flew for the navy, does not place those who did not at a disadvantage. Mr. Barratt may actually have a thing or two to learn from those flying the fires. Again, go figure.
The red flag for me is that the Sheriff’s office ordered the flight, under marginal conditions. Let’s not put the pilots in that position in the first place.
Agreed. There are plenty of past lessons learned that could have been applied to prevent this accident. Agencies, organizations, and companies that supply aircraft for firefighting should not wait for another long investigation to end before concluding night missions with air tankers is not worth the risk, period.
Could you really tell us how you feel? At the prompting of other lead plane pilots while on fire contract, they suggested an interview in Redding for an upcoming opening, lead plane pilot. The head of R 5 lead plane guys conducted the interview. After the interview I thought I had done pretty good, except I wasn’t a military trained pilot. He sort of “dressed me down” for wasting his time. I think he was a Naval aviator? A couple of type ratings (B 17 and R5D) flying fires just didn’t make the grade. Born into crop dusting aviation, I was probably the only 18 year old flying ag in high school. The A&P licensed didn’t help either
Retardant off a ducks back.
Thanks Doug
Being a former Army Guard and Reserve helicopter mechanic and DC10 and low time 900 hour commercial pilot, and being part of the SEAT community? I appreciate the candor. Being a mech attached to many Lift companies ranging from ash n trash, MEDEVAC, Engineers, and bucket missions, there were many missions that were similar, NOT so similar missions. Yep, the SEAT community borne from Ag Ops and drug interdiction is a different world from fire operations. Id have to agree, other than NAFA that you folks go through, there’s really no LMA agencies willing to own and operate aircraft. Easy to contract and “set policy” and dictate airman hours and requirements normally set by the FAA yet different to own a large fleet, maintain that fleet, insure that fleet, establish OpSpecs, FOM, AFM training. Id say the SEAT community as different as their operators, has maintained a semblance of a very professional community. Maybe it is time for some real heart to heart talks w ICs, IMTs, and Sheriff s Offices about night time air Ops in mountainous terrain and a little more DETAILED Aviation Meteorology that goes beyond S130/S290, and S390 taught to us in the fire world
I may have to correct myself….LMAs do have their own fleet of aircraft available to fire such as the SJ and some other missions and their operations are no different and ought not to exempt from any FAA regulations even under Punlic Service. Whats good for expectations upon contracting fire aircraft thru vendors ought be the same set of standards for Guv run fleets and I am sure LMA aviation is following that….but for too long, folks expecting the vendor to fall in line w contract requirements ought to be the same folks living it like the rest of the aviation communities. Like I’ve folks….theres is no Christmas or free rides in aviation….
I’m a retired military pilot turned SEAT pilot and operator and completely agree with your assessment. Why would the community even entertain a critique from someone who has no concept of the environment in which we operate.
A tragic and heartbreaking situation. One can only hope that as we move into the era of both rotary and fixed wing night operations, the Governments will head Bean Barrett’s wisdom. There is so much more work to do. The payoffs will be big and worth the effort.
Comparison of mishap rates is called for in this discussion. Are data available for fire aviation mishap rates or specifically SEAT mishap rates?
Some military aviation mishap information found in a 5 minute search:
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiCvYXiy670AhV_lmoFHZoRCikQFnoECAMQAw&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.airforcetimes.com%2Fnews%2Fyour-air-force%2F2021%2F03%2F11%2Fflight-hours-plunged-during-covid-but-aircraft-mishap-rates-ticked-up%2F&usg=AOvVaw1xLvmazaHVChG5-RjfYUA3
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA200/RRA257-1/RAND_RRA257-1.pdf
Night flying is political. The city and county agencies that have night flying programs have been doing it for years, and rarely do you see more than one or two ac flying at night, when several are out during daylight hours. There’s a reason for that. An alternative for Federal agencies (realizing this was not a federal incident, but Unified Command with a federal component), would be to bring ac on early and be flying before sunrise. Stagger the schedules so you have continuous coverage throughout the day.
Accident prevention needs to be improved, for certain. Ground ff (IMTs, crews, dispatchers, duty officers) need to be better educated and make better decisions on when and where to use ac, using past experience in the local area (like in this case) in order to mitigate the risk to aerial firefighters. Let’s not put pilots in the position of having to make borderline decisions. Generally speaking, a few well placed retardant or water drops early in the incident will keep from having to use ac all day long, day after day, week after week.
I back the statement by DOUG ! Fire fighting and military ops are totally different, PERIOD !!!
Sounds like something a person nicknamed Darth Vador would say who is also a past military pilot, who blamed and betrayed the four firefighters that past on the Thirty Mile Fire.
+1 for Doug’s comments!
I’ll only add that for an author of such title, one would think he lack’s the impulsivity to comment on the circumstances of so fresh a tragedy.
2020 US Department of Defense Budget $705.4 billion
2020 Navy Budget: $207.1 Billion Dollars
2020 USDA Forest Service Budget $5.14 billion
2020 US DOI BLM Budget: $1.2 billion
2020 State of Colorado budget: $30.5 billion.
Someday we will tell our wildland firefighters and pilots – “Thank you for your service”.
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