In a paper published October 4, 2021, researchers analyzed the structures that were destroyed and those that survived the Camp Fire that ran through the city of Paradise, California in 2018. They considered at least four primary characteristics of structures:
- Were they built before or after the adoption in 2008 of Chapter 7A of the California Building Code which requires certain fire resistance measures, including exterior construction materials used for roof coverings, vents, exterior walls, and decks and applies to new construction of residential and commercial buildings in designated fire hazard severity zones.
- Distance to nearest destroyed structure.
- Number of structures destroyed within 100 meters.
- Pre-fire overstory tree canopy within 100 meters
They found that the last three criteria were the strongest predictors of survival. Homes more than 18 meters from a destroyed structure and with less than 53 percent pre-fire overstory canopy within 30 to 100 meters survived at a substantially higher rate than homes in closer proximity to a destroyed structure or in areas with higher pre-fire overstory canopy. Most fire damage to surviving homes appeared to result from radiant heat from nearby burning structures or flame impingement from the ignition of near-home combustible materials. The researchers concluded that building and vegetation modifications are possible that would substantially improve outcomes. Among those include improvements to windows and siding in closest proximity to neighboring structures, treatment of wildland fuels, and eliminating near-home combustibles, especially within 1.5 meters of the structure.
The authors noted that while 7a includes requirements not found in many building codes, a few others are more complete incorporating multiple construction classes based on anticipated radiant heat, flame, and ember exposure levels. For example Chapter 7A does not consider the interaction between components such as siding, window, and the under-eave area on an exterior wall.
There is an opportunity for much needed improvement in both current building codes and how we live in wildfire prone WUI areas.
Below is the complete Conclusion section from the research.
Conclusions
The results of this study support the idea that both proximities to neighboring burning structures and surrounding vegetation influence home survival with wildfire. Denser developments, built to the highest standards, may protect subdivisions against direct flame impingement of a vegetation fire, but density becomes a detriment once buildings ignite and burn.
Recent examples of losses in areas of higher density housing include the wind-driven 2017 Tubbs Fire in northern California, where house-to-house spread resulted in the loss of over 1400 homes in the Coffey Park neighborhood (Keeley and Syphard 2019), and the wind-driven 2020 Almeda Fire in southern Oregon, which destroyed nearly 2800 structures, many in denser areas in the towns of Talent and Phoenix (Cohen and Strohmaier 2020). Once fire becomes an urban conflagration, proximity to nearby burned structures becomes especially important because occupied structures contain significant quantities of fuel, produce substantial heat when burned, and are a source of additional embers. For density to be protective, home and other structure ignitions would need to be rare.
Fifty-six percent of homes in Paradise built during or after 2008 did not survive, illustrating that much improvement is needed in both current building codes and how we live in wildfire prone WUI areas before proximity to nearby structures becomes a benefit rather than a vulnerability. The threat posed by nearby burning structures as well as our finding of an apparent strong influence of vegetation 30–100 m from the home—a distance that in most cases encompasses multiple adjacent properties—demonstrates that neighbors need to work together to improve the overall ability of homes and communities to resist wildfire exposures.
To maximize survivability, homes need to be designed and maintained to minimize the chance of a direct flame contact, resist ember ignition, and survive extended radiant heat exposure. Our analyses demonstrating the strong influence of nearby burning structures on home survival suggests improvements to resist radiant heat exposures may be warranted in the California Building Code—i.e., increasing the standards for buildings within a certain minimum distance of other structures.
Some possible improvements might include noncombustible siding with rating minimums tied to proximity to other structures, both panes in windows consisting of tempered glass, or installation of deployable non-combustible shutter systems. Additionally, certain options for complying with Chapter 7A are better for resisting radiant heat and flame contact exposures and could minimize fire spread to other components. Whereas the International Code Council’s Wildland Urban Interface Building Code (International Code Council 2017) provides three ignition-resistant construction classes to allow for material restrictions as a function of exposure level, Chapter 7A consists of one level, so is binary in nature in that a building either needs to comply, or it does not. The Australian building code for construction in bushfire prone areas, AS 3959 (Standards Australia 2018), incorporates six different construction classes based on anticipated radiant heat, flame, and ember exposure levels. Interaction between components, for example, siding, window, and the under-eave area on an exterior wall, is not considered.
Our summary of damaged but not destroyed homes in Paradise was in line with other reports showing a high proportion of home ignitions indirectly resulting from embers (Mell et al. 2010). Embers frequently ignited near home combustibles such as woody mulch, fences, and receptive vegetative fuels with flames and/or associated radiant heat then impacting the home itself, supporting awareness of the importance of combustibles within the first 1.5 m (5 ft) of the building on home survival.
A re-interpretation of defensible space fuel modifications is needed to increase the building’s resistance and exposure to embers and direct flame contact, especially in the area immediately around a building and under any attached deck or steps. This does not diminish the value of defensible space fuel modifications 9 to 30 m (30 to 100 ft) away from the home, which not only reduces fuel continuity and the probability of direct flame contact to the home, but also provides firefighters a chance to intervene.
While our data show a relationship between home loss and vegetative fuels (high pre-fire overstory canopy cover likely associated with a greater litter and woody fuel abundance, as well as other wildland understory vegetation) that can contribute to fire intensity and ember generation, the WUI fire loss issue has been described as home ignition problem more so than a wildland fire problem (Cohen 2000; Calkin et al. 2014). The damaged home data were in line with this view, with few homes showing evidence of continuity with wildland fuels that would contribute to flame impingement, but numerous homes with near home fuels, both from manmade and natural sources, that led to direct or indirect ember ignitions.
California’s Mediterranean climate will continue to challenge its residents with regular wildfire exposure throughout the state. Whether through modifying the nearby surface and vegetative wildland fuels or the home itself, adapting to wildfire will take time. The good news is that the trend in survival is improving with newer construction practices. However, with 56% of houses built after 2008 still succumbing to the Camp Fire, much room for improvement remains.
Our data suggest it is possible to build (and maintain) buildings that have a high probability of surviving a worst-case scenario type of wildfire, even in fire-prone landscapes such as the Paradise area. Newer homes built after 1972, where the nearest burning structure was >18 m away, and fuels associated with vegetation 30–100 m from the home kept at moderate and lower levels (<53% canopy cover) had a 61% survival rate—an approximately 5-fold improvement over the Paradise housing population as a whole. Survival percentages substantially higher still are potentially possible if all components of risk, including ember generation in nearby wildland fuels, continuity of wildland and other fuels on the property, and home ignitability are sufficiently mitigated.
Citation:
Knapp, E.E., Valachovic, Y.S., Quarles, S.L. et al. Housing arrangement and vegetation factors associated with single-family home survival in the 2018 Camp Fire, California. fire ecol 17, 25 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1186/s42408-021-00117-0
my uncles home burned in the camp fire,it was downtown Paradise.heavily wooded,wood shake roofing.absolutely no clear space,none.the house was built in the 1930s and added on to numerous times. as far a my dad and i could tell,those upgrades were never permitted or inspected,he was 98 when he passed in 2015,he daughter,my cousin, took the house over,and just barely made it out,was stuck in that big traffic jam,her husband passed away that day,not from fire but from a heart attack.he drove into the walmart parking lot in Chico,looked up at the smoke again and slumped over the steering wheel.he was in his 70s,same age as my mom ,and was in good health,but he couldnt take the fire.
A few years ago, a friend of mine purchased a home in Pollock Pines. After he took ownership he asked me to come up and make suggestions. My first suggestion was that he not have purchased the place without talking to someone who had an understanding of fire. His property was about 6 acres with five acres of nothing but heavy brush on a 60-some per cent slope. The dwelling was also at the top of a chute with all the brush below. There was heavy brush within six feet of the upslope side of the house, a wood deck on the downslope side, shingle roof, big oak tree overhanging the house, and a steep and narrow driveway to get into the property. There was also no water source for structure protection. He went into a “shoot-the-messenger” mode when I told him that he had very serious problems and that it was going to cost him a small fortune to address them. I also told him that even if he did fix the major problems that in all probability, he was going to loose his house just because of where and how it was built and the fact that no one was going to put an engine in there and risk it and it’s crew to try to protect a structure that was not a viable proposition. Fortunately, he kept the place only about a year and got out. His home was a classic example of why there should be very strong and restrictive building codes in the WUI. This was one more example of weak building codes, weak code enforcement, and very poor neighborhood planning. Before this property was put on the market and sold a fire risk analysis should have been performed and given to perspective buyers. That analysis should have also contained information as to what would be needed to make the buildings and property even minimally safe from an encroaching fire.
Sounds like too much common sense
EXACTLY
Some of those folks MIGHT listen….often not as evidenced by the last 70+ yrs and current FIREWISE needs more than the education components……it needs more action with legislation with teeth by local communities with county / city fathers and sisters with more than normal intestinal fortitude to push it into law…..otherwise, status quo…..
Once again, the TARGET is/are County Supervisors who approve of such expansion into the WUI and other forest settings with strict protection and building requirements.