The string of near-misses in U.S. airspace continues, this time involving a Southwest Airlines 737 and a fire department helicopter at Hollywood-Burbank Airport in southern California. Matthew Klint with liveandletsfly.com reported that “Southwest Airlines flight 353 was on approach for landing at BUR airport when Air Traffic Control noticed a Los Angeles Fire Department Bell 505 helicopter practicing takeoffs and landings, right where the Southwest flight was to land. The Southwest flight, a Boeing 737-700 with registration N551WN, was ordered to abort landing and performed a go-around.”
NBC Los Angeles reported that just before 10 a.m., the 737 from Phoenix was on approach to Runway 8 for a landing; it was about a mile out when air traffic control noticed the LAFD helicopter doing touch-and-go’s on the same runway. The controller told the helicopter to remain in place and directed the Southwest pilot to go around. Ed Whisenant Aviation has a related video online.
This is yet another incident at Burbank; on January 22 two aircraft were cleared to use the same runway at the same time (a Mesa Airlines CRJ900 operating for American Airlines and a SkyWest Embraer 175 operating for United Airlines). In that incident, an automatic alarm onboard the CRJ900 sounded, which may have prevented a tragedy.
9 Comments
Incidents like this underscore the need for increased aerial supervision at incidents and airspace deconfliction at and around wildfires. Some Regions have marginalized the need for Air Attack and Lead Planes over incidents in the past few years, in my opinion that is naive and assumptive about airspace safety and effective air operations…
What on earth would an air attack have accomplished for an airliner landing at a controlled airport? How is that in any way relevant? How does a traffic conflict involving an aircraft operating under IFR an airport controlled by an air traffic control tower “underscore” a need for leadplanes over a fire? If anything, it belies the advantage of supervision, as that didn’t do much to prevent this incursion, did it? Neither an air attack nor leadplane would have had any impact here.
If this type of event can occur at a controlled airport, something similar (airspace conflict) to it could occur within a Fire Traffic Area or as aircraft approach an FTA. FTAs are patterned after Class D airspace, no? It’s relevant if you can connect the dots, which is why the topic is mentioned on this website…agencies have relaxed the standards for aerial supervision over fires in the past few years.
How is an airline operation, under instrument flight rules, landing a FAA tower-controlled airfield, involved in a a runway incursion, in any way related to a need for an air attack or leadplane over a fire?
Firmly agree….this has nothing to do w airspace deconfliction over a fire. Can not apply fire fighting operations to everyday airport ops. I still believe LAFD could have planned training a little differently
Incidents like this have everything to do with managing airspace over a fire. The more supervision the better…I think you misread my post.
This incident has NOTHING to do with managing a fire. Nothing whatsoever. The fire traffic area exists because of a CDF midair collision between two S-2’s. The incident in his article involved a non-fire aircraft operating in the national airspace system under instrument flight rules, on an instrument approach, and a helicopter NOT involved in fire operations, doing landings at a tower controlled airport. There is no control tower over a fire. There is no mechanism nor means for a leadplane or air attack to get involved in an air traffic control situation such as this article. The presence of a leadplane would not have made any difference in how air traffic control directed traffic, or cleared an aircraft for an approach, nor would a leadplane or air attack have been able to participate in any way to prevent this situation.
The Fire Traffic Area (FTA) is a simple communication system which works well. It does not rely on aerial supervision, but incorporates it seamlessly, meaning that the FTA exists with or without supervision, and the same rules apply. The same contact and no-comm rings exist and we still communicate over the fire. When aerial supervision is available over the fire, it acts in a de-facto or quasi-ATC role, but does not have full control over the airspace, nor is the lead or air attack necessarily notified when ATC elects to move IFR traffic through a TFR, as sometimes happens. In fact, I’ve been under the supervision of an air attack and following a leadplane in two of the closest near-midair calls I’ve had in a fire area in my career. One involved a large helicopter that crossed a “fence” into our drop line, and the other involved a regional airplane that was sent through our fire, under IFR. In the second case, I was close enough to clearly see that the captain wore Rayban Outdoorsman II sunglasses with green lenses. That’s close, and in the smoke, too.
There are tools in the toolbox, today to include ADS-B, and TCAS. We have closely-spaced radio frequences with numerous options, and multiple radios. We look for traffic like our head is on a swivel. But we are going into an environment which is both dynamic and highly variable. We are initial -attack qualified, which addresses both communications among multiple aircraft, as well as fire assessment and retardant application in absence of other supervision. This does NOT change the fact that a runway incursion between a Part 121 airline operation, and a Part 91 government operation in controlled airspace, under IFR, has NOTHING to do with aerial supervision over a fire. NOTHING.
This site has gone down hill hard now that Bill passed. The new moderator is full of attitude and censors nearly everyone, no thanks, I’m out. It had a good run.
It’s nothing but rude for you to insinuate that things would be better with Bill’s passing. Thanks for leaving if you don’t want to contribute. Demand a refund if you’re so upset. Sheesh.
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