How NPS firefighters put out a vehicle fire in a mile-long tunnel

The National Park Service produced this video intended to be training film for NPS firefighters. It explains how personnel in Zion National Park in Utah suppressed a vehicle fire in a mile-long tunnel reinforced with wood beams. The car was a 1964 AC Cobra, an American-engineered British sports car reportedly insured for $800,000.

Roberta M. Gorman gets credit as author, and for project layout and design.

Poll: the minimum number of firefighters dispatched to a fire

The issue of a firefighter suppressing a wildfire alone has recently come up on Wildfire Today. Here is your chance to weigh in on the issue.

As a routine practice during fire season, should an agency dispatch less than two firefighters to put out (not scout) a wildland fire if little is known about the fire other than the location?

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Colorado: Fire Board releases report on Black Forest Fire

Black Forest fire
Black Forest Fire. Photo by Bill Gabbert.

Today the Black Forest Fire District Board released a report on how the Black Forest Fire was managed on the first day. Starting on the northeast side of Colorado Springs, the fire killed two people, destroyed 486 homes, and damaged 37 others in June of 2013.

The local county Sheriff, Terry Maketa, has been extremely critical of Fire Chief Bob Harvey,who was responsible for the initial attack. Sheriff Maketa has given several blistering interviews to the media criticizing Chief Harvey’s actions that day. His main point was that he thinks the Chief should have turned over the fire to him or the county much earlier.

The documents released today, a statement from the Board and a summary of the report, show strong support for Chief Harvey and generally appear to disprove some of the charges leveled by Sheriff Maketa.

One of the Sheriff’s main contentions was that the Chief waited many hours before turning over the management of the fire to the County or the Sheriff, which the Sheriff said occurred at 8:23 p.m..

The report concluded that the fire was reported at 1:42 p.m. on June 11. The first engine arrived about six minutes later. At 2:14 p.m. a strong wind of 25 to 35 mph developed, increasing the rate of spread and pushing the fire into the crowns of the trees. Firefighters were then forced into defensive positions for their own safety. Between 3:45 and 3:55 p.m. Chief Harvey verbally turned over command of the fire to County Deputy Fire Marshall Scott Campbell, a Type 3 Incident Commander. At 4:08 p.m. Mr. Campbell signed a document confirming the transfer of command. Other signatures on a Delegation of Authority document were obtained over the next several hours, with the last occurring at 8:23 p.m.

The Board commissioned retired Greenwood Village Police commander Dave Fisher to direct the inquiry. Mr. Fisher retired in October after a 29-year career at the suburban Denver department. He was assisted by Dave Daley, an operations executive officer at South Metro Fire Rescue in Centennial.

The statement of the Board criticized the attacks by the Sheriff and the media:

…This misadventure started because one elected official saw fit, for whatever personal or political reason, to make unsubstantiated allegations about our Chief’s performance following the onset of the Black Forest fire. We say unsubstantiated because the investigation has proven the facts, and what’s been established is very, very far from what was alleged. We have no way of knowing the motive in making these allegations and we are certain we will never know.

We also must acknowledge how disappointed we are in the conduct of some Colorado Springs media outlets in simply running with the allegations, and broadcasting the untruths, without a speck of legitimate journalistic enterprise to establish their validity. The media accepted the allegations at face value, further damaging this department’s reputation, and continued to repeat the damaging suppositions – again, leading us to hire our own investigator to get at the heart of the matter.

Colorado is one of a few states that have the policy of assigning the suppression of wildfires in unincorporated areas to the county employee with law enforcement responsibilities in those areas — the County Sheriff — rather than a person with expertise in fire suppression.

Red Flag Warnings, February 19, 2014

Red Flag Warning - February 19, 2014
Red Flag Warnings (in red) and Fire Weather Watches (in yellow) – February 19, 2014 (click to enlarge)

Red Flag Warnings and Fire Weather Watches for elevated wildfire danger have been issued by the National Weather Service for areas in Colorado, Texas, and New Mexico.

The Red Flag Warning map was current as of noon MDT on Wednesday. Red Flag Warnings can change throughout the day as the National Weather Service offices around the country update and revise their forecasts. For the most current data, visit this NWS site.

House introduces fire funding solution bill

The Nature Conservancy and other organizations are supporting a bill that has been introduced in Congress that should mitigate the funding problems caused when the costs of suppressing wildfires exceed the budgets of the federal land management agencies. Below is a statement issued by the groups:

A broad coalition of conservation, timber, tribal, recreation, sportsmen and employer groups praised Representatives Simpson (R-ID) and Schrader (D-OR) for introducing the Wildfire Disaster Funding Act of 2014 (H.R. 3992) that would create an emergency funding process for fire response. This funding structure is similar to existing federal funding mechanisms for response to other natural disasters, and would prevent “borrowing” from other USDA Forest Service (USFS) and Department of the Interior (DOI) programs. Since 2000 these agencies have run out of money to fight emergency fires eight times.

This bill ensures funding for both wildfire first responders and for land managers who care for public forests and streams. It is the House companion of the Senate bill, S. 1875, which was introduced at the end of 2013 by Senators Wyden (D-OR) and Crapo (R-ID) and continues to gain bipartisan co-sponsorship.

When the USFS and DOI wildfire suppression expenses exceed 70% of the 10-year average, this Bill provides funding from “off budget” sources in a structure similar to how the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) pays for other natural disaster responses. This would significantly minimize the need to transfer funds from non-suppression accounts when suppression funds are depleted. For years, the practice of transferring high suppression costs has negatively impacted agencies’ ability to implement forest management activities.

This additional funding would provide outside the normal discretionary appropriations process, and could potentially make these “savings” available for forest treatments that help to reduce fire risk and costs, such as Hazardous Fuels removal.

As this was written, the bill has been introduced in the House and referred to two subcommittees, Public Lands and Environmental Regulation, and Conservation, Energy, and Forestry.

The progress of the bill can be tracked at OpenCongress.org.

Thanks and a hat tip go out to Matt

Leader of Yarnell Hill Fire investigation says one firefighter should be able to attack a fire — alone

Yarnell Hill Fire, June 30, 2013
Yarnell Hill Fire, June 30, 2013. Photo by Joy Collura.

The leader of the 54-person team that conducted the Serious Accident Investigation Team’s investigation into the Yarnell Hill Fire in Arizona that killed 19 firefighters was quoted as saying that individual firefighters should be able to attack wildfires alone. Florida State Forester Jim Karels’ reasoning seems to be that it is too expensive to send two firefighters to a fire.

Below is an excerpt from an article at WFSU explaining that the Florida state legislature is considering a recommendation from the Florida State Fire Service Association that firefighters should not be sent alone to a fire:

…Florida Forest Service Director Jim Karels says the increased staffing mandate is not necessary because the lowest-risk fires only require one firefighter—and if he sends two to one fire, it’s possible nobody will be available when the next one breaks out.

“Safety-wise, purely, if I can send two firefighters to every fire every time with no other decisions, I’m good with that. But we’ve got to look at it on effectiveness and efficiency too,” he says.

But Rep. Mike Clelland (D-Lake Mary) says his experience as a firefighter makes him question the department’s refusal.

“I just can’t imagine one person responding to a forest fire or a brush fire,” he says. “I spent my whole adult life in the fire service.”

The article also has a 50-second audio recording in which you can hear Mr. Karels actually speaking those words.

This helps to explain how Mr. Karels’ 54-person investigative team came up with their analysis of the fatal Yarnell Hill Fire:

The judgments and decisions of the incident management organizations managing this fire were reasonable. Firefighters performed within their scope of duty, as defined by their respective organizations. The Team found no indication of negligence, reckless actions, or violations of policy or protocol.

Many people, including this writer, disagree with the conclusion reached by Mr. Karels and his team. The article we wrote on February 15 is an example of some, but not all, of the negligence, reckless actions, and violations of policy or protocol that have been documented about the fire, in spite of Mr. Karels’ analysis. Other examples surfaced after the release of the second official report on the fire which was issued by the Arizona Division of Occupational Safety and Health.

Many people, after studying for weeks how 19 firefighters were killed on a fire, would be hyper-aware and sensitive to firefighter safety issues, but not in this case. Florida State Forest Service Director Jim Karels is a danger to firefighters and should get out of the business. We don’t use term idiot often at Wildfire Today, but it is well deserved in this case.