Risk assessment in the West

In 2018 Rick Stratton, a USFS fire planning program manager for the R6 Regional Office in Portland and Pyrologix provided a Quantitative Wildland Fire Risk Assessment for communities most at risk in the Pacific Northwest — and he listed the top 25.

Six years later he compared that assessment with what had actually happened, and 18 of the 25 communities had recorded significant/catastrophic wildland fires. His assessment illustrates a rapidly evolving wildland fire environment, in which entire communities are at risk. Below are some of Stratton’s slides.

Risk assessment presentation by Rick Stratton

How do interface disasters occur? Jack Cohen‘s work on wildland/urban interface fires demonstrated that in the beginning, the set-up for a disaster fire includes extreme fire conditions — much of which has been widespread across the West over the last decade or more. Abundant dry fuels, fire-friendly weather such as drought, extreme heat, low humidities, and high winds all contribute to a landscape ready for a fire disaster.

To that setting is added both wildland fire (with rapid spread) and urban fire — which includes multiple simultaneous ignitions and residential areas in which fire spreads from house to house to house, complicated by non-vegetation burning of cars, fences, decks, garages, stacked firewood, and often-hazardous materials typically found on interface industrial properties, workshops and garden sheds, or even gas stations. Frightened residents trying to evacuate on limited access routes, often with uncoordinated communications and plans, simply multiply the crisis.

How interface disasters occur
How interface disasters occur — Jack Cohen

Pacific Northwest risk map: Clearly illustrated here is the band of interface-populated communities that runs down from the northeast corner of Washington to the southwest corner of Oregon — adjacent to and in forested areas.

Pacific Northwest risk map

Unlike the larger metro areas (Seattle, Portland), these communities are surrounded by rural and forested land, and consist mainly of smaller communities with limited suppression resources, and sometimes challenging water supply or prevention resources.

charted risk exposure

… and … 6 years later:

Interface fires in Northwest communities at risk fir catastrophic interface fire
Interface fires in Northwest communities at risk fir catastrophic interface fire

Only a few of those ranked community exposure locations were NOT burned by a large interface fire. Ellensburg, Washington, suffered multiple fires, as did Spokane, Grants Pass, and Chelan.


Joe Stutler
Joe Stutler

A Western Region Co-Chair for the Wildland Fire Cohesive Strategy, Joe Stutler worked 35 years with the U.S. Forest Service. Since retiring, he’s worked for Northtree Fire International and as senior forester with Deschutes County for 8 years. He has worked as a hotshot, smokejumper, district and forest FMO, district  ranger, law enforcement officer, and regional fire operations specialist  for both R5 and R6. He put in 33 years as Type I and II Incident Commander and 6 years on National Area Command Teams. He has managed all-hazard and law enforcement assignments across the country and currently fills Command and General  positions on Type 1 IMTs and Area Command teams.

Here are a few of Joe Stutler’s thoughts on these risk assessments: I am wide-eyed at the accuracy of Rick Stratton’s predictions and the big fires that followed in 2018-2022.  Most of these high-ranking landscapes were in Fire Regimes 1 & 2, and those that have been burned by large intense wildfire have now reset to Condition Class 1.  But what about those that remain in Condition Class 3, like here in central Oregon and other places in the U.S.?

The wildland fire environment is rapidly changing, and this slide deck shows that to be true. The question is, what can we in the business of helping people understand it actually do about it?  The answer lies in  collectively and strategically communicating these issues.

From my world, I immediately think about how the Cohesive Strategy has been affirmed by the Wildland Fire Leadership Council (WFLC) AND the President’s Wildfire Mitigation and Management Commission as THE strategic framework that can be applied at and by every level (federal, tribal, state, local, and NGOs) to address wildland fire challenges to make substantial, meaningful progress toward landscape resiliency, community resiliency, and fire adaptation — and a safer, more effective, risk-based wildfire response.

The part that stands out to me (apart from the obvious needs to increase the pace and scale of landscape resiliency treatments and address the different response approaches and needs of the “urban firestorm” probability) is the need for doubling down toward the CS goal of fire-adapted communities.  The goal is described as “communities that are as prepared as possible to receive, respond to, and recover from wildland fire.”

This elevates the responsibility for preparedness to more than just our response as land management agencies and organizations, but to us as residents, responders, planners, emergency managers, governments, businesses, news outlets, and other organizations in communities.  We each have a responsibility to think about what RECEIVING FIRE, RESPONDING TO FIRE, and RECOVERING FROM FIRE means to each of these community affiliates — and start heading down the path of preparation. These are ripe for defining within communities and providing suggestions for action.  The definitions and suggestions will be different in every community, and we can organize and assist with these conversations, suggestions, and actionable solutions.

Many best practices have been applied and are underway across the West by all these entities, but the devastating destruction of entire communities over the last decade tells us that there is still much to do at the community level to prepare for wildland fire.  Even today, many communities across the West — and for that matter east of the Mississippi — still do not realize that not only is the wildfire risk high, but there is also high likelihood of loss given the rapidly changing wildland fire environment.  A changing climate (hotter, drier, windier conditions) alone is making “urban firestorms” a more prevalent reality, even in the East and South.

It’s clear that we need efforts toward all three goals of the Cohesive Strategy to make a difference and change the outcomes of wildland fire.  Our vision is a good place to start — “To safely and effectively extinguish fire, when needed; use fire where allowable; manage our natural resources; and collectively, learn to live with wildland fire.” If we as individuals are truly learning to live with wildland fire, we must consider what that looks like in the face of the research and outcomes that Rick Stratton shares and then apply the Cohesive Strategy for better fire outcomes.

Ignoring our responsibility to learn to live with wildland fire is a choice. And we now know what the outcomes of that are.

911 calls: the stranded and missing in Maui’s wildfires

“The flames came back … they’re in the trees and the grass.”

“We slept on the street.”

“We’re dying out here.”

The Associated Press has compiled numerous 911 calls from the barrage that Maui operators received the day after wildfires swept through Lahaina. The operator answers were the same each time; emergency responders weren’t able to help find missing people because they were still trying to get people to safety, still working hotspots and responding to fires.

Maui fires, NASA image
Maui fires, NASA image

The 911 recordings from the morning and early afternoon of August 9, according to the Honolulu Star-Advertiser, were the third batch of calls released by the Maui Police Department in response to a public records request. The recordings demonstrate that dispatchers and first responders were limited by diminished staffing and communications failures.

Some callers ask where their family members are, some report disastrous fire damage, and others plead with dispatch  to tell them where to go to be safe. People were trapped in their homes or hotel rooms, many with no food or water. With each desperate call, operators had relatively the same response: they had no answers.

Read the full story here.

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FEMA director resigns after fire fund failure

Longtime federal agency official Angela Gladwell has “overseen” the $4 billion compensation fund that was supposed to pay victims of a disastrous 2022 New Mexico wildfire accidentally started by the Forest Service. Her resignation follows resounding criticism of FEMA’s handling of payments that were funded and due residents for damages caused by the Hermit’s Peak / Calf Canyon Fire, which destroyed over 400 homes and racked up literally billions of dollars in suppression costs and damages.

Angela Gladwell’s actually being “reassigned,” because the Federal Emergency Management Agency is “restructuring” its disaster response in New Mexico — in part because of loud and long criticism of its handling of disaster aid and damage payments — which Source New Mexico and ProPublica have followed for the past year.

A year after the fire, the FEMA claims office had paid less than 1 percent of its total funding allocated.

In a news release announcing Gladwell’s departure, Deborah Martinez with the claims office said she “successfully built a compensation program from the ground, assembling a team of locally hired staff with knowledge of New Mexico and the communities affected by the wildfires.” Martinez said Gladwell will now “transition to a new role” as FEMA consolidates recovery programs in the state. She would not, however, answer questions about what that “consolidation” might entail.

USFS: Throwing money at fuels treatments won’t stop communities from burning

Large communities destroyed by wildfire has become a yearly occurrence as of late. Lahaina last year, Colorado communities in the 2021 Marshall Fire, Oregon communities in the 2020 Labor Day firestorms including the  Almeda Drive Fire, and Paradise, California — leveled by the 2018 Camp Fire — all these communities were devastated by wildfire.

And the economic cost is incalculable — the Denver Post reported last year that the Marshall Fire was Colorado’s costliest ever; it destroyed $2 billion in property and killed two people.
Colorado's Marshall Fire, December 2021 photoUSFS researchers are using the stories of these destroyed communities to try to find commonality — and possibly a solution to the growing threat of fast-spreading wildland/urban interface fires. Each of these fires was human-caused or ignited near or inside communities — and all of them occurred during extreme wind events — and they immediately overwhelmed both wildland and structural firefighting efforts. The most important, and arguably most overlooked, commonality is that none of the above fires were technically “wildfires” at all, but were “conflagrations,” or fires that spread past built barriers.

“These problem fires were defined as an issue of wildfires that involved houses,” researchers said. “In reality, they are urban fires initiated by wildfires. That’s an important distinction — and one that has big repercussions for how we prepare for future fires.”

… none of the above fires were technically “wildfires” at all, but were “conflagrations,” or fires that spread past built barriers.

The importance of the distinction laid out by the researchers lies in what people believe the solution might be. Recent federal investments in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and Inflation Reduction Act address fire risk and prioritize fuel treatments on public lands.

Environmental/Community conditios, urban fires

But fuels reduction on federal lands would not have prevented any of the above fires. As wildfire suppression costs have increased, so have disastrous interface fires. Most wildfires are started by humans on private lands, and those fires destroy a majority of western U.S. structures.

“Wildland fires do not per se encroach on communities,” the report says.  “Rather, it’s communities that have impinged on wildlands, where fires play an important ecological role.”

If the goal of wildfire management is to stop the destruction of human communities, then communities and local governments must accept that wildland fires are a necessary and inevitable ecological aspect of the land they are living on. The change in mindset from wildfire suppression to adaptive living will require a shift at all levels of society. But the destruction and long recovery aftermath of each of the burned communities mentioned above shows that the rewards may outweigh the risks.

Paradise aftermath

The California community of Paradise, leveled in 2018 by the Camp Fire, has been rebuilding partly with that idea in mind.

A few of the homes were rebuilt with a World War II-era military design, which is very resistant to ignition. The needed shift will take more than the transition of a few community homes, but it’s a start. Other changes, such as new construction siting, design, construction materials, and landscaping requirements will also need to be part of the new paradigm.

“We have to live with wildland fire, says the report. “We don’t have to live with fire in our communities.”

Quebec arsonist pleads guilty

A Quebec man who posted conspiracy theories online — including that forest fires were being deliberately set by the government — has pleaded guilty to igniting fires that forced hundreds from their homes during last summer’s brutal Canadian fire season.

Brian Paré on facebook
Brian Paré on facebook

On Monday Brian Paré, 38, pleaded guilty in Quebec to 13 counts of arson and one count of arson with disregard for human life. The CBC News out of Montreal reported that prosecutor Marie-Philippe Charron said two of the 14 fires he lit caused the evacuation of 500 homes in Chapais, a community about 425 kilometres northwest of Quebec City.

“On May 31 at 8:30 p.m., the town of Chapais issued a mandatory evacuation order due to the raging fires,” Charron said, “in particular the fire at Lake Cavan as well as the airport fire, two fires that are included in the charges and were caused by the accused.”

Residents of Chapais could not return home for three days.

Chapais fire, Quebec

The Guardian reported that fighting that fire drew resources away from some of the nearly 700 fires in the province last summer. Most of those fires were ignited by lightning. The largest fire set by Paré, the Lake Cavan Fire,  was one of the first in a series of five that he set between May 31 and June 1 just days after the provincial government had issued a ban on open fires because of dry weather conditions and fire danger.

Quebec fires seen from Canadian Forces helicopter on 12. June 2023.

Provincial police and first responders noted that some of the fires had no possible natural cause, and evidence indicated that some of the fires were  intentionally set. Police first spoke to Paré on June 2; he had been seen in the area near a fire’s ignition point, and was considered a witness. Though he denied starting the fires, Charron said Paré demonstrated interest in fires in an interview, which led police to suspect him.

Brian Paré conspiracy post

And that month he began posting on facebook about Quebec’s record-breaking season; among his posts were claims that the fires were intentionally set by the government to trick people into believing in climate change. Police set a tracking device on Paré’s vehicle, and it tracked him at locations where other fires were ignited.

conspiracy posts on facebook by Brian Paré

Brian Paré on facebook

Paré was arrested on September 7 and admitted to starting nine of the fires. He said he was doing tests to learn whether the forest was really dry or not, according to the prosecutor.

Wiretap produces federal charges including bid-rigging and fraud

Editor’s note: This news ran almost a month ago and we missed it.
Thanks to Stanley for bringing it to our attention.


Following a court-authorized wiretap investigation, a federal grand jury in Boise returned an indictment last week charging two executives of competing companies with conspiring to rig bids and allocate territories in violation of the Sherman Act (which prohibits trusts, monopolies, and cartels), conspiring to commit wire fraud, and committing wire fraud, according to U.S. Attorney Josh Hurwit.

LocalNews8 reported in December that the seven-count felony indictment specifies that the conspiracy by 60-year-old Ike Tomlinson of Terreton and 61-year-old Kris Bird of Salmon affected contracts for firefighting services. The U.S. Forest Service runs a competitive bidding process for these contracts; the indictment alleges that beginning in February 2014  Tomlinson and Bird coordinated their contract bids to “squeeze” and “drown” competitors; they accepted payment for fuel trucks at collusive and noncompetitive daily rates, and then tried to conceal their actions.

The East Idaho News reported that the two were indicted by a grand jury on one count of felony conspiracy to commit wire fraud, five counts of felony wire fraud, one count of conspiracy in restraint of trade: bid rigging and territorial allocation. The charges involve actions between February 2014 and March 2023. The Jefferson Star reported in December that Tomlinson and Bird pleaded not guilty to the charges.

The indictment quotes a text conversation between Tomlinson and Bird, in which the two are discussing raising prices for water tenders.

Tomlinson: Got my water tenders in. Did not put any in salmon. FYI.

Bird: You are the man!! If you wan to put a couple here for a high amount I don’t really care!

Tomlinson: I think I might do that. What should I bid?

Bird: All find out what my bid was and then maybe we’ll both raise them.  😄 

Tomlinson: K just let me know Thanks

In 2020 Tomlinson admitted to collusion with Bird in a recorded conversation, suggesting to another (unnamed) individual that if they did not work together, that individual would “make no money.” Tomlinson told this person:

“As far as the fuel trucks go, I mean it’s just like – you know how Kris Bird and I work together? We basically talk once or twice a year and decide what we’re going to do. And we work it out. Now, if I wasn’t honest and didn’t work it out with you guys that year, trust is gone, we’re done. You know what I mean? We’re back to battling but -- and if we’re back to battling, then we’re both back to making no money. You see what I’m saying?”

Tomlinson then suggested the individual could “buy all the trailers” and then he  and Bird would “do the fuel trucks,” allowing them to “have an agreement where we don’t compete against each other.” The indictment says the other person told Tomlinson that his collusion with Bird was illegal — but the two continued anyway. Through a wiretap on Tomlinson’s cellphone, investigators heard him and Bird discussing how to push other contractors out of the bidding process, with Bird saying, “We could punch them suckers down so that it hurts ’em.”


The investigation was conducted by the Department of Justice Procurement Collusion Strike Force (PCSF). FBI agents, with judicial authorization, intercepted phone calls between Tomlinson and Bird, who spoke with each other just before the USFS deadline to submit bids on fuel truck contracts.  They agreed to rig their bids, allocate territories between their companies, and target other competitors.

A violation of the Sherman Act carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in federal prison and a $1 million fine for individuals and a maximum penalty of a $100 million fine for corporations. Violating the wire fraud statute carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in federal prison. A federal district court judge will determine sentences after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

Trial Attorney Matthew Chou and Assistant Chief Christopher J. Carlberg of the Antitrust Division’s San Francisco Office and Assistant U.S. Attorney Sean Mazorol for the District of Idaho are prosecuting the case.

Anyone with information in connection with this investigation can contact the PCSF HERE. You can also contact Cassie Fulghum, public information officer, at (208)334-1211.