Senators are also seeking hazard pay for federal employees in essential positions whose jobs cannot be accomplished while maintaining social distancing recommendations
A bipartisan group of senators has introduced a bill to ensure families of public safety officers lost to COVID-19 can quickly access survivor benefits.
(UPDATE at 10:40 a.m. MDT May 15, 2020: the Senate passed the bill. Now it goes to the House of Representatives)
The Safeguarding America’s First Responders Act (SAFR), led by senators Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) and Cory Booker (D-N.J.), clarifies the certification requirements for survivor benefits under the Public Safety Officers Benefits Program (PSOB) to account for the unique challenges presented by the pandemic. The legislation is cosponsored by Senators Cruz (R-Texas), Feinstein (D-Calif.), Tillis (R-N.C.), Coons (D-Del.), Daines (R-Mont.), Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), Scott (R-Fla.), Menendez (D-N.J.), Loeffler (R-Ga.), Blumenthal (D-Conn.), Moran (R-Kan.) and Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.).
The PSOB program provides the families of public safety officers who are killed in the line of duty with a one-time lump sum payment of $359,316 and/or education assistance of $1,224.00 per month to their children or spouse. Wildland firefighters who work for the federal agencies are included in the PSOB program.
Infectious diseases are covered under a line-of-duty death as long as evidence indicates that the infectious disease was contracted while on duty. Providing evidence that a deadly disease was contracted on duty can be straightforward in instances where an officer comes into contact with a dirty needle, however in the case of COVID-19, it can be very difficult to provide evidence that the virus was contracted on duty.
What the bill does:
Creates a presumption that if a first responder is diagnosed with COVID-19 within 45 days of their last day on duty, the Department of Justice will treat it as a line of duty incident.
The presumption will guarantee payment of benefits to any first responder who dies from COVID-19 or a complication therefrom.
The presumption will run from January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2021.
The presumption will require a diagnosis of COVID-19 or evidence indicating that the officer had COVID-19 at the time of death. This covers officers in high impact areas where finding tests can be difficult.
Another proposal – Hazard pay
A group of 19 Senators have sent letters to the Office of Personnel Management and the Office of Management and Budget requesting 25 percent hazard pay for federal employees in essential positions whose jobs cannot be accomplished while maintaining social distancing recommendations
Victor Stagnaro of the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation said on May 8, 2020 they are tracking 26 people connected with fire departments and 30 Emergency Medical Services personnel whose deaths appear to be caused by COVID-19.
Thanks and a tip of the hat go out to Jim. Typos or errors, report them HERE.
Guidance for maintaining continuity of wildland fire response
The Geographic Areas have started to release their Wildland Fire Response Plans for the COVID-19 Pandemic.
The National Multi-Agency Coordinating Group (NMAC) assigned three Area Command Teams to work with partners at all levels in the fire community to develop protocols for wildfire response during the pandemic. All of the teams worked directly with each Geographic Area’s Coordinating Group Chair, dispatch/coordination centers, and local units. They also worked under the direction and supervision of NMAC through a Team Coordinator (Joe Reinarz) and maintained frequent contact and communication through multiple daily briefings to the NMAC.
As this was updated at 1:36 p.m. MDT May 7, all of the plans are now available at the links below. NIFC had some problems with FireNET causing some of the links to not work over the last two days, but we were able to obtain from them direct links to the documents. Each one is about 80 to 110 pages.
Postponed on all forests in March, then allowed Region by Region in April
The assessed risk of conducting prescribed fires based on COVID-19 pandemic conditions in mid-March, 2020. By the Rocky Mountain Region of the U.S. Forest Service.
In mid-March the U.S. Forest Service cancelled or postponed all ignitions of prescribed fires in their Rocky Mountain Region (comprised of five states), the 13 states in the Southern Region, and California. Back then we reached out to the Forest Service’s Washington Office to ask, “Nationwide, have all prescribed fires been cancelled or postponed because of COVID-19?” On March 23 the Lead Public Affairs Specialist for the FS in Washington, Kaari Carpenter, confirmed that they were:
Our mission-critical work, such as suppressing wildfires, and other public service responsibilities, will continue within appropriate risk management strategies, current guidance of the Centers for Disease Control, and local health and safety guidelines. All new ignitions for prescribed fire have been postponed until further notice.
After hearing that prescribed fires on Forest Service lands might be allowed again, we checked with Stanton Florea, who recently transferred from a public information position in the California regional office to a similar position for the Forest Service at the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise that had been vacant. After a week, on April 30 we received what was described as “our response to your question”, which presumably came from or was approved by a government office in Washington.
The USDA Forest Service has not issued agency-wide direction to pause prescribed burning activities. Each region has been making their own decisions in terms of conducting prescribed burning activities.
Last week the Forest Service’s Pacific Southwest Region (California) included this announcement in a newsletter:
USFS
In March, the Rocky Mountain Region compiled a thoughtful analysis of the risk of conducting prescribed fires, taking many factors into consideration. The chart at the top of the page was the risk at the time that led to the decision to postpone the projects in the region. Below is the assessment of the conditions they established that would be necessary to allow prescribed fires to be restored after the COVID-19 pandemic has improved.
The assessed risk that would allow prescribed fires to be restored after COVID-19 conditions have improved. By the Rocky Mountain Region of the U.S. Forest Service.
If the Forest Service is going to use the above analysis to justify reinstating prescribed fire ignitions, then they will have decided that:
The ability to mitigate the risk changed from Moderate to Easy;
Risk to the public changed from High/Moderate to Moderate;
Social/Political moved from High to Moderate, and
Risk to employees changed from High/Moderate to Moderate.
The experience of suppressing a small to moderate-sized wildfire in Arizona on April 17 proved that managing the fire, which included the extraction of a firefighter with a broken ankle, proved to be much more complex than before the COVID-19 pandemic. If the fire had been large and the injury life-threatening, the difficulties would have been even more problematic.
Mount Rushmore prescribed fire April 30, 2020. Photo by Matt Danilchick.
The New York Times reports that the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection plans to burn roughly 3,200 acres over the next two months.
Below is an excerpt from their article, which addresses the effects of prescribed fire smoke during the COVID-19 pandemic:
Officials at CAL FIRE said they were taking steps to limit the health effects from their controlled burns, such as analyzing wind conditions to make sure smoke will not blow toward hospitals. Each burn, which can range in size from a few acres to several hundred, also requires advance approval from local air quality management boards, which in turn typically consult with local public health agencies.
Officials from several air quality boards and public health agencies downplayed the harm that controlled burns could inflict on those infected with Covid-19. “If they’re fighting for every breath, they’re in the hospital and not exposed to the smoky air,” said Lisa Almaguer, a spokeswoman for the Butte County public health department. “If they have moderate to severe symptoms then they’re home and in bed.”
Managing the extraction and treatment of a firefighter proved to be much more complex than before the pandemic
File photo. Milepost 97 Fire July 26, 2019. InciWeb.
The Verde Fire on the Coronado National Forest in southeast Arizona on April 17, 2020 was not large. The only size mentioned in the Rapid Lesson Sharing document was two acres at the initial size-up. The resources included two engines, a fire module, a hotshot crew, and a helicopter with firefighters.
But an incident within an incident that required a helicopter extraction showed that suppressing a wildfire while hampered by COVID-19 protocols requires significant modifications in what used to be standard operating procedures.
The issues that were identified can’t necessarily be called “lessons”, since there are no obvious solutions or best practices for some of the challenges.
Below are excerpts from the document:
Initial attack resources were dispatched to the Verde Fire at approximately 1630 on Friday April 17. Responding resources included: Helicopter 320, Coronado National Forest (CNF) Engine 351, CNF Engine 652, Patrol 552, Saguaro Fire Module, and the Aravaipa Interagency Hotshot Crew. The fire was initially sized-up at approximately two acres. The helicopter crew immediately began work securing the edge, utilizing the helicopter for bucket support. Responding ground resources were working to identify the best access, either by UTV or on foot. Local engines identified the area of the fire as difficult to access. Additional UTVs were delivered to the incident.
At 2000 the IC called Dispatch with a “Yellow” medical, requesting a helicopter for extraction of a firefighter with a broken ankle injury.
[…]
Lessons and COVID-19 Insights and Observations
Resources
1. With resources being held locally it creates a necessity to create “throw together” crews to meet the need. The Verde Fire ended up having five districts and four different agencies represented on the fire. Whereas the ability to order-up a couple of crews who have been self-contained generates much less intermingling of individuals.
2. Tracking contacts. As folks intermix on a fire assignment and then go back to their respective units, how are individuals tracking their interactions on a daily basis in case of contact with a COVID-positive individual? There will be a need to backtrack interactions to inform others who have also potentially been in contact.
3. What about interagency incident responses? If agencies have conflicting protocols, what do the employees of interagency districts adhere to?
Operational
1. The ability to implement COVID-19 mitigations—social distancing in particular—was highly dependent on operational tempo. The higher the tempo, the tougher it was to maintain recommended distance.
2. ATV/UTV helmets. With COVID there will be no sharing of ATV helmets. Therefore, what is the alternative? Either no ATV helmets but the wearing of fireline hardhats instead, or designating specific operators per incident? Fires are fluid so the reality of one single designated operator may not be realistic. There needs to be clear guidance about helmet use in the era of COVID.
3. Surpassing 2:1 Work/Rest on IA. On the Verde Fire resources surpassed 2:1 during the IA stage. Usually, Standard Ops is to send drivers to pick up sleep-deprived resources. In this scenario it would require four drivers to get into one vehicle together, drive out to the fire, then get into four different vehicles with the firefighters—cross-exposing one another. What is the new procedure for such logistical situations?
4. There needs to be a recognition that fighting fire is not the IWI of COVID-19, but the other way around. If the intent is to fight fire, there needs to be an understanding that the COVID-19 social distancing recommendations cannot be fully adhered to when engaged in firefighting. A simple need to bump a rig out of the way at a moment’s notice is a good example.
5. [Building off of #4 above.] The question that needs to be answered: Does a lack of completely adhering to COVID measures mean less engagement or not?
Incident Within an Incident
1. COVID measures cannot be adhered to during an IWI. At the very least, an EMT will need to interact with the patient. If there is a need to pack the patient off the hillside, the interactions obviously increase exponentially. There was a broken ankle injury that occurred after sunset on the Verde Fire, which obviously meant patient care would be necessary.
2. Hospital Liaisons (or anyone else who might usually accompany) are currently not allowed into hospitals. It was quickly learned with the Verde Fire injury that liaisons will not be allowed into the hospital. This means that there needs to be very clear information accessible to every district/unit/crew lead about what to do, which forms to send to the hospital, and who needs to fill them out. The question is: Who should the point of contact be within the hospital hierarchy to ensure that these forms are being filled out by the physician prior to discharge?
3. Why isn’t there a Duty Officer for [Albuquerque Service Center’s] injury department? Injuries that take place on a fire aren’t relegated to business hours. How can this be rectified? The Verde Fire injury happened on Friday. The injured party was in surgery Saturday morning. Due to the timing of this incident (just before the weekend), a case number could not be generated until Monday. This critical delay over the weekend has the potential to cause problems for the patient regarding billing issues.
4. Should the injured person also fill out a CA-2 due to potential exposure of COVID-positive people while in the hospital? This question speaks to how protected our people are in general. Are firefighters in the “High-Risk” category? If they are, does that mean that if someone becomes COVID positive that the exposure will be assumed to have been on the job? If firefighters are not in the “High-Risk” category what does that mean?
Other Considerations
1. This fire was human-caused. The high level of recreation use in the area is creating more opportunities for fire starts. If certain types of recreation were closed, along with fire restrictions being put into place, it would bring down the number of fire starts, thereby reducing the frequency of potential COVID exposure for firefighters.
2. This IWI (along with the resources involved) highlighted the benefits that a “fire service” could provide regarding clear intent, objectives, universal protocols/procedures, etc.
The Redding Hotshots conduct a safety briefing before beginning their assignment on the Trail Mountain Fire. U.S. Forest Service photo.
The National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) teams are working on procedures for managing wildland fire organizations and suppressing wildfires during the COVID-19 pandemic. Here is an update from NIMO.
Friday May 1, 2020
NIMO has been involved for some weeks now, with the development of a fire/COVID-19 simulation to help IMT’s and Agency Administrators prepare for fire in the new COVID environment this coming summer. If you wish to take part in one of the regional simulations, please contact your GATR..
COVID-19 Wildland Fire Simulation Development and Delivery
Date: April 27, 2020
Summary: Fire and Aviation Management (FAM), Workforce Development, Risk Management, Human Dimensions-Rocky Mountain Research Station, and National Incident Management Organization are collaborating to develop and deliver a late spring 2020 COVID-19 Wildland Fire Response Simulation.
The intended audience is Line Officers, Type 3 and higher complex Incident Management Teams (IMTs), and community partners. The intent of this virtual simulation is to facilitate dialog with Line Officers and IMTs on the use of Best Management Practices to make informed decisions, while providing an opportunity to evaluate and learn from those decisions. The exercise will highlight leadership principles and concepts, risk assessment processes, Gifford Pinchot’s Maxims, agency policy and direction; all within a complex fire situation under the constraints of a Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) environment where participants will perform functional and team responsibilities.
The simulation will provide for both Operational Risk assessment and Quantitative Risk evaluation using the Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW, and tools such as the atlas of Potential Control Locations (PCL), Suppression Difficulty Index (SDI), and asset layers.
This simulation will also prepare Line Officers and IMTs to use a whole host of decision tools including the 2020 Chief’s letter, Leadership Stance and Habits, and Center for Disease Control guidance, while evaluating decisions based on Social, Political, Health, and Safety considerations. Each simulation will be broken into two parts:
1) Morning session consisting of education, policy, guidance, and information
2) Afternoon session is the simulation with practical exercises
The Simulation will break participants into four teams to include representation of Line Officer(s), IMT Command and General Staff section chiefs, and partners, totaling no more than10 people per team. Delivery will be through Adobe Connect and will begin with Alpha and Beta test deliveries. Each delivery will be followed by an After Action Review (AAR). Closed captioning capabilities are available with at least a 48-hour notice prior to delivery. Below is the tentative schedule.
1. May 6 – Alpha delivery to Field Command School and NATP students
2. Week of May 11 Beta delivery to Regions 8 and 9
3. Week of May 18 Delivery to Regions 3 and 10
4. Week of May 25 Delivery to Regions 2 and 5
5. Week of June 1 Delivery to Regions 4 and 6
6. Week of June 8 Delivery to Region 1
Regional Training Officers will be advertising for, and prioritizing, participants for each simulation.
Please contact Jay Winfield at jay.winfield@usda.gov or 208-993-0768 for additional information.
One of the Senators’ questions was about the Forest Service’s projection of a worst-case scenario of a six percent “cumulative mortality rate” at large fire camps
Bureau of Indian Affairs firefighters participating in a fire briefing. Bureau of Indian Affairs photo.
Eleven Senators signed a letter dated April 30 asking Forest Service Chief Vicki Christiansen a series of very pointed, detailed questions about how the agency will manage their 10,000 wildland firefighters and safely suppress wildfires during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Here are some of their questions, paraphrased:
According to the Agency’s Quantitative Risk Assessment, the worst-case scenario gives a six percent “cumulative mortality rate” at large fire camps.
What measures and training protocols are the agency implementing to mitigate COVID-19 virus exposure and response?
How are you communicating the level of risk to field staff and local leaders, and how are you setting national guidance for priortizing firefighter safety?
Will national crews and assets be able to move between regions to respond to wildfires?
What are you doing to communicate the scale of risk?
How will you coordinate with other agencies to ensure communities impacted by wildfire smoke have access to health care and air filters, in light of COVID-19?
Do you need additional resources? (this question was asked multiple times)
How are you working with state, federal, and local partners to ensure consistency of response and COVID-19 related precautions are consistent, realistic, and implementable on multi-jurisdictional fire responses?
What is the agency doing to continue implementing forest management and hazardous fuels reduction activities?
In a letter from the Chief dated April 3, 2020 you mention that the agency would commit resources “only when there is a reasonable expectation of success in protecting life and critical property infrastructure.” This has led to some confusion about how quickly and aggressively the FS will respond to wildfires. Please expand on how you and the agency define a “reasonable expectation for success”.
Given that large fires will increase fire crew interaction and demand for outside assistance, what steps are the agency taking to plan for these scenarios and provide appropriate precautions to protect firefighter health and safety?
If you plan to work with local partners and businesses to help bolster capacity, supply meals, and offer temporary housing, how are you communicating agency direction to prevent transmission fo COVID-19?
Since a new contract for exclusive use Type 1 helicopters has not been issued and the contract for five additional large air tankers has been protested and may not be resolved until July:
Has the agency considered adding more exclusive use contracts for rotor and fixed wing aircraft?
Would additional aerial suppression assets assist in this year’s prioritization of initial attack and reducing smoke for vulnerable populations?
The letter was signed by eleven senators, all Democrats from western states: Kamala D. Harris (CA), Dianne Feinstein (CA), Ron Wyden (OR), Kyrsten Sinema (AZ), Jeff Merkley (OR), Patty Murray (WA), Catherine Cortez Masto (NV), Martin Heinrich (NM), Jacky Rosen (NV), Michael Bennet (CO), and Maria Cantwell (WA).
From my experience in the last three months of trying obtain information along these lines from the Forest Service, the agency is extremely reluctant to disclose anything meaningful about how operating procedures have changed during COVID-19. For example they flat refused to divulge any information about the peculiar 30-day contracts awarded to a handful of Type 1 helicopter companies — or even admit that the contracts existed. This is important, since the previous four-year contracts for Type 1 exclusive use helicopters ended April 30.
It appears that there is a degree of micro-managing going on in the federal land management agencies. Some questions from reporters that used to be routinely answered quickly at the local or Boise level now have to be filtered through not just the Washington office level, but may go all the way up to the Department of Agriculture and Department of the Interior. At that point the proposed response may be modified, sometimes to the point of producing useless gibberish.
For example, a question to a Forest Service spokesperson about the reasons for the unusual 30-day helicopter contracts and how they were awarded resulted in this “answer” several days later:
The USDA FS is utilizing all options available via the existing aviation contracts and Call When Needed Agreements to ensure that historical helicopter coverage remains in place.
It is possible that Regional and National leaders within the Forest Service do not have the support of appointees at the Department and White House level to make decisions based on their years of knowledge, skills, and experience. They may not have the confidence or authority to demonstrate real leadership or make the necessary decisions called for relative to the topics brought forward in this letter from the Senators. These eleven elected officials may be cognizant of this.
Thanks and a tip of the hat go out to Bill and Jason. Typos or errors, report them HERE.
