This amazing photo of night operations on the Whitewater-Baldy fire in New Mexico was taken June 6, 2012. Photo credit: Kari Greer for Gila National Forest. More of Kari’s excellent photos of the fire can be found HERE.
The Little Bear fire on the Lincoln National Forest in southeast New Mexico, the home of Smokey Bear, attracted attention today by making a big push to the east and putting up a huge amount of smoke.
The Little Bear fire started from a lightning strike on June 4 and is listed at 10,000 acres, but I’m guessing it increased to about 15,000 on Saturday.
More information about the Little Bear fire.
The video below shows time-lapse satellite images of the Whitewater-Baldy fire in New Mexico between May 20 and June 6 — which in itself is pretty cool, but this was done with an iPhone. Really?, you’re thinking? Yes, really. Kirk Klausmeyer made it after capturing MODIS satellite imagery on his cell phone.
The images were acquired with an app for the iPhone called The World Daily, which can capture satellite images of any place (as long as it is on the planet Earth). Mr. Klausmeyer told us that after collecting the images, he converted them to a video using the free Google program Picassa.
The Whitewater-Baldy fire grew by another 18,000 acres yesterday to 170,272 acres, becoming the largest in the recorded history of New Mexico, surpassing last year’s Las Conchas fire which blackened 156,593 acres. The Wallow fire last year was the largest in Arizona history. It burned 538,049 acres and destroyed 32 residences.
A person has to wonder. Is this going to be the new norm — frequent record-setting fires, while the number of federal firefighters and air tankers continue to shrink?
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has released a report on the death of BLM Hotshot crewmember Caleb Hamm, who died from hyperthermia, a heat related illness. (The most severe form of hyperthermia is heat stroke.) Mr. Hamm was working on the CR 337 fire near Mineral Wells, Texas with the Bonneville Interagency Hotshot Crew when he collapsed and died July 7, 2011.
His parents, including his mother, Lynette Hamm, believe the official BLM report on the fatality has errors and suspects that the agency has not been completely forthcoming in an attempt to hide errors or mistakes in judgement. Ms. Hamm has said she wants all the facts to be disclosed so that other parents of firefighters will not have to bury their sons and daughters.
A television station in Utah, KSL, did a story on the incident.
Here is an excerpt from the article at KSL TV, which quotes Martin Buzbee, a city official from Mineral Wells, Texas who acts as the GIS mapping coordinator. :
…”I kept waiting and waiting for a medevac helicopter to be flown in and take care of the patient,” Buzbee said.
The medical helicopter and ambulance were parked just a few miles away. They were supposed to be called in according to the BLM’s own emergency plan, but the BLM was trying to use its own helicopter.
“They were reconfiguring a helicopter from the fire: from dropping water with a bucket, taking the bucket off and to try to medevac the patient in,” Buzbee described.
Eventually, the BLM did call in the civilian helicopter and ambulance. Official reports said the delay was 20 minutes; however, Buzbee believes it was more like 45 minutes.
Hamm was taken by ambulance from Drop Point Twenty and pronounced dead at the hospital. The incident was investigated by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. NIOSH concluded the 20 minute delay did not contribute to Hamm’s death. But Buzbee believes if the BLM had called the medical helicopter to the top of the hill immediately, it might have made all the difference.
Below is an excerpt from the NIOSH report which was released May 14, 2012.
On June 23, 2011, a 23-year-old male seasonal wildland fire fighter (FF) on an interagency hot shot crew (IHC) deployed from his duty station in Utah to fight wildland fires in Georgia and Texas. After fighting fires in Georgia for 4 days, the crew was dispatched to Texas. After travelling for 3 days, then staging for 3 days, the crew began fire fighting on July 4, 2011.
On the morning of July 7, 2011, the FF was assigned swamper duties (clearing limbs after tree-cutting) to construct a fireline followed by cold trail operations (a component of mop-up) with a hand tool. After lunch, the FF refilled his water supply and continued securing the fireline and mopping up for about 1.5 hours. After being left alone for a short period of time, the FF was found unconscious at approximately 1550 hours. The weather was sunny and hot: a temperature of 105 degrees Fahrenheit (°F), relative humidity of 24% with minimal wind (1 to 3 miles per hour).
Initial assessment by the crew’s emergency medical technician (EMT) suggested the FF suffered from heat-related illness (HRI). Air Attack was notified as the crew EMTs provided basic HRI care at this remote location (the FF’s pack and shirt were removed, he was doused with water, and a tarp was held up for shade). Local emergency medical service (EMS) units (ambulance and Air Evacuation helicopter) were not notified of the incident for about 20 minutes due to uncertain drop point coordinates. This delay, however, did not delay advanced life support (ALS) treatment because it took 45 minutes to extract the FF to the drop point where the local EMS units were waiting.
Approximately 30 minutes after his collapse, the FF’s condition deteriorated; respiratory arrest was followed by cardiac arrest, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was begun.
Approximately 15 minutes after his cardiac arrest the FF arrived at the drop point and the local, ambulance and Air Evacuation units initiated advanced life support (ALS) but their treatment protocols for exertional heatstroke did not include cold/ice water immersion therapy. When the FF arrived at the hospital ED a core temperature of 108° F was documented and ALS continued for an additional 5 minutes. At 1703 hours the attending physician pronounced the FF dead and resuscitation efforts were stopped.
The autopsy report listed the cause of death as “hyperthermia.” NIOSH investigators agree with the Medical Examiner’s assessment. NIOSH investigators conclude that the FF’s hyperthermia was precipitated by moderate to heavy physical exertion in severe weather conditions. These factors led to exertional heatstroke.
All of the IHC members were exposed to heat stress (hot environmental conditions). Most IHC members interviewed by NIOSH reported symptoms consistent with HRI (feeling hot, feeling tired/fatigued/exhausted, weakness, headache, or nausea). Although indicators of heat strain were not measured (core body temperature, heart rates), on the basis of the environmental conditions and the reported symptoms, NIOSH investigators concluded that many of the IHC crewmembers had mild to moderate HRI.
Fatal exertional heatstroke is extremely rare among wildland fire fighters; this was the first reported case in the Agency’s 65-year history and only the second reported federal wildland fire fighter to die from heatstroke according to wildland fire service records. Agency records, however, show that less severe cases of HRIs and dehydration are more common; 255 cases occurred over the past 12 years. NIOSH considers cases of HRI to be “sentinel health events” [NIOSH 1986]. Sentinel health events are preventable diseases, disabilities, or deaths whose occurrence serves as a warning signal that preventive or therapeutic care may be inadequate [Rutstein et al. 1983].
To prevent HRI and heatstroke, a number of organizations have developed guidelines for determining when environmental conditions are too hot to continue training, sporting, or work activities. The environmental conditions during this incident exceeded these guidelines. NIOSH investigators offer the following safety and health recommendations to reduce heat stress, heat strain, and prevent future cases of HRI and exertional heatstroke among wildland fire fighters. Implementing these recommendations will demonstrate a continuing commitment to improve the safety culture of the wildland fire service.
- Strengthen the Agency’s current heat stress program with the following components:
- instruct fire fighters and command staff that hydration alone will not prevent HRI;
- develop re-acclimatization schedules for wildland fire fighters not working for more than 4 days;
- measure environmental heat conditions using a Wet Bulb Globe Thermometer (WBGT);
- when heat stress criteria are exceeded, discontinue physically demanding training according to the guidelines developed independently by the United States (U.S.) Army/Air Force and American College of Sports Medicine (ACSM);
- when heat stress criteria are exceeded, require hourly work/recovery cycles according to NIOSH and ACGIH guidelines, particularly when the operation does not involve rescue operations;
- when heat stress screening criteria are exceeded, consider monitoring fire fighters for signs of heat strain;
- when heat stress screening criteria are exceeded, consider a bimodal shift or two shifts;
- consider incorporating a screening checklist for heatstroke risk factors into the Agency’s medical screening and medical examination program;
- Always work in pairs and/or be in direct communication with crewmembers.
- Promptly alert local EMS units of a medical emergency per Incident Command protocols.
- When exertional heatstroke is suspected, inform responding EMS units of the potential need for cold/ice water immersion therapy.
- Seek input from crewmembers and frontline supervisors about removing barriers, real or perceived, to reporting or seeking medical attention for heat strain or HRI.
- Consider cases of HRI, particularly severe cases such as heatstroke or rhabdomyolysis that result in death or hospitalization, as a sign that the current heat stress program is inadequate.
- Consider incorporating members of the Department’s Safety Office into the Operations Management Team.
It is interesting that one of the NIOSH recommendations was to use a Wet Bulb Globe Thermometer (WBGT). In 1972 when I was on the El Cariso Hot Shots, a research organization paid the salary of one of the crewmembers that year, Tom Sadowski, to monitor three people on every fire, recording their pulse at regular intervals while they worked, what they ate, weather conditions, and other criteria. Tom also carried a WBGT, which was a thermometer with a three-inch black sphere on the end which had to be wet when readings were taken. The concept was that as the water evaporated the WBGT took into account the ambient temperature, the effect of wind on the evaporation, cooling from evaporation, and radiant heat from the fire or the sun. I don’t know what became of the research and the huge amount of data that Tom collected. Maybe there is a paper floating around out there somewhere.
UPDATE: Ken, in a comment, found the report from the study. The paper was first published in 1974 and a summary appears in a 1975 edition of Fire Management on page 16.
The recommendations the researchers made still seem applicable today. Interestingly, they suggest using a wet globe thermometer in order to “recognize heat stress situations”, which is similar to one of the recommendations made in the recent NIOSH report. This recommendation has been on the books for about 38 years. Maybe it’s time the agencies involved in wildfire suppression took action on it.
Perhaps every safety officer on a fire should have one when heat stress is a possibility. It might save a life.
Google Search found WBGTs listed for sale at $150 to $230.
UPDATE May 16, 2012:
The Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center and the International Association of Wildland Fire are hosting a webinar titled Wildland Firefighter Heat Illness Awareness and Prevention on May 17 at 1:00 p.m. PDT. More info HERE.
It is dry in much of the southwestern and eastern United States
Average precipitation, January through April, 2012:
Drought conditions as of May 1, 2012:
Escaped prescribed fires complicate future projects in Australia
Last year we first wrote about the prescribed fire in Leeuwin-Naturaliste National Park that escaped on November 23, 2011 and pushed by strong winds, destroyed 40 structures and burned over 8,400 acres in western Australia. Residents who had refused to evacuate later had to take refuge from the fire at the ocean on a beach. They were rescued by jet ski and ferried to a search and rescue boat offshore. The report on the incident was very critical of the government’s prescribed fire program, saying some employees of the Department of Environment and Conservation were overworked and performing above their skill levels.
A recent article in The Independent examines further the prescribed fire program in Australia in light of the recent failures. Here is an excerpt:
…A lobby group called the Bush Fire Front, which was set up by a group of retired foresters in western Australia, is also predicting dire consequences unless the burning programme is “greatly expanded”. The Front’s chairman, Roger Underwood, deplores a backlash against DEC’s staff, who have stopped wearing uniforms after being hissed at and abused in the Margaret River shops.
“DEC has been looking after their fire safety for years, doing all the dirty work,” says Mr Underwood. “They make one mistake and are crucified for it.”
However, as locals point out, it was not just one mistake. On the day of the fire, another controlled burn escaped near Nannup, east of Margaret River, incinerating 125,000 acres of national park and state forest, and damaging a farm part-owned by Stewart and Alison Scott. Mr Scott was about to start the afternoon’s milking when he saw flames sweeping towards his property. He dashed over to warn his family, but the smoke was so thick that one of his farmhands – who had leapt on a quad bike – collided with a car. The man suffered head injuries and spent months in Royal Perth Hospital.
California wildfire burns structures
A wildfire near Acton, California in southern California yesterday burned 126 acres and several structures. Inspector Quvondo Johnson of Los Angeles County Fire Department said an aggressive air attack, which included five helicopters and fixed wing air tankers, helped the crews on the ground contain the fire.
CAL FIRE sent S-2 air tankers from Porterville and Hemet, 120 miles and 90 miles from the fire, respectively. There were no federal air tankers at the air tanker base at Landcaster, 18 miles from the fire. The DC-10 very large air tankers are based at Victorville, 60 miles east of Acton.
Is fire suppression causing water shortages?
An opinion piece in the LA Times claims the 100-year old policy of wildfire suppression in the United States has caused water shortages. The theory is that over-stocked forests that have become that way due to successful suppression of fires, have locked up moisture in the trees and reduced runoff. Here is an excerpt from the article:
Today, the hottest and thirstiest parts of the United States are best described as over-forested. Vigorous federal protection has stocked semiarid regions of public land with several billion trees too many. And day after day these excess trees deplete a natural resource that has become far more precious than toilet paper or 2-by-4’s: water.
I will have to go on record as being skeptical of this trees-causing-water-shortage theory.
2011 summary of incident reviews
The Wildfire Lessons Learned Center has released a report summarizing the information gleaned from the seventy-eight 2011 incident review reports—from various agencies—submitted to and gathered by the LLC.
New Mexico establishes fire notification system
The state of New Mexico has established a system by which residents can be notified about wildfires. Emails will contain information including when the fire started, the cause, and a description of threatened homes and communities. For now, the system will send people who sign up for the service information about all fires within the state. Later it will be refined so that notifications can be filtered to more specific locations, such as counties. Anyone can sign up HERE.
Thanks go out to Johnny and Dick.