DC-10 air tanker drops on the Calf Canyon – Hermits Peak Fire, May, 2022. Santa Fe NF photo.The US Forest Service has activated seven air tankers on call when needed (CWN) contracts to join the 15 large air tankers that were already mobilized on exclusive use (EU) contracts.
Six of the seven CWNs are water scoopers, CL-415s and CL-415EAFs, operated by Bridger Aerospace and Aero Flite. While the FS calls it a CWN activation, four of the scoopers are on a 120-mandatory availability (MAP) arrangement while the other two are day to day.
The seventh ship on CWN is a 10 Tanker DC-10, on a 120-day MAP.
There are still three large air tankers with EU contracts that will start later this month, an RJ85, an MD87, and a Coulson aircraft to be named later, probably a 737 or C-130. This will bring the number of EU large air tankers up to 18.
The contract awards for CWN scoopers, announced by the FS on May 19, 2021, went to three companies, Aero Flite, Air Spray, and Bridger Air Tanker.
Air tanker requests filled, canceled, and unfilled
Last year 19 percent of the requests for air tankers were unable to be filled (UTF) and 22 percent were cancelled; 59 percent were filled.
Sometimes an Incident Commander’s request for an air tanker gets cancelled because the situation suddenly changed and the need no longer exists. But often, we have been told, the Geographic Area Coordination Centers tell the ordering point to cancel a request that they can’t fill. In those cases, what is actually a UTF is changed to a canceled request.
If we look at just the UTFs and canceled on a bar chart, it looks like this:
And it’s not just air tankers requests that get converted to canceled. We wrote this in a May 11 article on Wildfire Today:
Last year 1,858 (40 percent) of the orders for hand crews were unfilled, and 1,853 (29 percent) of orders for engines were unfilled. In addition, the number of cancelled orders were 32 percent of crew orders and 22 percent of engine orders. There can be multiple reasons why orders are cancelled, but they can include the order sat unfilled and the requesting unit gave up, or finally the need no longer existed. The number of orders actually filled in 2021 were 27 percent for crews and 49 percent for engines.
It conceivable that if the true numbers of UTF requests were tracked, it would easily justify an increase in numbers of resources — crews, engines, air tankers, and helicopters.
17 Comments
Have the rates for these federal CWN scooper awards been made public?
As usual ; about 1/2 the number of tankers that could be used !!
My impression is that the number of unfilled tanker requests is a less a function of numbers of airplanes and more of a result of resource-sharing philosophies amongst competing wildfire agencies.
In other words, they could achieve a lot more if they improved their inefficient dispatching and arcane day-off rules.
Not true at all…
Please expand your rebuttal. The dispatch and resource assignment procedures (on federal land) are hardly efficient, and having airtankers sit idle one day per week is ludicrous.
Sure, there are times most seasons where more airtankers would be helpful, but if the fed agencies insist upon CWN contract structures, there will come a time where those extra airplanes have found more permanent work elsewhere.
Your claim about dispatch and resource assignment procedures…is false.
Enlighten us, Steve.
This is isn’t rocket science and surely doesn’t come under DARPA secrecy. Part 121 and many 135 operators have dispatchers and flight coordinators to assign and track acft…whats yur secret? Please enlighten us
From Bruce’s post: “My impression is that the number of unfilled tanker requests is a less a function of numbers of airplanes and more of a result of resource-sharing philosophies amongst competing wildfire agencies.” …BS. This claim isn’t backed with facts, is contrary to resource dispatch practices, resource utilization policy, actual resource assignment data, aircraft prepositioning statistics…the list goes on.
Hi Steve, you raise some understandable skepticism, and I’ll reply with my observations, with the disclaimer is that none of the following is intended to provoke people who are trying to do the best job they can within a slow-to-change system. I’ll also admit the ‘glass houses’ principle applies to me, as there is of course no perfect organization anywhere in this industry, so I’ll keep my tossed pebbles small.
Doug highlighted what I believe many pilots see and experience. While I don’t have proprietary agency data at my fingertips, I’ll simply state that the sheer number of agencies competing for the same resources over such a large landbase gives rise to inefficiency.
Is there a single, central coordination center that accepts, prioritizes and assigns all airtanker requests across federal lands, or is it all done at the local or regional (GACC) level?
Can the duty officer at such a national center reassign a resource mid-mission if a higher-priority (IA or WUI) request arises, or does that have to be cleared by the on-site IC?
As long as a SEAT, a LAT, a VLAT and a MAFFS are considered as inherently different animals (hint: they are not) and have different procedures for each of them, that introduces inefficiency.
Having a valuable EU airplane parked off to the side of the ramp every Wednesday for “rest” is inefficient. You’ve lost 14% availability of that resource right away. Pilots require rest, airplanes don’t.
Requiring airtankers to shut down engines on every reload is inefficient, time-consuming and costly in maintenance terms. What is preventing reloads with engines running as SOP?
I’ve been on bases where it takes seven (!) people to load an airtanker, and on bases where a single person is loading a steady stream of airtankers. But I digress.
The USFS lead plane program with just a pilot aboard is inefficient. Pair pilots with an ASM/ATGS in every Commander or King Air etc, and certify them for low-level ops.
There is no need to lead every heavy airplane…even a VLAT. They can (and have) operate perfectly safely with a verbal run description, as long as the described run has been verified for safety. Leading an airtanker should not be the default option every time.
Initial-attack carded pilots being dispatched without an accompanying ASM platform: sorry. Really inefficient.
Importing highly-experienced ASM (birddog) platforms from other countries and not allowing them to do certain common functions “you can’t lead a US air tanker, because…reasons” is, you guessed it, inefficient never mind insulting. As Doug implied, there are politics at play and bruised egos and none of that should matter during a fire bust, and yet, it does. Too many people have actively worked to bar imported resources from working on their turf. Have experienced this one too many times first-hand (hello MWH & hello certain lead plane drivers).
Horizontal racetrack patterns of multiple airtankers over the same incident instead of vertical stacking is inefficient, never mind introducing a higher risk of conflict in congested airspace.
One-year contract terms, the debacles around award protests, and the generally unfavourable contract climate doesn’t inspire new & existing vendors to innovate and offer more resources. Similarly, not holding underperforming air tanker companies accountable to the terms of their contracts (retardant capacity, mission endurance, ability to carry passengers if spec’d, maintenance compliance, dispatch reliability etc) results in a less-capable fleet in the long term.
I’m curious what the average dispatch distance is for the federal airtanker fleet, measured from the responding base(s) to each incident and how much lower that could drop with more enlightened resource positioning.
Anyway, I firmly believe more can be done with the existing number of airtankers, even before adding more airplanes to the fleet.
I can’t agree with the sentiment that an IA-carded pilot and aircraft are inefficient without a lead or ASM; this isn’t so. Othewise, there would be no use of an initial attack qualification. The whole point of IA is that a pilot can respond not only to an incident with other aircraft, but to an incident without any other aircraft, and still work effectively with an IC, if one is available, or can assess and begin fighting the fire .
I submit that refraining from sending an IA-qualified pilot/aircraft to a fire because a lead/ASM isn’t available, is inefficient.
There is no such thing as an IA-carded pilot in Canada, and the time spent processing (arrival, orientation, demonstration, drop, exit) airtankers over incidents is a fraction than in the US.
Stretched over the duration of that incident, or a fire bust or a season, that time overhead is significantly reduced, allowing higher utilization of those airtankers. Also not factored in are the increased safety margins (the airtanker pilot doesn’t have to do low level recons), nor any delays in helicopter/crew action as they wait for the above process to take place.
I’ll amend my statement to say that IA-carded pilots aren’t INefficient, but using an ASM platform dramatically increases their efficiency.
I am assuming you mean that no Canadian agencies have an IA carding type policy? As there are Canadian pilots USFS carded for AK operations and export to lower 48. Australia also engages in a significant amount of IA/tanker only fires particularly in SEAT where I would say a Lead or Briddog is less likely available than more.
IA is far less efficient, as you say, than having a BirdDog and in my opinion is as much a sign of desperation as it is disorganisation. I need a lot of really good reason to do IA in a large tanker and only one mediocre one not to.
It’s almost as if I wrote this statement myself. If not for the proper grammar and correct spelling I’d be thinking I’ve been plagersised…plagerized…plagouraz…copied.
Good job!
I can’t back it up with facts either, but I can certainly tell you anecdotally, based on personal experience spanning several decades, that resource hoarding and sharing policies do play a BIG role in who gets sent where. I lost track twenty odd years ago of the number of times I was told, “we promised XXX that we’d have you back there by nightfall,” and sent to sit on a quiet ramp with no fire activity, while a state of emergency existed behind me. I flew the fire that day, then was sent back to a place where there was no fire, because of agreements between districts, and arrangements. We can let you have the airplane today…
This, when I’m a national resource. Go figure.
I’ve had that experience in air attack platforms, SEAT platforms, and in heavy tankers. I’ve had that experience on exclusive use contracts and CWN/OC contracts. I’ve had it on state and federal contracts. It absolutely happens, and I’ve experienced it on both coasts and most places in between. I’ve experienced it between BIA, CDF/Calfire, USFS, BLM, and various state agencies.
I’ve also seen some places where prejudices against certain platforms are well known and prevalent; Region 5 (California), for example; while SEATS see some limited use, there’s a strong prejuduce that in some locations borders on hostile (San Bernardino is a good example), and I’ve seen it expressed outright, and sometimes in abusive behavior (feed everyone but the SEAT on a fire bust, and leave the SEAT pilot on the couch watching everyone else eat). I’ve experienced it first hand.
So far as waving a policy and shouting, “here are the facts,” no. Doesn’t change the fact, though, and nobody will convince me otherwise. As a national resource, I’ve been sent all over the country. As a national resource, I’ve also been held back from being sent, or returned after one day on a fire that’s ongoing for a long time. I’ve been retained in places where there wasn’t any fire, just to show utilization (and have been told as much).
Probably the most egregious was some years ago, being held back months after the fire season ended, and we were told outright at the time that we were being used because the agency wanted to show max utilization of turbine assets to downplay piston equipment. I was released in a heavy blizard just before Christmas, to go home. Just prior to the blizard, I was sent on a “fire.” We arrived over the “fire” to find a lot of black, as far as they eye could see, and a lone pickup truck on a mesa. We asked where the retardant was desired, and were told “We don’t care, just string it out through the middle of the black somewhere.” When we asked what coverage level, we were told that they didn’t care. When we dropped the load, we were told “load and return.” It’s the only time in my career I can recall ever refusing to come back when the call didn’t involve safety of flight. As taxpayers, while we would make money flying the airplane, we elected not to accept the return because it offended us. Too over-the-top.
Politics, waste, and hoarding, as well as formal or informal agreements exist all over the place, and I’ve seen it happen for a lot of years, through different decades, different administrations, different agencies, different aircraft and operations, etc. It absolutely goes on.
I don’t think you’ll find a single tanker pilot who isn’t acutely aware of countless times when we could have launched on a fire and done some good, early in the process, but were held back, not dispatched, watched it burn from the tanker base, until later in the day during the “burn period.” Resources can absolutely be better utilized.
I sat through a district meeting at the tail end of a fire season, a fly on the wall, and listened to a frank and unapologetic conversation that detailed what the district had been able to do with the funds they saved by not dispatching the tanker, or holding it back. They put radios in trucks, bought personalized fleece for each firefighter, and other pet projects, and there was no question how the funds to do that came to be, within the district. Likewise, I’ve been on initial attack fires when one load was put around or across a small fire, even a single tree, and I was sent to hold because the ground fire wanted overtime and made a point to complain that they wouldn’t get it if the tanker put the fire out.
It cuts several ways; refusal to use tankers that are available, early when they can do the most good. Using tankers when not needed to burn budget; draw down funds; show utilization; for show on a fire where it’s not justified, keep a base open, etc; sending tankers back to quiet locations during a fire bust because of an “agreement” or because of a tanker contracted by one agency or the other, or even crossing the asbestos curtain between regions or agencies where preferences or prejudices exist…whether you see “facts” on the table or not, no lack of formal typed-up arrangement can ever convince me that I haven’t experienced it frequently over many, many years…especially when I’ve been verbally told by dispatch that’s exactly what’s happening.
Ya there is still a lot of shenanigans that are pulled with tankers, but it has not been as bad in recent years concerning hoarding, probably because there is such a shortage of them that the NMAC group keeps them moving around, and pries them back from the GACCS. Same with Type 1 helicopters. I don’t know that I agree that tankers are held back much these days early in an IA. On the fire that popped yesterday down near Pagosa Springs they immediately had 5 heavies working it. Sounds like a lot of your experiences were from back in the day. Times change.
A whole lot more recent than you might think.
That’s going to be EXPENSIVE…but show a lunch and get Presidential authorization for a loop of 91 skip.
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