(UPDATE at 10:20 a.m. MDT, July 16, 2013)
The Arizona State Forestry Division has issued a report that summarizes information about some of the major events and the firefighting resources that were deployed for the Yarnell Hill Fire. This new document corrects some of the information reported by the Associated Press below.
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(UPDATE at 10:15 a.m. MDT, July 13, 2013)
We checked with Rick Hatton, CEO of 10 Tanker Air Carrier, the company that operates the two DC-10 air tankers, about the use of their aircraft on the Yarnell Hill Fire. Mr. Hatton said each of their two DC-10s, which carry 11,600 gallons, made five drops on the fire. Throughout the day on Sunday June 30, the day of the tragedy, they made a total of eight drops, and then made two more on July 1.
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(Originally published at 8:20 p.m. July 12, 2013)
The Associated Press is reporting that a request for six “heavy” air tankers was placed about 50 minutes before the Granite Mountain Hotshots became entrapped and deployed their fire shelters on the Yarnell Hill Fire. However the request was never filled, and was classified as Unable to Fill, or UTF. There were only 12 heavy air tankers on duty June 30 in the lower 48 states and none were available to respond to the fatal fire near southwest of Prescott, Arizona.
The Granite Mountain Hotshots lost 19 of their 20 crewpersons that day when a passing thunderstorm caused the wind to change direction by 180 degrees and increase in speed, gusting to over 40 mph. In winds that strong it is unlikely that any aircraft could operate safely 200 feet above the ground or effectively drop a liquid that would accurately hit the intended target.
The last retardant drops before the fatal entrapment were made at 12:30 and 1 p.m. by P2V air tankers which carry a maximum of 2,082 gallons. After that the air tankers went back to another fire they had been working in northern Arizona. According to the AP, earlier the two DC-10 very large air tankers had been requested which drop 11,600 gallons each, but they were not available. The AP also said, “Only a spotter plane was in the air when the Prescott, Ariz.-based Granite Mountain Hotshots died. The state’s fleet of small single-engine retardant-dropping planes was grounded in Prescott because of the weather, and no helicopters or heavy tankers were available.”
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In 2002 there were 44 large or heavy air tankers on exclusive use contracts. Today there are 9. The day the 19 Hotshots died, four military MAFFS air tankers had been activated days earllier, but of those potential 13 air tankers, some of them would have been on their day off. And some, or all of those on duty, would have been actively working other fires. There were 50 uncontained large fires in the United States that day. If they all needed air tankers, which is not likely, each of the 12 that were on duty (according to the AP) would have to be shared by 4 large fires.
In 2012 about half the requests for air tankers could not be filled according to data from the National Interagency Fire Center. Of the 914 requests, 438 were rejected as “unable to fill” (UTF), meaning no air tankers were available to respond to the fire; 67 were cancelled for various reasons.
It is important to remember that airtankers are prioritized to new starts (IA) rather than Large Fires. It should continue that way so that more starts don’t turn into Large fires. That is where airtankers provide the most discernible difference. There are times when airtankers can be used for specific objectives on the fire, but normally in the large fire support role, it is a huge cost for little if any return. While everyone would like to think (emotionally) that an airtanker drop(s) from the DC-10s would have made the difference, in this instance – and most – it would not have. Conditions and terrain were overwhelming. I feel horrible for those who lost their lives. I’ve been overhead in two similar instances trying to help and those efforts were not effective. They did however escape. Maybe WFT could look at a breakdown of UTF for IA and Large Fires?
Some media reports I have gathered…
http://www.azcentral.com/video/2547117399001
http://www.prescottaz.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=121340
not sure how much good an air tanker would have been unless it happen to be overhead at the time of the incident. The fire exploded and changed direction so viciously that the only thing that could have saved our brothers was to have not been there in the first place. I just dont understand why they were not already in the safety zone when the thunderstorm got to the fire area.
The VLAT’s (Very large air tankers or the DC-10’s) can only land and take off from specific airports that have tanker bases that can support these large aircraft. Their turn around time can be long as it takes a lot longer to fly too and from a certain base and to load an aircraft that carries so much retardant all takes time. Maintenance crews also take a while to look over the aircraft before sending them out and they may need to be refueled. While the aircraft can fly in higher winds, the effectiveness of the drops comes into question at higher wind speeds as the retardant no longer comes out in a predictable pattern and is therefore less effective. These planes are also very expensive and therefore area fires are prioritized. It is a giant chess game and oftentimes the right pieces are not in the right places. More airtankers and heavy helicopters MAY have been able to assist this crew, however the one unpredictable factor, the weather, is always an unknown and while we try to predict for this, we are not always successful. It is easy to ‘arm-chair quarterback’ this event, but the end result is the same, we lost 19 incredible young men who enjoyed their lives as firefighters and one young man who survived simply because he was sent off as a look out and luck or fate stepped in and he made it through. Rest in Peace Granite Mountain Hot Shots.
Bill,
What time was that tweet from “Dolores” that said tankers were loading at 3 bases in Arizona incuding VLAT’s and SEAT’s”?
I saw one DC-10 drop around 17:00 as the storm was going on. I was with the fire crews on the south end of town on the east side of Highway 89. It was also spitting rain at that time.
I guess I can’t type that well on my smart phone.
The DC10’s were flying out of Gateway so they were not affected by the wx.
Did the DC-10s continue to drop even while the thunderstorm was creating winds gusting over 40 mph out of the northeast?
Like Panhandle, I have concerns about the AP story. It doesn’t jive with what I remember while at the fire that day. I do remember one of the DC-10s dropping south to north along the eastern edge of the fire in the residental area on the west side of Yarnell around 17:00 hours. The DC-10s were about an hour turnaround from Gateway in Phoenix.
Do you remember if this was before or after report of deployment?
Calvin, are you referring to this article: “Report: six air tankers requested before Yarnell Hill Fire entrapment, but they were not available”
Mr. Gabbert
I was directly replying to the statement above from Tom Story “ I do remember one of the DC-10s dropping south to north along the eastern edge of the fire in the residental area on the west side of Yarnell around 17:00 hours.”
I was reviewing some of your older articles when I came across this statement from an eyewitness. So the drop he is referring to is T-911 carrying 10,743 gallons of retardant.
This drop was made at 1651 according to SAIR page 101 as noted by stop time. This is the load of retardant that DIVA notifies ASM2” That’s exactly what were looking for, that is where we want the retardant,” at 1637.
I read your response to Elizabeth on the Yarnell Hill Fire Report Released section October 10 1213pm concerning the effectiveness of a vlat/ retardant: >A rapidly spreading fire in medium or heavy fuels will burn too intensely for retardant or water to be effective. The fire will burn right through it. This was the situation during the wind event that caused the entrapment of the 19 firefighters. One of the questions we asked Dave Nelson in our interview recently was “What is one of the more common errors in judgment you have seen on fires?” His answer: “Pounding a rolling fire with aerial retardant drops.”
To summarize, with everything I have read about the fire, my judgement is that aircraft attempting to drop on the entrapment site would not be effective due to strong winds dispersing the retardant, strong winds making it difficult or impossible for aircraft to operate safely, poor visibility due to smoke, lack of knowledge as to the exact location of the crew, and fire intensity that would have caused the fire to burn through retardant.< Bill Gabbert
There is a picture that was published in the International Business Times July 3 that shows a retardant line that protected Yarnell that is South to North. It appears this line is in the same area described above by Tom Story. I am not saying it could have saved Granite Mountain, I do not know that. With this information, I think it is safe to say the retardant was not delivered on the south side of the fire and it wasn’t delvered until approximately ten minutes after Marsh delivered final radio transmission. Thank You
Calvin, without knowing exactly where and when the DC-10 dropped the retardant you are referring to, it’s impossible to say how effective it could have been. But if it was on the east side of the fire during the wind event, the northeast or east wind would have resulted in a backing fire spreading slowly into the wind. Under those conditions on the east side it would be much, much easier for retardant to slow the spread of a fire.
The conditions I was referring to earlier, which you quoted, were on the west side that was being overrun by a fire pushed by a very, very strong wind. A head fire or something close to it overran the Hotshots’ position on the west side. That is very different from a backing fire on the east side of the fire. A head fire in medium or heavy fuels pushed by a strong wind in most cases can’t be stopped by a retardant drop… or 10. The fire is too intense, and would be moving too fast; spot fires would in some cases occur beyond the retardant line. The wind makes it difficult or impossible for retardant to hit the intended target. A backing fire moving slowly is a completely different set of conditions.
Another note: DC-10s almost always carry 11,600 gallons of retardant, which can be dropped all on one pass or in many smaller drops.
Your report is not accurate.
There were 3 p2s in PRC along with several Seats working the fire. The 10s were time coming out of of Gateway. Thunderstorms shut down ops in PRC for about two hrs and this is when they were burned over. There was a 10 in the air at that time. The tankers went back to the Yarnell after the weather improved. This is quite personal since there was a p2 working the fire when the helo team found the crew.
Thanks Panhandle. Assuming what you said is true, it turns out that most everything the Associated Press reported about the use of air tankers on the Yarnell Hill Fire is not true.
Can you explain what you mean by: “The 10s were time coming out of of Gateway.”
The DC-10s (air tankers) were coming (flying) out of Gateway Mesa Airport.
Regardless if your on foot, driving or operating a dozer even with the best of planning when things turn “sour” (go to crap) a retardant drop can become your safety island, of course as a last resort. A retardant in flashy fuels has saved many a fire fighter. Nothing is usually mentioned of this type of an incident and the “work” continues on. Air Attacks, leads, helcoes, and tanker pilots many times can observe something on the ground going wrong. But if you don’t have the retardant overhead?
That entire report is very troubling. We’re dealing with not only ‘acres lost’, but most importantly ‘lives lost’. Unacceptable.