NIOSH report on firefighter killed by exploding pressurized water tank

NIOSH report photo 12You may recall that on September 24, 2010 we reported that Firefighter Ryan Seitz, 27 of the McArthur Fire Department in Ohio was killed when he was hit by debris from an exploding pressurized water tank. At one time I worked with a small commercially manufactured compressed air foam system on a trailer pulled behind an ATV, and an SCBA tank pressurized the water tank and provided the air for the foam. I have never heard of a large engine-mounted pressurized water tank, but thanks to a NIOSH report that was released today the facts have been revealed.

The fire department obtained the fire engine, a military surplus Humvee, through the state of Ohio surplus property program. It had previously been operated by another fire department that gave it back when they obtained funding to purchase a new brush truck. The first fire department built the water delivery system in-house, installed it in the back of the Humvee involved in this incident, and put it into service in mid-1997. That fire department reported that the water delivery system was used 8-12 times per year through May 2008 when the vehicle was returned to the state surplus vehicle program.

NIOSH report photo 8The system included two 3,000 psi air cylinders which served as the source to pressurize the 120-gallon water tank, which was rated at 75 psi and designed for a home water well system. While operating at a vegetation fire, the tank exploded, killing the firefighter. Here is a description from the report:

The two fire fighters who had been raking the fire break rested in the Humvee while the other two fire fighters began to extinguish hot spots. While applying water to the dead tree, the hose snagged and then burst, spraying the fire fighter who was working the nozzle. The fire fighter who had been driving the Humvee ran to shut off the air pressure to the water tank. After closing the SCBA cylinder valve and the water tank inlet valve, the fire fighters removed the section of burst water hose. After repairing the water hose, the fire fighter working the nozzle attempted to put water on the tree but did not have adequate water pressure. The victim and the fire fighter who had been sitting in the Humvee got out of the vehicle to observe what was going on. Note: Fire fighters interviewed did not report any noises or physical changes to the water delivery system that would have indicated a problem.

The victim was standing at the rear of the Humvee near the center of the tailgate when the water tank exploded. The force of the explosion caused the bottom of the tank (closest to the rear end of the vehicle) to separate from the rest of the tank. The tank was pushed forward into the dashboard, breaking the pneumatic airlines and connections in multiple locations. The Humvee’s front windshield was shattered. The bottom of the water tank was propelled into the motorized hose reel. The force ripped the hose reel’s mounting bolts through the Humvee’s bed. The hose reel struck the vehicle’s tailgate and then flipped over the tailgate, striking the victim. The victim was thrown backward approximately 20 feet, and was killed instantly. The hose reel came to rest in close proximity to the victim while the end of the water tank was propelled into the woods. The fire fighter who had been operating the hoseline nozzle was knocked down by the force of the explosion but was not seriously injured. Two other fire fighters narrowly escaped injury.

NIOSH said contributing factors were:

  • Use of a self-made water delivery system without an over-pressurization safety relief mechanism and inappropriate system components.
  • Limited written operating procedures and policies.
  • The pressure gauge on the water delivery system was inappropriate for its intended use.
  • Limited training in the use of the equipment.

Recommendation #1:

Fire departments should ensure that fire suppression equipment is properly designed and safe for its intended use and refrain from using self-made equipment that does not meet applicable safe design standards and practice.

NIOSH report photo 9

The moral of the story is that pressurized tanks can be extremely dangerous, especially when fed by 3,000 psi SCBA tanks. This incident made me think of the military MAFFS air tankers. Their newest slide-in systems have retardant tanks that are pressurized by an on-board air compressor which forces the retardant out the lower pipe you can see in the photo below. The upper pipe is connected to an emergency air release system which would presumably, in the event of a malfunction, allow compressed air to exit the aircraft through the pipe in the paratroop door, rather than into the interior of the aircraft which would probably cause catastrophic damage, endangering the aircraft and crew. The first generation MAFFS slide-in units were pressurized by ground-based air compressors before take off, and pumped the retardant out the open rear door during a drop. A malfunction releasing a large quantity of compressed air was not as much of a threat with the huge open door.

MAFFS 2 interior
The interior of a MAFFS 2, showing the retardant discharge and emergency high pressure air release tubes going through the side paratrooper door. Loadmaster Bill Whitlatch operates a new MAFFS 2 unit aboard a C-130J aircraft with the Channel Islands Air National Guard. Photo by Stephen Osman, Ventura County Star.

20 years later, potential for another Oakland Hills fire?

It was 20 years ago today that a rapidly moving fire in the Oakland Hills east of San Francisco ravaged a community. Here is the way we describe it in our Infamous Fires Around the World document:

The “Tunnel Fire”, commonly referred to as the Oakland Hills fire or East Bay Hills fire, occurred on Sunday October 20, 1991. The fire killed 25 people (23 civilians, 1 police officer, and 1 firefighter), injured 150, and destroyed 2,449 single-family dwellings and 437 apartment and condominium units. Eleven of the fire victims died in traffic jams on Charing Cross Road while evacuating. Eight others died on narrow streets in the same area. The economic loss has been estimated at $1.5 billion.

1991 Oakland Hills fire progression mapThe fire started when an ember from a grass fire the previous day blew beyond the fire hoses that were still on the fire perimeter and started a new fire. Houses, like the vegetation, have grown back and some of the residents that lived through the 1991 fire are worried when they look around and see that some of their new neighbors are not doing as much as they could to prevent another disaster.

Here is an excerpt from an interesting article in the Mercury News:

As autumn returned and the mercury hovered in the 90s in the Oakland hills, Milt Brown started to feel anxious.

Twenty years ago, on a scorching, wind-whipped day, he lost two houses in one of the nation’s deadliest and most destructive urban wildfires, an inferno that jumped two freeways, destroyed more than 3,800 homes and killed 25 people, including the Browns’ former baby sitter.

Although he tries not to dwell on the horrible memories — or the chance of another devastating blaze — Brown and other survivors of the Oakland hills fire worry that the painful lessons of that day are being forgotten. Or worse, they are being ignored by the many newer residents who didn’t experience firsthand the hell of Oct. 20, 1991. Even the subtlest signs of danger make him nervous.

“I’m looking at the two houses below me and the branches are touching the house,” Brown said from his perch on Buckingham Boulevard — less than a minute’s walk from where the fire erupted on a hot Sunday morning. “I’m in a box canyon. If someone throws a match in there it will set the whole block off.”

But it isn’t just those who lived through the Oakland hills fire who are anxious about what they fear is a growing complacency that has built up alongside the stately homes in these steep, once-woodsy enclaves. Fire officials say that time has not only given rise to dense stands of fast-growing and fire-susceptible eucalyptus on public lands, it has also given vegetation on private property throughout the hills 20 years to mature. It often takes a second notice before residents take heed and clear a defensible space around their homes to protect it from fire.

Thanks go out to Dick

Murphy’s Fire Behavior Rules

Rule bookIn going through some papers today I rediscovered “Murphy’s Fire Behavior Rules” that govern wildfire suppression. I have no idea who created them. It’s possible that Rick Gale handed them out during a session in S-520, Advanced Incident Management, but I don’t think he was the author.

Murphy’s Fire Behavior Rules

  1. Winds will remain constant until your backfire is lit.
  2. Upon reaching the far side of the fire, all batteries cease to function.
  3. The last hard freeze of winter occurs the day after you fill the pumper.
  4. Rain occurs only after a fire is finally controlled.
  5. The arrival time for backup coincides precisely with fire containment.
  6. A 3:1 gas/diesel mixture burns hotter than 3:1 diesel/gas. So does the person carrying the drip torch.
  7. You are always one lunch short.
  8. Leakproof bladder bags will. Self-priming pumps won’t.
  9. Burning out the wrong side of the line will prolong the time of containment.
  10. Critiques are sometimes painful.
You may have some suggestions for #11.

Congressional committee holds hearing about federal response to Texas fires

US Representative Michael McCaul at committee hearing
U.S. Representative Michael McCaul at the Committee hearing. Photo: Alberto Martinez, American-Statesman

On Monday, October 17, 2011 a subcommittee of the House of Representatives’ Homeland Security committee held a field hearing in Austin entitled “Texas Wildfire Review: Did Bureaucracy Prevent a Timely Response?” The hearing was held in response to the loud complaints from Texas politicians that the federal government has not been providing enough support in dollars and firefighting resources to assist them in suppressing the numerous wildfires that have been occurring in the state since December, 2010.

The hearing was focused on speeding up the process of obtaining firefighting resources from the U. S. Forest Service and financial help from the Federal Emergency Management Administration. Texas Governor Rick Perry has slammed the federal government for deficit spending and has talked about Texas seceding from the United States, but he is seeking more than $200 million from the U.S. government to offset some of the $304 million the state has spent on wildfire suppression. Meanwhile Texas reduced the budget of the state’s wildland firefighting agency by 29 percent for the fiscal year that began in September.

Over the past several weeks there has been a lot of criticism that the USFS should have had more air tankers prepositioned in Texas, and the DC-10 Very Large Air Tanker has been a magnet for attention. When it was deployed to the state it had been working non-stop on fires in California and other states and the flight crew had bumped up against their mandatory days off. When it arrived, the aircraft had to sit for two days while the crew rested and a retardant plant was being assembled. There were complaints that the aircraft should have been able to begin working on fires immediately upon arrival.

But the DC-10, which delivered 280,000 gallons of retardant in 35 drops on fires in Texas, is just one air tanker and does not have any magical powers. Sure, it carries 11,600 gallons of retardant, four to five times more than conventional “large” air tankers that hold 2,200 to 3,000 gallons, but no single air tanker, no matter how big, could have prevented all of the damage from wildfires that Texas has been experiencing. As I’ve said many times before, aircraft do not put out fires. As long as the wind is not too strong, they can slow fires down enough to allow firefighters on the ground to put them out. It’s one tool in the tool box. Now that the U. S. Forest Service has allowed the number of large air tankers on exclusive use contracts to decline from 44 to 11, an air tanker that can carry as much retardant as four to five large air tankers, can be an extremely valuable tool in that box in the right conditions.

Texas Representative Michael McCaul, who organized the hearing, said “Despite all the warnings that Texas faced with it being the driest summer in more than 100 years, there was no prepositioned aircraft to help. We should have had more assets prepositioned. ” Tom Harbour, the Director of Fire and Aviation for the USFS, said the federal government had 3 large air tankers, 3 water-scooping air tankers, 15 single engine air tankers, and 12 helicopters in Texas on September 2 before the fires near Bastrop started.

Here is an excerpt from Harbour’s written testimony before the committee, and following that, commentary about a misleading statement he made:
Continue reading “Congressional committee holds hearing about federal response to Texas fires”

Photo of the Track fire in Raton Pass, from last June

Track fire June 14, 2011
Track fire, June, 2011. Photo: Colorado DOT

I ran across this photo of the Track fire that was posted to TwitPic by the Colorado Department of Transportation on June 14, 2011. The fire, which we covered here, started on June 12, 2011 and burned over 27,000 acres on both sides of Interstate 25 at the Colorado/New Mexico state line. It was contained on June 29.

Compare the above photo with the one below taken on October 17 on Interstate 17 in Colorado at Loveland Pass, also posted on TwitPic by the Colorado DOT.

I-70 at Loveland Pass October 17, 2011
I-70 at Loveland Pass in Colorado, October 17, 2011. Photo, Colorado DOT