Tag: Chimney 2 Fire

Above: Chimney Tops 2 Fire November 27, 2016. Photo by Brett Bevill.

It’s been six months since a wildfire tore through the Tennessee mountain town of Gatlinburg, but political contests hinging on — among other things — an allegedly botched evacuation are heating up.

With more than 300 members on its closed Facebook group, Gatlinburg Fire Survivors has billed itself as a support group and a “safe place to tell your stories, vent your frustrations, and talk with others who went through the same thing.” But according to the Knoxville News Sentinel newspaper, the group in recent months has begun lobbying for accountability, getting only mixed results and leading some to challenge incumbent elected officials for their political seat.

While they say they support the first responders who scrambled to evacuate the town when the fire blew up Nov. 28, they — and many others — have criticized the lack of public information and communication breakdowns that hindered timely evacuations.

Issues surrounding the Gatlinburg evacuation have been widely reported, including by Wildfire Today. Essentially, city officials downplayed the threat early in the incident. Then, when hurricane-force winds tore through the region and fanned the flames, a “communication failure” caused by disabled communication services prevented the immediate issuance of a timely alert. Alternative sources of emergency communication — local media, for example — had only a marginal effect.

“Communications between the agencies was interrupted due to disabled phone, internet, and electrical services. Due to this communication failure, the emergency notification was not delivered as planned,” local, state and federal authorities wrote in a joint news release at the time. “Despite the catastrophic events that created barriers to communication, officials utilized all resources available to them at the time to warn the public of the impending threat.”

Fast-forward six months, questions and demands for accountability still abound, especially from survivors groups whose members say they suffer from PTSD as a result of the frantic evacuation.

“From the perspective of the Gatlinburg Wildfire Survivors, those who wield political power in Gatlinburg have labeled them as nothing more than a band of troublemakers. Appearing at public meetings has been fruitless,” the newspaper reported this week.

The divide hit a turning point of sorts over the weekend when a former city councilman held a town hall and outlined his reasoning for seeking a return to the five-person council. From the Knoxville News Sentinel:

He said he decided to seek a seat on council after seeing too many quality programs and events “fall by the wayside” under the existing leadership. He said he was responsible for securing the downtown flood warning system when he was on council and wants a more comprehensive system to deal with a multitude of potential emergencies.

Hawkins’ flood warning system, which consisted of a string of public address speakers, wasn’t activated Nov. 28 until the majority of Gatlinburg’s residents had already decided to evacuate.

The election is scheduled for May 16.

Fourteen people died as a result of the wildfires and nearly 2,500 structures were damaged or destroyed by flames that charred more than 17,000 acres in and around Great Smoky Mountain National Park.

On a related news front, Dolly Parton’s Dollywood Foundation gave $10,000 each to nearly 900 families displaced by deadly Tennessee wildfires to assist with the damages, the Associated Press reported. The singer said in a statement that the final distribution of checks was made this week to families in Sevier County.

“I’m as proud of being part of this, helping my people, as anything I’ve ever done in my life,”Parton said Monday, according to CNN.  “And our next step is to continue to look at what’s ahead for everyone and our long-term recovery here.”

Don Jacobs of the Knoxville News Sentinel has written a well researched article about the Chimney Tops 2 Fire that burned into Gatlinburg, Tennessee on November 28. The fire was monitored but not suppressed for five days until a predicted wind event pushed the fire into the city, killing 14 people, destroying 2,013 homes and 53 commercial structures, and causing more than $500 million in damage.

In addition to talking with Great Smoky Mountains National Park personnel in an attempt to determine what actions were taken on the fire, Mr. Jacobs interviewed four former wildland firefighters to gather information about how wildfires are typically managed.

Below is the beginning of the article. You can read the entire piece here.

Officials should have doused a 1.5-acre fire in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park days before high winds created a megafire that swept into Gatlinburg, former U.S. Forest Service firefighters said .

At the very least, said retired employees with almost 200 years of firefighting experience, officials in the National Park should have summoned every resource available when alerted Nov. 26 of the expected high winds.

“I’ve written for years that the best way to keep fires from becoming megafires is to attack them with overwhelming force, both on the ground and from the air,” said Bill Gabbert, who writes an online blog about wildland fires and aviation resources to battle wildland fires.

“People say that is very expensive, but it is not as expensive as losing 14 lives and $500 million in lost structures.”

Gabbert has written three articles on wildfiretoday.com about the Gatlinburg fires, providing technical data about fire conditions and aerial resources available to firefighters.

Four other former U.S. Forest Service firefighters agreed park officials didn’t pay attention to the severe drought, low humidity that provided a tinderbox for flames, available options to quell the slow-moving fire before winds made the flames uncontrollable and alarming weather forecasts.

Mr. Jacobs quoted the park’s Superintendent, Clay Jordan, as saying:

There was no way the fire could have been extinguished before the winds came.

For the most current information about the Chimney Tops 2 Fire at Gatlinburg, see our articles tagged “Chimney 2 Fire”.

Typos or errors, report them HERE.

Above: Air Tanker 162, an RJ85, at Chattanooga, Tennessee November 27, 2016. Photo by Antonio More’. Other photos he took that day are at SmugMug.

Earlier at Wildfire Today we examined the information that the National Park Service released about the Chimney Tops 2 Fire that burned into Gatlinburg, and analyzed the day to day conditions at the fire. Today we will look further into the wind, the Energy Release Component, and the air tankers that were staged in the area but not used on the fire.

Air Tankers at Chattanooga

The fire started on November 23, 2016. On November 27, two days before the fire burned into Gatlinburg killing 14 people, destroying 2,013 homes and 53 commercial structures, and causing more than $500 million in damage, there were three large air tankers parked at Chattanooga, Tennessee, 105 miles southwest of the fire; two RJ85’s and one C-130Q. But the air tankers were not used on the fire.

The only aircraft used before the fire burned into the city was a helicopter in the afternoon of November 27, which was replaced a few hours later by two other helicopters. They were refilling their water buckets at Fontana Lake. The 26-mile round trip to refill with water greatly reduced the amount of water delivered to the fire, compared to how much could have been dropped if a closer water source had been created or used.

Normally aviation resources do not put out a fire, but they can sometimes slow down the spread until ground resources can move in to construct direct fireline around the perimeter, removing the vegetation, or fuel, and preventing it from growing. But if firefighters are not allowed to directly access the fire’s edge due to a perceived safety issue, very large amounts of water or fire retardant can be applied from the air that in some cases can virtually put out a small fire. Or, pause the spread until rains arrive — like it did late in the day on November 28.

Another alternative to directly attacking a fire is to construct firelines some distance away, or use natural barriers, and intentionally burn out the vegetation between that line and the fire, stopping the spread. This was not done during the five days before the fire burned into Gatlinburg as the fire grew from 5 to 35 acres during that period.

Wind speeds

Strong winds can not only cause a fire to grow quickly, but they can also make the use of air tankers and helicopters impossible. Any retardant or water dropped can be blown far off target, making it ineffective. And, strong gusty winds can make it unsafe for aircraft flying low and slow over rough terrain.

There were times between November 23 and 28 when the wind speeds were too high to allow the use of aircraft.

The data in the charts above, supplied by Great Smoky Mountains National Park, was recorded at Cades Cove 20 miles west of the fire, and Cove Mountain 8 miles northwest of the fire. It shows that the winds would have allowed the safe and effective use of aircraft during the daylight hours from early afternoon on November 24 through sundown on November 27. But they were not used except for the helicopters during the afternoon of November 27. The wind was far too strong on November 28 and 29 for aircraft.

Energy Release Component (ERC)

The ERC is calculated daily at Fire Weather Stations around the United States. It is a number related to the available energy (BTU) per unit area (square foot) within the flaming front at the head of a vegetation fire. Daily variations in ERC are due to changes in moisture content of the various fuels present, both live and dead.

The average ERC for the Tennessee mountains in late November is 16 to 20. The 97th percentile is 40, meaning 97 percent of the time it is lower than that number. Since early September it had mostly been above the 90th percentile and was above the 97th percentile during much of November. The day the fire started the ERC was 41, and in the following days was higher, reaching 50 at one point which was the highest ever recorded on that date in the 23-year history of data from that weather station.

When the ERC is above average, and especially when it is higher than the 90th or 97th percentile, fires spread more quickly, burn deeper into the duff and organic material on the forest floor, and exhibit more resistance to control.

The ERC, along with other indicators, is often used as a planning tool to preposition firefighting resources, increasing their numbers in areas where large fires are expected. Days off for firefighters can be cancelled and prescribed fires postponed.

On December 5 we wrote about the Keetch-Byram Drought Index (KBDI), an indicator of drought and its effect on how wildfires burn. On November 23 when the fire was discovered the KBDI was very high, 599, Molly Schroer, a spokesperson for the fire’s Incident Management Team told us. For reference, 600 or above would indicate severe drought and increased wildfire occurrence. Intense, deep burning fires with significant downwind spotting should be expected under those conditions.

Many fire managers, when informed about a new fire under those KBDI and ERC conditions, would have attacked it immediately and aggressively with overwhelming force, from both the air and the ground.

For the most current information about the Chimney Tops 2 Fire at Gatlinburg, see our articles tagged “Chimney 2 Fire”.

Typos or errors, report them HERE.