72-hour report on Beaver Fire shelter deployment

Beaver Fire deployment
The Division Supervisor’s truck is seen in the foreground just before the fire shelters were deployed. The photo is from the report.

A 72-Hour Report has been released for the incident on the Beaver Fire in which three people took refuge from a wildfire inside their fire shelters. The near miss occurred August 11 at 5:30 p.m. on the Klamath National Forest in northern California, approximately 15 miles northwest of Yreka. We first wrote about it on August 12. Below is the Incident Summary from the report:

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“At approximately 1730 on August, 11, a Division Supervisor, contract dozer and a Heavy Equipment Boss deployed their fire shelters on the Beaver Fire on the Klamath National Forest in northern California (U.S. Forest Service Incident CA-KNF-005497). The individuals involved were improving line on the far western edge of the fire, approximately 2 miles from the fire front. Fuels in the area consisted of a pine overstory and manzanita surface fuels. Extreme to exceptional drought, at the highest levels on the Drought Monitor system, existed over nearly all of northern California.

As indirect dozer line construction progressed downslope, outflow from a thunderstorm which had already tracked through the area, caused a dramatic and large scale pulse in fire behavior. As fire activity increased, the Division Supervisor drove down to the Heavy Equipment Boss and Dozer Operator to check their status. The dozer operator was in the process of constructing a predetermined safety zone. The fire quickly traveled a significant distance through heavy timber, impacting the indirect dozer line, requiring the three firefighters to deploy fire shelters to survive the heat blast and ember shower. The contract dozer operator received non-life threatening burn injuries, but was referred to a burn center for further evaluation.

PROPERTY DAMAGE: The DIVS pickup truck parked at the deployment site received heat damage and the bed and back seat caught fire. The Division Supervisor and Heavy Equipment Boss were able to put the fire out with two fire extinguishers. The Dozer received minor damage from a small fire which started behind the seat in the open cab.

Based on the nature of this incident, the Pacific Southwest Region will be utilizing the Facilitated Learning Analysis (FLA) process to maximize learning opportunities and better manage future incidents.”

Updated; Fire shelters deployed on the Beaver Fire

beaver fire convection column
Don Hall sent us this picture of a convection column over the Beaver fire, saying it was taken at about the same time the three firefighters were entrapped.

(Updated at 7:15 p.m. August 12, 2014)

The three firefighters who were entrapped and deployed fire shelters were removed from the fireline and transported to a hospital in Yreka, California Monday evening, according to Corey Wilford, a spokesperson for the Incident Management Team (IMT). He said all three were treated for symptoms of smoke inhalation and one of them had second degree burns on his lower leg. After treatment, they were all released from the hospital.

The area that the IMT had previously described as a “safety zone”, did not meet the definition, in that fire shelters were required. On the other hand, the three firefighters had previously observed the area and remembered that it could serve as a “deployment site”, meaning that firefighters could likely survive being burned over at that location, but they would need to deploy fire shelters.

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(Originally published at 8:44 a.m. PDT, August 12, 2014)

Three firefighters were entrapped by advancing flames Monday afternoon on the Beaver Fire in northern California, approximately 15 miles northwest of Yreka.

The incident occurred at 5:30 p.m. as a rapid wind shift affected the fire. All three firefighters deployed their fire shelters in a predetermined safety zone. They were evaluated on scene and no serious injuries were reported.

All firefighters on the fire were actively withdrawing as a thunderstorm approached. The weather system east of the Beaver Fire produced 30 to 35 mph outflow winds that changed direction rapidly and caused extreme fire behavior. With the increase in wind speed, flame lengths extended into the canopy of the trees, causing a sustained crown run which aligned with the exposed west slope on Buckhorn Ridge.

Beaver Fire, 8-11-2014
Beaver Fire, 8-11-2014. The California/Oregon border is the white line just north of the fire.

The lightning-caused Beaver Fire was discovered on June 30 and has blackened 28,000 acres. It is burning in a very remote area and could be a long-duration event. The Incident Management Team is calling it 30 percent contained.

The fire area is under a Red Flag Warning on Tuesday.

Research: firefighter entrapment rate decreases by 70 percent

During a presentation at the Large Fire Conference in Missoula this week, Bob Loveless, PhD, a retired structural firefighter, reported on his findings after studying the number of entrapments on wildland fires. Mr. Loveless has been an instructor in the Technical Fire Management program with the Washington Institute for over 25 years.

He compared entrapment rates before and after 2000, 1994 through 2013, thinking that the fatalities in the 1990s and the subsequent human factors studies led to a concentrated effort to increase safety in the U.S. federal wildland firefighter community beginning in 2000.

Mr. Loveless and his co-author, Adam Hernandez, a Captain with the Sierra National Forest’s Kings River Hotshots, estimated the annual rate of wildfire entrapments. They determined that since 2000, there has been a 70 percent reduction in the annual entrapment rate for all wildland firefighters, federal and other, after controlling for variation in annual acres burned, number of fires, and exposure time. A similar 76 percent reduction in entrapment rates was estimated for federal firefighters alone.

The researchers said other non-human factors changes since 2000, such as improved weather forecasting, may account for some of the reduction.

That is the good news.

However, in looking at the total number of fatalities, and not just from entrapments, as we did last November, the annual number, not adjusted for the acres burned, or exposure, or any other variable, has been increasing slightly over the last 24 years.

Wildland Fire Fatalities 1990 through 2013

Report: six air tankers requested before Yarnell Hill Fire entrapment, but they were not available

(UPDATE at 10:20 a.m. MDT, July 16, 2013)

The Arizona State Forestry Division has issued a report that summarizes information about some of the major events and the firefighting resources that were deployed for the Yarnell Hill Fire. This new document corrects some of the information reported by the Associated Press below.

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(UPDATE at 10:15 a.m. MDT, July 13, 2013)

We checked with Rick Hatton, CEO of 10 Tanker Air Carrier, the company that operates the two DC-10 air tankers, about the use of their aircraft on the Yarnell Hill Fire. Mr. Hatton said each of their two DC-10s, which carry 11,600 gallons, made five drops on the fire. Throughout the day on Sunday June 30, the day of the tragedy, they made a total of eight drops, and then made two more on July 1.

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(Originally published at 8:20 p.m. July 12, 2013)

The Associated Press is reporting that a request for six “heavy” air tankers was placed about 50 minutes before the Granite Mountain Hotshots became entrapped and deployed their fire shelters on the Yarnell Hill Fire. However the request was never filled, and was classified as Unable to Fill, or UTF. There were only 12 heavy air tankers on duty June 30 in the lower 48 states and none were available to respond to the fatal fire near southwest of Prescott, Arizona.

The Granite Mountain Hotshots lost 19 of their 20 crewpersons that day when a passing thunderstorm caused the wind to change direction by 180 degrees and increase in speed, gusting to over 40 mph. In winds that strong it is unlikely that any aircraft could operate safely 200 feet above the ground or effectively drop a liquid that would accurately hit the intended target.

The last retardant drops before the fatal entrapment were made at 12:30 and 1 p.m. by P2V air tankers which carry a maximum of 2,082 gallons. After that the air tankers went back to another fire they had been working in northern Arizona. According to the AP, earlier the two DC-10 very large air tankers had been requested which drop 11,600 gallons each, but they were not available. The AP also said, “Only a spotter plane was in the air when the Prescott, Ariz.-based Granite Mountain Hotshots died. The state’s fleet of small single-engine retardant-dropping planes was grounded in Prescott because of the weather, and no helicopters or heavy tankers were available.”

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In 2002 there were 44 large or heavy air tankers on exclusive use contracts. Today there are 9. The day the 19 Hotshots died, four military MAFFS air tankers had been activated days earllier, but of those potential 13 air tankers, some of them would have been on their day off. And some, or all of those on duty, would have been actively working other fires. There were 50 uncontained large fires in the United States that day. If they all needed air tankers, which is not likely, each of the 12 that were on duty (according to the AP) would have to be shared by 4 large fires.

In 2012 about half the requests for air tankers could not be filled according to data from the National Interagency Fire Center. Of the 914 requests, 438 were rejected as “unable to fill” (UTF), meaning no air tankers were available to respond to the fire; 67 were cancelled for various reasons.

Requests for large air tankers

Report released for engine burnovers and entrapment on North Pass Fire

E-2 after the burnover
E-2 after the burnover
E-2 after the burnover. Photo from the report.

A Facilitated Learning Analysis has been released for the engine burnovers and entrapments that occurred on the North Pass Fire on the Mendocino National Forest in northern California, August 25, 2012.

You can read the entire report (large 3.8MB file), but here is a very brief summary. On August 18,2012, five Type 3 Engines from municipal fire departments in southern California were working as a Type 3 Engine Strike Team with the assignment that day of securing a dozer line. Due to dense vegetation along the dozer line, and a lack of information about their situation, they were surprised when a spot fire caused by a burning tree resulted in a fire that overran their position.

E-2 at the burnover site, before the incident and before turning around
E-2 at the burnover site, before the accident and before turning around. Photo from the report.

The crew from E-2 dismounted to assist with the spot fire, leaving the engine operator to button it up, disconnect hoses, and move it to assist with the spot fire at another location along the dozer line. The fire approached the engine before the operator was able to relocate the engine. He decided to run down the dozer line to escape, telling a hand crew after he reached safety, “F*** my engine burned up…. F*** my engine burned up!” Hand-crew members responded, “It’s fine, it’s fine. You’re alive so it’s fine.”

A second engine was also burned over, according to the report:

At the same time fire is engulfing E-2, E-5 finds their egress cut off by the flames now lying over the dozer line. E-5 was then forced to withdraw to a safe area. Capt. E-5 notifies ST-1C STEN they are remaining at their current location and requests permission to fire out the area around them. ST-1C STEN tells them, “Do what you need to do.” The crew of E-5 pre-treats the area around them using Class A foam, depleting their water supply. E-5 then deploys thermal curtains, and they seek shelter in the apparatus as the fire burns around them.

After the burnovers the strike team was sent to a USFS work station. The Strike Team Leader reported to a Ground Support Unit Leader who escorted them to the Incident Base. After receiving medical evaluations, all personnel were cleared by the Medical Unit and received no injuries.

Below are excerpts from the lessons learned, as shared by the facilitated learning analysis participants:

  • “Try to think more three-dimensionally. I really didn’t see/perceive the layout of the road, the green, or the fire. It would of helped to realize the danger there.”
  • “Maybe a picture from the air.”
  • ”I wish I’d known I had a qualified faller. Don’t know that I would of used them.” [to cut down the tree throwing out burning embers that caused the spot fire.]
  • “Had I perceived the danger, I wish I’d thought twice about the assignment for E-2.”
  • “I will definitely request more 800 MHz radios.”
  • From the Division Supervisor: “It would have been more appropriate to recognize that their (ST-1C) specialties were in other areas of firefighting and take the time to give them a more thorough briefing on the assignment rather than handing them off to be briefed by ST-2C STEN.”
  • “Walking through it afterward, E-2 was in perfect alignment with the draw, but of course you couldn’t see with all of the vegetation.”
  • From Capt. E-1: “Should of used a faller to drop the problem tree in the first place. Use the professionals.”
  • And from the same Capt: “There are all these other resources that we don’t normally deal with, like fallers, inmate crews and dozers. We had resources we could have used, but I just didn’t have the experience to think to ask for them.”

Excerpts of observations from the FLA team members:

  • The participants believe the division was large and complex. Geographically the division stretched over 5 to 7 miles of line.
  • The participants felt complexity and scope of the division complicated communications over the assigned tactical channel. Early on in the shift it was identified that communications were difficult. To mitigate it, ST-1C began using their 800 MHz for intra-crew communications. One difficulty was that not everyone had both radios. Some had the 800 MHz, and some had a VHF radio, but not everyone had both. Every member should have the same type of communication capability.
  • FLA team members and participants acknowledged that utilizing an unassigned tactical frequency on an incident is against several policies & guidelines.

Investigation report – firefighter entrapment on Ridge Top Fire

Ridge Top Fire
Ridge Top Fire entrapment site
Ridge Top Fire entrapment site. BLM photo. (Click to enlarge)

The Bureau of Land Management has released the investigation report about a firefighter being entrapped and suffering first and second degree burns while working on the Ridge Top Fire on the Fort Hall Indian Reservation near Blackfoot, Idaho on July 28, 2012.

You can read the entire report, but here is a summary. The firefighter was referred to as a “Dozer Swamper” (DZSW1) who was was utilizing an All-Terrain Vehicle (ATV) to scout fireline and coordinate dozer activities. The DZSW1 was on the ATV going down a dozer line to tie in with another dozer when the fire activity increased adjacent to some unburned vegetation. The DZSW1 was heard on the radio saying “I need to get out of the smoke”. The DZSW1 attempted to turn around on the ATV and escape back up the dozer line but is unable to make the turn due to thick smoke and dozer berms, and then tried to escape down the dozer line on the ATV. The ATV then “became inoperable due to undetermined reasons”.

From the report:

DZSW1 recognizes imminent entrapment, takes a deep breath, curls up on the ATV and is hit by the first blast of radiant heat. DZSW1 recognizes the first blast has passed and drags the ATV uphill away from the dozer berm. DZSW1 considers deploying fire shelter but is concerned about exposure by standing up. DZSW1 crouches low and under the ATV and prepares for another heat blast. DZSW1 is able to start the ATV and proceeds down the dozer line to East Cemetery Road and turns north towards the safety zone.

DZSW1 ties in with an engine crew. His injuries are assessed and a paramedic is sent from the helibase who assumes care of the patient. DZSW1 is transported by ground ambulance to Bingham Memorial Hospital in Blackfoot, Idaho and about three hours later begins a ground ambulance trip to the University of Utah Burn Center in Salt Lake City, approximately 190 miles away. DZSW1 was released from the Burn Center the next day.

Below is a photo showing some melted plastic on the All Terrain Vehicle that the firefighter was using at the time of the entrapment.
Continue reading

Engine crew entrapment: “I thought I was going to die”

Flat Fire, July 11, 2012
Flat Fire, July 11, 2012
Flat Fire, July 11, 2012. Photo credit, Norcal1

A Facilitated Learning Analysis for the entrapment of an engine crew tells the harrowing story of five firefighters who had a very close call on the Flat Fire on the Shasta-Trinity National Forest in northern California July 14, 2012. Their survival may have been due in part to the fire above them burning through the trunk line on their hose lay, causing a leak which sprayed water on the fire creating an opening for the crew to escape back to the engine. Until then, at least one of the crew members thought he was going to die.

The crew of Engine 1 was attempting to suppress a 1/4-acre slopover below a road by installing a progressive hose lay. Initially the fire behavior was minimal, with one-foot flame lengths. They had completed 300 feet of the hose lay when the main fire made a run up to their location.

The entire FLA can be found here, but below is an excerpt:

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…The Engine 1 Engine Operator (ENOP) takes substantial heat from the fire run and takes shelter in the engine, then gets out and begins defensive engine protection with a 1.5 inch hose. This run hits the fireline and ignites additional spot fires east of the B spur to the south and east of the position of the Engine 1 crew and the original slopover. Flame lengths and rate of spread on these fires increase dramatically. The amounts of smoke and noise on the B spur increase also with the increased fire behavior making communication over short distances nearly impossible. The Engine 1 Engine Boss (ENGB) calls Division Supervisor (DIVS) Z (T) and states that they are abandoning the hoselay. This transmission is heard by Engine 2 and the engine Strike Team Leader and Strike Team Leader trainee (who are driving up French Creek Road towards DP-2). DIVS Z (T) responds saying that he had been trying to contact the ENGB to advise them to withdraw from their position because of increasing fire behavior, but was unable due to the high level of radio traffic. Radio traffic on Division Tac only pauses briefly and then resumes to being almost continuous.

The Engine 1 ENGB and the crew begin to rapidly withdraw back up the slope towards the engine as the fire closes around them. The ground is wet and slippery with foam from the initial suppression efforts and the slope is about 30 percent. The ENGB considers escaping downhill and rejects this option because it would mean leaving the ENOP in a hazardous position. As the crew moves uphill towards the engine, fire downhill of them continues to close, compromising a downhill escape route.

The ENOP considers cutting the hoselay and escaping in the engine and rejects this option because it would mean cutting off the water supply to the crew’s hoselay, leaving them without protection. The ENOP continues defensive engine protection.

The fire makes another run up from Pelletreau Creekand the fire to the east of the B spur closes to block the escape route of the Engine 1 crew while the crew is about 30 feet from the road, creating an entrapment.

Visiting the site after the incident, a member of the crew stated, “I thought that I was going to die, right here.” After a moment, the fire ahead of the entrapped crew burns through the trunk line on the hoselay spraying water on the fire and creating an opening for the crew to escape back to the engine.

As the crew reaches the B spur, there is a large pine torching next to Engine 1 and the front left tire is burning along with vegetation next to it, making their position at the engine untenable.

The ENGB transmits over Division Tac that the channel be cleared for emergency traffic, and then calls DIVS Z (T) on Division Tac requesting additional resources and states Engine 1 is on fire and that he is abandoning the engine. All five crewmembers from Engine 1 walk north up the B spur about 150 or 200 feet until they reach cooler air and less smoke. DIVS Z (T) calls the Engine 1 ENGB and confirms that the Engine 1 crew is accounted for and there are no injuries. Three crew members from Engine 1 then move west to the black and onto the dozer line. Hearing the declaration of“emergency traffic” from Engine 1, DIVS Z returns to the engine, which is still running but is abandoned. At this point, the fire behavior has moderated dramatically. He backs the engine off the burning vegetation into the road and then continues to DP-2. The Interagency Hot Shot Crew (IHC) Superintendent drives down from DP-2 and sees the ENGB and ENOP on the B spur. He takes the ENOP back to the engine (and the ENGB follows on foot) and together they extinguish the burning tire with a fire extinguisher from Engine 1 and the pump on the superintendent’s vehicle, check the engine for additional fire and damage, and then move the engine onto the dozer line.

 

Three firefighters entrapped and injured on the Likely Fire

Three firefighters on a crew in California suffered first and second degree burns on the Likely Fire northwest of Likely, California (map) on September 5. They were members of the CAL FIRE Devils Garden Crew 4 constructing fireline when a wind shift caused numerous spot fires. The firefighters attempted to retreat into a previously burned area when their escape route was blocked by a barbed wire fence. They received burns on their faces and were transported by a ground ambulance to a hospital where they were treated and released.

A Joint Accident Investigation Team comprised of BLM and CAL FIRE subject matter experts will be investigating the incident.

According to the criteria published by Ameriburn.org all facial burns should be treated at a burn unit, so we hope the firefighters received appropriate medical treatment and were not simply treated and released at the Modoc Medical Center in Alturas as stated in the 24-hour report.

Reviews of Pagami Creek Fire, and FLA for canoe entrapments

The U.S. Forest Service has released two additional reports about last year’s Pagami Creek Fire which was managed, rather than suppressed, for 25 days, until it ran 16 miles on September 12, eventually consuming over 92,000 acres of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness in Minnesota. We also remind you of the facilitated learning analysis of the eight USFS employees caught out in front of the fire in canoes.

Policy review

The objective of one of the reviews was to determine if the major decisions made by the incident management teams and the staff of the Superior National Forest were consistent with official USFS policy. The review was conducted by one person, Tom Zimmerman, a program manager for the USFS’ Wildland Fire Management Research, Development, and Application Program in Boise. Mr. Zimmerman analyzed the decisions and compared them with 21 policy statements, manuals, directives, and Forest level planning documents. He concluded that the decisions “appear consistent with all levels of policy and process direction”.

Decisions review

There was another review, “looking at decisions made by line officers and Incident Management teams based on the Delegation of Authority from the Forest Supervisor”. The individuals involved in this review were Jim Thomas, Fire and Emergency Operation Specialist for the Eastern Region of the USFS, and Jim Bertelsen, a Superior NF employee acting in his capacity as President of local NFFE Union 2138. This review also found no fault with how the fire was managed, saying no information was overlooked that would have predicted the unprecedented movement of the fire on September 12.

While we don’t dispute the qualifications of Mr. Zimmerman and Mr. Thomas, a person has to wonder if these internal reviews, each conducted basically by one person, would have reached different conclusions had they been completed by a panel of neutral subject matter experts.

Entrapment and near-miss facilitated learning analysis

Pagami fire shelters
Deployed fire shelters on the Pagami fire. USFS photo from the facilitated learning analysis.

In addition to those two reviews, released earlier was an excellent facilitated learning analysis (FLA) of the near misses and entrapments of eight USFS employees who were caught out in front of the rapidly spreading fire in canoes while they were trying to evacuate the recreating public from the area. At one point when they were fleeing the fire, the smoke was so thick they could not see the fronts of their canoes. Two people left a canoe and took refuge in the cold water, deploying a single fire shelter over their heads as they floated, suspended by their life jackets. Two others were flown out at the last minute by a float plane when it somehow found a hole in the smoke and was able to find them and land on the lake. Four people, after paddling furiously in the strong winds, dense smoke, and darkness, unable to find a fire shelter deployment site on the heavily forested islands, finally found a small, one-eighth acre barren island where they climbed inside their shelters as they were being pounded with burning embers.

The very well done FLA is a must read. Someone should make a movie about this.

 

Thanks go out to Dick