CL-415. Photo: LA County FD

(Note: we edited this on 9-10-2011 to add two additional air tanker studies that we became aware of today.) 

As we wait for another air tanker study to be completed, someone reminded me of one that was completed in the mid 1990s. Luckily, a summary of the study was published in the US Forest Service’s Fire Management Notes. We found out today that two of the reports about the 2009 fatal helibase rappel accident that we had linked to have been removed from the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center site, so we put a copy of this edition of FMN on our Wildfire Documents page, along with the Blue Ribbon Panel report we refer to below.

Called the National Air Tanker Study (NATS), it had two phases. The first was released in 1995 and had this recommendation:

Phase 1 used initial-attack efficiency analysis to recommend staffing for 38 large airtankers nationally. These 38 airtankers, as staffed in the 1996–98 National Airtanker Contract, came from the existing fleet, which had retardant tanks that range in capacity from 2,000 to 3,000 gallons (7,570 to11,360 L). Goals for phase 1 were to optimize the existing available large airtanker fleet and to find the best airtanker base locations. Accordingly, the optimum number of 38 airtankers was determined based on an aggregate of geographic-area analyses called “scenarios.” In each scenario, the number of large airtankers was increased and decreased from existing levels to determine the number within the geographic area that minimized total airtanker program costs (fire suppression costs plus net value change costs).

Phase 2 had eight recommendations. Here is one of them:

Establish a future fleet of 20 P3–A aircraft, 10 C–130B aircraft, and 11 C–130E aircraft.

So the study recommended 38 to 41 large air tankers. It seems odd, then, that there are now 11 large air tankers under exclusive use contracts and the USFS keeps saying we have plenty. Tom Harbour, the Forest Service’s director of fire and aviation, referring to the cancelled contract for the six P3 air tankers operated by Aero Union in July, was quoted by aNewsCafe.com on July 31, 2011:

This contract termination notwithstanding, we possess the aircraft support needed for this year’s fire season.

And an article from the Riverside Press-Enterprise published on September 3, 2011, happens to be on Senator Dianne Feinstein’s web site. In this article, Mr. Harbour is referring to the air tanker situation:

This fall in SoCal, we’ve got more than enough stuff to cover the fire needs.

While it may have been a reasonable decision for the USFS to cancel the Aero Union contract for the six P3 air tankers based on safety, this just further exposes the fact that we we keep losing air tankers in chunks, in addition to an average of one a year being lost in a crash. In 2002 we had 44 large air tankers. Now we have 11. As we have said many times before, a long-term large air tanker strategy should have been developed and implemented shortly after the two mid-air wing failures in 2002. It’s been nine years and nothing significant has been done. And nobody has been fired.

To summarize, there have been at least three five air tanker studies either completed or overdue for completion in the last 16 years:

1. 1995-1996, National Air Tanker Study (NATS) was summarized in Fire Management Notes. The study recommended 38 to 41 large air tankers be staffed nationally. While there should be debate about the models of aircraft they suggested, the sheer numbers of air tankers may still be valid, since the large air tankers of today have similar performance capabilities as those that were recommended.
2. Blue Ribbon Panel report. (1.1Mb) Federal Aerial Firefighting: Assessing Safety and Effectiveness; Blue Ribbon Panel Report to the Chief, USDA Forest Service and Director, USDI Bureau of Land Management; December 2002. This five-person panel was co-chaired by Jim Hall, former Chairman of the National Transportation Safety board. They were tasked with identifying weaknesses and fail points in the aviation program, focusing on safety, operational effectiveness, costs, sustainability, and strategic guidance. The panel (on page 17) seemed to shy away from recommending that we acquire additional ex-military aircraft and leaned toward development of “a fleet of purpose-built, turbine-engine, fixed-wing air tankers based on well-defined requirements”.
3. 2005 Wildland Fire Management Aerial Application Study. We have not found a copy of this, but the 2007-2009 study below refers to it, saying it recommended 25 new large air tankers be acquired.
4. National Interagency Aviation Council, December 7, 2007; Interagency Aviation Strategy, July 2008; approved by NWCG Fire Executive Council, July 2008; Modified Wildland Fire Large Airtanker Strategy, USDA Forest Service August 24, 2009. (note: that is what is on the cover) This study endorses the acquisition of 25 new large air tankers which was recommended in the 2005 study. It projects on page 21 the number of large air tankers increasing from 19 in 2008 to 32 in 2018. This takes into account the air tankers on hand when the report was written plus additional acquisitions. It also takes into account attrition through age of retiring P-3s and P-2Vs. The table with the numbers is below. The report recommends on page 73 that the new air tankers be C-130Js.
5. The study by the Rand Corporation that was due in January of 2011, which may not see the light of day until 2012. This study is supposed to craft still another large air tanker strategy, meant to guide the Forest Service’s acquisition of air tankers in the years to come. Some people claim to have seen a draft a few months ago that is floating around.
6. UPDATE September 26, 2011. The USFS announced they intend to give the Rand Corporation still another contract for still another study. This, apparently, is not a joke. UPDATE October 12, 2011. After the USFS announced that they would give a non-competitive contract to Rand, they changed their mind and are opening it up to competition.

The number of firefighting aircraft on exclusive use contracts, not CWN, projected through 2018. Source: page 21 of the 2007-2009 report referenced above.

Here is an interesting excerpt from a letter from the USDA Office of Inspector General, written in 2009 to the Chief of the Forest Service, Tom Tidwell, responding to the US Forest Service’s “replacement plan for firefighting aerial resources”:

…For example, FS’ initial attack success rate has dropped since it began losing air tankers in 2004 due to safety concerns. By 2007, FS’ success rate had dropped from 98.8 percent to 97.3 percent. FS estimates that this 1.5 percent decrease represents approximately 150 more fires that escaped initial attack and cost FS an additional $300 million to $450 million to suppress. In comparison, new airtankers cost up to $75 million each. So, if FS can demonstrate that new, faster, more reliable, higher-capacity airtankers increase the agency’s initial success rate, then it can show that acquiring them is cost effective.

If we have learned anything from history, around 2017 to 2022 we will be left with three to five large air tankers on exclusive use contracts and we should be expecting a new air tanker study. And nobody will have been fired.