May 2010 - Page 11 of 11 - Wildfire Today

Wildfire Awareness Week

This week four five states are observing Wildfire Awareness Week: California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Alaska. We did some research and were able to find 12 states that in recent years have observed a week to emphasize wildfire prevention. Unfortunately the dates for the week are scattered from the second week in April through late June. If there were agreement for all states to observe it at the same time each year, there could be national fire prevention campaigns to raise public awareness. Synergy.

In a step towards this goal, this year the states of California, Nevada, and Oregon jointly proclaimed May 1-8 (or 2-8) as “Multi-State Wildfire Awareness Week”. We suggest that other states make it their policy to declare the first full week in May as “Wildfire Awareness Week”. Or perhaps it could be a month or so earlier to accommodate the spring fire seasons of some areas. The National Association of State Foresters should coordinate this fire prevention opportunity.

Alaska: May 3-9, 2010
Arizona: (In Flagstaff [only?] it was April 24-May 1, 2010; In 2008 both NM and AZ had a joint WAW March 29-April 4, 2008)
California: first week in May, May 2-8, 2010
Colorado: (In 2008 it was June 22-28)
Florida: second week in April, April 11-17, 2010
Idaho: first full week in June
Maine: third week in April
Michigan: April 18-24, 2010
Montana: (In 2008 it was May 12-16)
New Mexico: March 28-April 3, 2010
Nevada: May 1-8, 2010
Oregon: (first full week of May) May 2-8, 2010
Pennsylvania: March 14-20, 2010
Texas: (in 2006 it was April 1-8)
Washington: May 2-8, 2010

If you are aware of any other states that observe Wildfire Awareness Week, let us know in a response or comment. We’ll add the additional dates as they come in.

Station fire fatality report released

The Los Angeles County Fire Department has released the Factual Report about the August 29, 2009 burnover of Camp 16 on the Station fire near Los Angeles. During that burnover, two firefighters were killed, Fire Captain Ted Hall, Superintendent 16, and Fire Fighter Specialist Arnie Quinones, Foreman Crew 16-3. Hall and Quinones were implementing a planned burnout below Camp 16 when their vehicle left the road. It was found 800 feet below the road with the two deceased firefighters inside.

The images are from the report; click on them to see larger versions. Below are the causal and contributing factors from the report.

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Causal and Contributing Factors

Causal Factors

Causal Factors are any behavior, omission, or deficiency that if corrected, eliminated, or avoided, probably would have prevented the incident.

1. The decision to protect Camp 16 and shelter in place and allow the firing operation was made at the Battalion Chief’s management level without contact with the Station IMT.

2. The lack of contact with the Station Incident prevented Camp 16 leadership from knowing about predicted fire behavior and available resources.

3. The firing operation on the Mt Gleason road was not successful due to the extreme fire behavior which exceeded the prediction of the plan.

Contributing Factors

Contributing Factors are any behavior, omission, or deficiency that sets the stage for an accident, or increases the severity of injuries.

1. The organizational culture allows firefighters to accept a notably higher risk to protect structures on wildland fires. A sense of ownership may have also influenced the decision to defend the facility.

2. The south winds aloft and prevailing up-canyon winds aligned with the topography of the North Fork of the Mill Creek drainage resulting in rapid fire progression toward Camp 16 and the firing team on the mid-slope road.

3. The fire burned in rugged terrain and the burnover occurred in the upper end of a steep drainage with fuel loads at seasonal low fuel moisture levels.

4. Resources assigned to Camp 16 were utilizing two different frequencies for tactical discussions and reports. Effective communication controls were not in effect prior to the incident.

5. There was no lookout dedicated to the firing operation.

6. The Station Fire IMT was either unaware of the threat to Camp 16 or understaffed to provide any assistance.

7. The ninety-year period of no fires in the vicinity of Camp 16 provided no historic baseline for reference.