More photos from the early hours of the Las Conchas fire

Start of the Las Conchas fire
The Las Conchas fire, taken at 1:44 p.m. June 26, 2011. Photo: Michael Grady

On July 2 we posted a photo of the Las Conchas fire in New Mexico that Michael Grady took soon after the fire started. Michael was hiking in the Valles Caldera National Preserve (VCNP) northwest of Santa Fe when a nearby smoke column pierced the sky and was kind enough to send us copies of his photos. Here are some of the others that he took, all within the first three hours after the fire started. According to InciWeb, the fire started at “approximately 1:00 p.m.”

Las Conchas fire photo
The Las Conchas fire as seen from the VCNP visitor center at 3:38 p.m., June 26, 2011. Photo: Michael Grady

Las Conchas fire from NM 4 looking west
The Las Conchas fire as seen from New Mexico Highway 4, looking west at 3:46 p.m., June 26, 2011. Photo: Michael Grady

Thanks again, Michael!

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Author: Bill Gabbert

After working full time in wildland fire for 33 years, he continues to learn, and strives to be a Student of Fire.

11 thoughts on “More photos from the early hours of the Las Conchas fire”

  1. The Las Conchas fire burned across our ” backyard ” so to speak starting approx 10mi west on Sunday aft (26th) to approx 0300 Monday when it made a run down a mesa one mile to the north. In daylight monday a small smoke column on the se flank of the sunday burn was plainly visable and stable till 1330 when the winds kicked up. To make it short this hotspot slowly spread over the next two days down into Bland Cyn , becoming a major burn. Nobody as much as peed on this thing for 48hrs as ALL attention was north on Los Alamos. An ex local voly FF/EMT I begged a brush truck off the town admin/EMT and went up Bland cyn and found fire moving but not running in ponderosa, cedar, brush mix with no flaming front. Bland cyn was clear cut approx 100 yrs ago, subject to some thinning in the 60/70s so did not have the tree density or size as Cochiti Cyn. I was spraying some foam out when FS p.u.truck arrived and was told FS had determined this area ” was toast ” and not going to be defended. County FD arrived and angry Chief told me ” they should do a back burn up here and leave you (locals) “with a pile of sticks “. He stated FS had ops control and all was up to them and off he went with nearest county dept. engine, brush, tanker, personnel with him. The Bland burn grew that aft and night over West Mesa and burned for 3wks thru another 20,000 acres, all from one hotspot a helitack probably could have doused alone monday morn. Check the nightly burn maps, no fire in Bland cyn monday morn. Note NOBODY claims IC on the South area till type one team on Wed aft about 1700. Our Jemez mts have burned 3 times in last 15 yrs to approx 220,000 ac. Hard to find unaffected acreage along 30 mile eastern exposure. Resource protection has to be a priority or we will not have any significant forested areas left to protect.

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  2. I think Royal said some very good things, but in reply to Dick on tactics to help eliminate mega fires here are a few:

    1. More dozers on IA and on the primary order.
    2. Continue to do dozer inspections prior to the season and have a quick cursory inspection at stage so they don’t sit in staging waiting for another full inspection. Stop using crews where dozers will work. Dozers on the ridges and plateaus, crews in the canyons and do it together.
    3. The IA Incident Commander when faced with a fire like Los Conchos should make an order for the intial needs then take a moment and make an order then for the next operational period. As an OSC or IC I loved it when we arrived and a substantial order was on the road to eliminate that transition time when nothing happens. An order on a fire like that might have been 6 strike teams of type 3 engines, 20 dozers, water tender for each ST engine, 20 firecrews, 6 division sups,4 Type 2 copters or larger, and a brisk pointed discussion with air attack on fixed wing potential effectiveness and availability. The federal agencies must give their intial attck IC’s the authority and confidence to make these orders and the FMO’s must support them. If the intial attack IC’s can’t do this get another one and train them
    4. Eliminate the 12 hour shift on active line. Use 12 hours only on daylight assignments such as mop up and patrol.
    5. IC’s must insist that your Air Operations and ground operations are linked. Too many times the air ops has a plan and it does not always complement the ground action.
    6.Branch fires such as Los Conchos immediately on each flank and let the Branch Director tell the OSC or IC when they need divisions and then supply them. Works like a champ, and stop worrying sbout the nonesense that Branching means type I and all that, it is a tool and should be used as needed.
    7. Allow wildland engine companies to complete burning operations. Burning does not have to be done by a Hotshot crew or a person with burn boss creditials under IA and fire attack conditions. Use crws to build line where dozers can’t go, connect the dots.

    Tip of the iceberg but it works.

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  3. Great comments! I have seen many fires “lost” during the transition period from I.A. extended attack to “it is going to go big”. Wait for the arrival of the TEAM to develop a big picture plan. The only thing happening during the early morning hours of the first full burning period is the arrival of the incident base contractors jocking around their stuff. The window of opportunity at near sunrise, if visibility allows, should see a full air attack attempt at changing the final outcome of a threating wildfire. But, let’s wait and see what the TEAM has in their bag of tricks.

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  4. If we look at the size and duration of fires that have occurred since the USFS went from “Control at 1000 of the next burning period” to “Appropriate Management Response” I would conclude that the USFS Fire Management policy is a failure.

    I will agree that some fires are destined to become large fires, but Federal policies of Wilderness Fire Management and lack of action under the guise of safety have allowed many fires to become huge or in some cases mega fires.

    On the Los Conchas, Monument and the Wallow fire, Federal IMT’s were in charge almost from the Initial Attack and all were woefully under dozered. All 3 fires burned into good bulldozer country, but the teams were behind the curve, trying to fight running timber fires with hand crews.

    Mike is right on another point; Federal Policy on Wilderness Tactics should be changed to force full suppression tactics in Wilderness Areas when the ERC’s are in the extreme levels. The Wallow fire is only the most recent example of a fire that was allowed to build a head of steam as a wilderness fire and then burned private land.

    There are two tactics that would reduce fire size…use more dozers and attack wilderness fires in a more aggressive manner.

    USFS fire policy needs a thorough review from an outside organization.

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  5. Let me address each one cause this is getting interesting. First, I am not venting but after 37 years in wildfire management I am really tired of federal fire policy destroying millions of acres of land, federal, state and private, and the common denominator in this is none of the land, none, belongs to the government. I know all of you are fire fighters and naturally get mad when you think I am chapping your asses, but actually you are just doing what the agency tells you and have become part of the federal fire culture. Love all of you, but your agency policies suck. Sorry, got messed up with New mexico and Arizona because both states had large fires poorly managed, so apply all I have said and will say to Wallow, Los Conchos, Day, Zaca, well just pick one fiasco of your choise and you will cover them all. Oh, trying to deflect from my point by pointing out my failings at geography is weak at best. Ignition and suppression are indeed two different issues, and a rapid rate of spread at the start does not preclude solid strategy and tactics when it settles down. There have been more than a few fires that take out significant acreage in the first burning period, been on a few myself, but one should be poised to address the perimeter when it is appropriate regardless of how much fun the ice cap was to photograph the day before. I also know if you stand around and ring your hands when fires get big during extreme conditions given enough time the fire will make more big runs. My friend Don Will once said that some times it is good to let the big dog eat and I agree but also there are ALWAYS opportunities so don’t let them pass you by. There are so many discussions about when to dis-enage but very few about when to re-engage. Although the Los Conchas fire might have been on other than federal lands, it was managed by a federal Type I Team, or actually a whole pile of them, and regardless of local agency objectives federal fire policy(culture) will prevail. Example, a fire of this size had around 15 dozers assigned. Should have been 50-60 to be effective, but the “milk the pulaski” drumbeat carries on so lets wait until it settles down, cut line around it and slap ourselves on the back for a good job. In California the USFS is famous for burning up SRA under FRA even though it is private land and in violation of the Public Resources Code, but who can question the federal government? Folks, I know this will fall on deaf ears but your responses are part of the problem. Instead of defending your agenies at detriment to yourselves consider some mild changes that won’t hurt: Hey, how about eliminating 12 hour shift and going to 24 for so many improvements I can’t list them here. How about eliminating the CTR, quit requiring lunch breaks on going fires and pay portal to portal so crews don’t have to beg for a few extra hours to make some money and maybe, just maybe you will find an interest in putting the fire out and going home. How about implementing a clause in wilderness fire policy that recognizes extreme ERC’s and requires full suppression when there is an ignition so a 60,000 acre prescribed fire doesn’t come out of the Bob Marshal and burn up thousands of acres of private land and then have the famous response from Jerry Williams, “it was good decision that went bad”. I know, I know, wilderness suppression is there, but I have been there asking for the right to suppress and the rectal weavels in the big house drag their feet and the fire does not wait. How about integrating ground action with aircraft instead of creating desert art, and the list just goes on. How about pulling your collective heads out of the processes you have devloped over the years, starting with 30 mile and apply good forest fire fighting fundementals for a change? The problem is most of you that read this are integrated in to the federal system and have the blinders on. Thats okay, but try to look outside the box and be the one that makes a change, remember you are fighting fire for the citizens not the agency. Now let me have it, but drop the big bad fire, I don’t know squat diatribes and try to tell me and those who might read this why federal fire policy is doing a good job. I can’t wait.

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  6. It is not the ignition that is the problem. It is federal fire policy, lack of viable strategy and tactics and an undieing committment to hand crews instead of dozers that cause these fires to be large, destructive and expensive. The USFS applies federal fire policy which is a land management tool, not a suppression tool to private lands under their protection. It is criminal and the agency borders on incompetence but alas, there is no judge to the federal system. Yes it is dry, yes it is windy, but the fires in Arizona are suppressable with proper tactics.

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    1. Mike – in your venting, you missed the point that this is NOT a Federal land fire – it’s on New Mexico State protection.But what the hell, don’t confuse me with facts: I’ve made up my mind already! Oh yeah, just another minor point: Las Conchas is not in Arizona!

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    2. Mike – I beg to differ with your statement that “it is not the ignition that is the problem”: it sure is a significant factor! If the same ignition had occurred on a cooler, more humid and less windy day, the IA forces from the NM Forestry would have had a good chance to catch it; different weather, different results, escaped fire!Coulda-shoulda-woulda with no basis in fact is not the kind of input I put much stock in when reviewing what happened on fires like this one.

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      1. Seems like the numbers I remember are that 98% of all fires are caught on IA, and the remaining 2% cost 98% of the $$ spent outside of normal expenses?? If Mike could only tell us the “proper tactics” that will make all fires “supressable” we could help reduce the National Debt without reducing my Medicare!

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