The U.S. Forest Service’s Washington office has directed their Technology and Development Center to conduct a review of the fire shelter system, which includes the fire shelter, fireline pack, practice shelters, and training. The Forest Service said the review “had been scheduled to begin in 2015, but due to factors both internally and externally, the WO-FAM requested this review process start in 2014.”
One of those “factors” is of course the deaths of 19 firefighters on the Yarnell Hill Fire on June 30, 2013 in Arizona. They all deployed shelters, but none of them survived, however it is not certain if they were all completely inside the devices when they were overrun by the fire. This review, which will include a search for different, more heat-resistant lightweight materials, may find that in order to protect firefighters entrapped in 2,000-degree flames they would have to carry something that would be too bulky and heavy to transport for 16 hours a day over steep terrain while constructing fireline on a hot day. Or, there might be a technological breakthrough with a radical new design and unthought-of materials.
This review will take three years, but one of the first steps is surveying firefighters for input.
David, believe me the loss of your son and the overwhelming emotional trauma to you, your wife and family are heart felt and on the mind of all of us that has been there especially veteran & current Hot Shot personnel. We are truly sorry and hope all of you will find peace of mind with time, God I hope so. I do not want to continue this dialogue of the tragedy based on the respect and sorrow I have for you and your family even though I have very strong personal opinions concerning this historic event as stated in my previous posts. God bless you and your family.
A wider-view set of questions might be, How might wildfire be fought differently if the risk of burnover and entrapments becomes less acceptable and safety becomes more regulated? What happens if, in the future, wildfire must be fought under much tighter occupational safety regs and how would firefighting techniques and tools have to change to still be effective? Woud wildland fire fighting and its culture be any different if it moved further from a large dependence upon a seasonal workforce with limited benefits to a more fully long-term career force whose welfare and safety might be more protected?
Mr Turbyfil
Read this…..good work.
Not a diatribe…..if folks ( veterans and noobs) do not want to face the facts that there is an inherent culture on a number of levels and facts…..
Those folks would be best advised to refer to this on a on demand basis.
Just because the Agencies have done it for 100+ yrs and we have had Smokey Bear for 70 years and we have a plethora of veterans and noobs that need or should be REQUIRED to mentor……this one is crying out for help.
Like I have said before, if the LMA’s were truly interested in emulating the US Armed forces and aviation world……some of the requirements would already have been met just like the FAA pushing many requirements onto Part 121 airline, regional , general aviation etc on to us pilots and mechanics.
To say that there has been all these checks and balances within all the Agencies who have lost personnel over many choice pieces of vegetated topography which by all rights, not one life should have been lost, proves that the training value has been lost, for some reason.
These ideas that you have brought up……people just need to face the facts that the the old saying……”that is the way we have been doing it for yeaaaaars” just does NOT hold water nor the training has been a failure and needs to re examined
Why does one suppose there has been so many training evolutions in the military and aviation for the last 60 of those 100 years…..the land management agencies just need to play catch up
New training styles ought to be the biggest “Leaders Intent” out there……not just what works for us for the last eons….
All good points, Mr Turbyfil!!
For the last year on almost every public forum I look at, read, and have had to spend it, defending the actions of the Granite Mountain Crew. Against accusations of making All of the mistakes, by not following the 10-18, and in doing so they paid with their lives. Most family members do not have the strength or the knowledge to read these postings and not be either deeply hurt or offended. I do not believe any of you truly mean any disrespect to the Granite Mountain Hotshots, I believe that you are just citing your cultural experiences and knowledge.
Main points of contention:
1. The 10 Standing Orders and 18 Watch Outs; many of you contend that if they would have only followed those they would still be here today.
2. They Should Have Stayed in the Black.
3. That Fire Shelters Should Never Be Deployed.
4. Continued Disagreement That the Fire Shelters Are Not a Problem by Veteran and Retired Firefighters
5. The Weight of an Improved Fire Shelter and the concept of, Lack of Oxygen.
6. That the Canadians and Australian Wildland Firefighters Do Not Carry Fire Shelters.
7. If Only You Guys Had Been There the Outcome Would Have Been Different Because of Your Vast Experience.
8. Culture of the Bureaucracy.
9. Culture of the Training and Tactics.
10. Overall Wildland Policy.
My Response to These Points:
1. While the 10 and 18 are great safety factors for the wildland firefighter and should be adhered to as closely as possible in the field. From an employer’s perspective, this is really about CYA, against wrongful death suits that might be brought from injured employees, families of the victims. It is hard to win a lawsuit for wrongful death. If you are complicit in your own fatality.
2. Should they have stayed in the black? Well this is normally a very practical tactic to save your butt. I have seen photos and weather data, that leads me and others, that the weather event is not properly being taken into account of by individuals that either were not there or have not been to the site. But some of you may not realize is that there was cyclonic rotation of 2 weather events happening directly over the town of Yarnell. As the weather column that was coming from the north, and over the east side of Yarnell spilled over the elevation change, the fire column collapsed on the Box Canyon where GMHS was trapped and spilled over the Ridge to their South, and the Ridge line that they had descended from all the way back to the anchor point of the fire that they were working.
3. The idea that a wildland firefighter should never deploy a fire shelter, or put themselves or their crew in a position to have to. The fact that you have unsustainable and deadly if you use it fire shelter, at this time I would tend to agree with that. However, if a truly survivable fire shelter safety system were in place wildland firefighters could more aggressively attack fires without fear of loss of life and the possibility of them deploying the more often would be completely a normal activity.
4. The fact that some current, veteran, and retired wildland firefighters have the idea that there is not an issue with the current fire shelter, this is a laughable thought. According to statistics that I have gathered from the you at US Forest Service show that from 1910 through 2013 there was approximately 1091 total fatalities due to all wildland firefighting operations. During that same period 504 of them was doing are due to burn over or entrapments. This is it approximately 50% fatality rate of all fatalities. And while since 1994, the burn over fatality rate had dropped to around 20% of all fatalities, but with the advance of 2013 is back up to nearly 25%. So I say to you again, the fire shelter most certainly is a problem, and just to try to put safety advancements to something you could relate to. Most of you do not get do not get into your vehicles without putting on a seatbelt, most of the vehicles that you drive today are equipped with air bags, racecar drivers use multilayer fire protection suits and helmets, and now since the death of Dale Earnhardt almost all racing sanctioning bodies use head and neck restraints while they did not even give it a consideration prior to that. You do not think twice about the firefighters driving around in the Big Red Trucks using full turnout gear when they show up to car accident or a structure fire. Just as in the 1990 Gulf War soldiers used very little body armor protection compared to our soldiers of today.
5. Weight, Cost, Breathable Air. All valid points, in terms of cost, there is always a cost benefit analysis done at some point. Since the hard truth is, that wildland firefighting fatalities are relatively low, can we really afford a more expensive shelter safety system. This question will be determined by families and taxpayers. In terms of weight and breathable air, the breathable air component is an already solved issue. In terms of the weight of a new fire shelter, that is actually survivable. This is a good question for the time being, but if you look at other alternatives of weight reduction systems. I think there are a lot of opportunities to reduce weight within your fire line packs, and all overall gear that you carry on the line. Maybe there needs to be a better supply chain to the wildland firefighter on the line.
6. Well, the Canadians and the Australians Do Not Use Them. Seems like on every other issue that matters to our country. We do not want to follow what other countries do including Canadian healthcare or European healthcare. So just because they do not does not mean we should not. I think the fire behaviors and types of intensity that Canadians see is not the same as we see here in the Southwest of America.
7. Had all of you other wildland firefighting veterans been there that day, we would have just pulled more bodies from the mountain. I am not trying to disrespect your experience or knowledge. But just because it did not happen to you during your career could mean that you just were freaking lucky.
8. The Cultures of Wildland Firefighting. I am not even sure how to really go about this particular position, but from reading both emails and postings. I would say that the culture, the unwillingness of change is ever present, and can continues to be perpetuated throughout the wildland fire community.
If you have taken the time to read my full diatribe here, I thank you profusely, please know that I respect all of you, your opinions, and value your service both current and former Wildland Fire Professionals.
Sincerely,
David Turbyfill
Mr. Turbyfilll-
I am so very sorry for the loss of your son.
#8 The Cultures of Wildland Firefighting–this is perhaps the ultimate reason my son, Caleb Hamm, isn’t with us today. (LODD 7/7/11, 337 Fire, Mineral Wells, Tx) It is my belief that reason, above all else, above all the other changes that could and will be made, is why we lose so very many good young men and women. The thinking which leads to deaths.
One thing I can pass on to you, as the parent of a dead firefighter: Change is very slow in coming. Sometimes, if at all. Despite the CDC’s warnings to the BLM about heat exertion, heat stress, etc., the BLM continues to ignore my requests for an investigation into my son’s death. I have grown used to the repeated ignoring silence they give me.
But don’t give up!!! Don’t stop fighting!!! That is what we are left here to do…….
My heart goes out to you………I am so very sorry about your son.
Lynnette Hamm
Rod I am in total agreement that all Wildland Firefighting Agencies, with emphasis coming from USFS, BLM and the BIA, which set the standards for all the other wildland firefighting agencies, should more aggressively attack fires in the early stages.
In my younger days I had served as a volunteer on the Groom Creek Fire Dept. So I have seen some brush fires, so I am not completely naïve to what goes on. But what I see in these photos, look at the timestamps that go with them. Then the subsequent loss of containment later in the day, it makes me wonder how a crew that was flown in at approximately 10:30 AM on Saturday morning, the 29th with the fire barely showing smoke could lose a handle on this unless they were setting on their behind’s all day. This is one area where I believe that wildland fire management and policy cost the lives of the 19 Granite Mountain Hotshots.
In the Manufacturing World, as a part moves through the shop and a defect is found during inspection or if a part fails in the field, like during an auto or plane crash, we have corrective action policies in place that look for and assess, Root Cause Analysis. For me, when you look at the Root Cause of why the Granite Mountain Hotshots perished on June 30.
• Ineffective Initial Attack and Wildland Management on June 29.
• Inadequate Fire Shelters
Now there are other factors that did play a role in the outcome of Yarnell fire, but I am only looking for the Ultimate Root Cause. But with all the other factors by relieving almost any one of them, individually, the outcome would still not be any different.
Sir,
I would be careful of drawing such inferences based on a time stamp. Hindsight is 20/20 my friend, perhaps you shouldn’t be armchair IC’ing on a fire that is now so socially complex. Please keep in mind that a crew flying into a fire at 1030 is coming in with the peak burning window. Also, they may not have had a nearby LZ, if not then there would’a been a hike in and creating a pad on-site as the first order of business (ahh, now i’m the one who’s speculating… it’s easy to go down that road). I will close by saying no crew worth anything would be “setting on their behind’s all day” and I would be highly skeptical that is what they were doing. Keep in mind that this was not your little VFD, splash and dash grass fire.
Josh, you’ve made one really correct statement, IF IT HAD BEEN MY LITTLE VFD, WE WOULD HAVE KNOCKED OUT THE FIRE ON FRIDAY AFTERNOON-EVENING, be damned with the State telling Yarnell to Standby. As far as armchair IC’ing this fire, everyone else seems to have plenty of harsh things to say about the Crew and why they were where they were. So I think I am little more entitled than most, as I lost my son. Travis’ mother and I are not part of the pending Claims/litigation
But I am not really going there. I am wanting a full explanation to what the pictures do show and maybe what they don’t. I have reached out to D. Fernandez and State Fire to have a meeting with the IC’s, Shumate and Hall
I am sorry for your loss and the hurt you must be feeling. Hopefully this website is somewhat cathartic for you, rather than inflammatory.
I thank all of you who comment on this and IVM forum, yes sometime its really frustrating for me, but it is also cathartic as well. For me, having been involved with fire, but not to the degree of any of you including my son, I feel as though I am try to get all of you to see your Culture, Policies, Tactics, Equipment, and Attitudes through a slightly different set of eyes or perspective.
Thanks to all who listen…..tears in my eyes…I just miss him so terribly.
David Turbyfill
Keep talking, we will keep listening. Eventually, it will numb up some, but the horrible sense of loss will never completely go away. Honoring the memory of what happened to Travis and the other members of Granite Mountain forever is the best monument that we as a community to build. Building a better way to keep it from happening to anyone else is better than the nothingness.
Best Wishes
The Fire Shelter is not the problem. The problem is not training to understand the expected fire behavior and getting out of the hazard area before you have to think about deploying. There are certain laws of physics and anatomy that you cannot get around with a shelter.
In the days of yesteryear, when i was packing a gen I shelter, I was supervised by crusty old fire and fuels guys who had operated in their home districts for decades and pretty much knew how things were going to develop.
with those positions now being used for career advancement posts we have lost most of that kind of expertise, hopefully some remains on the crews, but no crew should be going into a position where they can be trapped, or are violating the 10,18, and LCES.
Forest reforestation can be a jobs program, firefighters lives cannot be so easily replaced.
A bit off the current time/discussion line. Back in the early seventies I was assigned to clean-up a basement in a FS Guard Station. In it I found some very old smoke chaser backpacks on frames. While going through them I experienced a sort of time warp into the 1950s tools of the fire trade. I found a small metallic like bundle, labeled “Gas Capes” of 1940ish vintage. The contents tag on the out side of the packs said protective cape. I opened one and it was a brittle tent like affair designed to fit over a person like a poncho with a very yellowed plastic like window. Upon giving it a gentle shake much of the outer layer flaked off and it developed several tears. I’m thinking it was a very early attempt at a fire shelter, army surplus style
Well being a good employee I reported it to the crusty old boss and he said, “Just check for the damn stuff on the list, don’t test it. I do not want to hear your opinion of the contents”. Lucky for me there were several cases of spare capes, so I replaced the one I opened.
Anyone else ever see those type capes?
I recall seeing “gas capes” like those you described, in a surplus store when I was a kid. I dont believe they were ever intended for any firefighting use, but for chemical warfare purposes. Being govt surplus, I bet they found their way to the FS.
Mr. Turbyfill, First and foremost, I am sorry for your loss. I had to bury a grandson a few years ago, and the pain is still very fresh. I hope time helps heal your wounds.
I welcome your efforts. I would like to see improvement, but for my agency, it will be very slow. The cost to replace shelters is significant, and as they become more robust, I suspect that will only increase.
As someone that does walk many miles with a pack, to me, weight is more important than improved capability. I’m not sure that we can have a bulletproof shelter and still see 100% compliance, if it gets too heavy, we will have trouble with firefighters being willing to carry them.
Good day to all who are still following the events of last year’s disaster Yarnell Hill. As we grow close to the one-year anniversary, I am reasonably happy that the US Forest Service willing to consider a review on their fire shelter safety systems. Although without being said, they are only accelerating the review process and it could be another 3 to 4 years before you see anything come out of it. 1st I want to give you a link to a test that I conducted that I would like to have you guys take a look at. Here is a link to the YouTube video http://youtu.be/Ps-0cG70hps
To Rod Welch and other veterans of the wildland firefighting community, I have great respect for both your service and your knowledge when it comes to wildland firefighting operations from both the policy and procedure point of you. Rod you have made an assumption “Those who perish during a shelter deployment die of superheated air 300+ degrees. Next cause is panic and existing the shelter during the burn over. 2,000 degree survival is not possible by any type of lightweight shelter that can be hauled around on the fireline.” In truth, there are only a handful of people who really know how these wildland firefighters actually perish from burn over deployments. Well autopsies were done on the crew Of Granite Mountain Hotshots. They have not been made public, and most of the families who have had access to them have not read them.
Here is what I know for sure. My son Travis did not make it into a shelter, most likely was knocked down by the superheated gases that you describe. But keep in mind just because your lungs or burn it does not mean your mind is still working. It is not instantaneous death that a person dies that way.
You are right in the last 50 years the fire shelter has only seen one redevelopment that was a result from the storm King mountain tragedy of 1994 and took the US Dept. of forestry 5 years to even consider making changes an additional 5 to implement changes. They have done no further updates since the 2003-2005 release of the current fire shelter.
To be continued.
David Turbyfill
David,
I was reading the 20 years articles re South Canyon (Storm King Mountain) where 14 firefighters perished. It appears gas overtook them and few achieved shelter deployment.
I don’t know who to contact, but the idea that came to mind yesterday is this. Shelter deployment can be completed in a short amount of time, but it could be faster if airbag technology were utilized. If some company could develop a stand on version where the firefighter just pulls the rip cord it may save lives. It could be multi layered with air in between made of different shielding material.
Please pass on to whom every can get the idea into the proper channels for developement considerations.
Thanks
Tim
I believe the last firefighter fatality on a wildland fire in Canada was in 1995 (rappell crew member on the Lac La Biche fire, Alberta). British Columbia stopped using fire shelters in 2005 and were the only agency in Canada to pack them.
Agreed, the fire environment and tactics are quite different up here (lots of heli’s, less firefighters, less interface, and almost always with water). I am thankful we don’t pack fire shelters, however, after numerous assignments to the States, I get it. Given the terrain, fuel types, perceived pressures and expectations in the Lower 48, I understand why shelters are standard issue. On the other hand, if you have your 10 and 18 with L(A)CES, you should never need one.
(A = Anchor points)
The agency I worked for in the 1990’s. Parks Canada, considered shelters and I had one for a little while. It was decided that they simply did not make sense in our fire environment. I agree that standard issue in the US makes sense and also that you should almost never need one if you follow all the wisdom that has been passed down to us. However, like snow avalanche fatalities, you can sometimes make all the right decisions and still get into serious trouble.
In the time since Canada stopped using fire shelters have they had any entrapments or burnovers? If so, how does this compare with when they did use shelters?
No entrapments or burn-overs that I am aware since shelter use was ended in Canada but the fire environment and the tactics are very different in Canada. Generally a lot more helicopters assigned, fewer firefighters assigned and a lot more water used for suppression.
One more reason for me to leave the Forest Service.
While I agree we need to emphasize training people so we don’t need to ever deploy a shelter, I welcome investigating improved materials to increase survivability for those that have to deploy them. Myself, I wouldn’t mind if they were bulkier, but I don’t want it heavier. My pack weighs too much already, but I can’t find anything I am willing to dump.
Exactly. Change can be good; more weight will detract from safety rather than enhance it though.
Wild land fire agencies, especially the U.S.F.S. & BLM, should be evaluating, improving their initial attack action & methods to provide quick, aggressive and proper directed IA with overwhelming force instead of studying a fire shelter that will never meet the requirements of survival in a situation like Yarnell. Do not use wildfire to meet the agencies fuel treatment objectives, goals & let burn ideology but use the early offensive suppression ability window to put it out with less duration of exposure to risk and of course millions of dollars less expensive in suppression & rehab costs. Quit making excuses of “steep, inaccessible & unsafe” for not doing anything. Provide direction for a national initial attack policy & a national initial attack training package that allows chief officers and suppression resources to take the proper action. Given the responsibility of suppression must come the authority of quick, aggressive action.
Continuing my statement: I know a lot of wild land firefighters, both on hand crews & engines, that performed the exact same way and are still here today!!
Those who perish during a shelter deployment die of superheated air 300+ degrees. Next cause is panic and existing the shelter during the burn over. 2,000 degree survival is not possible by any type of lightweight shelter that can be hauled around on the fireline. The individual in a fire shelter, since its conception in the last 50 years, has never been expected to survive extremely high temperatures it has always been a requirement that the deployment must be made in a proper clearing vacant of sizable vegetation. Try educating crews to logically think not to place themselves into situations that require a deployment where survival is non existent and emphasize the importance of a safe escape route, like the burn, and not a clearing half a mile away thru the green. Experiencing 7 years on 2 inter-regional Hot Shot crews we never had to deploy a shelter because we followed the ten & 13 back then, 60’s, 70’s & 80’s, and was constantly evaluating our position, movement and constructive suppression actions. I know a lot of fine wild land firefighters that performed the e
Rod I met you many years ago in SanBernardino N.F. I think we both learned from some really good wildland fireman. I did hand crews for 40 years with Del Rosa hot shots and la.co. camp programs and I totally agree with your comments about the direction of training about shelters. Good stuff.
I’d simply add that as temps increase, the importance of a good seal gets to be more and more critical. So, in real-world conditions even a dramatically improved shelter might not offer much benefit beyond current ones if it is deployed in haste, particularly so in uneven ground. Improving gear is a good thing, but thinking what practical benefit that improvement can buy you is also important.