A decade after a similar concept was proposed, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) is being asked again to change the way Incident Management Teams (IMT) are configured. Currently there are three levels, Types 1, 2 and 3, with Type 1 IMTs being the highest qualified. The idea is to combine Types 1 and 2 into just one type, which will be called Complex Incident Management Teams (CIMT).
The Incident Workforce Development Group (IWDG), a working group of IMT practitioners and subject matter experts jointly chartered by the Fire Management Board (FMB), crafted a memo to the FMB asking for the change, in order to address the following:
- Reduced number of IMT participants to fill IMT rosters, impacting the total number of IMTs available nationally;
- Inconsistent use of IMTs due to lack of national IMT rotation management and commitment approval;
- Reliance on Administratively Determined (AD) employees, retirees, and cooperators to staff IMTs without commensurate trainee use; and
- Standardization of the IMT mobilization processes and other criteria across Geographic Areas.
In 2010, recognizing that the workforce management and succession planning for wildfire response was not sustainable, the NWCG chartered an interagency team to develop a new organizational model for incident management. In October, 2011 the NWCG released a 51-page document, Evolving Incident Management — A Recommendation for the Future. (If they issued a companion report, a Recommendation for the Past, we were unable to find it.) The suggestion was to merge all federally sponsored type 1 and type 2 teams into one type of IMT. There would three response levels: Initial attack (type 4 and 5 incidents), extended attack (type 3 incidents managed by type 3 IMTs), and complex incidents managed by Complex IMTs. Wildfire Today’s last update on that proposal was in 2015.
Below is a copy of the memo about the current suggestion. It was signed January 10, 2022 by the two top fire guys in the US Forest Service and the Department of the Interior and sent to the Fire Management Board, NWCG, and the National Multi-Agency Coordinating Group.
(Click on the document above to see at bottom-left how to zoom in or scroll to pages two and three.)
[pdf-embedder url=”https://wildfiretoday.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/CIMT_12-13-21.pdf” title=”Complex Incident Management Teams”]
The recently released report about the 2020 fatality on the El Dorado Fire addressed many issues the investigators felt were related to the management of that incident, including the current system for configuring IMTs:
“The same concerns exist for Incident Management Teams (IMT). With the reduction of 39 percent of the Forest Service’s non-fire workforce since 2000, the “militia” available to assist in IMT duties is rapidly being reduced to a mythical entity, often spoken of but rarely seen. The 2020 fire year was simply the latest in a long string of years where we did not have enough IMTs, let alone general resources, to address suppressing fire in our current paradigm. On the El Dorado Fire, Region 5 took a creative approach to ensure Type 1 oversight by grafting a Type 1 incident commander onto a Type 2 team, when no Type 1 teams were available. While this met the need and policy requirements, one cannot help but wonder what the difference really is between a Type 1 and Type 2 team. Why not just create one national team typing system, and why not ensure that it is staffed to a holistic fire management response (see Theme 2) and not just a direct perimeter control response.”
Thanks and a tip of the hat go out to Al.
No brainer, IMO, not much difference between the two anyway, and they can ease the transition by combining 1 and 2 personnel in the off season when the teams are selected. Many times a fire is left to the hazards of transition when a 2 is taken over by a 1 (usually at a very critical time), not to mention the cost.
After 20 years as an AD, starting on a hand crew and progressing to Logistics Section Chief, I am just about “up to here” with the AD bashing whenever team reform is brought up, during the last ten years of my career I generally did between 8 and nine team assignments every year, gaining vastly more experience than my agency counter parts. Often in the mid to late season I would still be updating agency folks on the changes in the last 1-2 years. Frankly, AD’s have carried most teams for years now. It is true there are some AD’s, who should step down, but there are many more that are key leaders with years of experience to contribute. AD’ s are not even a small part of the multitude of issues that need to be fixed concerning teams.
Pete,
You illustrated the problem precisely. 8-9 team rolls a year??? Unless you’re on an IHC, agency folks would never be able to do that based on the fact that IMT duties are collateral. Imagine the great experience an agency person could obtain if they were permitted to do that? Imagine the useful life of those skills if they were permitted to start with 10-15 years left before retirement? We have done a poor job of succession planning and training so we’ve just relied on the velcro show mafia to scab in. If we were doing our training a planning correctly, there would be no such thing as AD’s.
Federal agencies, by and large, mortally wounded themselves long ago when they stymied employee development. Take FFT1 for example, I’ve see supervisors ultra scrutinize and nitpick PTB’s and training to the point where it was taking 3-4 year to get signed off on FFT1!! At the FFT1 level, you essentially need a pulse and need to be able to read.
15-20 years to get signed off as a DIVS???? That is unforgivable. I know 18 year Hotshots that are just now getting their DIVS done despite having 10’s of thousands of hours of on-the-line real fire experience.
Honestly, nobody wants to be on IMT’s anymore because…why should they? After all those years killing yourself (and your family) for silly quals you finally get on a team and, guess what, it kinda sucks. Being on a rotation sucks, the hours (capped at 16 when you’re really working 24s) sucks. Having to work under increasingly stupid and untenable delegations of authority from clueless line officers sucks. After all that, you get back to your day job and you’re buried…so that sucks. You also go home and have to get reacquainted with your family and your system at home…which sucks and makes you feel guilty for being gone. The extra $$ from OT doesn’t play into your retirement annuity for high 3 so that sucks.
Personally, I prefer to just do things on a mercenary basis. I can plan when it’s good for my family and my day job to go available and I can pick and choose what I want to go out as. I have some modicum of control over my fate and schedule vs being rostered as a specific position and on a rotation. I learned long ago that Soldier of Fortune is the way to go!!
There is a lot to consider here. We have known for well over a decade that we were not prepared with appropriate successional planning in fire to staff the IMTs we need. So we rely on a lot of ADs to try to plug the gaps, unsuccessfully. Some of them are awesome, and honestly some of them are past their prime. But it is hard to tell your friend of so many years (or even a stranger) that maybe they’re not on their game anymore and should find a new hobby for the summer, especially when you need to fill that position desperately. We are also losing people from our active workforce, for a variety of perfectly valid reasons like pay, work life balance, and so on, which Congress has thus far failed to address in a timely manner. So we are left with a smaller and less skilled workforce than we need. So how to do the job? While I wasn’t fighting fire 30 years ago, in conversations with some who were, many fires that are now managed by Type 2 teams back in the day would have been Type 1 then. Incident complexity has increased, in some cases enormously, and true to form the people in our field have stepped up and done what needed to be done even when it was pushing the envelope of their skills and experience. I agree with Ms. Pincha-Tulley that incidents are not getting any less complex, but I think the line can be a little blurry between Type 1 and 2 teams, having worked on both. A lot of it depends on the personnel, I have worked with Type 1 teams that were more like Type 2 and vice versa. I don’t see a problem with combining the two. While I understand the need for a rotation, I think there should be room for AAs to order a local/regional team when incident complexity indicates that a high level of experience with local factors would be beneficial. I have not seen or heard anything in the meetings I have been in on indicating that structures need to be threatened to get a CIIMT, not sure where that came from but that seems unlikely to be the case.
Caveman, policy (at least federal) doesn’t facilitate people being DIVS qualified but not TFLD. Maybe this is an issue with states but the current PMS 310-1 from NWCG makes a reasonable amount of sense. It will never please everyone, right? In my opinion parts of it are too lenient in terms of prior experience, but they seem disinterested in input from people who are actually out doing the jobs and see the potential failures we are setting ourselves up for. I agree with Phil Beddoe, we really should have more full time teams like NIMOs but at the Complex or maybe even Type 3 level. There are plenty of projects that could be assigned to those organizations during non-incident times. Also, Joe Schmo is right. All the old timers who haven’t swung a tool in decades are showing that they have been on the porch for a while when they imply that we aren’t trying to catch fires in IA, or succeeding. As a first line module supervisor I can assure you we are, and we are still doing a damn good job of it. But as he says, the current fire environment is wildly different from what you guys experienced, and those fires that aren’t caught early can become quite challenging quite rapidly. Murry, if you read the comments on the article you wrote, you can see some of the factors that Merv had nothing to do with which contributed to the low amount of large fires on the RRS. It seems as if you’re looking at the situation through a straw and not seeing the whole picture. You’re an ex-jumper right? Is every fire jumpable? I can’t speak from personal experience but I think not. Again, today’s fire environment is not what you experienced. That said I think you make very good points about whether a Type 2 vs a Type 1 will have a substantial effect on the success of catching a given large fire; I think a lot of it is just that having a Type 1 team gives greater power to pull resources, which shouldn’t necessarily be the case but often that’s the justification for ordering up. Either way we do what we do, throw money at it until it snows, right? Not always but sometimes that’s about all we can do. The right action also needs to happen at the right time, which may not be August or even September. Good discussion all around.
The current model of ad hoc IMT’s is a dangerous joke given the current fire environment. Here is a FEDERAL organization that is supposed to come in a make order out of chaos when the local units get overwhelmed but it’s comprised with throw togethers, basically the equivalent of a “Regs” crew.
IMT’s, if they truly want to be considered “teams”, need to be permanent, full time organizations similar to NIMO teams. Imagine an NFL team showing up for the Super Bowl and trying to cast about for team members the day before the game?????? It’s laughable!!! This is the best the Federal Govt can do? Really??
If it’s true Teams you want, than build true teams but knock it off with this amateurish model of IMT’s.
So basically you’re not getting a CIMT unless you have structures threatened? I understand that these teams are meant for complex fire situations but I’ve been on plenty of fires where no structures were threatened that the operational and logistical demands stress even a well oiled type 3 team. In my opinion type 2 teams are a great asset, and serve a critical role. I get that filling teams is getting harder and harder, but why don’t we try and fix the staffing/recruiting/training problem instead of trying to patch it with a bandaid? It’s becoming clearer and clearer that federal wildland fire suppression has become too complex to be ran out of multiple agencies who have multiple other objectives, respectively. We need change, and we need it now.
Some of these comments make it sound like we’re not attacking fires aggressively during the IA stage and that’s not true for the majority of them. To the folks with the “back in my day” talk – you realize that the conditions we encounter regularly now are very different then the 1900s? The majority of the large fires I’ve been on in recent years have been fires that were aggressively attacked from the get go but couldn’t be caught for a variety of reasons – environmental conditions primarily, sometimes lack of resources or time it took to arrive on scene.
IMTs are great for providing logistical support but operationally are all over the map in terms of quality. It’d be great to have more folks from IHCs hop on a team!
Joe Schmo, This comment, “you realize that the conditions we encounter regularly now are very different then the 1900s?” is interesting because I’ve heard it so much from current FS fire people. I talk to crews, hotshots and jumpers all the time. And they say, Yes, sometimes fires are burning hotter and are more dangerous. But you can most always get in and do some good work on some parts anyway. And, while most fires nationwide may be being attacked fast and put out, that’s certainly not the case where I live in N.Calif. and most of the west. I work a fire lookout in summers and I’ve seen years where fires set a full day or more with no action. That seems to be getting better now and certainly does need to get better. Some forests will not hike crews at night to lightning fires, too dangerous, and my favorite, Too Steep and Too Rough. Silly, if you ask me. So, fires remain unstaffed until afternoon of the second day. In the meantime jumpers sit and wait, while they could have been over the fire that morning at 9AM, like we used to. They sit and wait at base after base, year after year. Unbelievable! Low use of smokejumpers is, and has been for many years, an issue needing addressed. Amazingly, I hardly ever hear fire staff bring it up, and when they do, it’s not with much vigor.
My personal opinion is that we’re not placing enough emphasis on the Type 3 organization. Seems like every fire these days goes from IA (Type 5&4) straight into a Complex Incident Management Team managed fire. Our primary recruitment mechanism is getting skipped over.
Great moniker, STM.,
I agree with your comments on T3s. The likely outcome of that is they will get ripped off to fill the T2 teams due to skill shortages all around. Something about “shortages” that needs to be said here, albeit at the potential rage from some, is the need and or desire of some to “not be away too long.”
Hey, you’re on the line until it’s over; short and simple.
Agree wholeheartedly about putting them out in the IA phase. Also, we used to pick up a whole bunch of fires in the early morning hours of the second day, working all night to catch them when intensities are down—now everyone goes home at 2200 so that they don’t go over 16 hours, which to me is crazy. As for Type 1 or Type 2, my two weeks at 520 in Marana were as tough as I can remember any training ever being. I think they had about a 40% failure rate, and the evaluators were tougher than your meanest teacher in high school. Now 520 is a only a week and it consists of touchy/feely subjects, where they have long discussions about theory, politics, HR, and long range predictions. PLUS, no one fails——everybody gets a trophy! So I guess the new federal Wildland mantra for people who are supposed to lead thousands of responders in the most demanding situations is mediocrity is acceptable. The system is broken in so many ways…….truly sad to see.
Okay, it’s me, Murry Taylor again and, for what it’s worth, I think combining the teams is a good idea. My take is that if you can’t put a fire out with a Type 2, Team, you’ll likely not be able to with a Type 1. From what I see in either of these fire camps, it’s just too many people, with too much hardware, with too many tasks, and too little work actually getting done on the ground. I think you could reduce the size of these teams by a third and never notice the difference. But here’s the other thing not talked about much these days — Why not just put these fires out when they’re small? Why not use smokejumpers like they should be used? IN the summer of 2020, the 430 or so jumpers in the US only made an average of four fire jumps. We used to average 1o or more–sometimes 15 to 2o. Doing the math using 6 jumpers per fire, they only jumped about 280 fires. If they had averaged 10, they would have jumped 710 fires. And that’s a difference of 430 fires. So right there is a good place to start. Imagine the savings. Imagine the reduced movement of people and equipment. Keep the number of big fires to a minumum and your teams will go farther and not become so exhausted.
I wrote an article here in Wildfire Today a month or so ago about the Rogue River – Siskiyou N.F. and the fact that they had gotten tough on IA and in the last two summers had 120 fires and only burned 70 acres. That’s not counting the Slater that burned over on the RRSNF from the Klamath. I have to say, I thought this would be received with a lot of interest and excitement by other FS fire managers. It was NOT. So, I have to wonder just how serious these people are about actually solving this problem.
I agree, the Supervisor of the Rogue has it figured out !
I suggest he become the Chief of the F.S. because of his experience and common sense, something that is missing with all these pencil pushing desk types leading these organizations.
But we will pay 2-5 times as much once the large fire occurs to contractors. Because thats a different silo of money. That we dont have to account for.
OLDGUY, I think it’s worse than that. Over the last 4 years, NPS/FS lost a lot of people from retirements, RIFs, and terminations, because their budgets were cut by 3%. The higher ups made a decision to get rid of people so that they could get their raises. The people who were fired have tried to come back, but the NPS/FS has black balled them. (Thanks to Jesse Standridge!!!) To make it even worse the people who were fired have lost their certs, because the NPS/FS were not doing training, because of COVID. Basically, the people who were working for NPS/FS got their red cards signed without getting the necessary training. (Which is not a new thing, this happened all the time in the FS.) So, when the people who were fired try to apply for a position they don’t qualify. Basically, the NPS/FS wiped out all of their middle management and now are having to restructure, because they don’t have enough qualified people. If I didn’t care so much, I’d think this is hilarious, because it’s finally biting them in the a… I’m sorry! I just think it’s funny that the NPS/FS has a Planning Division, but they didn’t plan for the consequences of mass reductions. Y’all can keep rearranging the Titanic, but it still sinks. Good luck everyone!
“If they issued a companion report, a Recommendation for the Past, we were unable to find it”
LOL!
Otherwise, this topic seems like reality vs. principles. I’m watching, wondering how things will turn out. Wishing luck, and grateful for retirement.
There is a significant difference in Type 1 and Type 2 incidents. The qualifications should not be combined as the complexity of incidents is only growing under the current climate change cycle. The federal agencies have been dealing with a decline of incident skills for a long time, however, a lack of sustained leadership and commitment needed to create, develop and maintain the needed pool of skilled personnel does not mean that diluting the qualifications is needed. Leadership, commitment and real recruitment by current Fire personnel are needed.
Land management in the West is inclusive of fire management. Agency Administrators need to have real fire management skills to understand the complexity and leadership needed to make critical decisions about personnel, training, qualifications and availability.
Honestly, Fire Management personnel, need Fire Management experienced personnel to work for to get the pool of skilled personnel trained and available. In the last few years, more incident personnel and civilians have perished under this decline of leadership. Making fewer teams, watering down qualifications, using less experienced personnel is not going to make the fatties decrease.
Well said Jeanne, this whole system is in decline.
Always enjoyed working with you !
It obviously comes down to the fact that there are not enough individuals willing to commit to teams.
It obviously comes down to the fact that there are not enough individuals willing to commit to working for USFS/DOI.
It obviously comes down to the fact, that regardless of some pay increases to $15 per hour, not enough individuals are willing to make this their occupation.
It’s obviously comes down to the fact, that this year, finding the few individuals willing to work in fire, will become a huge challenge for fire management, nationwide.
It’s obviously a huge problem, will continue to be a huge problem, on top of the increased fire activity of the last few years, etc etc etc
I’ll leave it with this, when the U Army starts dolling out $50k sign on bonuses for a six year commitment, we as a country have bigger issues then just the IMT realm of not having enough individuals to fill those spots
No, SR, it appears they are not doing much more than “shuffling the deck chairs” due to lack of availability of s kills.
There is obviously a greater need for more teams as evidenced the past two seasons, where it was largely blamed on the coincidence of COVID. But rather than increase the members on these teams, they are proposing merging Type I and II skill sets,
I like to “step back” from such muddling with a good system and take a bigger look at the problem causing this “perceived need.” During the past two years, were Type II teams overwhelmed more often due to the horrific nature of the abnormal dry fuels and high winds? What is really gained by mixing Type II skills with a Type I team, other than more fill-ins and depth, albeit less qualified? Merging may make the Type II personnel feel “more involved” but, do they really add value needed to Type I teams? And look at the gap that leaves between the newly merged I &II team vs all others less skilled below that level.
Interesting, but they are still not solving the real issue. The reduction of 39% of the workforce. Fix the real problem!!!
“…without commensurate trainee use.”
So, petty arguments and personal issues leading to supervisor refusing to open task books and refusing to send out trainees is finally coming back to bite, huh? Who could have foreseen that?