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Night flying helicopters discussed in Senate hearing

Bill GabbertMay 26, 2010June 3, 2020Uncategorizedhearing, helicopter, Station Fire4 Comments

Did anyone see the hearing conducted by the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior this morning? The agenda was supposed to be “Examination of the firefighting policy with U.S. Forest Service and U.S. Department of Interior”. The following report by 89.3 KPPC Southern California Public Radio concentrates on the use of night flying helicopters for fire suppression, as did other reports.

The U.S. Forest Service won’t deploy night-flying aircraft to fight fires before the end of Southern California’s traditional fire season.

The Forest Service has maintained a ban on fighting fires by air after dark since a helicopter crash back in 1977. Critics say that if the agency had allowed water-tanker planes in the air after dark, that equipment might have stopped last summer’s deadly Station Fire much sooner.

At a U.S. Senate hearing, Forest Service officials said they’re reconsidering the ban on night time aerial firefighting. The problem is that the Service doesn’t have the technology to do it. Democratic Congressman Adam Schiff of Burbank says they “no longer have the night time flying goggles or the equipment in the helicopter to be able to use them.”

Schiff was invited by his California colleague Senator Dianne Feinstein to join senators who questioned the Forest Service’s night time ban. Schiff says the Service is considering two options.

“One is to acquire the capability in house. Another is to work with some of their cooperators — which is what they call L.A. County, L.A. City, that already have the capacity. Whether they should basically contract with them.”

The problem is that local governments have their own equipment challenges. Last summer, a Los Angeles County helicopter was in the air, fighting the Station Fire after dark until a medical emergency diverted the chopper from the fire scene.

If the Forest Service lifts its ban, the earliest it could have aircraft ready to fly at night would be November, well into the Southland’s wildfire season.

UPDATE:

Here is an excerpt from the LA Times’ coverage of the hearing:

The head of the U.S. Forest Service told a Senate panel Wednesday that water-dropping helicopters would have been deployed during the critical first night of last summer’s disastrous Station blaze if they had been available and that the agency is considering ending its decades-long ban on using federal firefighting aircraft after dark.

Under pointed questioning by Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) and Rep. Adam Schiff (D-Burbank), Forest Service Chief Tom Tidwell also defended the agency’s handling of the fire the next morning, when a heavy air assault did not begin until several hours after daylight. He said aircraft alone would not have stopped the flames from raging out of control.

But Schiff expressed doubt that an earlier air attack on Day 2 would have been ineffective because of steep terrain, as the Forest Service determined in November after an internal review.

“The conclusion that it would not have helped anyway is a little too facile,” he said.

Feinstein, who chairs the Senate subcommittee that held Wednesday’s hearing, said equipping the Forest Service with night-flying aircraft is a “real priority,” especially in California. She said global warming and enduring droughts have heightened the danger of huge wildfires that threaten neighborhoods.

“Fires are not going to get better, they’re going to get worse,” she said.

Senate panel to evaluate USFS policy on night flying

Bill GabbertMay 21, 2010June 2, 2013UncategorizedStation Fire2 Comments

Next Wednesday the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior will hold a hearing focusing on the policy of the U.S. Forest Service that currently prohibits firefighting helicopters from operating over a fire at night. The agency has been criticized in recent months after USFS retirees and others said the 160,000-acre Station fire near Los Angeles that killed two LA County firefighters may not have have grown so rapidly on its second day if helicopters had attacked the fire the first night and early on the second day.

Rep. Adam Schiff (D-Burbank) has been very vocal in calling for hearings and as a advocate for using USFS helicopters at night

USFS retirees question agency findings about Station Fire

Bill GabbertMay 18, 2010June 2, 2013UncategorizedStation Fire

About two dozen retirees from the U. S. Forest Service are calling for an additional investigation of last summer’s Station fire on the Angeles National Forest in southern California–the fire that burned 160,000 acres and killed two LA County firefighters. The report that was released by the USFS in November was written by a five-member panel; three of the five members of the panel represented the USFS and LA County fire department, both responsible for the management of the fire or heavily involved as a cooperator, and both were the targets of criticism from the media and some members of the public. That report included no criticism of the management of the fire during its first 46 hours, and said that “appropriate decisions” were made.

A report written by the LA County Fire Department, released five days after the USFS report was released, was critical of some aspects of USFS management of wildland fires on the Angeles National Forest.

One issue that appeared in the media about the Station fire was that the number of ground and air resources assigned to the fire on the second day was not adequate, and this contributed to the fire becoming the largest in the recorded history of LA County.

An article in the LA Times has numerous quotes from USFS retirees about the management of the Station fire and the need for an independent investigation. Here are some excerpts–you might recognize some of the names:

“I didn’t think that conclusion was even close to being correct,” said Larry Boggs, a former fire management officer who worked for the Forest Service for 31 years, 13 of them in the Angeles. “It was a whitewash. Aircraft would have been quite effective on the fire that day.” [Referring to the USFS report’s conclusion that “appropriate decisions” were made about the resources assigned on the second day, and that steep terrain was the primary obstacle to stopping the spread of the fire during the first two days.]

…

“This is the most highly protected watershed anywhere, certainly in the United States,” Troy Kurth, a former fire prevention officer for the California region, said of the Angeles. “What were the factors that led to this fire’s escape? . . . I just can’t come to the same conclusions as the Forest Service did.”

…

The retirees began a behind-the-scenes lobbying campaign for a rigorous review in October, making their case through e-mail exchanges, telephone calls and meetings with Forest Service administrators, said Derr, who wrote several letters to the agency asking for the fuller investigation. Even after those requests were rejected, Derr said, he and other retirees were reluctant to go public because of an enduring loyalty to the Forest Service.

“An independent, comprehensive inquiry is essential to gather all the facts so that future fires can be safely and more effectively fought,” he added. “The November report was incomplete and flawed.”

Doug Leisz, the former associate chief of the Forest Service, was less harsh but said the report “missed some things.”

“I would still go back and talk to all the people who were involved,” he said. “I wouldn’t say, ‘Who screwed up?’ I’d say, ‘How could we do it better next time?’ ”

Mike Rogers, the former supervisor of the Angeles, said informal attempts to persuade Forest Service officials to take a fresh look at the Station fire were “kind of blown off.”

Rogers said some Angeles employees are afraid their careers would suffer if they criticize their superiors, “so there needs to be some kind of review where people’s anonymity is protected.

…

A Station fire commander had ordered the air tankers to be over the flames at 7 a.m.; they did not begin arriving until around 9 a.m., according to the records. During that two-hour interval, the fire grew exponentially, jumped a crucial defense line along Angeles Crest Highway and started to rage of control.

Don Feser, who retired as Angeles fire chief in 2007, said, “If their pilots couldn’t meet that timeframe, why didn’t the commanders do something about it?”

Feser said lingering questions about the aircraft could be cleared up only through another, wider inquiry: “It all comes down to interviewing the right people and getting the total story out.”

Station fire fatality report released

Bill GabbertMay 2, 2010August 25, 2019Uncategorizedfatality, lodd, Station Fire

The Los Angeles County Fire Department has released the Factual Report about the August 29, 2009 burnover of Camp 16 on the Station fire near Los Angeles. During that burnover, two firefighters were killed, Fire Captain Ted Hall, Superintendent 16, and Fire Fighter Specialist Arnie Quinones, Foreman Crew 16-3. Hall and Quinones were implementing a planned burnout below Camp 16 when their vehicle left the road. It was found 800 feet below the road with the two deceased firefighters inside.

The images are from the report; click on them to see larger versions. Below are the causal and contributing factors from the report.

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Causal and Contributing Factors

Causal Factors

Causal Factors are any behavior, omission, or deficiency that if corrected, eliminated, or avoided, probably would have prevented the incident.

1. The decision to protect Camp 16 and shelter in place and allow the firing operation was made at the Battalion Chief’s management level without contact with the Station IMT.

2. The lack of contact with the Station Incident prevented Camp 16 leadership from knowing about predicted fire behavior and available resources.

3. The firing operation on the Mt Gleason road was not successful due to the extreme fire behavior which exceeded the prediction of the plan.

Contributing Factors

Contributing Factors are any behavior, omission, or deficiency that sets the stage for an accident, or increases the severity of injuries.

1. The organizational culture allows firefighters to accept a notably higher risk to protect structures on wildland fires. A sense of ownership may have also influenced the decision to defend the facility.

2. The south winds aloft and prevailing up-canyon winds aligned with the topography of the North Fork of the Mill Creek drainage resulting in rapid fire progression toward Camp 16 and the firing team on the mid-slope road.

3. The fire burned in rugged terrain and the burnover occurred in the upper end of a steep drainage with fuel loads at seasonal low fuel moisture levels.

4. Resources assigned to Camp 16 were utilizing two different frequencies for tactical discussions and reports. Effective communication controls were not in effect prior to the incident.

5. There was no lookout dedicated to the firing operation.

6. The Station Fire IMT was either unaware of the threat to Camp 16 or understaffed to provide any assistance.

7. The ninety-year period of no fires in the vicinity of Camp 16 provided no historic baseline for reference.

California governor to appoint blue ribbon commission to look into Station fire

Bill GabbertFebruary 8, 2010September 6, 2018UncategorizedStation Fire1 Comment

While touring areas below the Station fire in the Los Angeles area that were affected by mud and debris flows, California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger said he would appoint a blue ribbon commission to look into the accusations by at least two politicians that mismanagement of the fire by the U.S. Forest Service caused the fire to become very large, which later resulted in mud slides.

In December, the Los Angeles Times reported that there were significant delays in getting aircraft assigned to the fire on the morning of the second day. There was criticism that more aggressive tactics that day may have kept the fire from turning into a megafire, eventually burning 160,000 acres, the largest fire in the recorded history of Los Angeles County.

On Sunday, La Canada Flintridge Mayor Laura Olhasso joined Los Angeles County Supervisor Mike Antonovich in blasting the U. S. Forest Service. Here is an excerpt from an article at myfoxla.com.

The mayor of La Canada Flintridge said the National Forest Service caused this weekend’s disastrous mud flows in her city, by mismanaging last summer’s big brushfire, and should pay to remove thousands of truckloads of muck.

Mayor Laura Olhasso joined Los Angeles County supervisor Mike Antonovich in blaming the 250-square-mile Station fire on U.S. Forest Service decisions not to call in helicopter tankers early in the fire’s spread last August. The mudslides that crushed nine homes Saturday are a direct consequence, they said, of catastrophically-bad firefighting strategies.

“I call on the federal government to take the responsibility to help our residents pay for cleaning up the mud,” Olhasso said at a news conference in a mud-filled Paradise Valley street, as Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger stood next to her. “The federal government must take responsibility for their mud, that is coming out of their hills.”

Olhasso has said U.S. Forest Service officials have compounded the threat to constituents living below the fire-denuded Angeles National Forest by refusing to let city crews onto federal property this winter to clear debris.

Arriving at the scene today, Schwarzenegger promised to “appoint a blue ribbon commission to look into” the local claims.

“It’s important for us to come out, right now, and say `what can we do to help?”‘ Schwarzenegger said. The governor pledged to cut red tape to find disposal sites for thousands of truckloads of debris that must be removed from houses, yards, streets and catch basins.

Los Angeles County Supervisor Mike Antonovich blamed the U.S. Forest Service for failing to commit more resources to the Station Fire in its infancy.

(THE VIDEO IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE)

AAR released for an extreme fire behavior event on the Station fire

Bill GabbertJanuary 8, 2010September 6, 2018UncategorizedStation Fire2 Comments

The Station fire approaches the safety zone of OCFA's engine strike team in Bib Tujunga Canyon — The Station fire approaches the safety zone of OCFA’s engine strike team in Big Tujunga Canyon. Photo: Orange County Fire Authority

On August 29, 2009 two strike teams of engines were forced to retreat to a safety zone in Big Tujunga Canyon on the Station fire near Los Angeles as a massive convection column collapsed and sent strong winds and a flaming front through the canyon, leading to the loss of about 35 structures and burn injuries to three civilians who had refused to evacuate.

On January 7 the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center posted an After Action Review of this event written from the viewpoint of an engine strike team, number 1400C, from the Orange County Fire Authority. The AAR documents the preparation before the fire approached, the safety zone experience, fighting fire and saving structures after they could leave the safety zone, and the treatment and extraction of the burn victims.

The entire document is very worth reading, but below are the lessons learned:

Continue reading “AAR released for an extreme fire behavior event on the Station fire”