Tag: Station Fire

The Los Angeles Times is continuing to investigate some of the decisions that were made during the first 48 hours of the 160,000-acre Station fire that started on August 26 near Los Angeles and burned much of the Angeles National Forest.

Here is an excerpt from an article they posted today, which includes quotes from Don Feser, the Angeles National Forest Fire Management Officer who retired in 2007.

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Newly released records contradict a finding by the U.S. Forest Service that steep terrain prevented the agency from using aircraft to attack — and potentially contain — the Station fire just before it began raging out of control.

Experts on Forest Service tactics also dispute the agency’s conclusion that helicopters and tanker planes would have been ineffective because the canyon in the Angeles National Forest was too treacherous for ground crews to take advantage of aerial water dumps.

Two officers who helped direct the fight on the ground and from the sky made separate requests for choppers and tankers during a critical period on the deadly fire’s second day, according to records and interviews.

At 12:49 a.m. on Aug. 27, Forest Service dispatch logs show, a division chief made this call for aircraft:

“Fire has spotted below the road, about five acres. Order one helitanker, three airtankers, any type. . . . Have them over the fire by 0700 hours.”

But the airtankers were canceled and the helitanker was significantly delayed, according to dispatch logs, deployment reports and interviews. The Times obtained the logs, reports and volumes of other documents through the federal Freedom of Information Act.

Records of the Day 2 battle do not cite the sheerness of the canyon above La Cañada Flintridge as a reason for withholding the aircraft, which firefighters who were at the scene say might have stopped the blaze from erupting into the disaster that it became. The fire was the largest in Los Angeles County history, killing two firefighters, destroying about 90 dwellings and charring 250 square miles in one of America’s most-visited national forests.

Last month, a Forest Service review endorsed the decision to not send the helicopter and planes but failed to mention the officers’ independent calls, made more than six hours apart, for a heavy air assault.

“It just irks me to see . . . that they’re blaming the terrain for why no action was taken,” said Don Feser, a former fire chief for the forest who retired in 2007. “They’re just making excuses.”

“I’ve covered a lot of that ground, and there is only a small percentage of land that is too steep to put firefighters on,” said Feser, who worked in the Angeles National Forest for 26 years, the last seven as fire chief. “And if we can’t put firefighters on it, guess what we do? We use aircraft.”

An officer who took part in the Day 2 operation said the absence of ground crews in the canyon did not keep commanders from using aircraft to bombard the area later in the fight. “We ran helicopters down there all day,” he said.

Choppers and tankers just after sunup, he said, could have slowed the flames’ march through the canyon, doused the surrounding ridges and given ground crews a much better chance of knocking the blaze down along Angeles Crest Highway, a crucial defense line.

“You could have made a stand,” said the officer, who requested anonymity because he is not authorized to speak publicly about the matter.

The Los Angeles County Fire Department has released a report about the 160,000-acre Station Fire which started on August 26 near Los Angeles in the Angeles National Forest and killed two firefighters.  This comes as a surprise, since the U.S. Forest Service, which was the lead agency for the fire, released their official report five days ago. One of the members of the five-member panel that wrote the USFS report was John Tripp, the LA County FD Chief Deputy for Emergency Operations, the second in command to the Fire Chief, P. Michael Freeman.

The LA County FD was of course heavily involved in the Station Fire along with the USFS, and they have been named, at least secondarily, in some criticisms reported in the media related to the number of resources assigned to the fire during the first 46 hours, until the Type 1 Incident Management Team assumed command.

We have requested a copy of the report from the LA County FD, but until we receive it, an article in the Pasadena Star News provides some insight about the report’s key details. Here is an excerpt.

The U.S. Forest Service should change how it attacks fires in the Angeles National Forest, implementing techniques and policies more in line with the Los Angeles County Fire Department, according to a county report on the Station Fire released Tuesday night.

The report calls for a “vastly different approach” to both fire prevention and response to wildfires that break out in the Angeles National Forest, specifically because of “its proximity to highly populated urban areas.”

In a key recommendation, the report – which was authored by a group of county fire chiefs – officials said the U.S. Forest Service should reinstitute night-time aerial water drops.

Unlike the county, the U.S. Forest Service does not allow water-dropping helicopters to fly at night. Last week Jim Hubbard, deputy chief for the U.S. Forest Service, said that the agency suspended the nighttime flights because the practice is extremely risky.

U.S. Forest Service could not be reached for comment after the report was released Tuesday night.

While no “particular action or tool may not have changed the outcome of the Station Fire,” the absence of nighttime flights “raises a valid question for the future,” the report said.

“There is no debate that a critical time period existed from initial dispatch on August 26, 2009, until approximately 8:00 a.m. on August 27, 2009, when the fire crossed the Angeles Crest Highway. What was not used were LACoFD firefighting helicopters during the hours of darkness on August 26, 2009, until dawn on August 27, 2009.”

In a phone interview, county Fire Chief Michael Freeman said officials “understand the history of helicopters operating at night and that there have been some tragedies,” but added that his experience in firefighting “says you need to have all the tools available …as opposed to some absolute that says that we do not fly at night.”

“Would such an attack have made a difference in the outcome? No one can say for sure, but such a tactical practice should be the norm for wildland fires in the forest,” the report stated.

The executive report also recommended that the U.S. Forest Service increase its focus on brush clearance around structures in the forest. Currently, the vegetation around structures is cleared for 30 feet.

UPDATE at 10:00 MT, Nov. 18:

We heard from the LA County FD, and they let us know that the report has been posted on an LA County web site. We also have a copy of it on the Wildfire Today site.

After a review of the first 46 hours of the management of the Station fire, a five-person panel concluded that appropriate decisions were made on the fire, which eventually burned 160,000 acres on the Angeles National Forest near Los Angeles.

The area of initial attack and the early perimeter of the Station Fire, Sept. 26, 2009. Google Earth image from USFS report.

The panel was comprised of two representatives of the U. S. Forest Service, one from L.A. County Fire Department, one from CalFire, and a person from private industry that specializes in decision making.

A quick review of the 66-page report which was released on November 13 found no criticism of the U.S. Forest Service or L.A. County Fire Department.
One issue that appeared in the media was that the number of ground and air resources assigned to the fire on the second day was not adequate, and this contributed to the fire becoming the largest in the recorded history of LA County.

But the report says:

Additional resources during the evening of August 26 [the day the fire started] and morning of August 27 would not have improved the effectiveness of operations during that operational period and would have resulted in needless exposure of firefighters to the hazards of wildland fire.

It goes on to say that the extremely steep terrain and the dense, dry vegetation made it difficult or at times impossible to safely take direct suppression action on some portions of the fire.

On the evening of August 26, spot fires occurred below the Angeles Crest Highway, near the point of fire origin, and were not accessible by firefighters due to excessively steep terrain, limited visibility, and decadent, thick brush. Aircraft use, without subsequent engagement of ground forces, would have been ineffective.

According to the report, the review panel found that:

• The Angeles National Forest had in place at the time of the incident an up-to-date staffing and action guide for initial attack.
• The actions taken by the Angeles National Forest and the Forest Supervisor with respect to overall incident objectives—controlling the fire at the smallest acreage practicable consistent with firefighter safety considerations, were consistent with the forest’s land management plans.
• The origin of the Station Fire was in extremely rugged terrain with limited opportunities for safe suppression activities by ground-based suppression resources.
• The dry, dense brush in the area of the fire was at high risk for potentially extreme fire activity and at a level that posed unacceptable risk to firefighters.
• Firefighters made cooperative efforts to engage the fire at critical points during the daylight phase of initial attack. Control of the incident was prevented because of a spot fire that occurred in an inaccessible location with limited visibility and thick, tall brush.
• The ordering and assignment of firefighting resources to initial attack was appropriate and consistent with accepted fire management practices. Additional ground tactical resources would not have improved the effectiveness of operations because they could not be safely deployed.
• Incident management decisions made during the review period were consistent with generally accepted incident management practices. Decisions made by initial attack incident commanders reflected sound judgment of the operational situation and were prudent with respect to firefighter effectiveness, safety, and suppression resource deployment.
• The review panel found no evidence or indication that initial attack incident commanders felt unduly constrained to inappropriately reduce direct suppression costs.

In conclusion the report says:

• Incident managers during the initial attack phase of the Station Fire acted in a manner consistent with best professional practices as accepted by wildland firefighting agencies, and
• Deployed suppression resources under conditions where firefighters would be safe and effective.
• In light of the extremely challenging topography encountered during initial attack and the highly volatile fire and vegetation conditions, incident commanders were reasonable and prudent in not exposing firefighters to actions that would have been ineffective and compromised their safety.

While we support firefighters taking no action unless it can be done safely, it is unusual for an investigative report on a complex incident like the Station fire to have no criticism. You could say no self-criticism, since three of the five members of the panel represented the USFS and LA County fire department, both responsible for the management of the fire or heavily involved as a cooperator, and both were the targets of criticism from the media and some members of the public.

UPDATE at 9:23 p.m. November 13, 2009:

The LA Times has an article on this report for which they interviewed John Tripp, a member of the 5-person panel that wrote the report, who also is the chief deputy of the Los Angeles County Fire Department. The Times asked him about the decision that was made by the fire managers to not aggressively attack the fire early in the morning on Day 2 with helicopters. Chief Tripp was quoted as saying that he agreed with the conclusions stated in the report that the fire managers “followed the policies and procedures appropriately”, but he stopped short of endorsing the decision about the helicopters on the second day.

From the Times’ article:

“It’s their fire and they’re running it,” he said. “Why wasn’t that helicopter there? That’s the question.”

He said it “was not my role” in the review to second-guess such decisions.
Hmmm. It makes you wonder what WAS the role of the 5-person investigation panel?