Documentary: South Canyon and Yarnell Hill Fires

(Originally published at 10:16 a.m. MST December 26; revised at 12:55 p.m. MST December 27, 2013)

This 34-minute documentary about the Yarnell Hill and 1994 South Canyon Fires is more evidence of how the deaths of 19 firefighters in Arizona on June 30 continues to resonate not just in the firefighter community but in the public as well. Six months later the media is still producing lengthy articles, sometimes a series of articles, and films inspired by the tragedy. This makes us think that if there is similar interest within the leadership of the wildland fire agencies there could be hope that lessons are being learned and meaningful changes could occur that may reduce the chances of it happening to another crew of 10 to 20 people. But there was similar hope almost 20 years ago when 14 firefighters died on the South Canyon Fire.

The documentary was produced by the Magic Valley Times-News which has recently published a series of articles about wildland firefighting:

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UPDATE: December 27, 2013: We found another article in the series: Questioning Authority: The South Canyon Solutions. While this article is interesting reading, and quotes Pete Blume who was the BLM Fire Management Officer at Grand Junction during the South Canyon fire, like most of the other articles it has a number of factual errors, for example claiming that the South Canyon fatalities directly led to several specific changes, some of which did not come about as a result of the fire. And there’s this:

An IC on a big wildfire today, for example, may appoint someone to oversee logistics, such as care and feeding of the crews; someone to spearhead finances, dealing with contractors’ shift tickets, crew time reports, etc.; and another person on operations, i.e. strategy and tactics, who may set up two divisions of teams, each responding to their respective supervisors.

This shows a lack of understanding of the Incident Command System by the writer, a system that was first used on the Pacoima Fire in 1975 and became widely used in the 1980s. And “two divisions of teams”? Please.

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Below is an excerpt from the last section of the “20 Years After the South Canyon Fire” article:

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“….Meanwhile, seasoned fire managers report to officials in Washington, D.C., who may be from forestry, fisheries or recreation.

“People who come into these situations aren’t coming from fire,” said Alex Robertson, [deputy fire staff officer for a vast swath of Oregon, working for the U.S. Forest Service and BLM]. “Many times, they have zero experience on fire, but we’re coming to them for decisions. … it could mean a bad deal for some poor firefighter on the ground because of a decision made many miles away.

“We’re trying to explain risk and exposure to someone who doesn’t know what it means to be on top of a snag patch with flames 100 feet high.”

“I’m looking at 20-plus years in fire service, but decisions are being made by somebody with 90 days,” said one manager, whose identity is being withheld to protect his career. “It may be a very talented, brilliant individual, but they don’t have the same mental slides. It’s troubling that somebody with 90 days’ experience is making decisions for firefighters nationwide.”

“Why would we hire non-fire people into a fire agency?” asked another supervisor, whose identity also is being withheld. “But it still happens today. People in charge of fire and aviation should have an understanding of fire and aviation. But the people in charge don’t.”

Military aviation people without fire experience often are hired under the federal “veterans’ preference,” and no one begrudges a job for someone who risked their life for their country. “But it takes so long for Department of Defense people to learn fire service,” the supervisor said. “We’ve got to get the focus back to the firefighters on the ground. You could have become a master in biology or some ‘ology,’ and you have to have at least 90 days’ experience. But you could become a fire management officer for a district.”

Administrators “have to be allowed the time to learn (fire),” said Joe Brinkley, [manager of the McCall Smokejumper Base, brother of Josh Brinkley and a triplet brother of Levi, who died in the South Canyon fire]. “Somehow there has to be a relationship where everybody’s talking to everybody.”

That’s why leaders need to take time outside of the fire season to “build these relationships and trust” with top administrators, Alex Robertson said. “They’re going to make decisions that put firefighters at risk. So we’re trying to build those relationships.” “

Granite Mountain Hotshots, in videos

Erick Marsh, Superintendent Granite Mountain Hotshots
Erick Marsh, Superintendent of the Granite Mountain Hotshots, in a screen shot from the 2010 video.

We just discovered these videos today that feature the Granite Mountain Hotshot crews of 2010 and 2012. I am surprised they have not received more attention.

The first video is a summary of their 2012 fire season, during which they worked more than 1,000 hours of overtime on fires. It shows some of the fires they fought, the crew at work, and some light-hearted moments as well. It was uploaded to YouTube by the City of Prescott on November 26, 2012.

The second video, below, was produced by the Prescott Daily Courier and describes some of the training the crew went through. It was shot in 2010 and was uploaded to YouTube on July 5, 2013, five days after 19 members of the crew were killed on the Yarnell Hill Fire in Arizona.

Katie Couric – Yarnell Fire families and Wildland Firefighter Foundation

The Katie Couric show on Tuesday did something surprising. Not only did they interview three wives whose husbands were members of the Granite Mountain Hotshots killed on the Yarnell Hill Fire June 30, but they publicized efforts to donate large sums of money to the Wildland Firefighter Foundation. The WFF assists firefighters that have been injured on wildland fires and the families of firefighters who have been killed. It is a wonderful organization that does great things for the wildland firefighter community.

In this first video Katie talks to the three wives.

Then three members of the Fire Department of New York mention how wildland firefighters helped them out by sending Incident Management Teams to assist them after they suffered the attacks on the World Trade center on 9/11. I have seen folks from the FDNY mention this several times — they talk about paying back the wildland fire community and “paying it forward”. They lost 341 firefighters and two paramedics on 9/11.

The FDNY has already raised $50,000 for the families of the Granite Mountain Hotshots, and on the show the brother of deceased firefighter Patrick Joyce, who runs a foundation in his honor, announced the organization was donating $10,000 to the WFF. Then Katie produced a second large check for the same amount contributed by the Safeway Foundation.

And it didn’t stop there. One of the FDNY gentlemen said they are hoping to get every firefighter in the country to donate $10 each to the WFF. If that happens, $10 million would be raised.

Wildland Firefighter Foundation donation Wildland Firefighter Foundation donation

If you have not already, join the WFF’s 52 Club, which means you have donated the equivalent of $1 a week for a year.

 

Thanks go out to Angie

City of Prescott and Arizona State Forestry reject Yarnell Fire claims and fines

Yarnell Hill Fire
Yarnell Hill Fire. Photo by Joy Collura, June 30, 2013.

The City of Prescott has rejected the claims filed by the mother of one of the 19 firefighters that were killed, as well as those filed by 21 residents whose homes burned during the Yarnell Hill Fire on June 30 in Arizona. According to the Prescott Daily Courier, the claims, which cited negligence in management of the fire, amounted to $48 million for the death of firefighter Grant McKee and nearly $100 million for the property damage.

The newspaper also reported that the Arizona State Forestry Division is contesting citations and $559,000 worth of fines issued to them by another state agency, the Arizona Division of Occupational Safety and Health. The Forestry Division said in their letter to the state OSHA agency that the citations and fines “are not supported by substantial evidence, are contrary to law, arbitrary, capricious and constitute an abuse of discretion by the Industrial Commission of Arizona.” The next step may be a review by the Industrial Commission’s Hearing Division, which originally approved the fines and citations recommended by the state OSHA. The fines included $25,000 allotted for the survivors of each firefighter, a total of $475,000.

In a related story by the Daily Courier, more claims have been filed:

PRESCOTT – The families of 12 of the fallen Granite Mountain Hotshots filed wrongful death claims today, seeking a total of more than $200 million from four public entities.

The notices of claim are going to the State of Arizona (including the Arizona State Forestry Division), Yavapai County, the City of Prescott, and the Central Yavapai Fire District (CYFD), and are claiming “intentional, reckless, careless and grossly negligent conduct” during firefighting efforts on the June 30 Yarnell Hill wildfire.

Idaho newspaper publishes series of articles about wildland fire

The Magic Valley Times-News in Twin Falls, Idaho has recently run a series of articles about wildland fire. One of them published this week is about the Yarnell Hill Fire and is very critical of the investigations and the reports produced by the 60 people assigned to uncover what went wrong and why. The reporters interviewed many current and retired firefighters in developing the lengthy article.

Ted Putnam, a U.S. Forest Service retiree who participated in several fire investigations, in the article had a suggestion for firefighters that he thought would improve their chances of survival if they are entrapped in a wildfire — two firefighters get under two fire shelters that are layered, one shelter on top of the other.

The other articles in the series at the Times-News include an editorial about wildfire fatalities, an article about aging aviation resources (which has one or two factual errors), and a piece devoted to fire shelters, their history, development, and ideas for improvement.

Response to the Yarnell Hill Fire “Swiss Cheese” article

On December 15 we wrote about the Yarnell Hill Fire and compared some of the issues identified on the fire to James T. Reason’s Swiss Cheese model of accident causation. Of the 19 issues (or “holes”), we mentioned that one of them was having only one aerial supervision platform, an Aerial Supervision Module (ASM), on a very complex fire at the time the 19 members of the Granite Mountain Hotshots were entrapped and killed.

In a response, a friend, Tony Duprey, kindly submitted his thoughts on the subject. Tony was qualified as an ASM and was an Air Tactical Group Supervisor (ATGS) and Branch Director on a Forest Service California Type One Incident Management Team for 7 years and continues to serve as an ATGS after his retirement. Below is his response to the article, and below that, a question from me and his answer.

We thank Tony for taking the time to compose this well-reasoned article.

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While I agree with your summation and the use of Dr. Reason’s “Swiss Cheese Model,” there are two slices that I believe COULD be misleading and I would like to attempt to clarify.

The first is the Aerial Supervision Module (ASM) role. The ASM program is an excellent program when utilized as originally envisioned and intended. (I will cover this in another article to you in the coming weeks). Suffice it to say, the ASM program has evolved quite a bit from its beginning with the Alaska Fire Service (AFS) and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).

Today’s ASM program enhances and strengthens both the stand-alone LEAD and Air Attack or Air Tactical Group Supervisor (ATGS) programs and positions. That is worth repeating: Today’s ASM program enhances and strengthens both the stand-alone LEAD and ATGS programs. How does it do that? Through cross-training, crew cohesion, having a firefighter (Division Supervisor qualified ATGS) in the LEAD cockpit, and having ATGS’s gain experience as a part of low-level (below 500 feet AGL) operations – and the aircraft/cockpit management process. So we end up with stronger stand-alone ATGSs and stronger stand-alone Leads.

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