Del Rosa Hot Shots

Fire Department Network News continues to produce interesting articles and videos about wildland fire. Here is a video they created about the Del Rosa Hot Shots on the San Bernardino National Forest in southern California.

(VIDEO NO LONGER AVAILABLE)

Loop fire, 43 years ago

On November 1, 1966, the El Cariso Hotshots were trapped by flames as they worked on a steep hillside in Pacoima Canyon on the Angeles National Forest.

Ten members of the crew perished on the Loop Fire that day. Another two members succumbed from burn injuries in the following days. Most of the nineteen members who survived were critically burned and remained hospitalized for some time.

Lessons learned from the Loop Fire resulted in the checklist for downhill line construction, improved firefighting equipment, better fire behavior training, and the implementation of new firefighter safety protocols.

Downed power line kills over a dozen animals

A power line that was hanging near the ground after being struck by a falling tree electrocuted over a dozen animals near Eureka in northwestern Montana over the last few months. Officials found the carcasses of five whitetail deer, four black bears, two wolves, one coyote, and a turkey vulture in the area.

The power company did not know about the problem with the line until the power went out on October 10. A biologist with the Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks thinks the deer probably walked into the line first and their carcasses attracted the predators, which were then electrocuted.

All of the animals were in various stages of decomposition except for a large dead wolf that was still warm when the power company crew arrived on the scene.

Findings from the Andrew Palmer safety investigation

After reviewing the “Accident Investigation: Factual Report” of the tree falling accident on the Dutch Creek Fire in which Andrew Palmer was killed, Wildfire Today compiled these findings, causal factors, and contributing factors from the document.

Findings

  • EM-CAPT was given a line assignment without adequate supervision for the assigned task. FC2 failed to exercise proper supervisory control by allowing EM-CAPT to cut trees above EM-CAPT’s level of certification.
  • Excessive motivation for EM to obtain a line assignment led to a series of inadequate communications and assumptions which subsequently led to a mismatch between resource request and resource assignment.
  • A class C tree was felled by an unqualified sawyer. Escape routes/safety zones were not effectively utilized by FC1.
  • There was insufficient pre-planning to integrate incident personnel and resources into the local emergency management system, taking into account local factors, including environmental conditions, to effectively manage a serious injury and the subsequent medical evacuation.
  • Inadequate leadership, communication, and risk management resulted in a lack of clarity in communicating the severity of the injury, resource availability, and a failure to evaluate the most appropriate method of evacuation relative to risk exposure, resources required, and timeliness.
  • The incident was operating with inaccurate or incomplete IAPs.
  • The National Park Service fleet management procedures for quality control are inadequate to ensure mission ready condition of new wildland fire engines and to appropriately handle maintenance and repair issues.
  • Iron Complex Ground Support failed to take appropriate measures to red tag EM’s engine.

Tree falling findings

  • Tree 1 was a class C tree. The stump measured 36.7” in diameter at the point the cut was made.
  • The highest saw qualification of any of the crew members present was that of a faller B.
  • The undercut of Tree 1 was not cleaned sufficiently as to provide an adequate “hinge” to direct Tree 1 during the felling process.
  • The undercut of Tree 1 exhibits two distinct horizontal (gunning) cuts and two sloping cuts. Multiple Dutchmen that would have altered the holding wood were also present.
  • Tree 1 fell away from its intended lay due to lean, possible limb weight, and an inadequately cleaned undercut.
  • Tree 1 appeared to have been a sound, green tree with no readily apparent defects that would have required it to be felled as a hazard tree.

Medical Treatment

Causal Factor

  • Failure to adequately control FC1’s arterial bleeding of the left femur injury received during a tree falling accident resulted in death due to excessive blood loss.

Contributing factors

  • There was inadequate accident scene command and control which led to a failure to communicate the extent and severity of the injuries and to evaluate the most appropriate evacuation method.
  • There was a delay in delivering FC1 to definitive medical care because personnel involved in the incident focused on the use of air resources, most of which were unavailable due to the smoky conditions.

The accident report is HERE.

Andrew Palmer fatality report released

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Andrew Palmer, NPS photo

The National Park Service has released the report about the accident in which an NPS firefighter, Andrew Palmer, died. Mr. Palmer was killed during a tree falling incident on the Eagle fire, part of the Iron Complex on the Shasta Trinity National Forest in northern California on July 25, 2008. He was a firefighter at Olympic National Park in Port Angeles, Washington.

Here is a link to the report.

Below is the complete executive summary from the factual report:

Early in the day on July 22, 2008, an engine from Olympic National Park received a resource order to report to the Iron Complex, on the Shasta-Trinity National Forest, near Junction City, California. The crew and line supervision at the park were so motivated to see the engine crew obtain an immediate assignment that the NPFMO accepted the resource order despite not being able to contact all crew members who were on their day off. NPFMO tried all day to contact the crew and eventually assembled and dispatched the crew at 2100. Despite a late start and a series of complications enroute to the fire, which included mechanical problems with their engine that lead to the separation of their crew and engine captain, the remaining crew members were encouraged to continue to pursue a line assignment as a falling team. Because Incident Management personnel were equally motivated to find a line assignment for the eager crew, the crew was ultimately given an assignment as a falling module that they were not qualified for and without qualified first or second line supervision. During that assignment the crew cut a tree that was outside their falling qualifications, which resulted in the injury of FC1.

Upon arrival to the Incident Command Post on July 23, EM reported mechanical problems with the engine that required CAPT to drive the vehicle into Redding, California for warranty service. EM-CAPT stayed at ICP and on July 24, were given a logistical assignment in camp. On July 25, while CAPT was attempting to obtain a replacement engine from Whiskeytown National Recreation Area, EM-CAPT were given an assignment as a falling module to Division B on the Eagle Fire. The assignment was to mitigate hazard trees along the fire line, so crews could safely work in the area. At approximately 1350, FC2 called ICP for medical assistance for severely injured FC1. Emergency medical personnel responded and treated the injured FC1 for severe bleeding. Due to heavy smoke conditions requiring Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) capability, primary helicopter resources were unable to respond to FC1’s location. Firefighters carried FC1, by litter, to a location where FC1 was hoisted into a United States Coast Guard Helicopter, at approximately 1630. The USCG helicopter carrying FC1 arrived at Redding Municipal Airport, where FLN, in consultation with a Mercy Hospital Emergency Room Physician, pronounced FC1’s death at 1710. The Coroner later determined the cause of death to be blood loss due to blunt force trauma to FC1’s left leg.

The report includes this statement on the page before the executive summary:

SAIT Disclaimer

Based on all evidence available to the SAIT, we know that FC1 was injured from being struck by a tree during a felling operation. From the time of the accident, until the preparing of this report, no individual member of EM-CAPT could be positively identified, nor excluded from being the sawyer at the time of the accident.

Evidence collected by the SAIT included 54 manual and electronic time-stamped documents. These documents were collected from multiple entities, in three different counties. Comparing documents that logged the same event, the SAIT noted time stamps often varied by 5 to 10 minutes.

“SAIT” is the Serious Accident Investigation Team.

Page 87 of the report includes this information:

Technical Assessment of Accident Site

Due to the lack of eye-witness accounts, a number of key facts are unclear; therefore actual events have been pieced together from interview statements and evidence at scene. FC2 and FC3 are the only surviving witnesses to the accident and they have not granted interviews to the Serious Accident Investigation Team. While it is impossible to determine at this time who actually fell Tree 1, it is possible for experienced observers to read the stump, the lay of the felled tree, and the felling area to determine how the felling of Tree 1 set into motion the sequence of events that lead to FC1 being injured.

On page 5 of the report is a description of the accident:

A decision was made to fall a large ponderosa pine (36.7” at the point of the cut). Downslope from the ponderosa pine was a 54” DBH sugar pine that had an uphill lean and a large cat face on the uphill side. When cut, the ponderosa pine fell downslope toward the sugar pine. It was contact with the sugar pine, or vibration from the ponderosa hitting the ground, that caused a portion of the sugar pine, approximately 120 feet long, to break off and fall upslope, hitting FC1 resulting in severe injuries.

The report includes the information that on August 6, 2008 the Serious Accident Investigation Team (SAIT) gave the case file to a National Park Service Special Agent. On August 7 the SAIT was “disengaged” from the “safety investigation” until further notice.

On January 26, 2009 the Federal Prosecutor issued a “Declination of Criminal Charges related to the death of FC1”. In early March the safety investigation resumed. The SAIT completed their report on May 18, 2009.

Evergreen’s unmanned aerial vehicle

Evergreen provides helicopters and the 747 “Supertanker” on contract to firefighting agencies. Now they are also offering an unmanned aerial vehicle that can obtain real-time imagery to firefighters on the ground. It can remain in the air for 20 hours at a time while transmitting the data back to Evergreen which then puts it on the Internet for firefighters.

But I’m not sure if the Federal Aviation Administration presently allows the use of UAVs over fires except in remote locations like Alaska, which Wildfire Today wrote about on August 27.

Fire Department Network News has a 3-minute video report about Evergreen’s UAV.

(VIDEO NO LONGER AVAILABLE)

Climate change researchers: Yosemite NP to have 19% more fires

According to researchers who published a recent paper in the International Journal of Wildland Fire (Volume 18[7] 2009), climate change will increase the number and burn severity of fires in Yosemite National Park. Using fire records, weather data, and satellite imagery they analyzed the fires in the park that occurred between 1984 and 2005. Comparing snowfall records with fire severity, they determined that during those years, decreased spring snowpack exponentially increased the number of lightning-ignited fires and the proportion of the landscape that burned at higher severities.

The researchers then made some predictions:

Using one snowpack forecast, we project that the number of lightning-ignited fires will increase 19.1% by 2020 to 2049 and the annual area burned at high severity will increase 21.9%. Climate-induced decreases in snowpack and the concomitant increase in fire severity suggest that existing assumptions may be understated – fires may become more frequent and more severe.

Here is the way this is supposed to work. There is some evidence to suggest that increasing levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will lead to more lightning strikes. With less snow, the lightning strikes are more likely to ignite fires. The dryer fuels will result in the fires burning more intensely.

UPDATE, November 5, 2009:

The authors of the report are James A. Lutz, Jan W. van Wagtendonk, Andrea E. Thode, Jay D. Miller, and Jerry F. Franklin. They are employed by the National Park Service, the U. S. Forest Service, the University of Washington, and Northern Arizona University.
They chose to publish the results of their taxpayer-funded research in a publication that is not accessible to taxpayers unless they pay substantial subscription or membership fees to the International Journal of Wildland Fire or the International Association of Wildland fire. IAWF members after paying their membership fee can access the content of the Journal.
We have written about this issue before. If you want a copy of this taxpayer-funded research, you can pay the fees, or you can email James A. Lutz at jlutz@u.washington.edu and ask him for a copy.
The authors of the report are James A. Lutz, Jan W. van Wagtendonk, Andrea E. Thode, Jay D. Miller, and Jerry F. Franklin. They are employed by the National Park Service, the U. S. Forest Service, the University of Washington, and Northern Arizona University.
They chose to publish the results of their taxpayer-funded research in a publication that is not accessible to taxpayers unless they pay substantial subscription or membership fees to the International Journal of Wildland Fire or the International Association of Wildland fire. IAWF members after paying their membership fee can access the content of the Journal.
We have written about this issue before. If you want a copy of this taxpayer-funded research, you can pay the fees, or you can email James A. Lutz at jlutz@u.washington.edu and ask him for a copy.

Missed opportunities on the Station Fire

The Los Angeles Times was the first news organization to point out that the U. S. Forest Service had a less than aggressive suppression effort in place on the morning of the second day of the fire that eventually burned 160,000 acres and claimed the lives of two firefighters in southern California. On Saturday afternoon they ran another in their series of articles, uncovering more damning details, including quotes from firefighters who were on the scene. Check it out HERE.

San Diego power company pays $14M to state for starting huge fires in 2007

San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) has agreed to a settlement with the California Public Utilities Commission to pay $14.3 million for starting the Witch, Rice, and Guejito fires in eastern San Diego County in 2007. Cox Communications agreed to pay $2 million without admitting they started the Guejito fire.

Here is an excerpt from a report in the San Diego Union Tribune.

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San Diego Gas & Electric and Cox Communications agreed Friday to pay $17 million to settle claims by state investigators that their shoddy maintenance led to three huge North County wildfires two years ago. SDG&E also apologized for obstructing investigators looking into the cause of the fires.

The companies did not admit fault for setting the fires, but said they would take steps to better maintain their lines and equipment. The settlement comes more than a year after investigators with the Public Utilities Commission concluded that power lines caused the Witch Creek, Guejito and Rice Canyon fires.

The fires burned more than 1,300 homes, killed two people and disrupted the lives of hundreds of thousands.

SDG&E agreed to pay $14.3 million to the state’s general fund and reimburse the PUC’s Consumer Protection and Safety Division up to $400,000 for a computer system designed to help investigate utility safety hazard incidents. The money will come out of SDG&Es profits, not from ratepayers.

As for the obstruction allegation, the company said it knows it has an “obligation and duty to respond promptly” when investigators need information and access to its workers. “SDG&E admits that its efforts fell short of meeting this obligation and duty in connection with the CPSD’s investigations into the Witch, Rice and Guejito fires and apologizes for permitting this to happen. SDG&E will conduct additional training in this area,” the company said in the settlement.

It also said it failed to file timely reports on the fires. In a statement, SDG&E President Debra Reed said the company wants to move on.

“We are settling this matter to put the issue behind us and avoid the costs and risks of further litigation,” she said.  “As part of this settlement, we maintain that our system met all compliance and safety requirements, but we fell short of meeting our obligations with respect to three follow-up reports,” she said. She did not mention the apology.

Cox, meanwhile, agreed to pay $2 million to the general fund, without admitting that it caused the Guejito fire. Investigators said a Cox lashing wire came loose in high winds and caused arcing when it came in contact with an SDG&E power line.

“We believe that our line was properly maintained and intact prior to the Santa Ana winds in 2007, and did not cause the Guejito fire,” Cox said in a statement. “The CPUC has a long history of handling disputes through agreements, and we entered into this agreement in an effort to move forward and stay focused on the business of serving our customers and our community.”

The settlement does not affect the ongoing litigation in San Diego Superior Court in which hundreds of fire victims as well as governmental agencies are seeking damages from SDG&E. Earlier this year, SDG&E settled many claims, paying out more than $740 million to dozens of insurance companies seeking partial reimbursement for money they had already paid to clients.

However individual fire victims have yet to be compensated for losses beyond whatever insurance they may have had, and numerous governmental agencies such as CalFire and the city and county of San Diego are still trying to recover millions of dollars in fire fighting costs and other damages.

SDG&E has asked the PUC for permission to raise rates to pay for damages beyond what its insurance covers, and for higher insurance costs because of the fires. Lawyers involved in the case say it could still be years before the litigation ends.

SDG&E has not admitted responsibility for the fires. At some point a judge will have to schedule a trial or trials to determine whether SDG&E is liable.