Firefighters killed in New South Wales identified

They were members of the Horsley Park Brigade

The New South Wales Rural Fire Service (NSW RFS) has identified the two volunteer firefighters that were killed December 19 while working on the Green Wattle Creek Bushfire near Buxton in southwestern Sydney.

Firefighter Andrew O’Dwyer, 36, joined the Service in 2003, and is a member of the Horsley Park Rural Fire Brigade.

Andrew O'Dwyer firefighter killed
Andrew O’Dwyer with his daughter Charlotte.

Firefighter Geoffrey Keaton, 32, joined the Service in 2006 and is a Deputy Captain of Horsley Park Rural Fire Brigade, and a former member of Plumpton Brigade.

Geoffrey Keaton firefighter killed
Geoffrey Keaton and his son Harvey.

A spokesperson for the the NSW RFS said, “That tree came down in front of that truck, the truck impacted that tree and then rolled resulting in fatalities to two of our firefighters.”

The incident occurred just before midnight at the end of a long shift. Both of them, members of the Horsley Park Brigade, were in the front seat of the truck and died at the scene. Three other passengers were injured and treated at the scene by paramedics.

RFS commissioner Shane Fitzsimmons said, “They work together, socialize together, they’re very interactive together. Their respective partners and wives shared a lot in common with their camaraderie and connection with the brigade,” he said.

“Geoff has a young son Harvey, and Andrew has a young daughter Charlotte, and both of those children were born two days apart back in May so they’re 19 months of age, which is just terrible.”

NSW Premier Gladys Berejiklian said: “I don’t think you can think of a worse set of circumstances to see two young fathers lose their lives in this way.”

On the night of Mr. Keaton’s death, his father John was fighting a a very large fire in Gospers Mountain northwest of Sydney, while his son was at the Green Wattle Creek Fire.

Andrew O'Dwyer fire truck
Andrew O’Dwyer (far left) is seen with colleagues in front of the truck he was riding in at the time of the accident.

The NSW RFS has created a dedicated bank account to collect donations for the families.

Two firefighters in Australia killed when their truck hits tree and rolls

Two New South Wales Rural Fire Service volunteers have died and three other firefighters were injured

NSW RFS engine truck rollover lodd
It is believed the NSW RFS truck (not pictured) hit a tree before rolling off the road. NSW RFS photo.

Authorities said the truck was traveling as part of a convoy when it is believed to have hit a tree on Wilson Drive in Buxton, before rolling off the road about 11:30pm. (map)

The driver and front passenger both died at the scene. Three other passengers were injured and treated at the scene by paramedics.

It happened December 19 near the Green Wattle Creek Fire near Buxton in southwestern Sydney, one of two bushfires still burning at emergency level through Thursday night.

A crime scene has been established, and an investigation has been launched into the circumstances surrounding the crash.

(From the Australian Broadcasting Corporation)

Our sincere condolences go out to the firefighters’ friends, family, and coworkers.

Thanks and a tip of the hat go out to Tom. Typos or errors, report them HERE.

TBT – Waldo Canyon Fire

Waldo Canyon Fire
Waldo Canyon Fire, Colorado Springs, CO, July 1, 2012; burn operation in Division Oscar-Papa (below Blodgett Peak) with Vandenberg Hotshots. USFS photo by Kari Greer.

Throwback Thursday –
On June 23, 2012 the Waldo Canyon Fire started in the Pike National Forest southwest of Colorado Springs, Colorado. On June 26 it spread into the Mountain Shadows area of the city. Before the fire was out, it had killed two people and burned 18,000 acres and 347 homes.

Waldo Canyon Fire
Waldo Canyon Fire, Colorado Springs, CO, July, 2012; Mountain Shadows aftermath. USFS photo by Kari Greer.
Waldo Canyon Fire President Obama
The President at the Waldo Fire Incident Command Post, June 29, 2012. USFS photo by Kari Greer.

Video: how the fire tornado formed at the Carr Fire

formation fire tornado Carr Fire
Early stage in the formation of the fire tornado at the Carr Fire, July 26, 2018. Screenshot from Scientific American video below.

Scientific American has produced a video that describes the formation of the fire tornado that burned and scoured a mile-long path as the Carr Fire burned into Redding, California July 26, 2018.

In the video below, click on the little square at bottom-right to see it in full screen.

There were two fatalities on the Carr Fire that day. Redding Fire Department Inspector Jeremy Stoke was burned over in his truck on Buenaventura Boulevard. On the other side of the Sacramento River, on the west side, Don Ray Smith was entrapped and killed in his dozer.

According to a Green Sheet report by CAL FIRE, the conditions that resulted in the entrapment of three dozers and the Redding Fire Department Fire Inspector that day were due to the fire tornado — a large rotating fire plume that was roughly 1,000 feet in diameter. The winds at the base were 136-165 mph (EF-3 tornado strength), as indicated by wind damage to large oak trees, scouring of the ground surface, damage to roofs of houses, and lofting of large steel power line support towers, vehicles, and a steel marine shipping container. Multiple fire vehicles had their windows blown out and their bodies damaged by flying debris.

The strong winds caused the fire to burn all live vegetation less than 1 inch in diameter. Peak temperatures likely exceeded 2,700 °F.

The Carr Fire burned 229,651 acres, destroyed 1,077 homes, and killed 3 firefighters and 5 civilians

The news media sometimes calls any little fire whirl a “fire tornado”, or even a “firenado”. These and related terms (except for “firenado”) were, if not founded, at least documented and defined in 1978 by a researcher for the National Weather Service in Missoula, David W. Goens. He grouped fire whirls into four classes:

  1. Fire Devils. They are a natural part of fire turbulence with little influence on fire behavior or spread. They are usually on the order of 3 to 33 feet in diameter and have rotational velocities less than 22 MPH.
  2. Fire Whirls. A meld of the fire, topograph, and meteorological factors. These play a significant role in fire spread and hazard to control personnel. The average size of this class is usually 33 to 100 feet, with rotational velocities of 22 to 67 MPH.
  3. Fire Tornadoes. These systems begin to dominate the large scale fire dynamics. They lead to extreme hazard and control problems. In size, they average 100 to 1,000 feet in diameter and have rotational velocities up to 90 MPH.
  4. Fire Storm. Fire behavior is extremely violent. Diameters have been observed to be from 1,000 to 10,000 feet and winds estimated in excess of 110 MPH. This is a rare phenomenon and hopefully one that is so unlikely in the forest environment that it can be disregarded.”

Thanks and a tip of the hat go out to Rick. Typos or errors, report them HERE.

“It smells like it’s time to go to work”

Said one of the American firefighters as they landed in smoky Sydney, Australia

Firefighting personnel from U.S. arrive in Australia
Firefighting personnel from the U.S. arrive in Australia, December 7, 2019. NSW RFS photo.

The 42 firefighting personnel from Canada and the United States have arrived in Australia. Each country sent 21 fire supervision and aviation specialists who will assist with suppressing the fires that have been burning in nearly unprecedented numbers over the last several weeks. There is no long term relief in sight since the Australian summer is just starting.

The Sydney Morning Herald has an interesting article about the Americans being incorporated into the New South Wales fire culture. Check out their very interesting article and the photos. Here is an excerpt:

As the first ever deployment of American firefighters made the descent into Sydney from the United States on Saturday morning, the bushfire smoke cloaking the city for the past week filled the aircraft cabin. For firefighting aviation specialist Michelle Moore, from Idaho, the smell wasn’t alarming.

“I understand it’s pretty traumatic for you guys, but it’s something we deal with – it’s our comfort zone,” she said. “It smells like it’s time to go to work.”

The group is spending Sunday in briefings before heading out on Monday to locations including the “mega fire” around Gospers Mountain that stretches from the Hawkesbury into the Hunter and Central Coast regions, and the Currowan fire north of Batemans Bay on the South Coast.

Inside the briefing notes on Sunday was the important lesson of getting familiar with Australia’s spiders and snakes. Fire and Rescue NSW Commissioner Paul Baxter said the Australian accent will probably also take some getting used to.

Firefighters from Canada arrive Australia
Firefighters from Canada arrive in Australia. Photo by NSW RFS December 5, 2019.

More than 40 insurance companies sue government over fire that burned into Gatlinburg

Chimney Tops 2 Fire Gatlinburg tennessee
Chimney Tops 2 Fire at 9:37 p.m. November 28, 2016 after it burned into Gatlinburg, Tennessee. Photo credit: Sevierville Police Department.

More than 40 insurance companies are suing the federal government for $450 million over how the fire that burned into Gatlinburg, Tennessee in 2016 was handled, the Knox News is reporting.

Five days after it started in Great Smoky Mountains National Park on November 23 the Chimney Tops 2 Fire spread into the eastern Tennessee city killing 14 people, forcing 14,000 to evacuate, destroying or damaging 2,400 structures, and blackening 17,000 acres.

The strategy used to manage the fire was controversial in that very little direct action was taken to suppress the fire during those first five days until a predicted wind event caused it to spread very rapidly out of the park and into the city.

Below is an excerpt from an article at the Knox News:

The lawsuits blame the devastation on National Park Service officials. Fire managers violated their own policies, the complaints state, when they opted to let the blaze burn amid prolonged drought and forecasted high winds, then failed to monitor it or warn residents of the danger it posed.

The lawsuits single out Greg Salansky, the park’s fire management officer who first spotted smoke coming from the park’s Chimney Tops peaks on Nov. 23, 2016. Salansky didn’t attack the roughly acre-sized fire directly, didn’t dig containment lines initially and waited four days to order water drops by airplane and helicopter.

Earlier drops, the complaints read, could have easily extinguished the fire when it spanned just an acre and a half.

Instead, Salansky opted to try to contain the fire inside a 410-acre box in hopes of coming rain. He briefed higher-ups at the park, according to the complaints, but made no significant progress in containing the fire. It didn’t help that most of the fire crew’s staff was on vacation due to the holiday. No one called them in.

Chimney Tops 2 Fire August 27, 2016
Chimney Tops 2 Fire November 27, 2016. Photo by Brett Bevill.

The National Park Service assembled an eight-person team to review the management of the Chimney Tops 2 Fire. Participants represented the NPS, U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Boone Fire Department in North Carolina, plus a Technical Writer-Editor. It was led by Joe Stutler, of the USFS, who is qualified as a Type 1 Incident Commander and Area Commander, positions at the pinnacle of the incident management structure.

Gatlinburg fire report Joe Stutler
On August 31, 2017 Joe Stutler presented information from the report about the Chimney Tops 2 Fire that burned into Gatlinburg, Tennessee.

In a press conference when the report was released, Mr. Stutler began by saying the report was intended to not place blame on anyone, and would “avoid should have, could have, and would have, statements that frankly inhibit sensemaking and also inhibit continuing to learn from the event.”

Describing the actions taken or not taken on the fire, he said, “the review team found no evidence of negligence of anyone at the park. They did the very best they could when it came to their duty. They did the very best they could based on what was loaded in their hard drive”, he said as he pointed to his head. “Never in the history of this park or even in the surrounding area”, Mr. Stutler said, “had anyone seen the combination of severe drought, fire on the landscape, and an extreme wind event” occurring at the same time.

Combined with a wildland/urban interface, it was the “perfect storm”, he explained. The review team concluded that the fire management officials did not see the potential for the low-frequency, high-risk event.

The 116-page report had a brief summary of its findings:

“The review team concluded that a lack of wildland fire preparedness during a period of drought conditions favorable to wildfires overwhelmed National Park Service response to the CT2 fire. Though the review team concluded that the firefighting decisions made by the personnel involved were commensurate within their knowledge and experience in fighting wildland fires in the region, this report recommends enhanced preparedness and fire planning based on fire-conditions assessments, and adherence to the National Park Service wildland fire program and policies. These recommendations will likely enhance the capability of the Great Smoky Mountains National Park to respond to a wildfire event with similar or greater fire weather conditions in the future.”

The report made recommendations, including:

  • Revise the park’s fire management plan to reflect more aggressive strategies and tactics during extreme fire weather conditions.
  • Expand communications capacity to allow interoperability with responders outside the federal system.
  • The Fire Management Officer should be supervised by a single individual, not two.
  • Since no Red Flag Warnings were issued around the time of the fire, evaluate current Red Flag Warning and advisory criteria to reflect conditions experienced during the 2016 fire season.
  • The National Park Service leadership should embrace and institute change to create wildland fire management organizations that have the capacity and resilience to meet the realities of this “new normal” fire behavior.
  • Institute formal fire management officer and agency administrator mentoring and/or development programs.

(The article was edited on December 7, 2019 to show that Joe Stutler is currently working for the U.S. Forest Service.)

Thanks and a tip of the hat go out to Bob. Typos or errors, report them HERE.