Wildfire Today

Fuel in a bladder bag

Bill GabbertDecember 21, 2011January 7, 2020Uncategorizedlame-ass ideas, safety12 Comments

Maybe I led a sheltered life as a firefighter, or perhaps I just worked around people who made safety number one, but until today I had never heard of filling a bladder bag (backpack pump) with a mixture of gasoline and diesel fuel and using it to apply the burn mix onto brush or slash piles that were to be burned, or were presently burning. But apparently it is a common practice on some U.S. Forest Service districts, according to a recently released “Lessons Learned” document. Below is an excerpt; the entire document is HERE. After the reported near miss, those practices may change.

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I was walking down the hall of the district office with one of the district staff when we stepped into a conversation some of the crew leaders and assistant crew leaders where having about a near miss on some pile burning operations the previously day. There had been a flashback of flame toward one of firefighters while using a Fedco five gallon with fuel mix (piss bag/ bladder bag) to fuel the ignition on one of the piles. Some of the group was thinking it was no was big deal, some were trying to defend the action of using the Fedco as a firing tool, some were not sure and others thought it was not the right tool for the job. One individual said “we used to use them in region “X” and on my old forest all time in pile burning no big deal you have to just be careful with the flashback”.

I decided to bring it forward to the group that this is something we need to talk about, some were a little reluctant but everybody joined in. I had someone inform the rest of the folks waiting to go out pile burning that we all needed to talk about this issue and that “the piles would wait”. Someone pointed out “have you ever seen a dry piss bag on a fire and did you think there was fuel on the outside of the bag”?

The employee who had the near miss said his fire shirt had fuel on it. We talked how the drip torch had a spark arrest in it, and you are creating a fine mist at the nozzle when you pump the bladder bag which is also creating flumes which comes back and creates the flash that becomes a very unsafe operation.

The subject came up how to carry 5 gallon of fuel mix up the hill as the gas cans weight down on the arm. We asked those that did not think this was the right device to use, why did they not say anything. They felt that they were not going to use it and the person who filled it up was the senior leader of the group.

“What if this had not been a near miss but more serious we should have spoken up or at least talked about it.” We discussed, both as a group and one-on-one, the actions, planning and proper tools to use. We all need to have more training and discussions of proper tools, safety, and minimizing risks.

How to make a hot toddy

Bill GabbertDecember 18, 2011December 18, 2012Uncategorizedholiday, hot toddy

In our (almost) annual tradition, we are reminding you how to make a hot toddy.

There really is a beverage called a “hot toddy”. And, except for you folks in the tropics (damn you!), this time of the year a hot drink on a cold night hits the spot.

GAO formally releases report on Station fire

Bill GabbertDecember 17, 2011June 2, 2013UncategorizedCalifornia, Station Fire

Yesterday Wildfire Today reported that the Associated Press had obtained a draft copy of the report the Government Accountability Office prepared on the controversies surrounding the Station Fire that killed two firefighters and burned 160,000 acres near Los Angeles in 2009.

Now the GAO has formally released the 80-page report (5.5 MB) along with a one page summary of their findings (80 KB).

The fire seemed more or less controlable until mid-morning on the second day when it exhibited extreme fire behavior and was off to the races.

One of the issues the GAO focused on was the fact that air tankers were requested by the Incident Commander at the end of the first day to be over the fire at 7:00 a.m. the next morning. The request was handled oddly and was delayed, and conflicting information was provided to the GAO from dispatch personnel who processed the order.

There seemed, although it was not explicitly identified, that there was a preference to order U.S. Forest Service air tankers, and a hesitancy to use state aircraft. This may have been due to the USFS memo that was issued a few weeks before the Station fire requiring fire managers to consider using USFS resources rather than state and local fire equipment and personnel in order to save money. The report concluded that USFS air tankers could not have arrived at the fire before approximately 9:00 a.m. on the second day due to the crews having worked on fires into the evening the previous day, and crew rest requirements came into play.

CalFire air tankers were not ordered for the second day and they may have been available, however since there were only three air tankers unassigned that day in California the state may or may not have released them for the Station fire, preferring to hold on to them for initial attack.

The Air Tactical Group Supervisor requested a Very Large Air Tanker three times on the second day and all three requests were denied by the Incident Commander and “an Angeles National Forest fire management official”. The IC and the ANF official disagreed with the ATGS about the potential effectiveness of a VLAT. Or, (but the report does not say this) they were concerned with monetary constraints.

Some other issues addressed in the GAO report include:

The non-use of LA County’s night flying helicopters, and the general lack of night flying capability within the USFS;
The timing of ordering an incident management team;
Whether the USFS mobilized its own assets rather than local ones in certain instances, even though its assets were located farther away and would take longer to arrive.
Whether more action could have been taken to protect homes in Big Tujunga Canyon, an area where dozens of homes were destroyed.
Adequacy and appropriateness of firefighting strategies and tactics.
Sufficiency and capability of aviation assets within the USFS agencywide.

The GAO report does not provide much in the way of specific judgments or recommendations. Some of the information they sought was not available in written form, and the agency personnel they interviewed sometimes provided conflicting testimony.

These were two “executive recommendations” made by the GAO:

to clarify the Forest Service’s intent and to reduce uncertainty about how its assets are to be used relative to those of other agencies, issue guidance describing when it expects its own firefighting assets to be used instead of contract or state and local agency assets, and,
document the steps it plans to take, and the associated time frames, to implement the lessons it identified in its review of the Station Fire.

The official Lessons Learned document issued by the USFS can be found HERE.

EIS decision: 30% of USFS lands now off limits for retardant

Bill GabbertDecember 16, 2011October 12, 2022Uncategorizedair tanker, Photo by Bill G14 Comments

Retardant drop Whoopup fire — Tanker 45 makes a retardant drop on the Whoopup fire near Newcastle, WY, July 18, 2011. Photo by Bill Gabbert

On Tuesday U.S. Forest Service Chief Tom Tidwell signed off on a decision that establishes new policies for the use of aerial fire retardant when fighting wildfires on U.S. Forest Service lands. Tidwell chose one of three alternatives in the final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that studied the use of retardant and how it affects water resources and certain plant and wildlife species. The new policy puts buffer zones around waterways and habitat for some threatened, endangered, and sensitive species in order to avoid applying retardant in those areas.

This will result in approximately 30 percent of USFS lands being off limits for retardant while fighting fire. There is an exception if human life or public safety is threatened.

The EIS was written in response to a July, 2010 decision by U. S. District Court Judge Donald Molloy in a lawsuit filed in 2008 by the Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics. The agency began soliciting public input on the EIS in May of last year.

Now firefighters and Air Tactical Group Supervisors will have roughly 12,000 maps identifying avoidance areas on 98 National Forest System units that identify locations of waterways and areas for hundreds of plant and animal species. Professional liability insurance anyone?

Link to the EIS documents.

Thanks go out to Dick

GAO report on Station fire

Bill GabbertDecember 16, 2011February 29, 2020UncategorizedStation Fire2 Comments

As we reported on August 6, 2010, the two California U.S. senators and several local House members signed a letter asking the Government Accountability Office to look into the management of the 2009 Station fire that burned 160,000 acres and killed two firefighters near Los Angeles. The Associated Press is reporting today that they have obtained a draft copy of the GAO report. Here is an excerpt from the AP article:

A draft report obtained by The Associated Press discloses conflicting accounts of why an air tanker was not summoned in the early hours of what turned out to be the largest wildfire in Los Angeles County history.

Critics have long said the U.S. Forest Service didn’t bring in enough aircraft and firefighters to quickly snuff the 2009 Station Fire in the Angeles National Forest. A nearby air tanker could have been called in shortly after the fire started, but the supervisor and the pilot provide different reasons why that didn’t happen.

“These decisions may be made with imperfect information and under severe time constraints, relying heavily on the professional judgment of those involved. It is not possible to know with certainty whether different decisions or actions would have resulted in a different outcome for the Station Fire,” the draft U.S. Government Accountability Office report concludes.

[…]

The report says the Forest Service needs to clear up foggy policies that could cause confusion when working with local firefighters.

In spite of the U.S. Forest Service’s November, 2009 report on the Angeles National Forest fire that found nothing to criticize about how the fire was managed in the first 46 hours, and further said that policies and procedures were followed, many knowledgeable former wildland firefighters have accused the USFS of under-staffing the fire during it’s early stages, and attacking the fire on the first night and the morning of the second day with strategy and tactics that were less than aggressive.

USFS releases Lessons Learned Report on Station fire

A few days ago the Wildfire Lessons Learned Center posted a copy of the Station Fire Lessons Learned Report, dated October, 2010, released more than two years after the fire. The two-year delay is probably due to the firefighter fatalities and the allegations of poor decisions made during the first 24 hours of the fire. If the allegations about the less than aggressive tactics, not using night flying helicopters the first night, and a several hour delay in dispatching air tankers the next morning are true, those decisions may have prevented the fire from being contained during the first 24 hours.

Some of the headlines from the Lessons Learned Report are below.