The Country Fire Authority (CFA) in the Australian state of Victoria is leasing five air tankers and one “bird dog” aircraft from a Canadian company for the down under summer fire season. Two CV-580 air tankers, three single engine Air Tractor 802’s, and a Turbo Commander 690 bird dog are being provided by Conair in what the CFA is considering a trial of the larger air tankers.
Capacity of the CV-580
The CV-580 has been used in Canada for a decade, but this is believed to be the first time they have seen action in Australia. The aircraft can carry up to 2,100 U.S. gallons and has a top speed of 310 mph.
A group of Canadian pilots and mechanics flew across the Pacific with the planes in early December, stopping to refuel at several islands along the way. The aircraft will be based at Avalon, Victoria (map) for the fire season.
The Canadian air tankers will join the three Erickson Air-Crane helicopters, Elvis, Elsie, and Marty, which are also leased for the next several months.
This video shows the CFA testing the CV-580’s at the Avalon Airfield in early February, 2011.
The video below, posted on YouTube in 2007, shows CV-580’s in action, dropping on numerous fires in British Columbia.
In what we called the “Siege of ’08”, four CV-580’s were sent from Canada to assist with the hundreds of wildfires that were started by a massive lighting barrage in northern California.
While we’re on the subject of air tankers, the richard-seaman.com web site has dozens of excellent photos of mostly amphibious aircraft that were taken at an air show in 2006, the Gidroaviasalon (“hydro-aviation exhibition”) held at the Beriev test center near Gelendzhik on the Russian Black Sea. Here is a very impressive photo of the two Russian-made amphibious air tankers flying in formation. The upper one is the Be-200, and the other is the A-42 Albatross. The site also has several other photos of these two air tankers operating at the air show.
A-42 “Albatross” (lower aircraft) and the Be-200 (upper aircraft). Photo: Richard-Seaman.com
On Monday the National Transportation Safety Board issued a number of recommendations to the U.S. Forest Service following the NTSB’s investigation into the fatal Carson helicopter crash on the Iron Complex fire in 2008 in northern California which killed nine firefighters and helicopter crew members.
On November 29, 2010, the USFS sent a briefing paper to the NTSB outlining some changes they had already made to their fire aviation program in response to the crash.
Here is a summary of the new NTSB recommendations. The complete memo that the NTSB issued to the USFS is below the summary.
Develop mission-specific operating standards for firefighter transport operations that include procedures for completing load calculations and verifying that actual aircraft performance matches predicted performance, require adherence to aircraft operating limitations, and detail the specific 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 regulations that are to be complied with by its contractors. (A-10-159)
Require its contractors to conduct firefighter transport operations in accordance with the mission-specific operating standards specified in Safety Recommendation A-10-159. (A-10-160)
Create an oversight program that can reliably monitor and ensure that contractors comply with the mission-specific operating requirements specified in Safety Recommendation A-10-159. (A-10-161)
Provide specific training to inspector pilots on performance calculations and operating procedures for the types of aircraft in which they give evaluations. (A-10-162)
Require a hover-out-of-ground-effect power check to be performed before every takeoff carrying passengers from helispots in confined areas, pinnacles, and ridgelines. (A-10-163)
Review and revise policies regarding the type and use of gloves by firefighting personnel during transport operations, including but not limited to, compatibility with passenger restraints and opening emergency exits. (A-10-164)
Review and revise your contract requirements for passenger transport by aircraft so that the requirement to install shoulder harnesses on passenger seats provides improved occupant crashworthiness protection consistent with the seat design. (A-10-165)
Require that helispots have basic weather instrumentation that has the capability to measure wind speed and direction, temperature, and pressure and provide training to helitack personnel in the proper use of this instrumentation. (A-10-166)
Modify your standard manifest form to provide a place to record basic weather information and require that this information be recorded for each flight. (A-10-167)
Require all contracted transport-category helicopters to be equipped with a cockpit voice recorder and a flight data recorder or a cockpit image recorder with the capability of recording cockpit audio, crew communications, and aircraft parametric data. (A-10-168)
The NTSB also issued some recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration.
The NTSB’s memo to the USFS is below. (Click the “+” or Fullscreen to see larger versions.)
A Hong Kong Government Flying Services helicopter lost power in one of its engines while dipping water out of a reservoir in northern Hong Kong on Monday. The 3-person crew of the Eurocopter AS332 L2, or Super Puma, activated the pop-out floats and the helicopter settled into the water, remaining upright. The crew escaped unharmed and swam to shore wearing inflatable personal flotation devices.
The helicopter was engaged in a water dropping operation, helping to suppress a vegetation fire near the Shing Mun reservoir when the accident occurred.
Here are three screen grabs from the video, which follows:
The helicopter lifting a bucket of water before activating the pop-out floats.Hong Kong helicopter with popped-out floats just before ditching into the water.
If you watch the video to the very end, you will see a photo of the aftermath of a helicopter vs. bus accident, something you don’t see every day.
On September 22, 2010, we ran a story about a helicopter operated by the New York Police Department that ditched into Jamaica Bay in Brooklyn, New York. The crew also activated their pop-out floats, preventing the helicopter from sinking.
Shortly before the National Transportation Safety Board held their December 7 meeting about the crash of the Carson helicopter on the Iron Complex fire in which 9 people died, the U. S. Forest Service sent a “briefing paper” to the NTSB that detailed the changes they made to their aviation program as a result of some of the findings of the investigation.
The changes include:
hiring 11 new Aviation Maintenance Inspectors, Helicopter Inspector Pilot, and airworthiness engineer;
the USFS has a 5-year strategy to achieve International Standard for Business Aircraft Operations (IS-BAO) certification;
changes to helicopter contracts in regard to seat belts and seats;
helicopter weighings will be witnessed by a USFS Maintenance Inspector;
passengers will not be transported on Type 1 (large) helicopters until a new “action plan” is completed and an acceptable level of risk is achieved; and
new requirements for inspecting contract helicopter pilots.
The “briefing paper” is below. Click on “Fullscreen” to see a larger version.
Yesterday we provided live coverage of the National Transportation Safety Board’s all-day meeting about the 2008 crash of the Sikorsky S-61N helicopter on the Iron Complex fire near Weaverville, California in which nine firefighters died. The pilot-in-command, a U.S. Forest Service check pilot, and seven firefighters were fatally injured; the copilot and three firefighters were seriously injured. The helicopter was operated by Carson Helicopters, Inc. of Grants Pass, Oregon.
According to the NTSB, there was “intentional wrong-doing” by Carson Helicopters that under-stated the weight of the helicopter and over-stated the performance of the helicopter in the documents they provided to the USFS when bidding on their firefighting contract. The NTSB estimated that the actual empty weight of the helicopter was 13,845 pounds, while Carson Helicopters stated in their contract proposal that the weight was 12,013 pounds. For the purpose of load calculations on the day of the crash, the pilot assumed the weight to be 12,408 pounds, which was 1,437 pounds less than the actual weight estimated by the NTSB. According to the NTSB, for the mission of flying the firefighters off the helispot, the helicopter was already over the allowable weight even without the firefighters on board.
In addition, here is an excerpt from the NTSB report:
The altered takeoff (5-minute) power available chart that was provided by Carson Helicopters eliminated a safety margin of 1,200 pounds of emergency reserve power that had been provided for in the load calculations.
The pilot-in-command followed a Carson Helicopters procedure, which was not approved by the helicopter’s manufacturer or the U.S. Forest Service, and used above-minimum specification torque in the load calculations, which exacerbated the error already introduced by the incorrect empty weight and the altered takeoff power available chart, resulting in a further reduction of 800 pounds to the safety margin intended to be included in the load calculations.
The incorrect information—the empty weight and the power available chart—provided by Carson Helicopters and the company procedure of using above-minimum specification torque misled the pilots to believe that the helicopter had the performance capability to hover out of ground effect with the manifested payload when, in fact, it did not.
The NTSB has notified the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General that Carson’s actions may merit a criminal investigation.
The NTSB and the FAA seem to have a rocky relationship. Some of the recommendations that the NTSB makes to the FAA following accident investigations are ignored, which frustrates the NTSB. This was evident a couple of times in the meeting yesterday. The AP reports on an example of this tension that affected the NTSB’s ability to investigate the Iron 44 fire fatal accident:
Two months after the accident, the FAA office in charge of overseeing Carson received letters from two pilots with knowledge of Carson’s operations who expressed concern that the company was miscalculating helicopter weights, investigators said.
Investigators said that if FAA had provided NTSB with that information at the time, it would have helped them figure out sooner that the weight calculations were faulty. FAA was a party to the accident investigation and its inspectors were aware of the investigation, they said.
However, FAA dismissed the allegations and didn’t provide the letters to NTSB until about a year later after the investigators made a general request for documents related to the agency’s oversight of Carson after the crash, investigators said.
Carson surrenders FAA certificate, but may still be operating in Afghanistan
It was reported by the FAA after the NTSB meeting on Tuesday that Carson Helicopters has surrendered their FAA Certificate, which is equivalent to an operating license. However, they may still be flying for the military as a subcontractor. The Mail Tribune in Medford, Oregon reported in January, 2009 that Carson Helicopters signed a contract with a subsidiary of Blackwater Worldwide (which recently changed their name to “Xe”) to use seven of their Sikorsky S-61 helicopters in Afghanistan. The contract, worth $605 million through 2013, is for the helicopters to transport supplies; they will not be involved in combat.
Fuel Control Unit missing
Conspiracy theory enthusiasts will enjoy speculating about the fuel control unit that went missing after it was gathered as evidence. The NTSB says the part played no role in the accident and that both engines were operating at full power during the accident. However, Carson is saying the crash was caused when one engine experienced a loss of power caused by the part that later disappeared. If Carson can successfully deflect blame to the company that manufactured the part, or at least establish some doubt about the accident’s cause, it may reduce their financial liability.
Who regulates wildfire aviation?
The answer is: nobody. The FAA claims they have no authority to regulate the aviation activities of other federal agencies or state and local governments. This authority has to be granted by Congress, which has shown no interest in becoming involved in the aviation safety of firefighters. And the federal agencies, or at least the U.S. Forest Service as proven in this accident, generally do not have the aviation expertise to inspect and regulate their own agency-owned or contracted aircraft. Good luck in trying to not think about this the next time you’re climbing into a helicopter at a fire. (Let’s see – got hard hat, gloves, line gear, tool, life insurance.)
Today, December 7, 2010, the National Transportation Safety Board conducted a Board Meeting about the August 5, 2008 crash of the Sikorsky S-61N helicopter on the Iron Complex fire near Weaverville in northern California that killed nine firefighters. The meeting was broadcast on a live webcast which we watched. The notes below were taken in real time during the webcast. It was not possible to pause or “rewind”, so there are probably errors and omissions, for which we apologize in advance. But we did the best we could, with limited multi-tasking and typing skills.
We originally covered some of the details of the NTSB’s Factual Report on the crash HERE. As we said then, one of the most startling facts the NTSB discovered is this:
The NTSB estimated that the actual empty weight of the helicopter was 13,845 pounds, while Carson Helicopters stated in their contract proposal that the weight was 12,013 pounds. For the purpose of load calculations on the day of the crash, the pilot assumed the weight to be 12,408 pounds, which was 1,437 pounds less than the actual weight estimated by the NTSB.
More information:
The presentations made during the meeting can be found on the NTSB web site HERE. They may only be available for three months.
The Accident Docket, a list of NTSB documents related to the accident, can be found HERE.
A recorded version of the webcast is now available HERE on the NTSB site. It may only be available there for three months.
After the meeting the NTSB issued a press release. We included it at the bottom of this article.
The meeting was held in Washington, DC, and the times shown below are Eastern Time. Below, the most recent updates are at the top.
4:23 – After a closing summary statement by Chairman Hersman, the board adjourned.
4:15 – Robert Sumwalt proposed, and the Board voted enthusiastically to approve, that the report be amended to include “Carson Helicopter, Inc.” in the title. During the meeting today, there was severe criticism of Carson, especially for their “intentional wrong-doing”. Some family members of the crash victims in the audience (which was never shown on camera) applauded the work of the investigative staff. Zoë (Zoëy) Keliher received special recognition for the investigative work that she performed. Other investigators, when they uncovered a surprising or extremely important fact, were said to have had a “Zoëy Moment”.
4:09 – Chairman Hersman said the Public Use area of aircraft operations, under which fire aviation falls, is an “orphan” in the regulatory system. She said the FAA needs to recognize and correct this. “We don’t want to investigate any more crashes like this”, she said.
3:58 – While they are reading the list, HERE is a link to a page that lists, and has photos of, the five members of the NTSB. Robert Sumwalt spoke more, and asked more questions, than the other four members. But they all were very professional, knowledgeable, brought up good points, and asked excellent questions of the investigators and witnesses.
3:53 – They just finished reading a list of probable causes, and now are reading 20+ recommendations. I can’t type that fast, but we’ll attempt to get a written copy.
3:48 – Robert Sumtwalt faulted the USFS for their lack of oversight before the accident, but praised them for the actions they took afterwards.
