Map of Beaver Creek Fire at 1 a.m. MDT, August 19, 2013
The Beaver Creek fire has not spread as much in the last two days as it did last week. This is due in part to the fire hitting the footprint of the 2007 Castle Rock Fire west of Ketchum, which can be seen on the map below posted on August 17.
The interior of the fire was active Sunday and there was some fire growth on the north and south ends of the fire. Red Flag conditions, including higher temperatures and wind gusts to 38 miles per hour, increased fire activity on the Beaver Creek Fire Sunday afternoon and evening. 1,150 firefighters working with 10 helicopters and 8 bulldozers expanded fire lines while large unburned areas within the fire lines and along the north and south edges of the fire sent columns of smoke 15,000 feet into the air. The fire is now 104,457 acres in size
Beaver Creek Fire, old school and new school. InciWeb photo.
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(UPDATE at 1:33 p.m. MDT, August 17, 2013)
Map of Beaver Creek fire at 2 a.m. MDT, August 17, 2013 (click to enlarge)
Extreme fire behavior occurred on the Beaver Creek Fire again on Friday, prompting additional evacuations, preevacuation warnings and the ordering of additional resources. The fire was active in the Greenhorn Gulch, Deer Creek, Dollarhide, and Baker Creek areas. The Baker Creek head of the fire produced a massive pyrocumulous column, while fire whirls, torching trees, and crown fire were visible from Hailey and the Highway 75 corridor leading to Ketchum.
At least one home, a bunkhouse and five other structures have been destroyed. However, the exact number of structures destroyed or damaged on August 15 is unknown. At least one primary residence was destroyed and there was damage to several others. The bridge on FS road 227 which connects Ketchum and Fairfield was destroyed. The loss of multiple outbuildings is certain. One Remote Automatic Weather Station (RAWS) was also destroyed.
Photos taken by Tech Sgt. Jeffrey Allred at Boise July 28, 2013 of two Modular Airborne FireFighting System (MAFFS) C-130 air tankers from the Wyoming and North Carolina Air National Guard units.
The Pike Hotshots took these photos at the Lodgepole Fire near Challis, Idaho; they are used with permission here. Click the images to see larger versions. The crew was recently released from the fire and is headed home for some days off.
Information Officer Shawna Hartman wrote this description of the air attack operation on the Brown Road Fire July 25 near Orofino, Idaho.
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“The job of Air Tactical Group Supervisor in the firefighting world is somewhat like a traffic policeman at a busy intersection. In Orofino on Thursday, the Air Tactical Group Supervisor, James Grasham, Zone Assistant Fire Management Officer from Idaho Panhandle National Forest stationed in Grangeville, with pilot Dave Parker coordinated the air support on the Brown Road Fire which greatly assisted in putting that fire out. Air support working the fire in Orofino, included 4 helicopters, 4 single engine air tankers (SEATS), 2 heavy air tankers, and a lead plane. With 11 aircraft over the fire, one could imagine the chaos that could ensue, hence the need for someone to coordinate the effort.
Due to effective regional communication and local pre-positioned air resources, aerial attack was immediate for the Brown Road fire. The terrain in that area makes on the ground firefighting difficult, and the aerial attack allowed the local firefighters to respond directly to the homes for structure protection. Circling above the fire, Grasham, is able to talk with firefighters on the ground as well as the air craft supporting the fire. In coordination with the ground Incident Commander, the Air Tactical Group Supervisor sets objectives for the fire and directs each retardant or water drop on the fire.
In Orofino last week, the helicopters were able to dip from nearby ponds and cool hot spots while the SEATs returned to Grangeville Tanker Base where they reloaded with retardant. The heavy air tankers were flown in from Missoula to assist with the Braun Road fire also. The “heavy” tankers are larger planes that may carry up to 2,000 gallons of retardant and also require a lead plane. The lead plane identifies the line in which the air tanker will drop their retardant load. While identifying that line the lead plane leads the tankers in and “checks the air”. These larger planes returned to Missoula to be refilled and one of them returned with another load to Orofino.
The SEATs hold up to 800 gallons of retardant per load; however, for safety reasons each load is usually only 725-750 gallons. The SEAT pilot can control the amount or coverage of retardant on each drop. If the fuel on the ground is heavy timber the pilot will likely release their complete load to ensure that it will reach the ground and coverage is good. The pilots stationed in Grangeville are highly qualified for wildfire and each year attend training and are recertified to continue to pilot SEATs.
When the SEATs get to the Grangeville Air Base, support personnel on the ground manage the safety of the “ramp”, the site of the retardant reloading station. SEAT managers keep track of flying time, safety, roll times loading and compliance with contract standards. There are at least 5 interagency dispatched personnel at the base that assist with the tanker base. As fire activity increase in the area, the more aircraft are called in and in turn more support personnel will arrive to help manage the Tanker Base.
The Idaho Department of Lands and the US Forest Service work closely together and share use of the SEATs. The Idaho Department of Lands holds the contract with the SEAT companies while the US Forest Service provides the airport support and staffing to maintain the Grangeville Tanker Base. This mutual aid agreement allows both entities use of this valuable firefighting resource without carrying the financial burden alone. The SEATs usefulness and efficiency of all personnel involved was exhibited on the Brown Fire and the air show over Orofino was entertaining as well.”
Pike Hotshots at a spike camp on the Lodgepole Fire, Challis National Forest, Idaho. Photo by Pike Hotshots.
A couple of our readers graciously allowed us to publish some of their fire photographs. Thanks Benjamin and Pike Hotshots.
Stuart Creek 2 Fire, near Salcha AK, July 4, 2013. This retardant drop was to prevent the approaching fire from jumping the road and threatening a repeater site. Photo by Benjamin Price. Stuart Creek 2 Fire near Salcha, AK, July 7, 2013. The fire burned 20,000+ acres on July 7 destroying three homes. It threatened both Eielson Air Force Base and North Pole, AK. Photo by Benjamin Price.
On Thursday CPTPA Chief Fire Warden Howard Weeks signed an agreement with OSHA that reduced the fine to $10,500 and revised the citation. Originally OSHA accused CPTPA of not furnishing a place of employment that was free of “recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees”. OSHA said eight of the 10 Standard Firefighting Orders and 11 of the 18 Watch Out Situations were present and not mitigated in the citation issued to the CPTPA and the Notice issued to the USFS.
Below is an excerpt from an article at Firehouse.com that originally appeared in the Lewiston Tribune:
Idaho Department of Lands spokeswoman Emily Callihan said the original citation would have made it impossible for firefighters to do their jobs.
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Callihan said the 10 and 18 are guidelines and not regulations, and the hazards they cover are present on nearly every fire. But, she said, the OSHA citation, as originally written, would have required firefighters to leave any fire where any of the 10 orders could not be followed or any of the 18 situations were present.
“What OSHA eventually recognized, is by removing firefighters from fires where any of those situations are present would result in not being able to respond with initial attack and keep fires small,” she said. “So it would have resulted in having fires get big and present more of a danger to firefighters and the public in the long run.”
The Nez Perce-Clearwater National Forest is planning to construct a memorial for Anne Veseth, a firefighter who was killed by a falling tree last year on the Steep Corner Fire northeast of Orofino, Idaho. If the environment assessment and other hurdles are overcome, a two-mile trail will be constructed leading to a vantage point overlooking the area where the fatality occurred. U.S. Forest Service officials are working closely with Ms. Veseth’s family in the design of the memorial.
She was in her second season working as a firefighter for the USFS when she was struck by a falling 150-foot tall fire-weakened green cedar tree. The tree fell on its own and was 13 inches in diameter where it struck her.
The USFS report on the accident did not find anyone at fault. It said the situation “required the presence of firefighters in an area where fire‐weakened trees could fall on their own with little or no warning.”
The House of Representatives passed their version of a continuing resolution last week, H.R. 933, that would fund the U.S. government through the end of the fiscal year which ends on September 30. Congress still has not passed a budget in four years, but at least this would prevent the government from shutting down.
According to a press release from Congressman Mike Simpson whose district is very close to the National Interagency Fire Center in Idaho, the bill included “adequate funding for fire suppression shortfalls”. Here is an excerpt from the release:
…“Idaho and the West faced an intense fire season in 2013, requiring more funding than initially budgeted to protect communities and manage resources,” said Simpson. “While we do our best to predict a fire season and budget accordingly, some years are worse than expected, and it’s not until all is said and done that we can take stock of the costs and respond appropriately.”
H.R. 933 provides $570 million to address shortfalls in fire accounts. This includes $97 million for the Department of the Interior and $473 million for the Forest Service. With carry-over and reserve wildfire funds exhausted through budget cuts in recent years, the Forest Service had to borrow roughly $600 million from non-fire accounts to meet fire suppression needs in FY13, the largest transfer in recent history. With the entire fire season accounted for, the continuing resolution fully restores these accounts.
“If we continue to rob land management accounts to pay for fire suppression, we are going to see fires that are bigger, more catastrophic, and much, much more expensive,” said Simpson. “This funding makes those accounts whole so that the agencies can do the work necessary to improve the health of our forests and rangelands. More work needs to be done to remove hazardous fuels buildup and prevent catastrophic fires, and so in addition to this funding we need to review or existing fire policy and continue to look at management reforms.”
H.R. 933 passed the House by a vote of 267-151. The current funding resolution expires on March 27, and the bill will now be considered by the U.S. Senate.
A report has been released about a tree felling accident that occurred in Idaho on the Caribou-Targhee National Forest July 31, 2012. You can read the entire report, but briefly, a Lodgepole pine being felled was 18 to 24 inches in diameter and leaning toward an open area where the chain saw operator hoped it would land. When the back cut was complete the tree did not fall since the weight of the limbs was pulling it 90° off the desired direction of fall toward a pump house with solar panels on the roof. The sawyer continued cutting, going all the way through the holding wood. At that point, the weight of the limbs pulled the tree toward the pump house where it landed, crushing some of the solar panels.
The report identified several things that went well. In addition, here are the lessons learned: Continue reading
The U.S. Forest Service has released their Serious Accident Investigation Report on the fatality of Anne Veseth, which occurred on the Steep Corner Fire 56 miles northeast of Orofino, Idaho August 12, 2012. The fire was on private property and was being managed by the Clearwater‐Potlatch Timber Protective Association (CPTPA). Ms. Veseth, in her second season working as a firefighter for the USFS, was killed when she was struck by a falling 150-foot tall fire-weakened green cedar tree. The tree fell on its own and was 13 inches in diameter where it struck her.
Here is an excerpt from the just-released USFS report:
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“Analysis and Conclusion
“The cause of this accident was that a green cedar tree, weakened by fire, fell and struck a firefighter in the head. It fell with a force far greater than the design limits of any hardhat could withstand. This tragedy resulted from the chance alignment of certain conditions: an emergency response to control a wildland fire, which required the presence of firefighters in an area where fire‐weakened trees could fall on their own with little or no warning. The SAI team concluded that the convergence of these events – in a very specific way and with very specific timing – resulted in a fatal accident. Slight differences in any number of factors could have led to drastically different results.
“Firefighters faced the same choice on this fire as they do on almost every fire: engage the fire and expose firefighters to a certain set of risks in order to control the fire, or don’t engage the fire and don’t control it, knowing that such a decision often poses a wider range of risks to firefighters and the public. Firefighters made the same basic risk decision on the Steep Corner Fire as they do routinely on most fires: to engage the fire and attempt to control it, knowing that firefighters would be exposed to hazards during suppression efforts.
“On the day of the accident, after the implementation of safety mitigation measures, the firefighting professionals involved in the Steep Corner Fire reasoned the risks of engaging and suppressing the fire to be acceptable. After considerable review of the incident, including the leadership, qualifications, interagency cooperation, fuels, weather, incident management organization, and local policies, the SAI Team concluded that the judgments and decisions of the firefighters involved in the Steep Corner Fire were appropriate. Firefighters all performed within the leaders’ intent and scope of duty, as defined by their respective organizations. The team did not find any reckless actions or violations of policy or protocol.
“On August 11, the day before the fatal accident, two Forest Service resources decided to limit their acceptance of risk on the Steep Corner Fire. Both the IHC and the E‐31 crew identified necessary safety mitigations. The IHC chose not to engage. The E‐31 crew disengaged and indicated they would not return to the fire until mitigation measures were implemented.
“C‐PTPA took these events seriously and subsequently addressed the recommended mitigation measures. Personnel became the “adapters” that allowed C‐PTPA and the Forest Service, two organizations with very different natural resource management mandates, to functiontogether. Mitigation measures included ordering more firefighting resources, adding line overhead and a radio repeater, and using contract fallers to fell hazard trees ahead of those digging fireline. The morning of August 12, the E‐31 crew decided to re‐engage when it became clear C‐PTPA was addressing their safety concerns. The IHC was already reassigned to anotherfire and did not return. In general, firefighters expressed their impressions that Saturday was a bad day but Sunday (before the accident) was much better, in terms of organization of the fire and mitigation of the hazards.”
(end of excerpt)
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The 38-page report only has two recommendations. One is to introduce the LCES (Lookouts, Communications, Escape Routes, Safety Zones) concept into the National Wildfire Coordinating Group’s curriculum for use in disciplines other than fire management. The other is: “Occupational Safety and Health Office should develop a methodology for effectively teaching non‐fire workers the concepts related to hazard tree identification, scouting an area, and determining escape routes and safety zones for overhead hazards”.
An opinion
Several things about the incident and the report are troubling, but one item in the report stood out (emphasis added):
This tragedy resulted from the chance alignment of certain conditions: an emergency response to control a wildland fire, which required the presence of firefighters in an area where fire‐weakened trees could fall on their own with little or no warning.
Perhaps it is just an unfortunate choice of words chosen by the primary author which somehow was missed by the large number of people who probably reviewed the report before it was released. Giving them the benefit of the doubt, maybe they didn’t really mean to imply that firefighters are REQUIRED to perform an action on a fire simply because the fire is uncontrolled, even “where fire‐weakened trees could fall on their own with little or no warning”.
Someone might say that trees could fall during suppression action on most timber fires. Right. However on this fire, the large number of falling trees was identified the previous day, when a Hotshot crew refused to be assigned to the fire because of falling trees and many other unmitigated hazards, saying in a SAFENET report filed three days later that they “had huge concerns about the number of snags burning”. An engine crew left the fire for similar reasons that afternoon, but returned the next day after being assured that the hazards had been mitigated.
Firefighters are not REQUIRED to perform a task on a fire if there are known extraordinary hazards that cannot mitigated. We are talking about trees, grass, brush, or houses…. that will all grow back. Firefighters can’t.
