They were working on the Coles Fire northwest of Coonawarra
Map showing the location of heat detected on the Coles Fire at 1605 UTC Jan. 20, 2022 in South Australia.
One firefighter working on the Coles Fire in South Australia has been killed and another hospitalized, the state’s Country Fire Service announced on Friday. The agency said “they were involved in a falling tree incident.”
In a news release the Country Fire Services said, “Family and other personnel have been informed and are being offered support at this time. The seriously injured CFS member has been taken to hospital for further treatment. The safety and wellbeing of our people is our highest priority and our thoughts are with our CFS family at this time.”
From The Guardian:
One firefighter has died and another has been seriously injured after a tree collapsed on a fire truck battling an out-of-control bushfire in South Australia’s south-east.
The incident occurred at the firefront at Coles, near Lucindale, where the blaze was running uncontrolled through bluegum plantations, scrub and grassland, a spokeswoman for the state’s Country Fire Service said.
The Coles Fire, first reported January 19, has burned 3,835 ha (9,476 a) about 28 km (17 miles) west-northwest of Coonawarra in southeast South Australia.
Data from the U.S. National Interagency Fire Center in 2016 showed that in the United States hazardous trees was the fifth leading cause of wildland firefighter fatalities, behind medical, aircraft accidents, vehicle accidents, and entrapments.
Our sincere condolences go out to the family, friends, and co-workers of the two firefighters.
Engine in Harris Fire burnover — July 16, 2021. From the report.
A Facilitated Learning Analysis has been released for the burnover that occurred July 16, 2021 on the Harris Fire near Joliet, Montana 25 miles northeast of Red Lodge. Dan Steffensen of Red Lodge Fire Rescue who had six years of experience with wildland fire was on a two-person engine crew when very strong winds suddenly shifted. He attempted to reach safety, but was overrun by the fast moving fire and was injured. Due to the severity of his burns, 2nd and 3rd degree on 45 percent of his body, Mr. Steffensen was flown to the University of Utah Burn Center in Salt Lake City where he was treated for nine weeks.
Mr. Steffensen was operating a nozzle while he and another firefighter who was driving the engine were making a mobile attack on a grass fire. It was burning in pastureland that had not been burned, grazed, or hayed in six years, consisting primarily of dense grass and some sage approximately two feet in height.
In accordance with department common practice, Mr. Steffensen was not wearing his line pack and fire shelter, as neither he nor the driver would ever get past the end of the hardline hose. In that first section, Mr. Steffensen was always in the driver’s direct line of sight, and the three-to four-foot flames “took down easy” and quickly.
The firefighters did not know that minutes before the burnover the National Weather Service had issued a Significant Weather Advisory for thunderstorms moving in their direction. “Wind gusts of 50 to 60 mph are possible with these storms,” it said. “A gust to 63 mph was reported in Big Timber with this activity.”
When the wind gusts arrived at the fire, increasing from 10 mph to about 55 mph, a helicopter pilot who had been dropping water was forced to jettison the water from his bucket.
As the wind speed suddenly increased and the direction shifted, Mr. Steffensen and the engine were entrapped by flames. The firefighter driving the engine had no visibility and knowing there was a cliff nearby, stayed in place and let it burn over the engine. He later described it as being “hotter than hell in the cab” for the 20-30 seconds of the burnover. He was not injured.
From the report:
For Dan, those few seconds between when he recognized that they had a problem and when the flame front hit were not enough for him to return to the engine or reach the black. He later said “I’ve been on many fires, [and] I’ve never seen one come out of nowhere so fast. All it took was the wind switch.” Although he was only 15 or so feet from the burned portion of the field that he and Scott had just left, the fire was traveling too fast for him to get there. With no line gear on him, and no time to deploy a shelter even if he had carried it, he was left with just his PPE to protect him from the 20-foot high, fast-moving flame front, which hit him after slamming into the driver’s side of the engine and eddying under to the passenger side.
Below are the Key Takeaways from the report:
Almost every single experienced wildland firefighter reading this analysis will find the series of events recounted here familiar: an initial attack in light, flashy fuels with rapidly changing conditions. It can, therefore, be tempting to write this off as an unavoidable situation in an inherently risky profession. While the FLA team agrees that accepting some level of risk while fighting fire is inevitable, we do believe there are some key lessons for the reader to consider, should they ever find themselves in a similar situation.
1) Remember the importance of PPE and wearing it correctly. Dan’s injuries would have been much worse had he not been wearing his Nomex, a layered shirt, gloves, and a helmet in the appropriate manner.
2) Remaining in your vehicle during a burnover may be the best option in light, flashy fuels. Scott was able to walk away from the Harris Fire that day with no physical injuries. The comparison of the conditions inside and outside of E78 suggest that this was the safest place he could have been in that moment.
We also encourage you to reflect on the following questions, especially as they relate to fast-moving initial attack scenarios:
1) When planning your escape route, how much time do you really have to react? It was repeated throughout this analysis, both from individuals involved in the incident and those not involved, how common it is in our current firefighting environment to operate outside of the black. In this case, however, there were some slightly unusual circumstances, such as the high grassy fuel loads, that contributed to the unintended outcome. Take the time to consider such factors, as well as harder to predict factors such as unexpected wind shifts, when planning an escape route.
2) Is the higher level of risk that comes with missing elements of LCES acceptable to you? If yes, what values must be threatened for you to accept that higher level of risk? When asked, Scott shared that his major lesson learned from the day was, “what were we doing here?” With time to reflect, he regretted entering an unburned area with an inadequate escape route to save a few acres of grass, especially when an alternate suppression strategy may have been as effective at keeping the fire on the plateau.
3) What is the process in your organization for quickly communicating special weather statements and advisories about changing conditions? In this case, the special weather statement was issued only minutes before the thunderstorm impacted wind speed, direction, and fire activity at the scene, and no one on the fire received this information in time to react and reevaluate their tactics.
4) When the forecast restates the same thing every day, how do you ensure that you still account for the potential impacts of extreme weather during initial attack? Even if those on the hill had received the special weather statement in a timely manner, it had been hot and dry with a chance of thunderstorms in the area for weeks. Such repetition during fire season often results in the line of thinking that “nothing bad happened yesterday, so today we should be fine again.” Even for the most experienced firefighters, extreme fire weather should still be of note; in fact, these are often the firefighters that must battle most against complacency to objectively consider the potential risk posed by extreme fire weather.
5) Is your assessment of fuels valid? Just as in timber litter fuel types, there can be significant variations in grass fuels with regards to fuel loading and arrangement. In many areas of the west, grazing lands are enrolled in conservation programs that govern the frequency of grazing, haying, or burning, resulting in significantly higher amounts of fuel on the ground. How do you make sure that your assumptions about fire behavior and spread rates are still valid as you make decisions about tactics?
If you are a federal employee hopefully you don’t know what “OWCP” stands for. If you do, you could have been forced to deal with them, and your experience may or may not have been a positive experience.
Many federal workers have been pleased with the services provided by the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, but too many stories from others are truly sickening.
On BuzzFeed you can find articles titled, for example, “Putting ketchup on more than half of these foods is a federal crime — are you guilty?” (for real). But an offshoot, named BuzzFeed News, actually writes serious articles about news of the day. They even have a reporter assigned to cover the White House. Yesterday they published a long thoroughly researched piece about how some wildland firefighters injured on the job have been profoundly mistreated and ill served by the OWCP.
If a firefighter is injured while working, or becomes ill on the job, OWCP is required to do everything they can to make them whole again, including covering medical and rehab expenses so they can get back to work without wiping out their bank accounts.
"The Mission of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs is to protect the interests of workers who are injured or become ill on the job, their families and their employers by making timely, appropriate, and accurate decisions on claims, providing prompt payment of benefits and helping injured workers return to gainful work as early as is feasible."
The BuzzFeed News article describes numerous examples of firefighters who were seriously injured while working, then confronted with huge medical bills. Some were being hounded multiple times a day from bill collectors demanding money that should have been paid by OWCP. Firefighters’ credit cards have been maxed out and credit ratings destroyed. Injured firefighters have routinely been reduced to setting up GoFundMe pages and depending on grants from the Wildland Firefighter Foundation. Rehab has been discontinued too soon. All because OWCP is incompetent or because their funding has been reduced to the point where they can’t hire enough staff to “protect the interests of workers who are injured or become ill on the job.”
One of the more recent, of many examples in the article is what has happened to Michelle Koch Hart, the widow of Tim Hart, a smokejumper who died after being injured on the Eicks Fire in New Mexico in May of this year.
Here is an excerpt from the BuzzFeed News article:
“Today, she’s still battling with federal agencies, trying to prove the facts around her husband’s death to recoup money. It’s been a maze of talking to case managers who send her to different departments, calling 1-800 numbers that lead nowhere, digging up records, and refiling paperwork that apparently never went through. Some of the claims can’t be submitted until the Forest Service investigation into Tim’s death is completed, and she has no idea when that will be. The Forest Service told BuzzFeed News that “reviews of fatalities can be a lengthy process.” This month, she got an unexplained bill from the Department of Agriculture for $1,030, due Dec. 9. She has no idea what it’s for, and when she tried to find out, she said, the agent could not talk to her because she was not Tim.
” “It’s very traumatizing, lonely,” she said. “There’s no one person in the federal government who is helping me. People don’t know who I should talk to. I have to do everything on my own, but I still have so many unanswered questions. The system is broken.”
“The US Forest Service, which oversees the large majority of the country’s wildland firefighters, has known for more than a decade that its employees have struggled to navigate the workers’ compensation filing system, get claims approved, and have their medical needs paid for, according to the documents reviewed by BuzzFeed News. They give insight into how many top officials, including the Forest Service’s current director, were not only aware of these widespread problems, but had been discussing their frustrations about the process internally for years.
“Leadership in the Forest Service failed to do a damn thing to address our issues with OWCP despite us repeatedly asking and offering solutions,” Buddy Byrd, a former safety and occupational health manager for the Forest Service’s Region 6, which spans Oregon and Washington, told BuzzFeed News. “OWCP is a piece of a bigger systemic failure on behalf of the US Forest Service.”
Our take
The federal agencies that employ firefighters and forestry technicians, need to quadruple their efforts to force OWCP to process the claims of the injured quickly and fairly.
They could consider assigning a human resources person to every injured employee who can troubleshoot problems caused by the OWCP. They should not be left alone and victimized a second time for the injury they suffered while serving their country fighting wildfires.
Upon the death of a firefighter the agencies need to figure out a way to quickly produce enough documentation to satisfy the OWCP that they were killed on the job in the line of duty.
Congress needs to appropriately fund the OWCP so they have staff capable of serving the needs of injured firefighters, and their spouses.
Thanks and a tip of the hat go out to Ben and Tom.
Caldor Fire, looking northeast from Armstrong lookout, August 29, 2021. AlertWildfire.
A firefighter on the Caldor Fire suffered serious burns and is being treated in the burn unit at UC Davis Medical Center, the Modesto Bee reports.
Richard Gerety III of Patterson was on a four-person engine crew from West Stanislaus Fire when he fell into burning material. It was his tenth day on the fire. He suffered third-degree burns on his arms and hands and second-degree burns to his legs, said his wife, Jennifer Gerety. The burns account for about 20 percent of his body.
She said he will undergo skin grafting surgery Wednesday and recovery is expected to take up to a month.
Thanks and a tip of the hat go out to Kelly and Dan.
Working on the Skyline Ridge Complex 22 miles southeast of Roseburg, Oregon
1:53 p.m. PDT August 12, 2021
Map of the Skyline Ridge Complex of fires at 8:22 p.m. PDT August 11, 2021
Four firefighters assigned to the Skyline Ridge Complex of fires in Oregon were transported by ambulance Wednesday morning August 11 after their vehicle rolled over.
The Douglas County Sheriff’s Office reported that a crew vehicle transporting fire personnel from their night shift assignment on the Skyline Ridge Complex east of Canyonville struck approximately 60 to 70 feet of guardrail before driving up a hillside and rolling over. The crash resulted in non-life threatening injuries to four firefighters who were transported by ambulance to Mercy Medical Center in Roseburg, Oregon where they were treated and later released.
The call came in to 9-1-1 at approximately 9:53 a.m. of a single vehicle rollover crash in the 15000-block of Tiller Trail Highway roughly 10 miles east of Canyonville and Interstate 5.
The injured personnel are part of a 20-person crew assigned to the fire. Additional crew members traveling in two other vehicles were not involved in the accident.
Deputies determined the driver, a 38-year-old wildland firefighter from Salem, Oregon fell asleep at the wheel while returning to fire camp after working the night shift on the fire. Alcohol and speed were not contributing factors in the crash and no citations or arrests were made.
The Skyline Ridge Complex is a group of fires started from lightning on August 1, 2021 about south-southeast of Roseburg, Oregon. Combined, the fires have burned 3,546 acres.
These firefighters were very lucky. From 1990 through 2014, 22 percent of the wildland firefighter fatalities were the result of vehicle accidents.
McFarland Fire. USFS photo published August 6, 2021. (Not related to the injuries)
On Friday August 6, a handcrew was working on the south side of the McFarland Fire when a spot fire ignited ahead of them, the U.S. Forest Service said in a statement released August 7. While attacking the spot, six firefighters were exposed to some heat that resulted in first degree and minor second degree burns.
Amanda Munsey, one of the Information Officers at the fire, told Wildfire Today that the firefighters were examined by a Division Supervisor who happened to be a former Medical Unit Leader on the Incident Management Team. A helicopter was ordered to transport them to a hospital, Ms. Munsey said, but it was cancelled after it was determined it was not necessary. The six were taken by ground transportation to a hospital in Redding, California. The injuries did not meet the criteria for admittance to a Burn Center, so they were treated and released.
The firefighters will have two or three days off before they resume their duties.
The McFarland Fire is in northwest California on the south side of Highway 36, 5 miles west of Platina, California about an hour and 15 minute drive from Redding. It was one of many fires started from lightning around July 29 and has burned 30,000 acres since then.
The 44,000-acre Monument Fire is 21 miles to the northwest, 20 miles west of Weaverville, and on both sides of Highway 299.
Map of fires in Northwest California. The white lines were the perimeters Aug 7, 2021. The red dots represent heat detected by a satellite at 1:34 p.m. PDT Aug 7, 2021.Satellite photo at 6:51 p.m. PDT Aug 7, 2021. Fires in Northern California, Oregon, and Washington.
