Hawaii officials have released their third and final report on Maui’s deadly Lahaina Fire in 2023, focusing on how each of Hawaii’s counties can prevent a similar tragedy from happening again.
The Fire Safety Research Institute‘s “Lahaina Fire Forward-Looking Report” is phase three of a three-part investigation into the catastrophic wildfire. The group previously released the Lahaina Fire Comprehensive Timeline Report, which presents a chronology of the fire’s events, and the Lahaina Fire Incident Analysis Report, which looked into the systemic causes and response to the fire.
“It is vital to reiterate, as demonstrated throughout this report, that no single factor is, or set of factors are, directly responsible for the tragic outcome,” the Phase Three report said. “The preconditions for these fires have been in the making for decades, stemming from the changing landscape of Maui Nui, more frequent extreme weather events, and the increased frequency of vegetation-fueled fires. It is important to note these same conditions exist across the State of Hawaii, in numerous other locations throughout the United States, and around the globe.”
The report identified 10 priorities for enhancing wildfire readiness throughout the state, the top two of which focused on establishing an Office of the State Fire Marshal and creating an action plan for future wildfire events through working with the Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization. The eight remaining priorities are focused on how the State Fire Marshal can implement said action plan, including:
Wildfire Education Programming
Communication Systems
Utilities Risk Reduction & Planning
Fire Weather
Evacuation
Codes & Standards
Wildfire Response Preparedness
Vegetation & Land Management
The report also breaks down how wildfire readiness can be enhanced at the county level, specifically through risk assessment and data-driven investment. The priorities were reviewed by each county fire chief, according to the researchers.
“This streamlined approach provides a clear roadmap for the counties to initiate progress and take the critical first steps necessary to establish a solid foundation that supports future meaningful improvements,” the researchers said.
Wildfires in regions across North and South America released more emissions in July than any other July in recorded history — specifically in Alberta, California, Bolivia, and the the tropical forest zone of the Amazon River basin — according to the European Union’s Copernicus Atmosphere Monitoring Service (CAMS).
“CAMS estimates emissions from wildfires and vegetation fires around the world based on satellite observations of fire radiative power in its Global Fire Assimilation System (GFAS), combining FRP observations from different satellite sensors to estimate a number of emissions related to wildfires,” according to the Service.
Alberta’s total estimated carbon emissions in July are the highest of any July in the CAMS Global Fire Assimilation System dataset, which has recorded emissions for the past 21 years. Canada as a whole recorded increased emissions through July and is approaching the highest annual totals estimated for any year before 2023, which had by far the highest emissions ever recorded in the country. Fire intensity s in British Columbia and Saskatchewan has also increased throughout July, while more wildfires developed in the Yukon and Northwest Territories in mid-July.
California’s Park Fire, the state’s fourth-largest wildfire on record, made July the most emissions-heavy July on CAMS’ record. Oregon’s emissions are near the highest of July totals after fires burned nearly 500,000 hectares (1,235,527 acres) across the state, which local officials say is four times the seasonal average. Notable fires and emissions in Alaska persisted through late June and early July, but have since greatly reduced. CAMS has also recorded increased wildfire emissions in Washington, Montana, and Colorado.
Wildfires in South America increased in both intensity and frequency through the second half of July. Amazonas’ total estimated emissions in July were much higher than any other recorded year — three times higher than in 2023 and 2022. The neighboring state of Rondonia also recorded the highest in the CAMS dataset.
South America’s highest wildfire activity was in Bolivia and areas of the Brazilian Amazon. Bolivian government officials said a record 11,576 active fires burned in the region on July 24, with 165,999 fires detected since the start of July. Brazilian authorities also estimated this was the worst July in two decades with more than 22,000 active wildfires. Wildfire increases occurred around two weeks earlier than usual during fire season in the region, which historically has peaked in August and September.
Brazil’s above-average emissions are caused in part by wildfires burning across the Pantanal wetlands. The world’s largest tropical wetland and biodiversity haven has marked record-breaking wildfires this year, just four years after similar fires burned 13,300 acres of the preserve.
~ By Chuck Sheley, retired smokejumper (Cave Junction 1959)
and current NSA Smokejumper Magazine editor
As part of our family drove along the Lahaina Bypass Road on July 5, 2023, I mentioned to my son that I had never seen things so dry in the 20+ years that we have been going to Maui. The bypass road ran by Lahaina a quarter mile or so up the hill from that historic town. The area between the town and the bypass was solid grass a couple of feet tall. With the continual downhill winds, I mentioned that this was a disaster waiting to happen. On August 8, it happened. Lahaina was a historic town and a major tourist attraction. Years of history there.
I’ve always wondered about the Hawaiian “Hang Loose” attitude, but their house, their attitude. You can substitute incompetence for Hang Loose in this fire. Let’s look at what happened at Lahaina, where over 100 people died. Could it have been prevented? Were fire and law enforcement caught off guard? Definitely not! They just ignored the inevitable.
Chuck Sheley
The Warning: In 2021 a Maui County commissioned report, County of Maui Report on Wildfire Prevention, was released. A summary: Wild/brush/ forest fires appear to be increasing; wild/brush/ forest fires present a growing threat to Maui County citizens; there are ongoing fire threats to Maui Island: grasses and combustible materials along road rights-of-way; low-hanging, failure, or shorting of above-ground powerlines.
The report included comments on Maui County’s Fire and Safety Response: “Prevention is given short shrift. There is no stated goal of fire prevention or any metric to assess success or improvement in prevention. There is much space devoted to preventing injuries and illness of employees and to preventing equipment failure, but nothing about what can and should be done to prevent fires.”
They were told wildfire is coming. However, they respond with employee concerns. How about the citizens? Sounds like an employee union response.
2014: Michael Walker, Hawaii’s Fire Protection Forester, urged state lawmakers to make a relatively meager financial commitment to boost wildfire preparedness: about $1.5 million. That money would have funded new firebreaks, livestock grazing, and water infrastructure for firefighting. The bill died in committee.
National Weather Service data shows that in the last 17 years, the NWS issued 65 red flag warnings or fire weather watches for the area, including Lahaina.
When the predicted happened: The New York Times published an excellent report, with video, on this disaster from start to finish. “A cascade of failures by officials left thousands trapped and largely fending for themselves.”
Conditions: The NWS forecasted hurricane-force gusts up to 76 mph, with winds accelerating down the slopes leading into Lahaina. Using the NYTimes as a source, we have the following timeline: Shortly after sunrise on August 8, a powerline snapped and started a fire. Firefighters responded and contained the fire. Crew left site at 2:18 p.m. and returned to station. A 911 call at 2:52 p.m. as fire started again. (Fire Dept. did not leave anyone on the fire and did not make sure it was out.) At 3:22 p.m. fire jumped Lahaina Bypass and at 3:51 p.m., a Lahaina resident texted, “We are trapped.” At 4:13 p.m. fire spread across total area. Emergency managers chose not to activate the siren system, fearing people would evacuate TOWARD the fire. (Evacuate uphill toward a fire pushed by 70 mph winds?) 4:16 p.m. officials issued an evacuation alert via cellphones. But by then, the fire had already burned through the evacuation zone — 20 minutes earlier.
By 4:19 p.m. the fire had crossed Front Street. Roads were blocked. At 4:35 p.m. a caller to 911 said, “The roads are closed, I can’t turn out.” Roads blocked by downed powerlines, but Hawaii Electric said that the powerlines had been de-energized for hours. No one told the police who were blocking the escape routes. (No coordination between agencies.) 4:45 p.m. gridlock. Front Street blocked. Firefighters said they were losing water pressure. (Water and hoses against a wildfire pushed by 70 mph winds?) 6:00 p.m. Maui County mayor said he was “happy to report” the opening of the roads that had been blocked.
Honolulu Civil Beat: Maui County has known the town of Lahaina and its neighboring communities were the island’s most at risk for wildfires for years, with alarms being raised at least as far back as 2018. According to the county’s hazard mitigation plan developed in 2020, West Maui had a 90 percent chance of annual wildfires. Lahaina and the area around Maalaea were identified as being of highest concern.
Hawaii News Now: HNN obtained the report as part of an ongoing investigation of the county’s actions before, during, and after the wildfire that leveled Lahaina. Two months after the disaster, which claimed at least 99 lives with six others still unaccounted for, it’s clear that the wildfire threat was well-documented — the result of poor land management, inadequate planning, and drought. Escape routes blocked: As a reader, you can go to youtube and see videos taken by residents trying to escape Lahaina. Cars are backed up on Front Street, side by side and not moving. If the north end of Front Street had not been blocked by law enforcement, cars could have easily moved to safety in the large parking lots at Safeway — or driven farther north to safety. Some people drove around the blockage, but that didn’t help those trapped in line a mile back.
Associated Press (8/23/23): As flames tore through a West Maui neighborhood, car after car of fleeing residents headed for the only paved road out of town in a desperate race for safety. And car after car was turned back toward the rapidly spreading wildfire by a barricade blocking access to Highway 30. During a news conference on Tuesday, Maui Police Chief John Pelletier said, “So the police were blocking roads, the exit, some of the exit roads out. And I’m assuming it’s because there’s been some downed powerlines or some downed trees.”
In another news report: This week, Maui’s police chief explained why barricades were set up. “Downed powerlines, which would kill you if you drove over them,” said MPD Chief John Pelletier. Danger from downed powerlines: We know or should know that downed powerlines present a danger. The rule: Do not exit the vehicle, stay inside. Other references: A powerline is the source (electricity), so the only place it will want to flow is to ground. A vehicle sits atop rubber tires which provide an insulator, so the occupant would be insulated. Since the vehicle does not provide a path to ground, driving over a powerline would not pose a risk for the insulated occupant. (Trained officers and the Fire Chief should know this.)
Common sense is uncommon: We have a situation where a town is engulfed by a 70 mph wind-driven fire. Exit roads are blocked, and cars are jammed and not moving. Even as a law enforcement official, if you did not know that a vehicle could drive safely over downed powerlines, could you see the alternative — being burned to death by a wildfire? People with off-road vehicles ignored the barriers and drove around them to safety. Was there any power in those lines?
“By 6:40 a.m., there was no power to Lahaina or West Maui, according to Darren Pai, a spokesman for Hawaiian Electric.” (Honolulu Civil Beat)
Bottom line: There was plenty of advance warning, some back as far as 2014, that this wildfire would happen. Whoever was at the top of the food chain should have put fire, law enforcement, medical, and Hawaiian Electric into a room and devised a plan to coordinate all these agencies.
After the Camp Fire in Paradise, California, which destroyed a town of 26,000 people in a matter of hours, all of Maui should have been aware of the need to shut down powerlines during high-wind events. Coordination between fire and law enforcement is also at the top of the list. Each seemed to be operating independently of the other in Lahaina. I still cannot understand how law enforcement officers could block escape routes. That is like locking people inside a burning building.
Maui should have had trained wildland firefighters. Anyone thinking that the loss of water pressure was a factor here does not have much knowledge of wildfire. You don’t face down an advancing wildfire pushed by 70 mph winds with a hose. Time spent spraying water on a burning house, surrounded by 30 other burning houses, is a waste of time. Forget the houses and concentrate on evacuating people.
How many eventual victims could have been saved if those roadblocks were removed? After the Camp Fire in Paradise, I’ve championed the establishment of “safe zones” rather than road evacuation. It didn’t work in Paradise, and it didn’t work in Maui. There is a concrete parking garage at the north end of Lahaina. I would bet that 500-600 people could have sheltered in place there. Athletic and play fields at the schools were other possible safe zones. There are many experts in planning and coordinating wildfire efforts. Because the local officials on Maui, with years of advance warning, couldn’t properly prepare for a disaster, bring in some experts from the mainland.
Chuck Sheley (Cave Junction ’59) graduated from Chico State University in 1960. He taught Physical Education for 36 years and coached track and cross country in Chico for 53 years. After two seasons on an engine crew on the Lassen National Forest, he jumped at Cave Junction 1959-66, then out of Fairbanks 1967-1970. Sheley was the organized crew coordinator for the Mendocino National Forest for 19 years, where he recruited and trained 300 new firefighters each year. He finished his fire career with 34 seasons in wildland firefighting, and he’s still coaching and officiating Track & Field and has served as editor of Smokejumper magazine since 1999 — he’s also the vice president of the National Smokejumper Association.
“After landing on runway 17, during the landing roll, the airplane began to veer right of centerline, and the PIC added left rudder correction. A vibration developed and increased as the airplane continued to veer to the right. Despite the PIC’s application of left brake and additional rudder inputs, the airplane continued to veer right, exited the runway, and struck a runway light, taxiway light, and taxiway sign. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the right stub wing bulkhead was substantially damaged. The airplane has been retained for further examination.”
Contrary to the earlier report, there were two pilots onboard, not one. The report doesn’t say whether the U.S. Forest Service was a party to the investigation along with the FAA (Helena office). The NTSB did not show up for the investigation.
First responders showed up within minutes of the first reports to dispatch, on the huge wildfire last summer that nearly destroyed Lahaina, the historic Hawaiian town on the island of Maui. The first emergency calls came in to dispatch at 2:55 p.m. on August 8, according to the new report by the State Attorney General. Firefighters spotted smoke at 2:57 p.m., arrived at the fire at 3:00 p.m., and were joined by law enforcement who said the first building caught fire at 3:05 p.m.
The new report indicated that the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives has a separate investigation underway into the origin and the cause of the fire.
Maui fire progression map
According to the REUTERS report, first responders battled a storm of embers sailing downslope ahead of unusually high winds. The fires destroyed most of Lahaina, the former capital of the Hawaiian kingdom, killing over 100 people.
The Associated Press compiled numerous 911 calls that dispatchers on the island received the next day, and the dispatchers’ answers were the same each time; police and fire responders couldn’t help find missing people because they were still trying to get people to safety, still working hotspots and responding to fires.
The New York Times reported that fatalities from the Maui fires surpassed that of even the 2018 Camp Fire in Paradise, California, and made the Maui fires the deadliest since the Cloquet inferno in Minnesota killed hundreds back in 1918.
The island’s officials were pleading with tourists from the U.S. mainland and elsewhere to cancel vacation plans and spare locals and emergency responders the drain on scarce resources, and later encouraged tourists to come back to the island that depends heavily on visitors and tourism dollars. Hotels and other lodging options on Maui scrambled to shelter evacuees and the suddenly homeless; that struggle on the island is far from over.The state attorney general’s office has more maps online.
Kansas’ recognition as a top fire state has long been overdue.
The state experiences at least 5,000 wildfires annually, which ranks it among the top five states for number of wildfire incidents in the country among the likes of Texas, Oregon, and Montana. Kansas is also a top prescribed burning state in acreage, with well over one million acres burned yearly, according to the Coalition of Prescribed Fire Councils.
Despite this, Kansas is far from the first state many think of when wildfires are mentioned. A large reason for this, according to Kansas Forest Service Interim Fire Management Officer Eric Ward, is that wildfires have been chronically underreported throughout the state.
“The lack of reporting has been identified for years as a problem,” Ward said. “The problem is that, unlike many states, wildfires are nearly 100 percent a local responsibility.”
The Kansas Governor’s Wildfire Task Force final report of 2023 estimated that around 30 percent of the state’s wildfires go unreported annually. Ward attributed the underreporting to two aspects of the state: the lack of federally-owned land and the state’s designation as a “Home Rule” state.
In the nation, Kansas has the third-least amount of federally owned land compared with privately owned land, according to a 2020 Congressional Research Service report. Only 253,919 acres of Kansas’ total 52,510,720 acreage, or 0.5 percent, is federally owned. The only other states with such a low federal land ownership are Connecticut and Iowa, both at 0.3 percent.
Additionally, Kansas has been a Home Rule state since 1961 by constitutional amendment, meaning that local jurisdictions, to an extent, have greater autonomy — and state interference in local affairs is limited. Kansas is also a “Dillon’s Rule” state, meaning that local governments only have powers that are explicitly assigned to them.
Because of this combination, the duty of reporting usually falls to local jurisdictions, some of which fail to file the proper paperwork.
“[Kansas Forest Service] supports local fire departments as requested on major incidents, but as a home rule state, the local jurisdiction is still in charge, and responsible for reporting,” Ward said.
“With the vast majority of departments being small volunteer departments, some simply ignore the state law that requires reporting. And no one at any level of government wants to prosecute a local volunteer fire chief for not doing paperwork. So, many simply never get reported.”
Research suggests Kansas and other wildfire-prone states are projected to have 30 more days per year of extreme wildfire risk in the near future. To meet the current and future wildfire challenges, the state appointed a new State Fire Marshal last November and released a new wildfire risk tool last October. However, until wildfires are accurately reported in the state, Kansas won’t be getting the recognition of a top wildfire state that it deserves.
Kansas’ recognition as a top fire state has long been overdue.
The state experiences at least 5,000 wildfires annually, which ranks it among the top five states for number of wildfire incidents in the country among the likes of Texas, Oregon, and Montana. Kansas is also a top prescribed burning state in acreage, with well over one million acres burned yearly, according to the Coalition of Prescribed Fire Councils.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) has wrapped up its investigation into a hard landing on May 4 of an Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2. A Global News report back in May said the pilot walked away with minor injuries after he made a hard landing at the Edson Airport in western Alberta.
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police said officers were called just after 8 p.m. to the airport, about 180 kilometres west of Edmonton in Yellowhead County. The helicopter was helping fight wildfires; forestry officials also responded to the airport, along with emergency crews. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada was notified and planned to investigate.
The helicopter, registered to Range Helicopters Inc., was approaching the Edson Airport from a firefighting staging area to the east, according to a report by CTV News out of Edmonton.
According to the TSB report, as the helicopter approached from the east, another aircraft was approaching from the west. The pilot decided to change his typical route to the airport and approached from downwind and to the north of the runway. As the pilot neared the airport and reduced speed, he noticed a pair of airtankers at the fire base. Not wanting to overfly them, he slowed down even more, and the helicopter began an uncontrolled descent.
“The pilot applied collective to reduce the rate of descent; however, the rate of descent increased,” the report said. “This scenario is consistent with a vortex ring state (VRS).”
A VRS, sometimes called “settling with power” in the U.S., is a dangerous aerodynamic condition that can occur in helicopter flight when a vortex ring system engulfs the rotor and causes loss of lift. The helicopter hit the ground hard and flipped quickly onto its starboard side.
The pilot, who walked away with just minor injuries, held a commercial license and was up-to-date, including training for VRS.
In the seven days leading up to the incident, he had worked a total of 85.5 duty hours including 46.6 flight hours, but investigators do not believe that fatigue was a factor.
The report highlights the importance of approach planning and power management, especially when approaching a landing site from downwind. “It is critical that helicopter pilots remain aware of and avoid flight conditions that can cause VRS to develop,” it said. “Any potential time saved by attempting a downwind approach must be carefully weighed against the risk that it may represent.”
The U.S. faces a wildfire crisis that costs the federal government $2.5 billion a year — a crisis that a recent report [PDF] concluded the feds can’t face alone.
President Biden’s Bipartisan Infrastructure Law in 2021 created the federal Wildland Fire Mitigation and Management Commission and charged it with recommending improvements to federal agencies’ management of wildfire across the landscape. The commission was tasked with creating new policy recommendations to address the wildfire crisis.
The commission released the culmination of its efforts in September, and it includes numerous proposed changes that forest managers and wildland firefighters have been suggesting for decades. The commission ultimately found that many of these changes are needed soon to adequately reduce the risk of wildfires throughout the U.S.
“The Commission urges Congress to take swift action to advance the holistic solutions needed to reduce the risk of wildfire to the nation,” the report says. “Only through comprehensive action can we hope to prepare for the wildfires of today and, critically, the wildfires of tomorrow.”
The commission listed 148 recommended changes in its report, which focused on eight points:
Shift focus from fire response to pre-fire planning and risk mitigation
Treat the wildfire crisis as a public health crisis
Unify local and federal resources
Improve community and ecosystem resilience in post-fire areas
Increase pay and hiring for wildland firefighters
Update the fire management system with current technology
Significantly increase investments to reduce long-term costs and risks
Enhance work across jurisdictions
“Rather than selecting one or more potential recommendations to carry forward for implementation, the Commission urges audiences of this report to take an ‘all of the above’ approach,” the report says. “There is no single solution to the wildfire crisis; the scale of the issues necessitates solutions that are integrated, comprehensive, and broad in scope. The urgency of this need cannot be overstated.”
Black Mountain Hotshots, September 2012 Mustang Complex, Idaho — Kari Greer photo
A midair collision in Cabazon, California in August involving two on-duty contracted Cal Fire helicopters, one of which crashed and killed the three men on board, was the result of one aircraft colliding with the other in mountainous terrain, with the pilots apparently not aware of where they were in relation to each other.
According to City News Service, the National Transportation Safety Board on Friday released its preliminary report on the August 6 crash that destroyed a Cal Fire Bell 407 helicopter en route to a fire just south of Interstate 10 in the area of Apache Trail and Pipeline Road.
Cal Fire Assistant Chief Josh Bischof, 46, of Menifee, Cal Fire Capt. Timothy D. Rodriguez Jr., 44, of San Jacinto and contract pilot Tony Sousa, 55, of Red Bluff were killed in the accident.
Aviation International News reported that the Sikorsky S-64E Skycrane was descending when the collision occurred. The Bell 407 — a derivative of a LongRanger — was flying in an observer-coordinator role. The two aboard the Siller heavy helicopter were uninjured; they were able to land the Sikorsky and walk away.
Both aircraft were under contract to Cal Fire and were part of the late afternoon initial attack response to the Broadway Fire west of Palm Springs. “The Sikorsky landed nearby without further incident,” reads the report. “The right main landing gear tire was damaged, with an approximate 12-inch portion not located.” (It’s likely that a foot-long piece of the snorkel was missing, not the landing gear.)
Both aircraft had taken off from nearby Hemet, 11 miles southwest of the fire, with the 407 airborne approximately three minutes ahead of the S-64. The two helicopters flew different routes around mountainous terrain toward the fire, and ADS-B data showed both helicopters on a converging flight path until the time of collision west of the fire.
The report said a piece of delaminated main rotor blade marked the beginning of the 407’s debris path, which was about 950 by 550 feet, and that the main rotor blades, mast, and transmission came to rest around 285 feet northwest of the main wreckage, upslope from the initial impact point.
Our sincere condolences to the family and friends of all involved, including the Sikorsky crew.
This information is preliminary and subject to change.
Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report
Location: North Fork, Idaho — Accident Number: CEN22FA331
Date & Time: July 21, 2022, 16:44 — Local Registration: N388RA
Aircraft: Columbia Helicopters CH-47D — Injuries: 2 Fatal
Flight Conducted Under: Public aircraft
FROM THE REPORT: On July 21, 2022, about 1644 mountain daylight time, a Columbia Helicopters CH-47D, N388RA, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near North Fork, Idaho. The pilot and co-pilot were fatally injured. The helicopter was operated as a public use firefighting flight. The operator was contracted by the U.S. Forest Service for the Moose Fire and had relocated the helicopter to the area on July 19, 2022, then began firefighting flights on July 20, 2022.
Figure 1 — Chinook over the Salmon River. Image captured from the video provided by a local resident.
On the day of the accident the pilots had completed about 1.5 flight hours and multiple bucket loads. The helicopter was equipped with a water bucket attached to the helicopter via a 200 ft long line and a belly cargo hook.
A 38-second video of the accident was recorded by a local resident and was provided to the investigation. The video revealed that the helicopter was setting up to dip the water bucket in the Salmon River. The helicopter was facing east and hovered about 250 feet above the river (Figure 1). Generally, the helicopter began a left yaw turn that increased in rotation rate as it descended and impacted the river.
A preliminary assessment of the video revealed that prior to water impact, the rotors were rotating near their rated speed of 225 rpm. Just before water impact, the helicopter counterclockwise yaw rate was 124 degrees/second. The helicopter wreckage was removed from the river via crane and placed on land for an initial examination. After the examination, several components were removed for further examination and testing. The helicopter has been retained for further examination.
VIDEO: FireAviation readers are cautioned that you may or may not want to view the following video. It’s loaded with information, including prelimary accident cause, but it does show the Chinook hitting the river. It’s on youtube at: youtu.be/P0N15ihORHA
crash site on the Salmon, from the report.
The USFS released a brief initial report last summer, and Bill Gabbert reported then that the pilots, the only personnel on board, were Thomas Hayes, 41, of Post Falls, Idaho, and Jared Bird, 36, of Anchorage, Alaska. The helicopter was operated by Anchorage-based ROTAK Helicopter Services. The FAA confirmed then that the registration number of the helicopter was N388RA, one of two CH-47D ships ROTAK had recently purchased from Columbia Helicopters.
Here’s a photo illustrating the terrain — a shot of the Comet Fire that Bill Gabbert took years ago from Highway 93 just east of the Moose Fire, 13 air miles north of Salmon, Idaho. The Salmon River is in the foreground.
VIDEO: FireAviation readers are cautioned that you may or may not want to view the following video. It’s loaded with information, including prelimary accident cause, but it does show the Chinook hitting the river. It’s on youtube at: 
