Wildland fire discussion at NFFF conference

NFFFThe National Fallen Firefighters (NFFF) just concluded a conference they called Tampa 2 this week. It was a followup to the original NFFF Firefighter Life Safety Summit held in Tampa in April of 2004, where the 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives were developed for structural firefighting. The goals of the conference were to continue to work towards firefighter safety, to reaffirm the initiatives, and identify what changes are needed in order to continue the industry’s advances in safety.

Conferences like this usually concentrate on structural firefighter issues, but a panel discussion at least briefly discussed wildland firefighting, according to an article at Firehouse.com. Below is an excerpt:

The Life Safety Initiatives really aren’t relevant to wildland firefighting, and that needs to be changed.

Also, “consistent firefighter medical standards are not being followed by all organizations involved in wildland firefighting resulting in potentially preventable medical emergencies or LODDs.”

Video about 2003 fire tornado in Australia, and the results of the fire behavior research

Lee side slope fire behavior
Lee side slope fire behavior. A wind eddy on the lee slope can push the fire up the slope opposite the prevailing wind direction. At the ridge top, the fire can also move horizontally, 90 degrees off the main wind direction. Screen grab from the video.

In November, 2012 we wrote about some of the research that was conducted to study and document what can only be described as a fire tornado in Australia, a tornado-like event that can be generated by a wildfire. In recent years a new term has been coined — firenado — which seems appropriate.

It occurred near Chapman in the Australian Capitol Territories during the McIntyres Hut Fire January 18, 2003. After studying the event, Rick McRae of the ACT and others discovered that it traveled across 25 kilometers at 30 kph (19 mph), had horizontal winds of 250 kph (149 mph), and vertical winds of 150 kph (93 mph). Damage that occurred to trees and structures is much like what you would see after a tornado in Oklahoma.

Australia’s ABC TV produced an excellent video that goes surprisingly deeply into some of the scientific principles of this phenomenon, including fire behavior when a strong wind pushes a fire up a slope. This can result in spot fires at the bottom of the slope on the other side, the lee slope, which can be pushed rapidly up the lee slope by a wind eddy in the opposite direction of the prevailing wind (see the screen grab above from the video). They also documented how a fire at the top of the ridge can travel across the ridge at 90 degrees to the direction of the prevailing wind.

Knowledge about this kind of fire behavior is something that wildland firefighters should retain in their “slide file”, in the unfortunate event that they find themselves in danger of being entrapped and are considering using the lee side of a ridge as an escape route or a sheltering location.

Check out our November, 2012 article for more information about this 2003 event. The video below illustrates some of the findings developed by the fire researchers.

The information in the video can be even more interesting when considered along with the winds at the site of the Yarnell Hill Fire entrapment, as modeled by WindWizard. The image below is from page 79 of the Yarnell Hill Fire SAIT report. Click the image to see a slightly larger version.

Yarnell Hill Fire, wind vectors modeled using WindWizard

Leader of Yarnell Hill Fire investigation says one firefighter should be able to attack a fire — alone

Yarnell Hill Fire, June 30, 2013
Yarnell Hill Fire, June 30, 2013
Yarnell Hill Fire, June 30, 2013. Photo by Joy Collura.

The leader of the 54-person team that conducted the Serious Accident Investigation Team’s investigation into the Yarnell Hill Fire in Arizona that killed 19 firefighters was quoted as saying that individual firefighters should be able to attack wildfires alone. Florida State Forester Jim Karels’ reasoning seems to be that it is too expensive to send two firefighters to a fire.

Below is an excerpt from an article at WFSU explaining that the Florida state legislature is considering a recommendation from the Florida State Fire Service Association that firefighters should not be sent alone to a fire:

…Florida Forest Service Director Jim Karels says the increased staffing mandate is not necessary because the lowest-risk fires only require one firefighter—and if he sends two to one fire, it’s possible nobody will be available when the next one breaks out.

“Safety-wise, purely, if I can send two firefighters to every fire every time with no other decisions, I’m good with that. But we’ve got to look at it on effectiveness and efficiency too,” he says.

But Rep. Mike Clelland (D-Lake Mary) says his experience as a firefighter makes him question the department’s refusal.

“I just can’t imagine one person responding to a forest fire or a brush fire,” he says. “I spent my whole adult life in the fire service.”

The article also has a 50-second audio recording in which you can hear Mr. Karels actually speaking those words.

This helps to explain how Mr. Karels’ 54-person investigative team came up with their analysis of the fatal Yarnell Hill Fire:

The judgments and decisions of the incident management organizations managing this fire were reasonable. Firefighters performed within their scope of duty, as defined by their respective organizations. The Team found no indication of negligence, reckless actions, or violations of policy or protocol.

Many people, including this writer, disagree with the conclusion reached by Mr. Karels and his team. The article we wrote on February 15 is an example of some, but not all, of the negligence, reckless actions, and violations of policy or protocol that have been documented about the fire, in spite of Mr. Karels’ analysis. Other examples surfaced after the release of the second official report on the fire which was issued by the Arizona Division of Occupational Safety and Health.

Many people, after studying for weeks how 19 firefighters were killed on a fire, would be hyper-aware and sensitive to firefighter safety issues, but not in this case. Florida State Forest Service Director Jim Karels is a danger to firefighters and should get out of the business. We don’t use term idiot often at Wildfire Today, but it is well deserved in this case.

New communication tool enhances incident management and situational awareness

Uses of NICS

At least 255 emergency management agencies in California and a few other areas have been experimenting with and in some cases using a new tool that provides enhanced situational awareness for incident managers. Called Next-Generation Incident Command System (NICS), the developers describe it as “a mobile web-based command and control environment for dynamically escalating incidents from first alarm to extreme-scale that facilitates collaboration across [multiple] levels of preparedness, planning, response, and recovery for all-risk/all-hazard events.” It is a combination of tools, technologies, and an innovative concept of operations for emergency response.

NICS is called “technology for the tired, dirty and hungry — dirt simple to learn and dirt simple to use”. It was conceived, envisioned, and functionally specified by experienced first responders, many from the California emergency response community, and developed by skilled scientists and engineers at MIT Lincoln Laboratory, a government facility on Hanscom Air Force Base in Massachusetts. The software and electronic data are being hosted at the San Diego Supercomputer Center, thanks to a monetary appropriation from the San Diego County Board of Supervisors, but NICS can be hosted anywhere and with a minimum of gear — even on a well equipped laptop.

The development of the project has been funded by the federal Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate, but that source is scheduled to end October 31, 2014. The two people primarily involved in outreach to the emergency response community, and who are working on finding funding for the next 5-year increment, are retired Chief Bob Toups and Dr. Jack Thorpe.

NICS is “technology neutral.” It can be used on computers as well as tablets and hand-held devices. It is compatible with Windows, iOS, Linux, Android, and the web browsers Chrome, Firefox, Safari, and later versions of Internet Explorer.

Uses of NICS
NICS graphic.

Maps can be created by firefighters on scene in a matter of minutes, which are then immediately viewable by anyone who has access to that incident on a computer or hand-held device with internet connectivity. The maps can show an incident perimeter, staging areas, evacuation zones, road blocks, division breaks, and symbology commonly used on incident maps.

The information can be accessed not only by firefighters on site and in command centers, but by law enforcement officials responsible for evacuation and anyone else on a need to know basis.

One of the limitations of the system is that it communicates via the internet. If firefighters in a remote location do not have internet access from their cell phone or computer, or via a satellite connection, they can’t send or receive the information. However, this should not be a problem for higher level managers in offices who also have a need to create and share information about the incident. And, mobile cell sites, commonly called a Cell on Wheels, or COW, are increasingly available and should be deployed automatically to large incidents that have poor cell coverage.

The best way to get a feeling of how the system works and what it can do is to view the very well done 9-minute video which is embedded below. A .pdf presentation document about NICS can be found HERE.

NICS has been in development since 2007 and in 2010 was first utilized by agencies in southern California. Last year it was used on 102 incidents in the state. It was also in use during the 2013 Boston Marathon assisting in managing the event and tracking the 26,000 runners, and continued to be utilized after the bombing.

NICS can display the near real time location of emergency resources using Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL) and/or Position Location Information (PLI) technologies. Tracking can be either cellar or satellite-based. Currently some agencies that use Delorme InReach satellite-based tracking devices can see where their resources and personnel are located. Several other tracking devices are compatible with the system as well. Mr. Toups and Mr. Thorpe told us that if an appropriate software backend was written, other tracking devices could be integrated also. It is possible that the 6,000 tracking devices recently purchased by the U.S. Forest Service could be used within NICS.

NICS incidents in 2013
NICS incidents in California in 2013. NICS graphic. (click to enlarge)

While NICS will not solve every problem a firefighter or other emergency responder has, it can add a significant level of situational awareness for personnel on the sharp end of the spear as well as those in remote offices who have to make decisions related to the incident. One chief put it this way: “We are able to compress the time of developing our situational awareness from 12 hours to 12 minutes.”

Being aware of the near real time location of firefighters is half of what we call the Holy Grail of Firefighter Safety. The other half is knowing the real time location of a wildfire. Some near real time fire mapping is currently being done with NICS in California — if that ever routinely becomes part of NICS and is commonly available nationwide, it will reduce fatalities.

Mr. Toups and Mr. Thorpe call the development of NICS about 20 percent complete. They have plans to continue to make improvements and to add features. Most of the additions will be from the emergency response community: Everyone is encouraged to develop apps that can plug-and-play into the basic NICS architecture, just like other apps developed for smart phones and tablets.

To date NICS is primarily being used by state and local agencies in California. The federal wildland fire agencies are not using the system.

The person that gets credit for choosing the name, Next-Generation Incident Command System, is Jose A. Vazquez, a Special Assistant for First Responder Technologies with the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate — the organization that supplied four years of funding to develop the system.

Our only criticism is that unfortunate choice — the name, Next Generation Incident Command System. It implies that ICS is being thrown out and replaced. But NICS is a communications tool, infrastructure that works within the ICS or the National Incident Command System, and will not replace, but will enhance, ICS. Most products named next-generation, such as the next-generation air tankers, are intended to immediately or eventually replace older versions.

NICS is provided at no cost to all emergency response organizations. It is an open community, open standards, shared project. No vendor has any claim to its intellectual property. It belongs to the community. For more information contact Bob Toups, cdfbob at gmail.com, or Jack Thorpe,  jack at thorpe.net.

Report released on USFS engine rollover in Wyoming

Engine 492, front

The U.S. Forest Service has released a report on the August 8, 2013 rollover of Engine 492 southwest of Newcastle, Wyoming. In August we provided some information from the 72-hour report.

Below is an excerpt from the summary — you can read the entire report HERE.

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“On Thursday, August 8, 2013 Medicine Bow-Routt National Forest and Thunder Basin National Grasslands Engine 492, a 2013 KME Type 4 engine was involved in a rollover accident along Wyoming State Highway 450. The accident occurred around noon, as Engine 492 was responding to the Osage Fire, in mutual aid assistance to Weston County, Wyoming. The accident occurred near mile marker 40, or approximately 10 miles east of the Thunder Basin Work Center.

The engine left the highway, veered slightly to the right side of the road hitting a paved apron to a side gate, with the driver seeking to decelerate and regain control of the engine. The engine returned to the road, with the engine brakes being heavily applied, then redirected back to the highway, which resulted in crossing the center line and going to the opposite road edge. Engine 492 rolled over a few times before coming to rest on its wheels (up-right).

At the time of the accident all three members of Engine 492 were wearing their seatbelts. Use of seatbelts and the integrity of the engine cab are likely the principal reasons for the survivability of this accident. All three crew members were hurt in the accident and the Type 4 engine was a total loss. Two of the crew members were transported by ambulance to Newcastle, Wyoming and the third member was transported by ambulance to the high school practice field in Wright, Wyoming where he was transferred to, and then transported by helicopter to the hospital in Casper, Wyoming. The two crewmembers that were transported to Newcastle, Wyoming were released later the same day. However, the injuries sustained by the third member resulted in a longer stay in Casper and release from the hospital on Saturday, August 10th…”

Engine 492, left side Engine 492, wide

Wildfire briefing, February 6, 2014

Arizona: specialty license plate for honoring wildland firefighters

Arizona firefighter license plate proposal

An effort is underway to create a specialty license plate in Arizona to honor fallen wildland firefighters. The cost of the plates will be $25 with $17 of that going to the Wildland Firefighter Foundation to help support injured firefighters and families of those firefighters we have lost.

There is only one thing holding this effort back — $32,000 has to be raised to get the program started. The group working on this said:

Our nonprofit is set up, Our account is set up, now we need donations to make this possible! We need your help to reach our goal..and our goal is to start a long lasting/revolving fundraiser that will support injured firefighters and families of those that have lost a firefighter! These plates will be to honor the memory of those who have paid the ultimate sacrifice. Soon you will be able to buy these plates and show your support on your vehicles! But first, we need to raise the money to start them!…every amount helps folks!

You can make a donation at youcaring.com, and more information is on Facebook.

Safety Matters, Topic #1

The Safety Matters group has established their first forum topic:

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“HOW CAN 19 FIREFIGHTERS DIE WITHOUT SOMETHING GOING VERY WRONG?

The idea exists that the Granite Mountain Hotshots died because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time, and sometimes bad things happen. We strongly disagree with this assessment of the situation.

In order to get a clearer view of firefighter fatalities due to entrapment and burnover, we examined wildland fires from 1990 through 2013 where journeyman firefighters have died.

We started with an analysis of all firefighter fatalities that were attributed to entrapment and burnover based on statistics from the NIFC website Historical Wildland Firefighter Fatality Reports. We expanded our analysis to determine the common factors on fires that took the lives of experienced firefighters on eight fires with a total of 44 fatalities.

  • Fire Escaped Initial Attack – 100%
  • Type III Incident – 75%
  • Mountainous w/steep drainages – 100%
  • Fire Danger Rating (Extreme or Very High) – 88%
  • Brush a Major Component of Fuel – 100%
  • Experienced an Exceptional Weather Event – 88%

Question for discussion:  If firefighter safety is truly our Number One Priority, then how and why did 44 highly trained and experienced firefighters perish in this manner? (Especially in light of the fact that their actions did not directly result in saving lives or structures).

We will be exploring some of the more specific contributing reasons in the near future. We would now like to hear your thoughts on the question for discussion. Thank you for your participation in Safety Matters!

Safety.Matters@aol.com
Facebook: Safety Matters: A Wildland Firefighter Forum for Change
Twitter: @FFSafetyMatters  ”

The Telegraph writes about the Yarnell Hill Fire

Mick Brown has written a long article for The Telegraph about the tragic fire that killed 19 members of the Granite Mountain Hotshots on June 30, 2013 in Arizona. I have not had a chance to read it yet, but Mr. Brown did quite a bit of research, talking to quite a few people including yours truly.

 

Thanks and a hat tip go out to Hermione, Holly and David

Introducing — Safety Matters: A Wildland Firefighter Forum for Change

A group of people who care about firefighters have been looking at the safety and fatality record of wildland firefighters over the last 20 years. They are convinced that more effective steps can be taken to slow down the accident and fatality rates and will be establishing a forum in which firefighters and others can contribute toward that goal. In the coming months they will be organizing a more formal means for two-way communication with those involved in this effort, but until then, we have been asked to provide this introductory information that they submitted:

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“Introducing:  Safety Matters: A Wildland Firefighter Forum for Change

We are a diverse group of individuals who are passionate advocates for wildland firefighter safety. We seek and encourage participation in this dialog with relevant comments and suggestions from a wide audience including but not limited to:

  • wildland firefighters
  • fire managers and policy makers
  • families and friends who have lost a loved one
  • homeowners in the wildland urban interface

The purpose of this paper and forum is to call attention to deficiencies in wildand firefighter safety presented by current wildland fire management systems.  We encourage firefighters, the public, and their representatives to support and demand changes in policy and practices so that wildland firefighter and public safety is truly the first priority in all fire management actions.

In the coming weeks, following our introductory paper, we will post several specific safety topics for review and discussion. Please direct your interest to our email address below (preferred), or you may leave a reply at the end of this article.

Safety Matters: A Wildland Firefighter Forum for Change

Dan O’Brien: Career Wildland Firefighter: National Park Service: Retired
Elizabeth Anderson: Fire Ecologist:National Park Service & U.S. Forest Service: Retired
Barry Hicks: U.S. Forest Service: Retired
Judy Edwards: Ruby River Consulting
Holly Neill: Wildland Firefighter: National Park Service & U.S. Forest Service: Retired

EMAIL: SafetyMatters  a t  aol . com

correction EMAIL: Safety.Matters a t aol . com

Thank you to Bill Gabbert for hosting this Forum!

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Safety Matters: A Wildland Firefighter Forum for Change

A.  Overview:  The primary aim of wildland fire suppression is to safely suppress wildland fires and protect values at risk. While this objective has remained the same across a century of fire suppression, the wildland fire environment has changed dramatically over the last 30 years. Decades of effective wildland fire suppression has led to a heavy loading of burnable fuels in wildland areas. Shifts in global weather patterns have produced consistently longer and more severe fire seasons. Together, these changes have resulted in historically unique conditions in which high fire frequency, rapid fire growth and extreme fire behavior have become the new norm.

Additionally, values at risk to wildland fire have exponentially increased in number and complexity. Public and political demand for firefighters to effectively protect resources located in the wildland-urban interface- particularly homes- has made structure protection a permanent aspect of wildland fire suppression.

It has been twenty years since fourteen firefighters died on the South Canyon Fire in Colorado.  Subsequent to those fatalities, there have been positive changes made to improve firefighter safety.  In spite of those developments, the total number of firefighter fatalities has steadily increased.  In 2013, 34 wildland firefighters perished, 19 of which were members of the Granite Mountain Hotshot Crew on the Yarnell Hill Fire. In spite of these tremendous losses, to our knowledge, no action toward the improvement of firefighter safety has been initiated or scheduled by any governing wildland fire management agency.

The continued annual occurrence of firefighter fatalities suggests that existing fire suppression practices routinely fail to adequately prioritize firefighter safety over the protection of values at risk.

Improvements to firefighter safety should come from field experience, review of existing data, and research.  The fire organization has never developed a comprehensive plan or process for determining trends, needs, strengths or deficiencies concerning firefighter safety.  This need is partially being filled by independent parties and individuals.

B.  National Wildland Firefighter Policy and Guidance:  Policy regarding the prioritization of firefighter safety is established by the Department of Agriculture, Department of Interior and the National Association of State Foresters.  This policy was adopted in 1995 and, while later modified, still reads:

“Firefighter and public safety is the first priority in every fire management activity.”

The National Wildfire Coordination Group chartered the Federal Fire and Aviation Safety Team (FFAST) to help coordinate firefighter safety issues.  This team states:

“The goal of the fire safety program is to provide direction and guidance for safe and effective management in all activities. Safety is the responsibility of everyone assigned to wildland fire, and must be practiced at all operational levels from the national fire director, state/regional director, and unit manger, to employees in the field. Firefighter and public safety always takes precedence over property and resource loss.”

C. Current Wildland Fire Situation:  Vegetation and weather conditions have significantly changed over the last three decades to produce historically extreme fire behavior, growth potential and fire frequency.  The current wildland fire situation can be attributed to significant changes in three variables:

1.  Following a century of aggressive fire suppression, the amount of burnable vegetation has dramatically increased in wildland areas.

2.  The wildland-urban interface has become increasingly populated by private residences and other values at risk.  The increase in residential homes in these areas is accompanied by increasing public and political demand that firefighters protect these structures from wildfire.  Efforts to defend homes and communities through hazard fuel reduction programs have not kept pace with the increasing threat.  Funding cuts for hazard fuels reduction projects have compounded this trend.

3.  There has been a continued and significant change in weather patterns across the US that is characterized by record high average temperatures, low average humidities, droughts, and longer fire seasons.

These three factors have synergistically combined to produce fire behavior and rates of spread that many veteran firefighters have never before experienced.  Firefighters operating under rapidly deteriorating conditions have found they can quickly become at higher risk than the structures they are attempting to protect.  The expectation and pressure to succeed imposed by firefighters themselves, their supervisors, the fire organization, and the public, further clouds this issue of firefighter safety being the first priority.  These situations have repeatedly occurred over the last 20 years and on multiple occasions have resulted in firefighter fatalities.

D.  Common Factors in Wildland Fire Burnover and Entrapment Fatalities:  A recent independent study showed that four critical factors can jeopardize firefighter safety.  As these independent factors intersect, firefighter safety is increasingly compromised.

1.  A recent independent study showed that entrapment fatalities almost entirely occurred on low management complexity fires that escaped initial attack and  were rapidly expanding in size and complexity.

2.  Rapid and unforeseen changes of weather variables (particularly changes in wind direction and speed) under conditions of extreme fire danger resulted in unanticipated, explosive fire growth.  Accelerated fire expansion and extreme fire behavior quickly rendered existing strategies and tactics to be ineffective and/or unsafe. As time frames for evaluation and decision-making became compressed, key incident personnel found themselves functioning at an incident complexity level that exceeded their abilities and qualifications.

3.   Land managers with jurisdictional responsibility often failed to provide timely and clear management direction and priorities to fireline personnel.  This was especially true during times when conditions and situations were rapidly worsening.

4.  Structures threatened by wildfire may often require the presence of firefighters. Firefighters can be subject to intense external and internal expectations pressures concerning structure protection.  These factors alone can make it extremely difficult to objectively prioritize firefighter safety. Recent independent studies strongly suggest that decisions made under these circumstances have been a major factor in incidents that resulted in firefighter fatalities.

E.  Conclusion:  For 20 years federal policy has identified firefighter and public safety as the first priority of all wildland fire management actions. Despite this policy and efforts made to implement it, records for the same period demonstrate that fatality rates for burnovers and entrapments have remained relatively constant.  During this same time period, the fire organization has not identified all of the critical factors that contribute to firefighter fatalities. Without this understanding, it is improbable that needed changes will be made.  In order to effectively reduce future wildland firefighter fatalities, a comprehensive and impartial review of all current wildland fire management procedures and practices must be completed.”

Some Montana firefighters no longer obligated to save homes from wildfires

Structure fire in Hot Springs, SD.
Structure fire in Hot Springs, SD. Photo by Bill Gabbert.

The County Commissioners of Lewis and Clark County in Montana recently approved a resolution making it clear that county-level firefighters are not under an obligation to protect a home from a wildfire in the Wildland Urban Interface (WUI). Below is an excerpt from an article in the Missoulian:

“…A lot of crews think they have to protect homes, and we’re trying to make it clear they’re just sticks and bricks,” said Sonny Stiger, who helped write the resolution. “This lets our firefighters know they’re not obligated to put their lives on the line to save homes.”

Stiger, a retired fire and fuels specialist with the U.S. Forest Service and a board member with FireSafe Montana, said building defensible space around homes in the urban interface is the sole responsibility of property owners who choose to live there.

Stiger said the new resolution makes it clear that homeowners should not expect firefighters to put their lives at risk to defend property.

“We can save a lot of homes going back in after the fire front passes, or in the case of the Yarnell Hill fire, not going in at all,” Stiger said, referring to the Arizona blaze that killed 19 firefighters in June. “It’s time we stepped up at the county level to deal with this, and to let (firefighters) know they’re not obligated to protect homes…”

The resolution says in part:

Homes in the Wildland/Urban Interface will not dictate fire suppression tactics, strategies, or the location of fire lines.

The article claims this is a “first-of-its-kind resolution”, which may be the case. There is no doubt that some homeowners who moved into the WUI and refuse to cut or thin the trees and brush growing within 100 feet of their houses will be furious at this concept. Some of them take no responsibility as a property owner to make their homes fire-safe, but expect firefighters, many of them volunteers, to risk their lives to save their structures.

Placing the primary responsibility to protect a home from wildfire on the property owner, where it belongs, is very appropriate. County, city, and state regulations recognizing this do not exist in many areas..

On the Yarnell Hill Fire there was at least one person in a supervisory role who asked the Granite Mountain Hotshots to move from their safe, previously burned area, over to the the town of Yarnell in order to protect the structures, many of which were described later as not defendable due to brush and trees very close to the buildings. Some of the homeowners had done little or nothing to make their homes fire-safe. As the crew hiked through unburned brush toward the town, they were overrun by the fire and killed.

In the structural firefighting world you will sometimes hear opinions about risk-taking while fighting fire, including:

  • Risk a lot to save a lot.
  • Risk a little to save a little.
  • Risk nothing to save nothing.

“Risk a lot” usually refers to rescuing occupants or preventing their death. “Save nothing” may apply to an abandoned building.

In wildland fire, vegetation could be in the “nothing” category. Sure, wildland fuels may have ecological, watershed, aesthetic value, or monetary value in the case of timber or pasture, but most vegetation has adapted or evolved to burn on a regular basis and will usually grow back. Houses grow back too, but firefighters don’t. Firefighters should never risk much to save acres OR houses.

Lessons Learned Review: Rhabdomyolysis leading to heat stroke

Heat stroke and rhabdo
PT run trail
Trail on which the PT run was conducted. NPS photo.

A Lessons Learned Review (LLR) for an unusual but severe injury has been released. A firefighter working for the National Park Service at Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks in California developed rhabdomyolysis (rhabdo) during his first week of work this season, probably after his first day which included very strenuous physical training. Then four days later, on June 27, 2013, he suffered from heat stroke during a training run. Recent research indicates that muscle damaging exercises can increase heat strain during subsequent exercise.

The firefighter was treated by NPS medics at the scene and then transported by a California Highway Patrol helicopter with a paramedic on board. He arrived at a Level I trauma center within one hour and thirty three minutes of his collapse while running. The doctor at the hospital told his parents that he was “…a profoundly sick young man, who may not make it.” He was hospitalized for two weeks and underwent kidney dialysis three times a week for seven weeks; reduced to once a week at the time the report was written, and was projected to make a full recovery. He hopes to return to light duty work, but cannot do so until he is finished with kidney dialysis treatments.

An excerpt from the report:

The LLR Team would like to commend the EMS responders, both from the NPS and the CHP, for their quick- thinking and actions. The LLR Team is certain that if these employees had not done so, [the firefighter’s] injury would have proved fatal.

The report, written by a four-person team that included an Exercise Physiologist with a PH.D., is very well written. It includes numerous recommendations for sustaining good practices as well as suggestions for improving the handling of rhambdo and other serious injuries, both locally and nationally.

All firefighters should read this Lessons Learned Review.

Heat stroke and rhabdoMore information and heat illness and its prevention.

Other articles at Wildfire Today about rhabdomyolysis.