The fire is in Yolo and Colusa Counties near Rumsey
3-D map of the estimated perimeter of the Sand Fire, looking north. Perimeter data from CAL FIRE at 9:56 p.m. PDT June 8, 2019 and heat detected by a satellite at 3:12 a.m. PDT June 9, 2019. Map by Wildfire Today. Click to enlarge.
(UPDATED at 3:54 p.m. PDT June 9, 2019)
At 3:50 p.m. PDT Air Attack estimated that the Sand Fire had burned approximately 2,220 acres. He said the spread had been stopped except for an area encompassing 500 acres. Some of the smaller air tankers, the S-2s, were released so they could be ready for initial attack on new fires, and a few of the larger ones are being told after dropping retardant to return to their reload base to “load and hold”.
The Lake Berryessa camera that had been pointed at the fire for the previous 24 hours and captured the photos below, apparently got bored with the decreased activity on the Sand Fire. When we checked at 4 p.m. it was pointed in a different direction where no smoke or fire was visible. Back to its regular job of detecting new fires, apparently.
(Originally published at 12:15 p.m. PDT June 9, 2019)
The Sand Fire reported at 2:50 p.m. on June 8 had burned approximately 1,800 acres as of Sunday morning. It started near the Colusa/Yolo county line and spread southwest along both sides of County Road 41 (Sand Creek Road) crossing Highway 16 northwest of Rumsey.
Most of the fire is in Yolo County 13 miles west of Interstate 5 and 19 miles east of the town of Clearlake. It is 4 miles east of Lake County, which has seen numerous very large wildfires over the last several years.
Evacuations have been ordered for all residents on County Road 41. The evacuation Center is the Esparto Boy Scout Cabin at 16980 Yolo Avenue. (evacuation map)
At about 9 a.m. Sunday Air Attack began requesting air support and by 9:54 a.m. bumped the order up to a total of three large air tankers and two S-2 fixed wing air tankers. However, the availability of all of those aircraft proved to be challenging. At least three Type 1 helicopters are also being used on the fire.
The photos below were taken Saturday afternoon and Sunday morning.
Photo of the Sand Fire at 5:07 p.m. PDT June 8, 2019. PG&E camera at Lake Berryessa.Photo of the Sand Fire at 9:30 a.m. PDT June 9, 2019. PG&E camera at Lake Berryessa.Map of the estimated perimeter of the Sand Fire. Data from 9:56 p.m. PDT June 8, 2019. By CAL FIRE.
Bald Mountain and Pole Creek Fires south of Provo in 2018
Pole Creek-Bald Mountain Fires. Photo from the report.
The Bald Mountain and Pole Creek Fires started last year on August 24 and September 6 respectively about 15 miles south of Provo, Utah in the Uinta-Wasatch-Cache National Forest. Both fires were initially managed in a less than full suppression mode — allowed to spread within lines drawn on a map. Rainfall amounts ranging from 1.3″ to 2.3″ on August 25 put a damper on the fire activity, but within days the Energy Release Component had returned to the 90+ percentile range. Meanwhile the area had been classified as in Severe Drought by the Drought Monitor.
The weather changed on September 10, bringing strong winds and a series of Red Flag Warnings causing the two fires to burn together. The final size was 120,851 acres.
Map of the Pole Creek – Bald Mountain Fire. Wildfire Today
The Bald Mountain Fire caused mandatory evacuation of two cities: Elk Ridge and Woodland Hills. The Pole Creek Fire triggered mandatory evacuations for the Covered Bridge Community of the Spanish Fork Canyon along with the Diamond Fork Canyon and the Right Fork Hobble Creek Canyon areas.
Late afternoon on August 24, the District Ranger wrote a Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) decision for the Bald Mountain Fire, which was then at 0.1 acre in size. This decision was published on August 27 at 1018 hours. Based on map estimates, the planning area boundary was 3,280 acres.
The relative risk was determined to be low, as were the probability of a significant event or extreme fire conditions. A Type 4 organization was determined as appropriate for staffing. The course of action recorded in WFDSS was to: “Allow fire to burn to north, northeast and east. However, consider and allow suppression actions on the southwest and southern boundaries to prevent fire from reaching private lands and minimizing the need to close the Mona Pole Road. Fire behavior may dictate a different outcome, but where management of the fire through suppression or other tactics allow for steering the fire in the right direction, implement those.”
[…]
Fire managers assessed the opportunity to take advantage of this fire to meet restoration objectives by taking into account such factors as: a lack of values at risk (campgrounds, private inholdings, power lines, etc.), the composition of the surrounding vegetation, time of year, remote location, recent precipitation, and potential hazards (standing dead trees, steep terrain, and loose rocks). They expected the fire to go out by itself like other recent fires on the Forest.
“We put the Bald Mountain Fire into monitor status due to issues with snags and associated safety concerns, but also because it was Wilderness where fire is OK as a natural process,” said the Zone Assistant Fire Management Officer/Duty Officer (ZAFMO/DO). “But firefighter safety was the primary driver for our decision.”
[…]
September 10
Shortly after 1400 hours, ICT4 called Dispatch, informing them that the winds had increased and the fire had aligned with the south fork of the drainage and was making a run. He requested that they order a Type 2 Incident Management Team (IMT) and multiple aviation resources. ICT4 was new to the Region but came from a high complexity forest with a heavy fire load. Where he was from, an order for a Type 2 Team and significant aviation resources would have been automatic.
Meanwhile, ZFMO had just left the fire an hour before, when it was still 25 acres. “When I hit the bottom of Nebo Loop [Road] I could hear clearly a Type 2 Team being ordered from the fire,” said ZFMO/DO, a long-time UWF employee who had also been a hotshot superintendent on a northern Utah crew. He thought, “We need to ‘pump the brakes’ on the team order.” He told ICT4, (also a qualified ICT3) to hold on until he could get a look at the fire.
At the time ICT4 was calling for a Type 2 Team, the Forest DO and Forest FMO were briefing the Forest Supervisor. Not knowing the details of the rapidly evolving situation and thinking the fire was approximately 75 acres, the Forest Supervisor asked the Forest DO to put a hold on the aircraft and Type 2 IMT. After the Forest Supervisor’s review of WFDSS, it didn’t make sense to take such aggressive suppression action. The fire was well within the planning area, meeting objectives, and not close to threatening values at risk (see Figure 13). Parts of the order for aircraft went through, however, and shortly thereafter a Type 1 Helicopter and some “Fire Bosses” (water-scooping single-engine air tankers) were on scene.
[…]
September 13
[…] At 0836, the Forest Supervisor canceled the Type 2 IMT and ordered a Type 1 IMT to assume command for both the Pole Creek and the Bald Mountain Fires. At 1030, ZFMO flew the fires with ICT3 and ICT3t. The flight was rough due to unstable air and high winds. Both fires were actively burning and had already formed columns. They witnessed extreme fire behavior along the Highway 89 corridor with ongoing firefighting efforts. ICT3 noted that the Pole Creek Fire would likely impact Highway 6. ZFMO contacted Forest DO and recommended that the Forest Supervisor order a second Type 1 Team for just the Bald Mountain Fire due to fire behavior, values at risk, and the complexities of both fires.
September 13: Bald Mountain IC Transitions
At approximately 0500, a local Fire Chief arrived on scene and tied-in with Bald Mountain IC. The Chief ordered three engines from his department. All resources on the Bald Mountain Fire were now engaged in evacuations.
[…]
The WFDSS for Pole Creek published on September 13 included these courses of action:
Only commit firefighters under conditions where firefighters can actually succeed in protecting identified values at risk.
Utilize direct and indirect tactics to fully suppress the fire. This action will take into account: first, risk and exposure to firefighters and the public; and second, the protection of identified values such as utility corridors and infrastructure, private structures, the railroad corridor, and the Highway 6 corridor.
The WFDSS for Bald Mountain published on September 13 included the previous courses of action for Pole Creek and added:
Assign a Public Information Officer in order to disseminate timely information to the public, partners, and cooperators, including local government and law enforcement. All closures and evacuations will be coordinated with the Utah County Sheriffs’ Office.
Agency Administrator approval is required prior to any mechanized tool use within the Nebo Wilderness Area. Outside the Wilderness, the full range of tools and tactics are authorized. Work with READ [Resource Advisor] to mitigate impacts and assess rehab needs
[…]
Lessons Learned by Participants of the Incidents
Preparedness
Reading the 7-10 day outlook along with the spot weather forecasts can assist in gaining a better long-term perspective, which may lead to making different decisions in long-term events.
Using the 10 risk questions in WFDSS can open our thinking to options we may not have considered. These questions could encourage us to more carefully consider a wider array of possible outcomes from the decisions we make.
Fire modelers and weather forecasters are able to make better predictions with accurate and timely field observations.
Collaboration with predictive services early in an incident around long-term outlooks may help fire decision-makers. They are constantly producing tools to help firefighters in the field.
“Normalization of deviance2” (also referred to as “practical drift”) led us to not consider the worst-case scenario. Without planning for the worst-case scenario, we are constantly behind the power curve.
Operations
Nighttime fire behavior surprised us, especially this late in the season. This experience showed that high winds can override cooler temperatures and still create extreme fire behavior late in the fire season.
Understanding the capability and capacity of your resources is critical to ensuring the probability of keeping your resources safe.
As a precaution PG&E will shut off electricity to at least 1,600 customers Saturday
Red Flag Warning June 8 and 9 in Northern California.
Strong winds, low humidities, and well above average temperatures have resulted in a Red Flag Warning being issued for parts of Northern California until 5 p.m. Sunday.
The forecast for the central valley in Northern California calls for north winds of 15 to 30 mph gusting at 35 to 45, with 10 to 20 percent humidity.
The North Bay Hills above 1,000 feet should experience 15 to 25 mph northeast winds gusting at 40 to 50, with 12 to 22 percent humidity.
In order to prevent their power lines from starting wildfires during the wind event, Pacific Gas and Electric said they will shut off power to at least 1,600 customers Saturday.
From USA Today:
The utility announced Friday night that as of Saturday morning it will turn off electricity to customers in Napa, Solano and Yolo counties west of Sacramento.
The utility said it also will monitor conditions in parts of the Sierra foothills Saturday night through Sunday when they will be at peak fire risk. The company said it could decide to cut power to 30,000 customers in Butte, Yuba, Nevada, El Dorado and Placer counties.That includes portions of Paradise, where a wildfire wiped out nearly 15,000 homes last year.
A firefighter on the Squires Fire in Pender County, North Carolina. NCFS photo.
From the North Carolina Forest Service:
Mop-up efforts on the Squires Timber Fire in Pender County concluded this week and it’s now in monitor status. NCFS rangers are keeping an eye on this to make sure it stays out. About three acres of the wildfire were in a Carolina bay with heavy organic soils which made for challenging control as the fire burned as much as two feet deep. The 8-acre wildfire began April 29 but flared back up after long, hot, and dry days. The initial cause was an escaped debris burn.
A firefighter works on the Squires Fire in Pender County, North Carolina while wearing wildland firefighter personal protective equipment. NCFS photo.A dozer puts in a fireline on the Squires Fire in Pender County, North Carolina. NCFS photo.
Map showing heat detected on the Ranch and River Fires at 3:31 a.m. PDT July 28, 2018, about 15 hours after they started. Click to enlarge.
Investigators for the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, CAL FIRE, determined that the Ranch Fire that started east of Ukiah, California July 27, 2018 began when a man used a hammer to drive a 24-inch metal stake into the ground.
An hour after the Ranch Fire began during Red Flag Warning conditions, the River Fire started about 13 miles to the south, west of Clear Lake. The two fires were later managed as the Mendocino Complex, named after the county in which they started. The Ranch Fire consumed 410,203 acres and damaged or destroyed 280 structures.
The investigators talked with a property owner who explained that he was installing a shade cover over a water tank when he agitated an underground yellow jacket’s nest. Being allergic to bees, he retreated until after they stopped swarming, then using a claw hammer he drove the metal stake 10 to 12 inches into the ground to plug the hole. He smelled smoke and saw a fire that was about two feet by two feet. His efforts to put it out with a shovel and two different water lines were not successful.
While he was riding his four-wheeler to try to get out ahead of the fire, the vehicle rolled downhill, lodging itself between the water tank and a cut bank.
The investigator said that at the time of the interview the man appeared to be suffering from smoke inhalation and heat exhaustion but he refused an ambulance and medical treatment.
The recently released investigator’s report was written March 28, 2019.
The red line on the map was the perimeter of the Ranch Fire at 9:15 p.m. PDT August 26, 2016, a month after the fires started. The white line was the perimeter on August 14. The red and yellow dots represent heat detected by a satellite in the 24 hour period ending at 2:31 a.m. PDT August 27, 2018. Click to enlarge.
Hearing about technology for wildland fire, before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee June 5, 2019.
This week the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee held a hearing in Washington about new technologies that can aid wildland firefighters. The Committee invited companies to describe new systems that can help firefighters communicate and improve their situational awareness. Legislation signed by the President in March requires the federal land management agencies to adopt within 6 to 24 months systems that can track in real time both the advancing edge of a wildfire and all of the firefighting resources working on the incident. Firefighters have been killed when these important facts about a dangerous fire were not known, due to smoke, darkness, or terrain.
In the video below we see interviews with the representatives of six companies describing their systems that may improve the situational awareness of firefighters.
Only three of the 20 Senators that are members of the committee attended the hearing, Cory Gardner (CO), Maria Cantwell (WA), and Martin Heinrich (NM). Approximately 20 Senators sent one or more members of their staff to observe.
In addition to the six companies that appear in the video, other organizations that had exhibits and made presentations in the hearing were the National Weather Service, Rave Mobile Safety, Vulcan Fire, and Simtable.
