Associated Press reporter Jeff Barnard has written a number of articles about wildland fire, as you can see in the results of a Google search for his name and “fire”.
With him not being a newby on the subject it was surprising to see what he wrote near the bottom of an article about the “old Coast Guard planes” the U.S. Forest Service will be using as air tankers.
Just how effective air tankers are in stopping the spread of wildfires in the West remains a matter of belief rather than fact. In 2013, the U.S. Government Accountability Office noted that there is no scientific data to support air tanker use.
He is saying it is not factually true that air tankers are effective in “stopping the spread of wildfires”.
There is no doubt that in certain weather, fuels, and topography conditions air tankers are of no value, except to CNN and other video vendors. However, many firefighters will say it is a FACT that when burning conditions are not extreme air tankers can often, but not always, slow the spread of a fire enough to allow firefighters on the ground the time to move in and stop the spread.
Air tankers certainly can’t “stop the spread” of all “wildfires in the west”, but under the right conditions, they can effectively slow the spread, which with adequate followup from ground firefighters can result in stopping a fire from spreading.
As we have said before, an aggressive initial attack on new fires with overwhelming force within the first 10 to 30 minutes, with resources from both the ground and the air, can reduce the number of fires that become megafires, potentially saving tens of millions of dollars.
The headline of Mr. Barnard’s article is, “Forest Service will use old Coast Guard planes to fight fire”.
In the video above the Martin Mars makes a demonstration water drop in Coal Harbor in Vancouver on Forestry Day during the Olympics in 2010. If you like the sound of four 18-cylinder big-ass radial engines, turn up the sound.
(UPDATED at 9:33 p.m. MT, July 6, 2015)
Britt Coulson told us Monday evening that their company already has a Call When Needed contract for the Martin Mars with the British Columbia Wildfire Service but the aircraft has not been activated yet. The Coulson Group told the agency that if they activated it by the end of the day on Monday the Martin Mars could be serviceable and fighting fires on Thursday. As of 6:11 p.m. MT, the Coulsons had not heard from BCWS.
Mr. Coulson also said the wildfire on Sproat Lake is close to their Martin Mars facilities:
We can sit on our dock [on Sproat Lake] and watch the action its so close to our house, this is the first time in our history we have ever fought fire locally.
We have an S61 [large Type 1 helicopter] on it. The Mars base is just down the lake and you can sit in the airplane and watch the fire. It’s so smoky in the valley no traditional airtankers could get in but because the Mars scoops and is all low level it would have made a huge difference.
A great deal of misinformation about contracts and the B.C. government using or not using the Martin Mars is floating around in the mainstream media as well as the social media.
****
(Originally published at 7 p.m. MT, July 6, 2015)
Several media outlets are reporting that the British Columbia government has talked with the Coulson Group about the possibility of using the Martin Mars air tanker on fires currently burning in the province. One fire is in Sproat Lake Provincial Park a short distance from the aircraft’s base on Sproat Island.
Below is an excerpt from an article in the VanCityBuzz on July 6:
…“We provided the information to them, and that’s where it’s at,” [Wayne Coulson] said. “We’re watering the Mars tomorrow morning and we’re going to start test flying it.”
While there are more cost-effective options available, in the right circumstances, it can now be called on to supplement the airtanker fleet.
The pilots who are test flying it will be the ones who would conduct the operation if the provincial government decides to use the aircrafts. Coulson said the earliest it could be deployed would either be Wednesday or Thursday.
The Martin Mars can scoop up to 7,200 gallons of water and then mix it internally with Class A foam or gel concentrates. The aircraft is not amphibious and must always land on water. It was built in the 1940s and after its service in the U.S. Navy worked as an air tanker in Canada for several decades. The U.S. Forest Service had it on a call when needed contract in 2008 and 2009 and occasionally based it at Lake Elsinore in southern California and Lake Shasta in the north part of the state.
We reported on May 24 that Britton Coulson of The Coulson Group said their company will be using the Martin Mars to train 14 test pilots from China during two weeks in late July who will be the first to fly the new TA-600 amphibious aircraft being built now. The training will include ground, water taxi, flight, as well as scooping and dropping water. The trainee pilots will go through classroom and hands on training using Coulson’s Hawaii Martin Mars aircraft, actually taxiing and flying the huge flying boat.
USFS photo from the report on the escaped prescribed fire, the Pautre Fire, in North Dakota and South Dakota.
The Associated Press is reporting that the Department of Agriculture, in a letter signed by Department Secretary Tom Vilsack, is denying $50 million in claims filed by sixteen ranchers and landowners over a prescribed fire that escaped and burned 10,679 acres in North Dakota and South Dakota.
The “Pasture 3B” prescribed fire was planned to be 210 acres on the Dakota Prairie National Grasslands, but strong winds on April 3, 2013 caused by the predicted passage of a cold front pushed the fire across a mowed fire line into tall grass and ultimately burned 10,679 acres, (3,519 acres federal and 7,160 acres private). The wildfire, named Pautre Fire, was stopped at 11 p.m. that night.
In explaining the denial, Secretary Vilsack said the Forest Service relied on forecasts from the National Weather Service in Rapid City, South Dakota, that ultimately proved inaccurate.
In February, 2014 the US Forest Service released a report about the fire, called a “Facilitated Learning Analysis. The issues listed by the document included:
Improved weather forecasts are needed.
Consider additional research on methods to predict effects of drought on fire behavior in grass fuel models.
The nearest remote automated weather station (RAWS) is more than 90 miles away.
The project was conducted at the critical edge of the prescription.
Consider gaming out worst case scenario “what ifs” during the planning process, and discuss with participants during the on-site briefing.
There were problems with radio communications [note from Bill: I don’t remember EVER seeing a report like this that did not cite radio communications as being an issue].
Two drones temporarily halted air tanker operations Thursday on the Sterling Fire burning in the foothills north of San Bernardino, California, but operations soon resumed. The first drone was interfering with fire operations and that pilot has not been found. Another drone was reported by a concerned citizen and it was located. After reviewing the footage from the second aircraft it was determined that it was not interfering with fire operations.
The Sterling Fire. which has burned 100 acres north of San Bernardino, was reported about 6:30 p.m., on June 25. It spread north from the end of Sterling Avenue in San Bernardino into the San Bernardino National Forest. The cause of the fire is under investigation.
On June 24 a hobby drone flown over the Lake Fire east of San Bernardino, California caused a safety problem, requiring all firefighting aircraft to be grounded, according to CAL FIRE Public Information Officer Daniel Berlant. There has been no report that the pilot has been identified. The LA Times also has an article about that incident.
A scene from the movie Minority Report, starring Tom Cruise
Researchers at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, which is affiliated with the Department of Homeland Security, must have seen the movie Minority Report many times. The video below which been around for a couple of years teases how the lab is developing future work environments for the emergency management community called Precision Information Environments (or PIEs). PIEs will hopefully provide tailored access to information and decision support capabilities in a system that supports the multiple user roles, contexts, and phases of emergency management, planning, and response.
Do you think the windshield of a fire vehicle will ever be able to instantly transform into a huge computer monitor?
Homes were threatened by the Whoopup Fire east of Newcastle, Wyoming, July 18, 2011. Photo by Bill Gabbert.
From CoreLogic:
Nearly 900,000 single-family homes across 13 states in the western U.S. are currently designated at “High” or “Very High” risk for wildfire damage, representing a combined total reconstruction value estimated at more than $237 billion. Of the total homes identified, just over 192,000 homes fall into the “Very High Risk” category alone, with total reconstruction cost valued at more than $49.6 billion.
The CoreLogic Wildfire Risk analysis designates risk levels as “Very High,” “High,” “Moderate” and “Low.” Two additional categories, “Urban” and “Agriculture” indicate homes at even lower risk. Homes designated as “Urban” are located in areas with a dense concentration of buildings and infrastructure to such an extent that little natural vegetation exists to support a wildfire. Homes designated as “Agriculture” are located in areas comprised of row crops, orchards/vineyards or other specific land use that is typically irrigated. Even if it is not irrigated, the crops are nourished and healthy with no ground litter present, and therefore, the vegetation is unlikely to support or enhance a wildfire.
The analysis also assigns a numeric risk score to each property, ranging from 1 to 100. This separate score indicates the level of susceptibility to wildfire, as well as the risk associated with the property being located in close proximity to another high-risk property or area. The score designation is important since wildfire can easily expand to adjacent properties and cause significant damage even if that property was not originally considered high risk. When expanding the analysis to include the numeric score, more than 1.1 million homes fall under the highest Wildfire Risk Score segment (81-100), representing a combined potential reconstruction value of more than $268.5 billion
Total U.S. Properties at Risk and Reconstruction Values by Risk Category
Wildfire Risk Level
Total Properties
Reconstruction Cost
Very High
192,242
$49,608,484,867
High
704,860
$187,661,388,760
Moderate
1,351,313
$292,811,373,342
Low
1,378,104
$334,120,053,463
Agriculture
993,580
$244,167,729,666
Urban
23,778,799
$6,094,873,170,789
Total:
28,398,898
$7,203,242,200,887
Total U.S. Properties at Risk and Reconstruction Values by Numeric Risk Score
(1-100)
Total Properties
Reconstruction Cost
81-100
1,101,131
$268,549,008,333
61-80
1,193,814
$338,395,410,748
51-60
487,013
$131,081,392,801
1-50
25,616,940
$6,465,216,389,005
Total:
28,398,898
$7,203,242,200,887
The states most commonly associated with wildfires also contain the most properties at risk – California, Colorado and Texas have the largest number of residential properties categorized as “Very High Risk,” with a combined reconstruction value exceeding $36 billion. Including homes located in the “High Risk” category, the reconstruction value is more than $188 billion for these three states. When analyzed by risk score, 816,515 homes with reconstruction costs valued at more than $206.5 billion fall into the highest risk segment of 81-100.
Limiting the evaluation to property-level risk strictly in the “Very High” category, California tops the list of states analyzed with a total of 50,905 homes falling into that group. Comparatively, when assigning the Wildfire Risk Score, Texas takes the top spot with 451,848 homes scoring in the 81-100 highest-risk range.
Total Properties at Risk by State and Risk Category
State
Low
Moderate
High
Very High
Agriculture
Urban
Total
AZ
43,273
4,443
8,488
8,089
5,332
1,910,771
1,980,396
CA
221,104
169,468
255,023
50,905
146,013
8,208,625
9,051,138
CO
70,935
38,628
50,009
49,667
66,876
1,482,352
1,758,467
ID
37,352
22,968
15,197
11,078
86,542
384,018
557,155
MT
60,588
18,903
9,601
10,218
22,516
194,927
316,753
NV
17,845
20,520
8,653
281
3,166
816,975
867,440
NM
55,969
19,554
25,766
9,481
16,200
483,282
610,252
OK
165,009
88,642
187
0
33,225
968,210
1,255,273
OR
37,137
41,160
51,872
13,788
157,749
938,664
1,240,370
TX
332,766
829,457
261,855
35,016
175,691
5,960,221
7,595,006
UT
11,185
13,590
3,441
68
31,825
681,016
741,125
WA
308,066
72,069
12,509
1,997
219,334
1,625,394
2,239,369
WY
16,875
11,911
2,259
1,654
29,111
124,344
186,154
Total
1,378,104
1,351,313
704,860
192,242
993,580
23,778,799
28,398,898
Total Properties at Risk by State and Numerical Risk Score
State
1-50
51-60
61-80
81-100
Total
AZ
1,919,351
14,308
27,159
19,578
1,980,396
CA
8,286,708
133,654
367,457
263,319
9,051,138
CO
1,454,787
52,823
122,509
128,348
1,758,467
ID
476,310
9,554
27,868
43,423
557,155
MT
243,990
13,114
27,301
32,348
316,753
NV
848,682
2,337
9,184
7,237
867,440
NM
523,755
14,487
32,139
39,871
610,252
OK
1,250,888
1,431
2,219
735
1,255,273
OR
1,091,300
22,616
46,655
79,799
1,240,370
TX
6,458,363
197,548
487,247
451,848
7,595,006
UT
693,256
14,713
24,311
8,845
741,125
WA
2,192,567
8,662
17,001
21,139
2,239,369
WY
176,983
1,766
2,764
4,641
186,154
Total
25,616,940
487,013
1,193,814
1,101,131
28,398,898
Reconstruction Values by State and Numerical Risk Score
State
1-50
51-60
61-80
81-100
AZ
$369,191,090,202
$2,781,562,044
$5,612,822,008
$4,002,789,607
CA
$2,785,871,424,591
$53,258,974,686
$153,067,995,013
$88,448,970,333
CO
$333,552,521,110
$13,769,558,737
$33,846,313,158
$36,107,351,913
ID
$102,894,072,845
$2,426,687,082
$6,899,872,812
$10,300,994,948
MT
$52,685,950,526
$2,997,541,855
$6,338,603,322
$7,639,941,924
NV
$216,436,292,731
$624,126,373
$3,860,921,144
$3,188,829,537
NM
$105,891,175,664
$3,334,262,905
$7,919,619,903
$10,468,473,653
OK
$230,716,181,496
$235,452,854
$370,084,424
$124,431,936
OR
$248,596,738,298
$5,247,235,235
$11,061,921,922
$18,192,420,905
TX
$1,276,614,038,497
$39,753,699,730
$97,535,512,589
$82,027,014,100
UT
$159,359,659,455
$4,309,214,977
$7,363,299,947
$2,115,609,007
WA
$547,066,785,312
$1,964,631,216
$3,905,374,051
$4,938,186,894
WY
$36,340,458,278
$378,445,107
$613,070,455
$993,993,576
Total
$6,465,216,389,005
$131,081,392,801
$338,395,410,748
$268,549,008,333
At the CBSA (Core Based Statistical Area) level, Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, Colo. ranks first for the most number of homes at “Very High” risk out of the 258 CBSAs analyzed. Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, Calif. comes in a close second, followed by Sacramento-Roseville-Arden-Arcade, Calif.
When ranking CBSAs based on Wildfire Risk Score, Riverside-San-Bernardino-Ontario, Calif. takes the top spot for the most number of homes that fall under the highest risk segment of 81-100, followed by Sacramento-Roseville-Arden-Arcade, Calif. and Austin-Round Rock, Texas.
Top 10 CBSAs Ranked by Homes at Very High Risk
CBSA
Very High # Homes
Home Reconstruction Value
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
17,860
$5,358,513,217
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
14,249
$4,233,998,840
Sacramento-Roseville-Arden-Arcade, CA
9,698
$3,351,781,562
Bend-Redmond, OR
9,128
$2,328,466,791
Colorado Springs, CO
7,296
$2,086,189,220
Durango, CO
6,052
$1,776,710,340
Fort Collins, CO
4,609
$903,336,600
Truckee-Grass Valley, CA
4,569
$1,430,020,245
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
4,219
$917,157,644
Flagstaff, AZ
4,109
$753,176,500
Top 10 CBSAs Ranked by Numerical Risk Score
CBSA
81-100 Risk Score
Home Reconstruction Value
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
50,605
$14,805,549,511
Sacramento–Roseville–Arden-Arcade, CA
42,042
$15,875,023,943
Austin-Round Rock, TX
35,807
$9,019,956,767
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
35,174
$10,807,628,461
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX
31,350
$7,097,211,479
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA
17,006
$8,654,562,030
Chico, CA
15,103
$3,754,593,902
Colorado Springs, CO
14,990
$4,408,080,237
Truckee-Grass Valley, CA
14,671
$4,945,547,724
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
14,092
$3,063,417,604
*Additional CBSA-level data may be available upon request.
To enhance accuracy, this CoreLogic wildfire analysis has been expanded from prior annual analyses to encompass additional categories of single-family residential structures including mobile homes, duplexes, manufactured homes and cabins, among other non-traditional home types. The values represent estimates of reconstruction costs, taking into account labor and materials, and are based on 100-percent or total destruction of the residential structure. Depending upon the size of the wildfire, there may be less than 100-percent damage to the residence, which would result in a lower realized reconstruction cost.
The Wildland fire Lessons Learned Center has published a facilitated learning analysis for an entrapment and fire shelter deployment that occurred on the Upper Lyons prescribed fire last October in Redwood National Park in northern California.
Below is the one-page summary of the 27-page document, which can be read in full HERE (1.3MB).
****
“Number and type of injuries
One individual with second degree burns to the left hand and first degree burns to the right hand and face.
Narrative Summary
On October 13, 2014, firefighters were conducting a prescribed fire in the Bald Hills Area of Redwood National Park.
Crews were burning off of a handline when a combination of factors aligned to cause several spot fires in heavy fuels outside the unit. These spot fires burned together to form multiple slopovers.
A decision was made to suspend ignition until an assessment of the slopovers could be completed. At approximately that same time, a firefighter who was hiking up the fireline became entrapped due to intense heat and dense smoke. As a result, this firefighter deployed their fire shelter on the handline.
The firefighter was quickly located and escorted a short distance out of the smoke and heat. The firefighter, immediately assessed by an onsite paramedic, was able to walk—with some assistance by others—to an area where a vehicle was waiting to transport them to a landing zone.
The firefighter, accompanied by a flight nurse, was airlifted to Shasta Regional Hospital for treatment. The firefighter was released a short time later and referred to the University of California Davis Burn Center for follow-up the next day.
The diagnosis from the specialist at the burn center was second degree burns to the left hand and first degree burns to the right hand and face. Over the next several weeks, the firefighter received follow-up treatment at the burn center.
Significant Note
During the Facilitated Learning Analysis (FLA) process, the firefighter continued to emphasize the profound role that previous fire shelter training played in the successful deployment of the firefighter’s shelter during this event.”
Air Tanker 45, similar to Tanker 11, on final to drop on the Whoopup Fire near the South Dakota/Wyoming state line in 2011. Photo by Bill Gabbert.
The National Transportation Safety Board probable cause report on the June 3, 2012 crash of Tanker 11 concluded that while preparing to drop retardant on the White Rock fire near the Utah/Nevada state line, the flight crewmembers “did not properly compensate for the wind conditions while maneuvering”. The aircraft impacted the ground before it reached the location for the intended drop, causing the death of pilots Todd Tompkins and Ron Chambless.
A photographer got some pictures of the tanker as it was attempting to make the drop (below). It is likely that the pilots jettisoned the retardant when it became obvious they were too low.
Tanker 11 before the crash. Photo from NTSB.
The P2V, operated by Neptune Aviation, was about to make its second drop on the fire that day. Shortly before the crash it made a dry run over the target area, then when lining up for the drop on the next pass took a different path, which was lower, and made a wider right turn, according to the report.
The same day that Tanker 11 crashed, another P2V, Tanker 55 operated by Minden, had a mechanical failure and landed at Minden, Nevada with a main landing gear not fully extended. The aircraft was heavily damaged, but there were no serious injuries. The landing was recorded on video.
On June 26, 2010 air tanker 44, a P2V operated by Neptune Aviation also experienced a hydraulic failure upon landing, had no brakes, and went off the runway at Rocky Mountain Metropolitan Airport (JeffCo) in Colorado (map). Both pilots self-evacuated and were walking around when the fire apparatus arrived to put out a fire in one of the engines. Neptune repaired the aircraft and put it back into service.
The NTSB released a nine-page Factual Report on the crash of Tanker 11. Below is the complete text of the one-page probable cause report, released September 24, 2014:
****
14 CFR Public Use
Accident occurred Sunday, June 03, 2012 in Modena, UT
Probable Cause Approval Date: 09/24/2014
Aircraft: LOCKHEED P2V-7, registration: N14447
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this public aircraft accident report.
Tanker 11 departed the tanker base to conduct its second fire retardant drop of the day in the same location. Upon arriving in the fire traffic area, Tanker 11 followed the lead airplane into the drop zone, which was located in a shallow valley 0.4 mile wide and 350 feet deep. The lead airplane flew a shallow right turn onto final and then dropped to an altitude of 150 feet above the valley floor while approaching the intended drop zone. While making the right turn onto final behind the lead airplane, Tanker 11’s right wing tip collided with terrain, which resulted in a rapid right yaw and subsequent impact with terrain. The wreckage created a 1,088-foot-long debris field, and a postimpact fire ensued.
Two witnesses took photographs of the accident sequence photos, and an examination of these photographs showed that the lead airplane was positioned ahead of the tanker throughout the flight; however, the orientation of the lead airplane compared to the orientation of Tanker 11 indicated that Tanker 11 did not directly follow the lead airplane’s path to the final drop course. Rather, it was about 700 feet left of the lead airplane’s path and made a wider right turn as it attempted to align with the final drop course. The accident flight crewmembers had previously flown nearly the same exact drop and the lead pilot cautioned them about tailwind conditions during the flight; however, the wider turn suggests that they did not properly compensate for the wind conditions while maneuvering. In addition, the previous flight was conducted at an altitude above the ridgeline. GPS evidence indicates that the accident flight was conducted below the ridgeline, which would have made it more difficult to detect the rising terrain during the wider turn. A review of the airplane’s cockpit voice recorder audio information revealed that the flight crew did not recognize or attempt to correct the reduced clearance between Tanker 11 and the rising terrain until about 2 seconds before impact.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The flight crew’s misjudgment of terrain clearance while maneuvering for an aerial application run, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew’s failure to follow the lead airplane’s track and to effectively compensate for the tailwind condition while maneuvering.
Screen grab from the Steven Colbert report on firefighting inmate crews.
Steven Colbert, in his usual satirical style, in this December 2 video talked about the inmate population, with an emphasis on California’s inmate fire crews.
Bernardo Fire. Screen grab from live video from NBC7 at about 4 p.m. PDT, May 13, 2014.
The Bernardo Fire that started May 13, 2014 was one of the first in a series of 12 large wildfires that occurred in San Diego County during a 10-day period in mid-May. No homes were destroyed, in spite of the fact that it burned through and adjacent to dense housing developments. This was a testament to the community planning and preparedness that is evident in many areas in California.
A 72-page report has been released on the 1,548-acre fire which identified lessons learned and recommendations for change. Examples include:
Outfit five Type 1 engines for immediate deployment during high risk wildland fire days. The engines would have all radios, pagers, MDC, EMS equipment (short narcotics) on board. Storage could possibly be within the Repair Facility.
Purchase and make available additional radios and batteries to meet the needs of large-scale incidents.
Direct Division/Group Supervisors to identify supply Drop Points and Staging Areas within their geographic divisions and/or functional groups.
Increase the number of City fire/rescue medium-lift helicopters to three (3) to insure SDFD’s ability to provide aerial fire suppression and rescue.
Request funding to hire additional brush management inspectors. A total of 22 positions are required to conduct annual inspections of the 42,505 private parcels in the wildland/urban interface within the City of San Diego. The Department currently has 6 positions dedicated to these inspections.
Train additional Department personnel to fill all IMT, DOC, and EOC positions to a minimum three-deep roster. Consideration should be given to using non-uniformed staff for incident support positions to free uniformed staff for key skills or fire line assignments.
Ensure that only one ICP is being utilized. One of the benefits may be that angled drafting tables, large-scale maps, and overlays would be made available by one of the other agencies in UC. Purchase and make available the drafting tables, large scale maps, printers and plotters and install in the CIMU vehicles.
Consider including redlines and foam pro systems in future fire engine specifications.
Consider assigning water tenders to each strike team and task force.
Issue each individual SDPD officer their own vegetation fire PPE so that they are equipped with the necessary safety equipment upon arrival at a vegetation fire.
Provide display processing equipment at the ICP to include hardware and tools necessary to provide a large format, bright, clear picture for collaboration should be determined and purchased. Provide command vehicles both paper backup large format topographical or satellite maps and a digital map display solution. Ideally, a “Google Earth-like” solution on a large format touch screen monitor should be run. NICS provides the basis for this type of map display collaboration and markup. Properly paired with the correct hardware either in command vehicles or support vehicles will allow incident managers better awareness.
Consider extending capability to track additional support vehicles (and staff) utilizing existing GPS technology tracking hardware/services.
