Wildfire Today

Broken ankle presents numerous opportunities for COVID-related lessons learned

Bill GabbertMay 3, 2020WildfireArizona, coronavirus, COVID-19, pandemic4 Comments

Managing the extraction and treatment of a firefighter proved to be much more complex than before the pandemic

File photo. Milepost 97 Fire July 26, 2019. InciWeb.

The Verde Fire on the Coronado National Forest in southeast Arizona on April 17, 2020 was not large. The only size mentioned in the Rapid Lesson Sharing document was two acres at the initial size-up. The resources included two engines, a fire module, a hotshot crew, and a helicopter with firefighters.

But an incident within an incident that required a helicopter extraction showed that suppressing a wildfire while hampered by COVID-19 protocols requires significant modifications in what used to be standard operating procedures.

The issues that were identified can’t necessarily be called “lessons”, since there are no obvious solutions or best practices for some of the challenges.

Below are excerpts from the document:

Initial attack resources were dispatched to the Verde Fire at approximately 1630 on Friday April 17. Responding resources included: Helicopter 320, Coronado National Forest (CNF) Engine 351, CNF Engine 652, Patrol 552, Saguaro Fire Module, and the Aravaipa Interagency Hotshot Crew. The fire was initially sized-up at approximately two acres. The helicopter crew immediately began work securing the edge, utilizing the helicopter for bucket support. Responding ground resources were working to identify the best access, either by UTV or on foot. Local engines identified the area of the fire as difficult to access. Additional UTVs were delivered to the incident.

At 2000 the IC called Dispatch with a “Yellow” medical, requesting a helicopter for extraction of a firefighter with a broken ankle injury.

[…]

Lessons and COVID-19 Insights and Observations

Resources

1. With resources being held locally it creates a necessity to create “throw together” crews to meet the need. The Verde Fire ended up having five districts and four different agencies represented on the fire. Whereas the ability to order-up a couple of crews who have been self-contained generates much less intermingling of individuals.

2. Tracking contacts. As folks intermix on a fire assignment and then go back to their respective units, how are individuals tracking their interactions on a daily basis in case of contact with a COVID-positive individual? There will be a need to backtrack interactions to inform others who have also potentially been in contact.

3. What about interagency incident responses? If agencies have conflicting protocols, what do the employees of interagency districts adhere to?

Operational

1. The ability to implement COVID-19 mitigations—social distancing in particular—was highly dependent on operational tempo. The higher the tempo, the tougher it was to maintain recommended distance.

2. ATV/UTV helmets. With COVID there will be no sharing of ATV helmets. Therefore, what is the alternative? Either no ATV helmets but the wearing of fireline hardhats instead, or designating specific operators per incident? Fires are fluid so the reality of one single designated operator may not be realistic. There needs to be clear guidance about helmet use in the era of COVID.

3. Surpassing 2:1 Work/Rest on IA. On the Verde Fire resources surpassed 2:1 during the IA stage. Usually, Standard Ops is to send drivers to pick up sleep-deprived resources. In this scenario it would require four drivers to get into one vehicle together, drive out to the fire, then get into four different vehicles with the firefighters—cross-exposing one another. What is the new procedure for such logistical situations?

4. There needs to be a recognition that fighting fire is not the IWI of COVID-19, but the other way around. If the intent is to fight fire, there needs to be an understanding that the COVID-19 social distancing recommendations cannot be fully adhered to when engaged in firefighting. A simple need to bump a rig out of the way at a moment’s notice is a good example.

5. [Building off of #4 above.] The question that needs to be answered: Does a lack of completely adhering to COVID measures mean less engagement or not?

Incident Within an Incident

1. COVID measures cannot be adhered to during an IWI. At the very least, an EMT will need to interact with the patient. If there is a need to pack the patient off the hillside, the interactions obviously increase exponentially. There was a broken ankle injury that occurred after sunset on the Verde Fire, which obviously meant patient care would be necessary.

2. Hospital Liaisons (or anyone else who might usually accompany) are currently not allowed into hospitals. It was quickly learned with the Verde Fire injury that liaisons will not be allowed into the hospital. This means that there needs to be very clear information accessible to every district/unit/crew lead about what to do, which forms to send to the hospital, and who needs to fill them out. The question is: Who should the point of contact be within the hospital hierarchy to ensure that these forms are being filled out by the physician prior to discharge?

3. Why isn’t there a Duty Officer for [Albuquerque Service Center’s] injury department? Injuries that take place on a fire aren’t relegated to business hours. How can this be rectified? The Verde Fire injury happened on Friday. The injured party was in surgery Saturday morning. Due to the timing of this incident (just before the weekend), a case number could not be generated until Monday. This critical delay over the weekend has the potential to cause problems for the patient regarding billing issues.

4. Should the injured person also fill out a CA-2 due to potential exposure of COVID-positive people while in the hospital? This question speaks to how protected our people are in general. Are firefighters in the “High-Risk” category? If they are, does that mean that if someone becomes COVID positive that the exposure will be assumed to have been on the job? If firefighters are not in the “High-Risk” category what does that mean?

Other Considerations

1. This fire was human-caused. The high level of recreation use in the area is creating more opportunities for fire starts. If certain types of recreation were closed, along with fire restrictions being put into place, it would bring down the number of fire starts, thereby reducing the frequency of potential COVID exposure for firefighters.

2. This IWI (along with the resources involved) highlighted the benefits that a “fire service” could provide regarding clear intent, objectives, universal protocols/procedures, etc.

Federal wildfire policy and the responsibilities of community planners and homeowners

BillMay 3, 2020UncategorizedFireWise, fuel management, fuel treatment1 Comment

If communities are to become truly fire-adapted, suppression efforts must be complemented with other preventative mitigation measures.

fire Whiskeytown National Recreation Area, California, 2009 — Whiskeytown National Recreation Area, California, 2009. NPS photo.

This is an excerpt from an article at Headwaters Economics written by Kimiko Barrett titled “Federal wildfire policy and the legacy of suppression.” Most of the original piece lays out the history of wildfires and the related government policies. Below is the last part that covers the 2018 wildfire budgeting fix and the responsibilities of individual homeowners and the government. It is used here with permission.

…To end the cycle of deficit spending and wildfire borrowing, a massive appropriations bill was passed in 2018—which was also the worst wildfire season in decades and saw the death of over 80 civilians from the Camp Fire in Paradise, California. Captured as a provision in the omnibus bill, the “wildfire fix” treats wildfires similar to other natural disasters and establishes a reserve fund to use during extreme wildfire seasons. Starting in 2020, a wildfire disaster fund of $2.25 billion was created and will be gradually increased over the following 10 years. When the Forest Service’s suppression costs exceed annual appropriations, based on FY2015 levels, funds can be withdrawn from the reserve budget rather than borrowing from nonfire programs. The spending bill also increases funding for fuels reduction projects, grants environmental review exemptions for projects meeting categorical exclusion, extends land stewardship programs, and initiates the process of wildfire risk mapping.

The 2018 wildfire fix was widely applauded by nongovernmental organizations, industries, and policymakers for stabilizing agency budgets and ending wildfire borrowing. While the new legislation provides the Forest Service with the financial flexibility to accommodate soaring suppression costs, it reaffirms the government’s prioritization of fire control and the protection of people and homes at any price.

From Federal Policy to Local Action

Continued reliability on wildfire suppression shifts responsibility for home protection from the individual homeowner and local jurisdictions to the federal government. Yet local communities bear the economic, environmental, and social costs of wildfire disasters, and some of the most essential mitigation actions need to be taken at the scale of individual communities and homes.

At the neighborhood and community scale, land use planning provides a suite of mitigation measures. Land use planning tools, such as regulations, zoning, and building codes can influence how, where, and under what conditions homes can be built in high wildfire hazard areas. Through the proactive lens of planning and anticipating wildfires, people and communities can learn to live with wildfire on the landscape.

By performing basic home mitigation measures, such as trimming trees, managing vegetation, safely storing flammable materials away from the home, and reducing other vulnerabilities within the home ignition zone (HIZ), a home’s chances of surviving a wildfire greatly increase. Constructing a home using wildfire-resistant building materials can also contribute to a home’s survivability during a wildfire.

Conclusion

Large and extreme wildfires are inevitable and efforts to extinguish them are costly, dangerous, and unrealistic. The federal government’s ongoing commitment to wildfire suppression is rooted in early 20^th century policies that haven’t kept pace with current science and knowledge on wildfire behavior. If communities are to become truly fire-adapted, suppression efforts must be complemented with other preventative mitigation measures.

This post is based on an article originally published in the Idaho Law Review, Volume 55(1).

Kimiko Barrett has a deep interest in rural landscapes and the people who live there. Born and raised in Bozeman, Montana, she appreciates the outdoors and the intimate connections people have with the land. After obtaining undergraduate degrees in Political Science and Japanese, Kimi completed a Master’s in Geography from Montana State University and a Ph.D. in Forestry from University of Montana. Her doctorate research focused on climate change impacts in high mountain ecosystems and took her to remote places in the western Himalayas.

Simulation developed for managing wildfires during COVID-19

Bill GabbertMay 2, 2020Uncategorizedcoronavirus, COVID-19, NIMO, pandemic3 Comments

Redding Hotshots Trail Mountain Fire — The Redding Hotshots conduct a safety briefing before beginning their assignment on the Trail Mountain Fire. U.S. Forest Service photo.

The National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) teams are working on procedures for managing wildland fire organizations and suppressing wildfires during the COVID-19 pandemic. Here is an update from NIMO.

Friday May 1, 2020

NIMO has been involved for some weeks now, with the development of a fire/COVID-19 simulation to help IMT’s and Agency Administrators prepare for fire in the new COVID environment this coming summer. If you wish to take part in one of the regional simulations, please contact your GATR..

COVID-19 Wildland Fire Simulation Development and Delivery
Date: April 27, 2020

Summary: Fire and Aviation Management (FAM), Workforce Development, Risk Management, Human Dimensions-Rocky Mountain Research Station, and National Incident Management Organization are collaborating to develop and deliver a late spring 2020 COVID-19 Wildland Fire Response Simulation.

The intended audience is Line Officers, Type 3 and higher complex Incident Management Teams (IMTs), and community partners. The intent of this virtual simulation is to facilitate dialog with Line Officers and IMTs on the use of Best Management Practices to make informed decisions, while providing an opportunity to evaluate and learn from those decisions. The exercise will highlight leadership principles and concepts, risk assessment processes, Gifford Pinchot’s Maxims, agency policy and direction; all within a complex fire situation under the constraints of a Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) environment where participants will perform functional and team responsibilities.

The simulation will provide for both Operational Risk assessment and Quantitative Risk evaluation using the Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW, and tools such as the atlas of Potential Control Locations (PCL), Suppression Difficulty Index (SDI), and asset layers.

This simulation will also prepare Line Officers and IMTs to use a whole host of decision tools including the 2020 Chief’s letter, Leadership Stance and Habits, and Center for Disease Control guidance, while evaluating decisions based on Social, Political, Health, and Safety considerations. Each simulation will be broken into two parts:
1) Morning session consisting of education, policy, guidance, and information
2) Afternoon session is the simulation with practical exercises

The Simulation will break participants into four teams to include representation of Line Officer(s), IMT Command and General Staff section chiefs, and partners, totaling no more than10 people per team. Delivery will be through Adobe Connect and will begin with Alpha and Beta test deliveries. Each delivery will be followed by an After Action Review (AAR). Closed captioning capabilities are available with at least a 48-hour notice prior to delivery. Below is the tentative schedule.
1. May 6 – Alpha delivery to Field Command School and NATP students
2. Week of May 11 Beta delivery to Regions 8 and 9
3. Week of May 18 Delivery to Regions 3 and 10
4. Week of May 25 Delivery to Regions 2 and 5
5. Week of June 1 Delivery to Regions 4 and 6
6. Week of June 8 Delivery to Region 1

Regional Training Officers will be advertising for, and prioritizing, participants for each simulation.

Please contact Jay Winfield at jay.winfield@usda.gov or 208-993-0768 for additional information.

Eleven Senators sign letter asking Forest Service how they will suppress wildfires during the COVID-19 pandemic

Bill GabbertMay 1, 2020July 12, 2021Uncategorizedcoronavirus, COVID-19, letter, pandemic, Victoria Christiansen20 Comments

One of the Senators’ questions was about the Forest Service’s projection of a worst-case scenario of a six percent “cumulative mortality rate” at large fire camps

BIA briefing — Bureau of Indian Affairs firefighters participating in a fire briefing. Bureau of Indian Affairs photo.

Eleven Senators signed a letter dated April 30 asking Forest Service Chief Vicki Christiansen a series of very pointed, detailed questions about how the agency will manage their 10,000 wildland firefighters and safely suppress wildfires during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Here are some of their questions, paraphrased:

According to the Agency’s Quantitative Risk Assessment, the worst-case scenario gives a six percent “cumulative mortality rate” at large fire camps.
- What measures and training protocols are the agency implementing to mitigate COVID-19 virus exposure and response?
- How are you communicating the level of risk to field staff and local leaders, and how are you setting national guidance for priortizing firefighter safety?
- Will national crews and assets be able to move between regions to respond to wildfires?
- What are you doing to communicate the scale of risk?
How will you coordinate with other agencies to ensure communities impacted by wildfire smoke have access to health care and air filters, in light of COVID-19?
Do you need additional resources? (this question was asked multiple times)
How are you working with state, federal, and local partners to ensure consistency of response and COVID-19 related precautions are consistent, realistic, and implementable on multi-jurisdictional fire responses?
What is the agency doing to continue implementing forest management and hazardous fuels reduction activities?
In a letter from the Chief dated April 3, 2020 you mention that the agency would commit resources “only when there is a reasonable expectation of success in protecting life and critical property infrastructure.” This has led to some confusion about how quickly and aggressively the FS will respond to wildfires. Please expand on how you and the agency define a “reasonable expectation for success”.
Given that large fires will increase fire crew interaction and demand for outside assistance, what steps are the agency taking to plan for these scenarios and provide appropriate precautions to protect firefighter health and safety?
If you plan to work with local partners and businesses to help bolster capacity, supply meals, and offer temporary housing, how are you communicating agency direction to prevent transmission fo COVID-19?
Since a new contract for exclusive use Type 1 helicopters has not been issued and the contract for five additional large air tankers has been protested and may not be resolved until July:
- Has the agency considered adding more exclusive use contracts for rotor and fixed wing aircraft?
- Would additional aerial suppression assets assist in this year’s prioritization of initial attack and reducing smoke for vulnerable populations?

The letter was signed by eleven senators, all Democrats from western states: Kamala D. Harris (CA), Dianne Feinstein (CA), Ron Wyden (OR), Kyrsten Sinema (AZ), Jeff Merkley (OR), Patty Murray (WA), Catherine Cortez Masto (NV), Martin Heinrich (NM), Jacky Rosen (NV), Michael Bennet (CO), and Maria Cantwell (WA).

From my experience in the last three months of trying obtain information along these lines from the Forest Service, the agency is extremely reluctant to disclose anything meaningful about how operating procedures have changed during COVID-19. For example they flat refused to divulge any information about the peculiar 30-day contracts awarded to a handful of Type 1 helicopter companies — or even admit that the contracts existed. This is important, since the previous four-year contracts for Type 1 exclusive use helicopters ended April 30.

It appears that there is a degree of micro-managing going on in the federal land management agencies. Some questions from reporters that used to be routinely answered quickly at the local or Boise level now have to be filtered through not just the Washington office level, but may go all the way up to the Department of Agriculture and Department of the Interior. At that point the proposed response may be modified, sometimes to the point of producing useless gibberish.

For example, a question to a Forest Service spokesperson about the reasons for the unusual 30-day helicopter contracts and how they were awarded resulted in this “answer” several days later:

The USDA FS is utilizing all options available via the existing aviation contracts and Call When Needed Agreements to ensure that historical helicopter coverage remains in place.

It is possible that Regional and National leaders within the Forest Service do not have the support of appointees at the Department and White House level to make decisions based on their years of knowledge, skills, and experience. They may not have the confidence or authority to demonstrate real leadership or make the necessary decisions called for relative to the topics brought forward in this letter from the Senators. These eleven elected officials may be cognizant of this.

Thanks and a tip of the hat go out to Bill and Jason. Typos or errors, report them HERE.

Above average wildfire potential predicted for southern Arizona and Florida this month

Bill GabbertMay 1, 2020May 1, 2020Uncategorizedpotential, weather

In June, above average wildfire potential is expected in California, Oregon, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico

The National Significant Wildland Fire Potential Outlook issued today by the Predictive Services section at the National Interagency Fire Center continues to have generally good news for those concerned about wildfires. Similar to the prediction released a month ago for May, the only area in the United States likely to have above normal wildfire potential this month are the south portions of Arizona and Florida. That is expected to change in June with the addition of locations in California and parts of Nevada, Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico.

The data from NIFC shown here represents the cumulative forecasts of the ten Geographic Area Predictive Services Units and the National Predictive Services Unit.

Below:

An excerpt from the NIFC narrative report for the next several months;
More of NIFC’s monthly graphical outlooks;
NOAA’s three-month temperature and precipitation forecasts;
Drought Monitor;
Keetch-Byram Drought Index.

“Overall, the entry into the season is expected to be normal; however, there are areas of concern emerging for the summer months. While the Pacific Northwest received beneficial precipitation in late April, the overall pattern has been warm and dry which may be problematic for Oregon and Central through Eastern Washington. Northern California and the Great Basin area are also areas to monitor closely for Above Normal significant wildland fire potential as fuels continue to dry and cure. Additionally, fine fuel loading is expected to be above average for the third consecutive year in the lower elevations. Those fuels will dry and cure, becoming receptive to fire by mid-June.

“Other locations across the West and in Alaska can expect overall Normal conditions, though there could be pockets of Above Normal potential and activity along the Mexican Border in May and June before the anticipated arrival of a moderate monsoon in early July which should diminish fire activity in the Southwest while increasing activity further north across the Great Basin, Northern California, the Pacific Northwest, and the Northern Rockies by July.”

CDC changes COVID-19 guidelines for testing firefighters

Bill GabbertApril 30, 2020April 30, 2020Uncategorizedcoronavirus, COVID-19, pandemic4 Comments

First responders with symptoms are now in the high-priority category

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has added the nation’s first responders to the list of those eligible for high priority COVID-19 testing. But, they have to already have symptoms.

Earlier this month, Congressman Neguse (CO) led a bipartisan letter, with the support of 33 members of Congress, to Vice President Mike Pence and CDC Director Robert Redfield requesting first responder priority. First responders who show symptoms are now eligible for high-priority testing, joining hospitalized patients, healthcare workers, and workers and residents in congregated facilities or long-term care facilities.

On April 17 Congressman Neguse with the support of Congressman John Curtis (UT) introduced the Wildfire and Community Health Response Act of 2020, bipartisan legislation aimed at supporting the health of firefighters and emergency response teams and mitigating the impact of wildfires on vulnerable communities during the COVID-19 pandemic. The bill directs the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Interior to jointly report to Congress on their efforts to mitigate wildfire risk, as wildfire smoke can have a severe impact on the respiratory health of nearby populations. The report must also identify the steps being taken to slow the spread of COVID-19 among emergency response personnel. Additionally, the report shall offer recommendations from the Secretaries as to what Federal support is required to successfully support these activities.

Our take:

This action by the CDC, while it is a small step in the right direction, is not adequate to protect the health and safety of our firefighters and other first responders. All of them need to be tested, with or without symptoms, at regular intervals.

All emergency services personnel need to be tested for the coronavirus. Dispatching untested wildland firefighting crews and incident management teams when it is almost certain that some are shedding the virus and infecting others, is dangerous and unethical.

— Wildfire Today ? (@wildfiretoday) March 31, 2020

If they are already symptomatic, it means there may have been a failure at some point. It’s like closing the barn door AFTER the horse escapes. In addition, contact tracing for those testing positive should be automatic. If the CDC or the states will not do it, the Forest Service and Department of the Interior need to implement their own testing and contact tracing programs for firefighters.

I wrote on March 19 about the need for testing in an article titled “Fighting fires during a pandemic”:

All firefighters need to be tested for the virus at regular intervals

If firefighting crews have to isolated and put on the sidelines because one member develops COVID-19 symptoms, it is likely that they had already been shedding the virus for days, possibly infecting others.

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