A prescribed fire in Leeuwin-Naturaliste National Park in Western Australia escaped on November 23 and has destroyed or heavily damaged 19 to 30 homes in the Prevelly area. Pushed by strong winds, the fire has burned at least 4,900 acres.
Fifty-five people that had refused to be evacuated later had to take refuge from the fire on a Prevelly beach. They were rescued by jet ski and ferried to a waiting search and rescue boat offshore. From there they were taken to nearby Gracetown and then bused to an emergency welfare center in Margaret River.
It was pointed out to us that in addition to Theresa Schnoor who died soon after the April 28, 2011 controlled burn, the two people that were injured also passed away later. Further research found that Robert Seybold, 40, died May 18, 2011, and 37-year-old Anthony Meguire died at a burn center in Lincoln, Nebraska September 18, 2011. More details are HERE.
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On May 4, 2011, Wildfire Today covered the tragic story of the fatality and two injuries that occurred on a controlled burn in southwest Nebraska on April 28, 2011. Yesterday the Omaha World-Herald published an in-depth article about the incident and the difficulty of small volunteer fire departments being present at every controlled burn conducted by a private land owner. Here is an excerpt from the article:
Two weeks ago, shifting winds whipped a grassland fire over a firebreak in southwest Nebraska, killing a 46-year-old woman and critically burning two men.
Theresa Schnoor, Omaha World-Herald
The tragedy involved a growing fraternity of Iowa and Nebraska landowners and others using fire to rid grazing land of unwanted trees and to reinvigorate grassland and wildlife habitat.
The incident was part of a spring run of fires in Nebraska’s dry southwest that exposed holes in the thin line of volunteers who fight wildfires — and then chase after the rare prescribed burn that escapes its handlers.
Lack of manpower and money were the primary reasons no trained firefighters were on hand April 28 when flames engulfed 46-year-old Theresa Schnoor of Trenton, Neb. The State Fire Marshal’s Office is investigating the death.
Some rural fire departments send crews to stand by at prescribed burns — commonly referred to as controlled burns — as part of their training, but neither Nebraska nor Iowa requires their presence.
State Sen. Annette Dubas of Fullerton held hearings on the issue of prescribed burns last year and found no need to have volunteer firefighters at every event, so long as the procedures set in state law are followed.
“It was very clear to us that volunteer firefighters are already overextended, and imposing more training or regulation on them could be a disincentive to volunteering,” said Joselyn Luedtke, an aide to Dubas. “The problem didn’t seem to be that there was a need for more firefighters on the ground, but a need for landowners to develop and follow prescribed burn plans.”
There were no indications that the Trenton-area burn would turn tragic, said former State Sen. Tom Baker, who watched the operation start and later was the first emergency medical technician on the scene.
The Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center recently posted three reports: 1) An After Action Review, 2) A Facilitated Learning Analysis, and 3) a 72-Hour Report.
1) Painter Piles escaped pile burning project, After Action Review; Black Hills National Forest near Custer, South Dakota, March 12, 2010. While the title of the report is “Painter Piles After Action Review”, the terms “Painter prescribed fire” and “Windsong prescribed fire” are both used in the report. Here is an excerpt from the Executive Summary:
On March 12, 2010, a U.S. Forest Service prescribed fire near the town of Custer, South Dakota, spread onto Forest and Private Lands. The slopover was contained within the first burning period and was not declared a wildfire. The pile had been ignited on March 10, 2010, and was one of the thousands in the Painter project. The Windsong Incident involved one land owner.
Some of the private land that burned. USFS photo
The Windsong Prescribed Fire was immediately adjacent to the Forest boundary and was managed by the Hell Canyon Ranger District (RD) of the Black Hills National Forest, in the Rocky Mountain Region of the U.S. Forest Service. Prescribed fire was planned to treat up to 3200 acres of hazardous fuels (piled slash) on National Forest land. The Windsong Incident consisted of 8.1 acres outside the intended treatment area, including 0.5 acres of private land. The fire traveled down slope and directly threatened one single family dwelling, and two out buildings. Damage to private property was minimal including one scorched pine, one small cedar tree, and scorched fence post.
2) Cooter’s Bog escaped prescribed fire, Facilitative Learning analysis, Kisatchie National Forest, in Louisiana, April 26, 2010. Here is the text from the Introduction:
On Tuesday, April 26, 2010 on the Calcasieu Ranger District of the Kisatchie National Forest, Louisiana, the 709 acre Cooter’s Bog Prescribed Burn (Compartment 132) was implemented. After completion of the firing phase of prescribed burn operations, a pine snag caught fire and threw embers outside of control lines, causing a spot fire in a pine plantation on adjacent private lands. The fire intensity and size of the escape grew rapidly and exceeded the capabilities of onsite resources for that burn unit. The FMO declared the escape a wildfire at 1445, per direction in the prescribed burn plan. The wildfire eventually burned 132 acres of pine plantation before being brought under control by on-site and contingency resources.
The initial responding engine entered the pasture involved, and went up to the top of a hill in an attempt to find access to attack from the black, in order to be able to work from within a safety zone. They were unable to find immediate access to the burned area, and for reasons as-yet unknown, their engine stalled. They got out, and were almost immediately overrun by the head fire. They ran laterally out of the head fire, back towards where they had come from, which placed them in unburned fuel on one flank of the fire. At that point, a wind shift converted that flank to the new head, and threatened to overrun them again, as the rate of spread was too fast to outrun. The initial attack IC was nearby in a pickup, and was able to drive over and remove them before the new head fire again overran them. He estimates the time frame for this sequence of events was under one minute from onset until he had them in his vehicle and was driving away.
The first firefighter, who was going to be doing the direct attack, was wearing full structural bunker gear (not wildland PPE), consisting of boots, pants, coat, gloves, and helmet, except for his Nomex hood. He did have a “grass mask” on. He sustained 2nd and 3rd degree burns in the areas between his helmet, mask, and coat. He was treated initially at a local hospital, and is receiving outpatient treatment from the burn unit, but the area burned is small enough it did not require inpatient treatment. The other firefighter was the driver of the engine, and as such was only wearing bunker pants and boots over street clothes. He sustained burns on his face, neck, hands, and arms. Burns were initially identified as 2nd degree and have now been determined to involving some 3rd degree burns as well. He remains an inpatient in the burn unit in Wichita at this time.
The engine involved experienced significant body damage, but after the fire had moved past, it was discovered with its pump still running, and the interior was intact. It was started and driven back to the fire station after the fire.
The Helena Independent Record has an excellent editorial about the report that was released on Monday on the prescribed fire that escaped on August 26, 2010 and burned over 2,000 acres of private and U.S. Forest Service land 28 miles northwest of Helena, Montana. The report, and the reaction to it from Kevin Riordan, the Helena National Forest Supervisor, indicates that the U. S. Forest Service is not fully aware of, or at least will not publicly admit, the impacts of the serious mistakes and errors in judgement that were made. Accountability did not seem to enter the minds of the 5-person review panel or the Helena National Forest.
Read the entire editorial, but here is an excerpt.
…Our disappointment with the Forest Service’s lack of accountability to accept responsibility is threefold:
First, the Forest Service’s top fire officials should have known the weather, fuels conditions and tree types. That’s what they’re paid and trained to do. The wildfire wouldn’t have ignited had the fire boss used common sense and called off the prescribed burn out of precautionary measures. If there is any blame to be had, it’s there. Right there.
Second, if this was a Regular Joe who didn’t put out a campfire which boomed into a $3 million firefighting effort, they’d be in jail, or at least facing stiff criminal charges. Instead, the Forest Service gets a free pass to “Go.”
Third, we expect more from our governmental leaders. If they goof, which happens, we expect them to own up to it and admit their mistakes. It’s OK to learn from those mistakes; that’s how we all grow to be better people and better citizens. But to blatantly disregard those mistakes is unacceptable.
Ultimately, the forest will grow back, and Forest Service officials will continue to rightfully use prescribed burns as an important forest-health mechanism. Ultimately, they might even learn a lesson or two from this debacle.
But it’s the public trust that has been burned the worst, and that is going to be hard to redeem.
The mistakes and errors in judgement before this prescribed fire was even lit are mind-boggling. Some Forest Supervisors, if their heads were not in the sand, would consider firing those responsible.
We have previously covered good and bad examples of accountability and accepting responsibility. We’ll make a mental note to add this incident to the bad example list.
Firefighters line the Stemple Pass Road Thursday, Aug. 26, watching the Davis Fire. Dylan Brown photo.
The Helena National Forest has released their report on the Davis prescribed fire that escaped on August 26, 2010 and burned over 2,000 acres of private and U.S. Forest Service land 11 miles southeast of Lincoln and 28 miles northwest of Helena in Montana.
The firefighters ignited a test burn at 10:45 a.m on Wednesday, August 26. By 2:00 p.m. strong winds became a problem and the fire moved into the tree canopy. All ignition ceased, but soon there was a spot fire which burned 20 acres in heavy mixed conifers. When all personnel left the fire at 10:00 p.m. to avoid the hazard of falling trees, the spot fire had been partially lined.
The next day, Thursday, additional personnel were on scene. They were completing the fireline and gridding for other spot fires when an undetected one took off at 1:00 p.m. which quickly transitioned to a crown fire. The prescribed fire was declared an escape at 1:15 p.m. and a Type 2 Incident Management Team was requested at 2:27 p.m. By nightfall the fire was estimated at over 1,600 acres on federal land and 450 acres on private lands involving multiple landowners. Approximately 22 structures were evacuated on Thursday afternoon and evening.
Here is one-page summary of the report that the Helena National Forest issued along with the 27-page report. (click on the magnifying glass or “fullscreen” for easier reading)
The five-person review team consisted of three US Forest Service employees, one from the Bureau of Land Management, and one from the state of Montana.
The Helena Independent Record today quotes Kevin Riordan, the Helena National Forest Supervisor, about the findings from the report.
“I don’t want to push anything off or say it was no big deal on any of those things, but each of the factors identified in and of themselves were not a huge piece where we can say, ‘Jeez, here’s something clearly that we did wrong, done incorrectly or that we’re going to make big changes on,’” Riordan said on Monday. “I think there are some small pieces of something that adds up to be a bigger thing. Those are what we are trying to dial into and focus in on so we can make some changes.”
I will go beyond Mr. Riordan’s assessment, and go out on a limb and say there are at least two “huge pieces” that were clearly “done wrong”.
1. The first issue was the failure to take notice of the spot weather forecast that was issued at 10:43 a.m. Wednesday on the day of the burn, just before the firefighters ignited the test burn. That forecast predicted stronger winds than in the forecast that was issued the previous day which was for “winds upslope 3 to 6 mph, ridge top winds southwest 5 to 10 mph with gusts to 15 mph”. Here is what Wednesday morning’s forecast predicted for the day of ignition (the all-caps are from the weather forecast, a bad habit the NWS needs to break):
WIND (20 FT)……..SOUTHWEST WINDS 10 TO 15 MPH WITH AFTERNOON
GUSTS 20 TO 25 MPH.
RIDGE TOP WIND……WEST AT 15 TO 20 MPH.
The report says:
The prescribed fire personnel stated they did not note any differences between the two forecasts.
That forecast also stated that on the following day, Thursday, the winds in the afternoon would be 30 to 35 mph. The maximum wind speed allowed in the prescription for the project was 15 mph, which, from my experience, is quite high for a prescribed fire.
2. The second issue is the fact that they knew on Tuesday, the day before the burn began on Wednesday, that near record heat and a Fire Weather Watch with gusty southwest winds was forecast for Thursday. This Watch was upgraded to a Red Flag Warning on Wednesday afternoon after ignition had begun. Even in a best case scenario, if there had been no spot fires or other control problems on Wednesday, the 30 to 35 mph winds predicted for the day after ignition should have alerted experienced fire management personnel that the winds across the 100-acre prescribed fire could have caused embers to be blown across the lines, resulting in the fire escaping. Control would have been difficult in 30 to 35 mph winds.
We wrote about the escaped fire as it was burning in August. On this Wildfire Today search page, the first eight articles are about this fire.
Here is a video from KFBB which has some images of the fire as well as an interview with the Forest Supervisor.
The Billings Gazette has a lengthy article with new information about the Davis fire, a prescribed fire on the Helena National Forest in Montana that escaped and burned over 2,000 acres on August 26. An excerpt is below, but check out the entire article.
On the morning of Aug. 26, a 26-person hand crew, nine engines, three water tenders and a helicopter were ready to finish the job. The forecast for Helena called for a high of 94 degrees and warned that a cold front would blow in by Aug. 27, bringing with it gusty winds. The spot forecast for Granite Butte predicted temperatures of 75 to 80 degrees, winds up to 20 mph in the afternoon with gusts to 30 mph and relative humidity of 10 to 15 percent.
“The wind and high temperatures were still decent conditions for what we would consider fire weather,” Schott said. “On that day the relative humidity dropped in some places down to the single digits, which is well below the threshold we typically use for red-flag days.”
Crews continued to arrive at the prescribed fire scene throughout the morning, and the dispatch log doesn’t show when they ignited the fire. However, Greg Archie, who works for the state Department of Natural Resources and Conservation, was working with the Forest Service crews and at the Aug. 26 public meeting recalled that they were “making pretty good headway.”
Then the winds picked up. Embers blew into grasses and trees outside the prescribed burn’s boundary, momentarily unnoticed. Fanned by the wind, they burst into flames and took off running. The prescribed burn was declared a wildfire at 1:13 p.m. Aug. 26.
“We lost 3 acres in a matter of about two minutes, another 10 to 15 acres in the next eight minutes. The fire got up and moved,” Archie told the group gathered that night at the Canyon Creek School. “In no more than an hour, there were more than 100 acres on fire.”
They quickly requested tankers for an air attack. More crews. More engines. Bulldozers. Helicopters. Volunteer firefighters to protect structures only half a mile away.
By Aug. 27, what was now being called the Davis fire was 2,000 acres. It didn’t change much in size after that, and one week and $2.2 million later, the fire was considered to be 100 percent contained.
