Map showing the location of the Basin Fire at noon MDT, May 10, 2020. Data is from a BLM GPS flight.
(UPDATED at 9:54 p.m. MDT May 11, 2020)
Data from a GPS mapping flight Monday afternoon revealed that the Basin Fire in northwest Arizona is three times larger than previously estimated and now covers 36,355 acres.
The lightning-caused fire is 14 miles southeast of Mesquite, Nevada.
A Red Flag Warning is in effect for Tuesday with a forecast for 20-30 mph southwest winds with gusts of 35 to 45 mph with relative humidity of 10 to 20 percent. This could cause the fire to spread further to the northeast if the fuels are receptive.
Approximately 134 personnel are assigned to the fire.
A BAe-146 air tanker drops on the Basin Fire May 11, 2020. BLM photo.
(Originally published at 3:37 p.m. MDT May 11, 2020)
Map showing the approximate location of the Basin Fire at 3:06 a.m. MDT, May 10, 2020.
A lightning-caused wildfire has burned approximately 10,000 acres in northwest Arizona 17 miles north of the Grand Canyon, 17 miles southeast of Mesquite, Nevada. It was reported in Grand Canyon-Parashant National Monument at 2 p.m. Sunday after the passage of thunderstorms.
The area has been under a Red Flag Warning since Sunday morning — for dry lightning on Sunday and low relative humidity and gusty winds on Monday. The dry, windy conditions will lead to another Red Flag Warning on Tuesday.
Basin Fire, May 10, 2020. BLM Photo.Red Flag Warnings in effect May 11, 2020. NWS.Red Flag Warnings in effect in Alaska, May 11, 2020. NWS.
Map showing the approximate location of the Moonfish Fire in Big Cypress National Preserve at 2:42 p.m. EDT May 8, 2020.
A wildfire that started May 7 is spreading rapidly in Big Cypress National Preserve 37 miles west of Miami, Florida. The fire is south of Tamiami Trail near the shared boundary with Everglades National Park.
The Moonfish Fire is actively burning in sawgrass prairie and cypress strands. Full suppression actions are taking place given the current drought and wind conditions. Wildfire Today’s very unofficial estimate of the size is approximately 6,000 acres.
An MD-87 air tanker, Tanker 101, delivered a total of four loads of retardant on Thursday and Friday, flying out of the Lake City Tanker Base, a 650-mile round trip. On April 21 that aircraft lost an engine after dropping retardant on the Holcombe Road Fire in Crockett County Texas. The crew declared an emergency and landed safely on one engine after diverting to Midland, Texas (MAF) as airport crash-rescue trucks stood by.
Personnel from Big Cypress National Preserve and Everglades National Park are working the Moonfish Fire along with interagency assistance from Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Service, and Miami-Dade Fire to protect structures in the area. Two helicopters and three engines were assigned to the fire on Thursday.
South Florida is currently experiencing hot, dry conditions typical of this time of year.
Radar detects smoke from the Moonfish Fire in Big Cypress National Preserve, 8 p.m. EDT May 8, 2020.
Map showing heat detected on the Five Mile Swamp Fire by a satellite at 2:48 a.m. CDT May 7, 2020.
(UPDATED at 9:50 a.m. CDT May 7, 2020)
Satellite data collected overnight shows heat from the Five Mile Swamp Fire well south of Interstate 10 on both sides of Garcon Point Road approaching Blackwater Bay.
(Originally published at 9 p.m. CDT May 6, 2020)
Map showing heat detected on the Five Mile Swamp Fire by a satellite at 3:24 p.m. CDT May 6, 2020.
Strong winds and low relative humidity caused a wildfire in the panhandle of Florida to grow about eight times its size Wednesday. The Five Mile Swamp Fire started from an escaped prescribed fire Monday afternoon and by Wednesday afternoon had blackened approximately 2,000 acres (up from 250 acres Wednesday morning) forcing the closure of Interstate 10 south of Milton, Florida.
The fire is burning on both sides of Interstate 10 about five miles south of Milton. The Florida Forest Service (FFS) reports several structures south of I-10 have been damaged or destroyed.
On Wednesday resources working the fire included 18 tractor/plow units, 3 helicopters, and firefighters from multiple departments throughout Santa Rosa County.
Residents of Ski Lane north of I-10, and those south of I-10 and east of Avalon Boulevard have been ordered to evacuate.
About 1,100 residences are threatened by the Five Mile Swamp Fire.
The prescribed fire from which the wildfire escaped was on private land east of the former Moors golf course, east of Avalon Blvd., and north of I-10. Described as a “#GoodFire” by the Florida Forest Service in a May 4 tweet, it was expected to burn only 250 acres.
?WILDFIRE UPDATE?@FLForestService crews are in day 3 of suppression efforts on the #5MileSwampFire. Additional firefighting personnel & resources are en route to assist.
I-10 is closed from Exit 22 Avalon Blvd to Exit 31 at Hwy 87.
Managing the extraction and treatment of a firefighter proved to be much more complex than before the pandemic
File photo. Milepost 97 Fire July 26, 2019. InciWeb.
The Verde Fire on the Coronado National Forest in southeast Arizona on April 17, 2020 was not large. The only size mentioned in the Rapid Lesson Sharing document was two acres at the initial size-up. The resources included two engines, a fire module, a hotshot crew, and a helicopter with firefighters.
But an incident within an incident that required a helicopter extraction showed that suppressing a wildfire while hampered by COVID-19 protocols requires significant modifications in what used to be standard operating procedures.
The issues that were identified can’t necessarily be called “lessons”, since there are no obvious solutions or best practices for some of the challenges.
Below are excerpts from the document:
Initial attack resources were dispatched to the Verde Fire at approximately 1630 on Friday April 17. Responding resources included: Helicopter 320, Coronado National Forest (CNF) Engine 351, CNF Engine 652, Patrol 552, Saguaro Fire Module, and the Aravaipa Interagency Hotshot Crew. The fire was initially sized-up at approximately two acres. The helicopter crew immediately began work securing the edge, utilizing the helicopter for bucket support. Responding ground resources were working to identify the best access, either by UTV or on foot. Local engines identified the area of the fire as difficult to access. Additional UTVs were delivered to the incident.
At 2000 the IC called Dispatch with a “Yellow” medical, requesting a helicopter for extraction of a firefighter with a broken ankle injury.
[…]
Lessons and COVID-19 Insights and Observations
Resources
1. With resources being held locally it creates a necessity to create “throw together” crews to meet the need. The Verde Fire ended up having five districts and four different agencies represented on the fire. Whereas the ability to order-up a couple of crews who have been self-contained generates much less intermingling of individuals.
2. Tracking contacts. As folks intermix on a fire assignment and then go back to their respective units, how are individuals tracking their interactions on a daily basis in case of contact with a COVID-positive individual? There will be a need to backtrack interactions to inform others who have also potentially been in contact.
3. What about interagency incident responses? If agencies have conflicting protocols, what do the employees of interagency districts adhere to?
Operational
1. The ability to implement COVID-19 mitigations—social distancing in particular—was highly dependent on operational tempo. The higher the tempo, the tougher it was to maintain recommended distance.
2. ATV/UTV helmets. With COVID there will be no sharing of ATV helmets. Therefore, what is the alternative? Either no ATV helmets but the wearing of fireline hardhats instead, or designating specific operators per incident? Fires are fluid so the reality of one single designated operator may not be realistic. There needs to be clear guidance about helmet use in the era of COVID.
3. Surpassing 2:1 Work/Rest on IA. On the Verde Fire resources surpassed 2:1 during the IA stage. Usually, Standard Ops is to send drivers to pick up sleep-deprived resources. In this scenario it would require four drivers to get into one vehicle together, drive out to the fire, then get into four different vehicles with the firefighters—cross-exposing one another. What is the new procedure for such logistical situations?
4. There needs to be a recognition that fighting fire is not the IWI of COVID-19, but the other way around. If the intent is to fight fire, there needs to be an understanding that the COVID-19 social distancing recommendations cannot be fully adhered to when engaged in firefighting. A simple need to bump a rig out of the way at a moment’s notice is a good example.
5. [Building off of #4 above.] The question that needs to be answered: Does a lack of completely adhering to COVID measures mean less engagement or not?
Incident Within an Incident
1. COVID measures cannot be adhered to during an IWI. At the very least, an EMT will need to interact with the patient. If there is a need to pack the patient off the hillside, the interactions obviously increase exponentially. There was a broken ankle injury that occurred after sunset on the Verde Fire, which obviously meant patient care would be necessary.
2. Hospital Liaisons (or anyone else who might usually accompany) are currently not allowed into hospitals. It was quickly learned with the Verde Fire injury that liaisons will not be allowed into the hospital. This means that there needs to be very clear information accessible to every district/unit/crew lead about what to do, which forms to send to the hospital, and who needs to fill them out. The question is: Who should the point of contact be within the hospital hierarchy to ensure that these forms are being filled out by the physician prior to discharge?
3. Why isn’t there a Duty Officer for [Albuquerque Service Center’s] injury department? Injuries that take place on a fire aren’t relegated to business hours. How can this be rectified? The Verde Fire injury happened on Friday. The injured party was in surgery Saturday morning. Due to the timing of this incident (just before the weekend), a case number could not be generated until Monday. This critical delay over the weekend has the potential to cause problems for the patient regarding billing issues.
4. Should the injured person also fill out a CA-2 due to potential exposure of COVID-positive people while in the hospital? This question speaks to how protected our people are in general. Are firefighters in the “High-Risk” category? If they are, does that mean that if someone becomes COVID positive that the exposure will be assumed to have been on the job? If firefighters are not in the “High-Risk” category what does that mean?
Other Considerations
1. This fire was human-caused. The high level of recreation use in the area is creating more opportunities for fire starts. If certain types of recreation were closed, along with fire restrictions being put into place, it would bring down the number of fire starts, thereby reducing the frequency of potential COVID exposure for firefighters.
2. This IWI (along with the resources involved) highlighted the benefits that a “fire service” could provide regarding clear intent, objectives, universal protocols/procedures, etc.
The fire was about two miles northwest of Gulfport
Wildfire in Harrison County Mississippi, April 27, 2020. Photo by Mississippi Forestry Commission.
A fire two miles from the Gulf Coast burned approximately 1,700 acres in southern Mississippi northwest of Gulfport. Reported at noon on Sunday April 26, the Tillman Road Fire stretches for about 2.5 miles from 11th Street north to Interstate 10 where Monday night firefighters ignited a backfire to stop it from crossing the six-lane highway west of the Canal Street off-ramp.
The Gulf Coast was in a drought situation with high winds and low relative humidity at the time and the fire was in a hard to reach area for the Mississippi Forestry Commission (MFC) tractor plow units due to canals and creeks. In his size-up MFC Incident Commander Sam Morgan estimated it at 100 acres. Roads, dozer lines, canals, and creeks were used to prepare for burnout operations. Crews fought well into the early morning hours Monday to try to contain the blaze, reaching 20 percent containment.
Wildfire in Harrison County Mississippi. Photo by Mississippi Forestry Commission.
On Monday morning, the MFC Pilot in the agency’s Cessna estimated the size at about 300 acres. Then the fire made a big push with strong southerly winds that led to several evacuations and road closures in the area. Emergency responders fought hard to protect lives during this period of peak fire activity. As the RH rose at dusk, firefighters used burnout operations to contain sections of the fire. With crews working well into the night again, the burnouts were completed putting the fire at about 1,500 acres with 80 percent containment.
Tuesday brought slightly more favorable fire weather conditions, allowing crews to keep the fire boxed in. With some interior burning, the wildfire had blackened 1,700 acres by Tuesday night.
Wildfire in Harrison County Mississippi, April 26, 2020. Photo by Mississippi Forestry Commission.
Wednesday brought about one inch of rain in the area allowing the fire to be declared contained and controlled. It is now being monitored for re-burns.
Approximately 25-30 MFC wildland firefighters responded to the Tillman Road Fire along with 14 tractor plow units during the four day duration of the fire. MFC’s Cessna and a Harrison County Sheriff’s Department helicopter assisted firefighters on the ground by providing eyes in the sky and monitoring the spread.
Jason Scott, the Director of Information and Outreach for the MFC said 106 residences and 7 commercial structures were threatened and saved. One outbuilding and an RV were destroyed.
Pat Sullivan of Harrison County Fire reported that the number of resources on the fire exceeded 200 with close to 80 pieces of equipment, from small drones to large structure fire engines, representing at least 15 agencies and organizations.
Wildfire in Harrison County Mississippi, April 26, 2020. Photo by Mississippi Forestry Commission.Wildfire in Harrison County Mississippi, April 26, 2020. Photo by Mississippi Forestry Commission.Wildfire in Harrison County Mississippi, April 27, 2020. Photo by Mississippi Forestry Commission.Wildfire in Harrison County Mississippi. Map by Mississippi Forestry Commission.
Map showing the approximate location of the Lion Fire 1.5 miles west of Meeker, Colorado. Data from Orora Technologies detected from 2:12 p.m. MDT April 7, to 2:30 a.m. MDT April 8, 2020.
An informal After Action Review has been produced for the Lion Fire that burned about 229 acres west of Meeker, Colorado on April 7. The fire was attacked by the Meeker Volunteer Fire Department, Bureau of Land Management, and the Colorado Division of Fire Prevention and Control. By the end of the day firefighters had stopped the spread. Investigators determined that it started near a mobile home which was consumed in the fire. Several outbuildings and vehicles were also destroyed, according to Meeker Fire Chief Luke Pelloni.
Below is the ARR, distributed by the Zone Fire Management Officer:
As many of you know we had the Lion Fire last week just west of Meeker involving multiple jurisdictions/agencies. I was tasked with letting you all know how things went as far as COVID-19 measures and mitigation’s.
We have taken multiple steps in our station to limit and minimize exposure to firefighters as we are entering fire season. I believe there have been lots of good discussions and decisions made in regards to COVID-19. However, just like in everything we do the plan looks good on paper until the smoke is flying in the air. Listed below are some of the lessons learned from on the ground experiences last week.
Social distancing is very tough in stressful situations. The crew discussed social distancing before leaving for the fire and to try and abide by the guidelines, upon arrival multiple structures/vehicles were burning and instincts to protect life and property take over.
When evacuating public, maintaining distance is difficult when property/landowners are panicked and looking for answers and guidance.
When working with multiple agencies the COVID-19 mitigation measures and messages have varied widely and are hard to enforce or maintain.
Briefings are hard to conduct in the field with large crowds and maintain the appropriate distance that is recommended. We usually don’t have microphones or platforms in initial attack so harder to hear and voice critical information to multiple crews.
Once dispatched we utilized four vehicles with eight firefighters. This idea seemed like a good idea until arrival and the parking and safety areas for vehicles was minimal. It added a bit of cluster you could say to the initial arrival to the incident.
Upon arrival personnel jumped into different trucks and engines to engage on the fire creating more “contaminated” surfaces by different people at different times of the incident.
It is very difficult to keep equipment sanitized throughout an incident (examples: truck radios, hand tools, chainsaws, steering wheels, compartment doors, etc.)
A few individuals did wear masks and experienced a harder time communicating to one another thus decreasing the distance between individuals. The people who did wear masks seemed to be touching their faces and adjusting masks more.
These are a few of the lessons or experiences that we noticed on our first wildfire of the year. I think we are taking adequate measures to address issues and potential situations that crews will experience this summer. I think the list above will be some of the issues or challenges that firefighters will encounter on incidents. One concern I have is the ability to sanitize and clean work areas. We have spent an entire day trying to purchase items but our current credit card procedures are making that difficult to achieve. If anyone has any questions or concerns feel free to give me a shout anytime. Hope everyone is safe and making it through these interesting times.
End of AAR
Lion Fire. Photo by Rio Blanco Co Sheriff’s Office April 7, 2020.
