Wildfire Today

NTSB preliminary report on fatal helicopter crash in Arizona does not determine cause

Bill GabbertNovember 10, 2020UncategorizedArizona, crash, fatality, helicopter, lodd, Polles Fire1 Comment

The accident occurred July 7, 2020 on the Polles Fire west of Payson, Arizona

On July 7, 2020 a UH-1H helicopter crashed while transporting supplies to firefighters who were spiked out (camping) while working on the Polles Fire about 10 miles west of Payson, Arizona. The only person on board, pilot Bryan Jeffery “BJ” Boatman, 37, of Litchfield Park, Arizona was killed. We send our sincere condolences to the family and friends of Mr. Boatman, and to the forestry technicians who were at the fire.

The brief preliminary report issued by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) did not mention any obvious causes for the crash, which happened while transporting firefighters’ equipment in an external sling load. Multiple personnel on the ground observed the helicopter flying erratically until finally “it entered a steep nose up attitude and then descended rapidly,” according to the report. Fire personnel saw no signs of fire before the crash and all major structural components of the helicopter were accounted for at the accident site.

BJ was born on June 8, 1983 in Provo, Utah. He was a third-generation pilot and worked alongside his parents to build their company, Airwest Helicopters of Glendale, Arizona.

3-D map of the Polles Fire from data at 10:36 p.m. July 7, 2020; looking north.

The helicopter, N623PB, serial number 64-13689, was manufactured in 1964. It is a UH-1H registered to Aero Leasing in Glendale, Arizona, the same city where Air West Helicopters is located.

Polles Fire - Payson helicopter crash fatality — Airwest Helicopters photo, N623PB.

In addition to the preliminary report released by the NTSB, a 23-page facilitated learning analysis (FLA) was commissioned by the U.S. Forest Service.

The FLA is solely devoted to analyzing the response to the accident — the Incident Within an Incident and the actions taken in the following days. It does not address what caused the helicopter to crash. The report found very little to criticize and praised most of the actions that were taken. It goes into quite a bit of detail about how the fire’s Incident Management Team handled the emergency response during the first few hours, as well as organizing over the next several days to care for BJ’s family and the forestry technicians that were witnesses to the crash or were otherwise affected.

Anyone who could in the future find themselves in a similar unfortunate situation would benefit from reading this FLA. Firefighting is dangerous, in the air and on the ground, and others will have to walk this same path.

During a 49-day period that began July 7, 2020 there were six crashes of firefighting aircraft — three helicopters and three air tankers. In addition, three members of the crew of a C-130 from the U.S. died when their air tanker crashed January 23, 2020 while fighting a bushfire in New South Wales, Australia.

Below is the text from the narrative portion of the three-page NTSB report. The complete report which will analyze the cause, might be released within the next year.

“On July 7, 2020, about 1213 mountain standard time, a Bell/Garlick UH-1H helicopter, N623PB, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Payson, Arizona. The pilot was fatally injured. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 133 external load flight.

Illustration from the NTSB report — Figure 1: Depiction of helicopter flight path based on witness statements. From the NTSB preliminary report.

“The helicopter was owned by Airwest Helicopters LLC and operated by the United States Forest Service at the time of the accident. According to witnesses, the helicopter was transporting supplies using a long line for a hotshot firefighting crew that were repositioning on the ground. The pilot transported three loads to the new destination uneventfully prior to the accident and had been using an indirect route to the north to avoid a fire area (Figure 1). While transporting the fourth load, witnesses observed the helicopter begin to fly erratically while en route to its destination. During this time, a witness stated that he observed the helicopter enter a high nose-up pitch attitude and the external payload began to swing. The helicopter then displayed irregular movements for several seconds before the external payload settled and the helicopter appeared to stabilize. However, after about 3 seconds, multiple witnesses observed The witnesses did not observe the helicopter on fire during the accident flight, nor did the pilot report any anomalies over the helicopter crew’s common air-to-ground radio frequency or any other assigned frequencies for the fire.

“The helicopter wreckage came to rest about 0.5 nm north of its drop off destination, oriented on a heading of 074° magnetic and was mostly consumed by postcrash fire. All major structural components of the helicopter were accounted for at the accident site. The helicopter’s external payload was found 123 ft southeast of the main wreckage.

“The wreckage was retained for further examination.”

Smoke from the Polles Fire, posted July 6, 2020. InciWeb.

Smoke — and the health of firefighters

Bill GabbertNovember 8, 2020November 11, 2020Uncategorizedfirefighter health, smoke, smoke & health10 Comments

smoke pyrocumulus bushfires Australia — Photo of smoke from bushfires by Merrin Macleod on a flight from Canberra to Melbourne, Australia, posted January 4, 2020.

Originally published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

While research has not yet been conducted on all the hazards and risks associated with the wildland firefighting job, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is asked numerous questions about the hazards of fighting wildland fires. This blog is designed to answer some of those questions.

What Is in Wildland Fire Smoke?

Wildland fire smoke is a mixture of gases and particles such as carbon monoxide (CO) and respirable particulate matter (PM) that may cause short- and long-term health effects. Wildland firefighters can be exposed to smoke at wildfires and “prescribed” fires (planned and intentionally ignited low-intensity fires). The contents of and exposure to wildfire smoke can vary greatly throughout the day depending on the vegetation type, fire behavior, and meteorological conditions. Research has shown that wildland firefighters have been exposed to gases and particles such as CO and PM above the occupational exposure limits during both wildland and prescribed fires. While burning vegetation is the primary exposure of concern for wildland and prescribed fires, when fires burn in the wildland urban interface (WUI, where wildland vegetation and urban areas meet) the smoke may contain compounds that are more similar to what structural firefighters encounter. Wildland firefighters will often suppress these fires and may be exposed to some of the hazardous compounds of WUI smoke such as volatile organic compounds (VOCs), flame retardants, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). However, wildland firefighters do not have the benefit of wearing some of the personal protective equipment (PPE) typically used in a structural response (e.g., self-contained breathing apparatus [SCBA], turnout gear) that could provide protection from these compounds. Additionally, wildland firefighters may be exposed to smoke at firefighting base camps (incident command posts) where they eat and rest while off-duty.

What Do We Know About the Health of Wildland Firefighters?

Cardiovascular and Lung Health

In the past decade, several studies have linked exposure to wildfire smoke to short-term health effects, such as increases in inflammation and respiratory effects, for example, lung function decline.[i] However, these studies have only examined the health effects across a few shifts or a single fire season. It is not clear if these adverse health effects continue after fire season and whether they worsen after several seasons of fighting fires. Researchers suspect that exposure to particulate matter and other contaminants from wildfire smoke, heavy physical exertion, existing health and behavior risk factors, and cardiovascular strain could contribute to sudden cardiac events for wildland firefighters. Recent research indicated that wildland firefighters may be at an increased risk of mortality from cardiovascular disease and lung cancer than the general public from career exposure to wildfire smoke.[ii]

COVID-19

The strenuous work, long work shifts, close living and working conditions, limited access to hygiene supplies, and a workforce that responds to incidents all over the country on short notice to wildland fire incidents may be conducive for the transmission of infectious diseases, including SARS-CoV-2. Exposure to air pollutants in wildfire smoke can irritate the lungs, cause inflammation, alter immune function, and increase susceptibility to respiratory infections, possibly including COVID-19.[iii] In addition to potentially making firefighters more vulnerable to getting COVID-19, inflammation in the respiratory tract due to wildfire smoke might also increase the risk of developing more severe outcomes for those with COVID-19.[iv] Wildland firefighters should implement the recommendations described in the CDC’s FAQ for Wildland Firefighters to prevent infection and spread of COVID-19.

Heat-Related Illness and Rhabdomyolysis

Due to the nature of their work, firefighters are at risk of developing severe heat-related illness (such as heat stroke) and rhabdomyolysis (muscle breakdown).[v]^,[vi] Delays in diagnosis and initiating treatment of these illnesses increase the risk of permanent muscle damage. Since 2010, 62 cases of severe rhabdomyolysis among wildland firefighters have been reported to a passive surveillance system designed to capture fatalities and certain types of injuries and illnesses including rhabdomyolysis. The actual number of cases is likely higher due to underreporting and inconsistencies in reporting requirements and systems. Prior to 2010, no cases were reported.

Hearing

Wildland firefighters work around power tools and heavy equipment that produce noise levels that are hazardous to hearing. In addition to hearing loss, noise exposure may also cause tinnitus (ringing/buzzing in ears), increased heart rate, fatigue, and interfere with verbal communication. Researchers from NIOSH and the United States Forest Service (USFS) evaluated personal noise measurements on 156 wildland firefighters conducting various training and fire suppression tasks, and reported that 85 of the 174 measurements were above the NIOSH maximum allowable daily dose[vii]. A follow-up study showed use of hearing protection was mixed; while almost all the wildland firefighters were aware of the noise in their environment and potential risk, very few were enrolled in hearing conservation programs.

What Are NIOSH Researchers Doing to Better Understand Exposures and Health Effects?

NIOSH is currently conducting research to understand the exposures and health effects of firefighters suppressing wildland and WUI fires. NIOSH researchers and collaborators at the US Forest Service and Department of the Interior have finished the second year of a multi-year study investigating exposures and health effects among six federal 20-person firefighting crews. The primary goal of this study is to measure exposures in the wildland fire environment and examine associations between those exposures and changes in lung, cardiac, kidney, and hearing function during each fire season and the off season over multiple fire seasons. This study has been paused in 2020 due to COVID-19 but is expected to resume.

To understand exposures and health effects faced by WUI firefighters, NIOSH is working with researchers from the University of Arizona and University of Miami to expand an existing collaborative research study (the Fire Fighter Cancer Cohort Study) to collect data regarding exposures from WUI fire incidents during the 2019 and 2020 fire seasons. Characterizing the types of chemicals, as well as the routes and levels of exposures, will help us understand health risks for wildland firefighters.

NIOSH is also in the process of developing a study assessing self-reported exposures to wildfire smoke and COVID-19 health outcomes among wildland firefighters. Additional information about this research will be available soon on the NIOSH Fighting Wildfires Page.

Authors of this article:

LCDR Corey Butler,MS REHS, is a Lieutenant Commander with the United States Public Health Service and an Occupational Safety and Health Specialist in the NIOSH Western States Division.

CAPT Christa Hale,DVM, MPH, DACVPM (Epi), is a Captain with the United States Public Health Service and Senior Epidemiologist and Veterinarian in the NIOSH Western States Division.

Kathleen Navarro, PhD, MPH is an Associate Service Fellow with the Division of Field Studies and Engineering.

Elizabeth Dalsey, M.A., is a Health Communication Specialist in the Western States Division.

CAPT Chucri (Chuck) A. Kardous, MS, PE, is a Captain with the United States Public Health Service and a research engineer with the NIOSH Division of Field Studies and Engineering.

Pamela S. Graydon, MS, COHC, is an Electronics Engineer working in hearing loss prevention in the NIOSH Division of Field Studies and Engineering.

CAPT David C. Byrne, Ph.D., CCC-A, is a Captain with the United States Public Health Service and a research audiologist with the NIOSH Division of Field Studies and Engineering.

References

[i] Adetona O, Reinhard T, Domitrovich J, Boryles G, Adetona A, Kleinman M, Ottma R, Naher L [2016]. Review of the health effects of wildland fire smoke on wildland firefighters and the public. lnhal Toxicol 28(3): 95-139. Available from: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26915822/

[ii] Navarro K, Kleinman M, Mackay C, Reinhardt T, Balmes J, Broyles G, Ottmar R, Naher L, Domitrovich J [2019]. Wildland firefighter smoke exposure and risk of lung cancer and cardiovascular disease mortality. Environ Res 173:462-468. Available from:https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001393511930194X

[iii] Reid CE, Maestas MM. Wildfire smoke exposure under climate change: impact on respiratory health of affected communities. Curr Opin Pulm Med 2019;25:179–187.

[iv] Moore JB, June CH. Cytokine release syndrome in severe COVID-19. Science 2020;368:473.

[v] West MR, Costello S, Sol JA, Domitrovich JW [2020]. Risk for heat-related illness among wildland firefighters: job tasks and core body temperature change. Occup Environ Med77(7):433-438. Available from: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31996475/

[vi] NIOSH [2012]. Report of a NIOSH health hazard evaluation, HHE 2011–0035. By Eisenberg J and McFadden J. Cincinnati, OH: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Unpublished.

[vii] Broyles G, Butler C, Kardous C [2017]. Noise exposure among federal wildland fire fighters. J Acoust Soc Am 141(2) EL177. Available from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5975217/

Did closure of West Yellowstone air tanker base affect suppression of a wildfire near Bozeman, MT?

Bill GabbertNovember 6, 2020Wildfireair tanker, Bridger Foothills Fire, Montana3 Comments

The Bridger Foothills Fire destroyed 28 homes

100-mile radius circles around tanker bases at Helena, Billings, and Pocatello. The location of the Bridger Foothills Fire is identified. Wildfire Today map.

This article was first published at Fire Aviation.

Two current or former firefighters were quoted in the Billings Gazette as asserting that the downgrading of the West Yellowstone Interagency Fire Center air tanker base in Montana to a Call When Needed base may have affected the amount of retardant applied on a recent fire near Bozeman, Montana.

200-mile radius circles around tanker bases at Helena, Billings, and Pocatello. The yellow circle is around West Yellowstone. USFS map.

Bridger Foothills Fire

The Bridger Foothills Fire that started September 4, 2020 northeast of Bozeman burned 8,224 acres and destroyed 28 homes. Three firefighters were forced to deploy and take refuge in their fire shelters September 5 when their safety became compromised by the spread of the fire. After the danger passed they moved to a safety zone and were later treated at Bozeman Health for “smoke inhalation and heat exhaustion” and then released.

West Yellowstone air tanker base

From the Billings Gazette, quoting a former smokejumper who had been based at West Yellowstone:

“The Bridger fire could have been staffed with more planes and twice the retardant dropped had West Yellowstone been used with the other bases,” said Tommy Roche, a retired wildland firefighter, in an email.

In addition to the former air tanker base at West Yellowstone, Montana, there are three other bases in that part of the country. Listed below are all four with their distances from the Bridger Foothills Fire.

West Yellowstone, 73 miles
Helena, 76 miles
Billings, 118 miles
Pocatello, 142 miles

gallons Retardant used at Air Tanker Bases — Retardant used at Air Tanker Bases in the Forest Service’s Northern Region, 2009-2018. (Screenshot from document supplied by the Custer National Forest, November 3, 2020; a letter signed by Shawna Legarza, Director of Fire and Aviation for the Forest Service at the time)

Forest Service will not release the Conklin de Decker and Associates air tanker study

From the Billings Gazette:

A Freedom of Information Act request, filed more than a year ago by West Yellowstone airtanker base manager Billy Bennett, for the Forest Service’s airtanker study has not been fulfilled. “In my opinion, I do not believe the study exists!” Bennett wrote in an email. “No one admits to ever having seen it.”

According to documents provided to Fire Aviation by the Custer National Forest in Montana, in 2019 the Forest Service commissioned an independent analysis of next generation air tankers performance by Conklin de Decker and Associates (CdD).

We asked for a copy of the study today and were told by Forest Service Fire Communications Specialist Stanton Florea that it “…contains proprietary information. You would need to file a FOIA [Freedom of Information Act Request] with our national office.”

Forest Service did not release the RAND air tanker study

We were told the same thing after requesting and then filing a FOIA to obtain a copy of the $840,092 RAND air tanker study completed in 2012. The Forest Service refused to honor the FOIA, saying “…the report is proprietary and confidential RAND business information and must be withheld in entirety under FOIA Exemption 4.” Their refusal letter went on to say: “The data, analysis, and conclusion in this report are not accurate or complete” and that the USFS wanted “to protect against public confusion that might result from premature disclosure.”

RAND finally released it in 2012. Both air tanker studies were prepared at taxpayer expense.

The RAND study recommended that the U.S. Forest Service upgrade its airborne firefighting fleet to include more scooper air tankers. “Because scoopers cost less and can make multiple water drops per hour when water sources are nearby, we found that the most cost-effective firefighting fleet for the Forest Service will have more scoopers than air tankers for the prevention of large fires,” said Edward G. Keating, lead author of the study and a senior economist at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. “However, air tankers are important in an ancillary role in initial attack for the minority of wildfires where water sources are not nearby, and possibly for fighting large fires as well.”

Performance of the BAe-146 at West Yellowstone

In a letter signed April 4, 2019 by Shawna Legarza, who at the time was the Director of Fire and Aviation for the Forest Service, she wrote, “Based on CdD information, the BAe-146 [air tanker] will not be able to operate from West Yellowstone unless temperatures are below 69°F”, and included the table below. She also wrote, “Retardant will not be downloaded”, meaning the BAe-146 must always carry 3,000 gallons.

The performance of the BAe-146 at West Yellowstone is due to the elevation at the base, 6,640 feet above sea level. On a warm day the thin air results in a density altitude that makes it difficult for the aircraft to take off with a full load of retardant on the 8,400-foot runway.

CdC study, retardant loads at tanker bases Northern Region — Reportedly from the CdD study, retardant loads at tanker bases Northern Region. Supplied by the Custer National Forest.

The table indicates that there would be no restrictions for the C-130, C-130Q, RJ 85, and the MD-87 air tankers, but the BAe-146 tankers operated by Neptune Aviation would not be able to carry a full 3,000-gallon load of retardant under certain conditions. The BAe-146 and the RJ 85 are very similar, but the RJ 85s operated by Aero Flite have more efficient engines than the BAe-146.

Closing West Yellowstone air tanker base

The letter from Director Legarza included this:

Based on safety and efficiencies, Region 1 should consider whether any future investment into the West Yellowstone Airtanker Base is warranted. The airtanker bases in Billings and Helena, Montana, and Pocatello, Idaho are within 30 minutes flight time for a next generation airtanker and can maintain the airtanker response and capability needed for that portion of your geographic area. Additionally, a temporary airtanker base could be setup at the Bozeman, Montana airport if the fire situation in that portion of Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming warranted a quicker response.

Forest Service begins to appreciate scooping air tankers

Another reason cited by the Forest Service for downgrading the West Yellowstone tanker base was the “increased use of scooper aircraft”, such as the CL-415 which can skim across a lake while scooping up to 1,600 gallons of water without having to return to an airport to reload with water or retardant. Historically the agency has been extremely reluctant to use scooping air tankers but four are currently under contract. For years they completely disregarded the RAND report’s recommendations about the efficiency of scoopers.

“The timing for the new scooper contract is this winter for the 2021 season and it is expected that Bridger Aerospace (based in Bozeman, MT) will have four turbine CL-215’s ready to bid which will add to the four CL-415’s on the current contract for a total of 8 nationally,” said Marna Daley, a Public Affairs Officer for the Custer National Forest in an email. “Regionally, Canadian scoopers are available and used through the agreement the Montana DNRC has with Canada.”

Bridger Aerospace is in the process of acquiring six old piston engine CL-215s that have been overhauled and upgraded with new turbine engines; they are designated as CL-415EAFs.

Tanker 281 Cedar Fire Nevada — Air Tanker 281, a CL-415EAF, completed over 60 water drops in support of firefighters at the Cedar Fire south of Elko Nevada on its first ever mission. Photo July 21, 2020 by K Mita, Bridger Aerospace.

West Yellowstone becomes a CWN base, dependent on portable retardant infrastructure

The West Yellowstone air tanker base is now classified by the Forest Service as a Call When Needed base. In the fall of 2019 the powder retardant was removed and the retardant mixing equipment was decommissioned according to documents supplied by the Forest Service. The base can now only be used to reload air tankers if a transportable retardant mixing plant is ordered and set up at the airport.

Forest Service’s evaluation of the use of air tankers at the Bridger Foothills Fire

In an email to Fire Aviation, Ms. Daley explained the agency’s opinion about the use of air tankers and the availability of the West Yellowstone tanker base during the Bridger Foothills Fire:

In terms of LATS (Large Air Tankers) and VLATs (Very Large Air Tankers) the Bridger Foothills Fire initial attack (day 1) and extended attack response (day 2 and day 3) was the most effective air resource response on the Custer Gallatin in 20 plus years. There wasn’t a moment where suppression efforts were lacking a retardant response. The ability of the Helena and Billings tanker bases to reload was unprecedented and fire managers were able to get full retardant loads on every tanker drop. The transition of the West Yellowstone Tanker base to a call when needed base did not affect the outcome of the Bridger Foothills fire. The base in West Yellowstone could have been opened under the Forest’s Call When Needed plan but that was not requested or needed because Helena and Billings bases were far more efficient.

Report issued for water tender rollover in Northern California

Bill GabbertNovember 6, 2020November 6, 2020WildfireAugust Complex, California, rollover, water tender1 Comment

Mendocino National Forest, September 27, 2020

Water Tender rollover — The water tender after the rollover. September 27, 2020. IMT photo.

This is the 66^th article on Wildfire Today about rollovers of wildland fire vehicles. But, it is the first we have heard about in 2020.

From the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center:

At approximately 0755 hours on September 27th, August Complex South Zone communications was notified of a Water Tender accident via radio by another Water Tender Operator who was also working in the area.

The Water Tender involved in the accident was full with approximately 4,000 gallons of water being utilized for road dust abatement.

Before experiencing radio challenges, the first Water Tender on scene was able to notify communications that there had been an accident and the Water Tender Operator had an injury to the shoulder, back and neck.

It is unknown if the driver was ejected from the vehicle during the accident, but the first water tender on scene did observe the driver climbing out from underneath the front bumper area of the wreckage.

Due to the accident’s location and lack of clarity of the nature of the accident/injuries, the Incident Management Team started a Life Flight response per the Medical and Incident Within an Incident (IWI) Plan. Upon activating the local Life Flight care provider, it was determined that the closest two helicopters were unavailable due to maintenance issues, leaving the third option of an ETA of 35 minutes. The decision was made to utilize the exclusive use Helicopter 514, staffed with an EMT, to transport the paitient with a 10 minute ETA.

A Safety Officer assigned to the incident arrived on scene, provided a size-up of the incident and assumed command of the IWI. When units arrived on scene, the Water Tender was upright, resting on its wheels against a tree with its tank separated from the chassis.

The area of the accident had a suitable landing spot. The patient was loaded into the helicopter and taken to the local trauma center for evaluation.

LESSONS

Always take the time to put on your seatbelt. This should be a given because it is a state law, but in a rush to accomplish a task or when a task is short duration, clicking a seatbelt can get skipped. A properly worn seatbelt can reduce injuries during an unintended outcome.
It is critical for any vehicle operator to keep vehicles at a reduced speed to the extent possible while vehicles are under heavy load driving on surfaces with increased stopping distances.
Beware of soft shoulders, narrow sections, blind corners, compromised visibility, and distractions— any combination of these conditions is especially dangerous.
Given the frequency with which water tenders roll on wildland fires, be very judicious about assigning work for tenders. Always ask: “Is this mission necessary?”

The Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center has reports for 13 Water Tender Rollovers from 2015 to 2020.

Over 200 Forest Service fire personnel have tested positive for COVID-19

Bill GabbertNovember 5, 2020November 5, 2020Uncategorizedcoronavirus, COVID-19, firefighter health4 Comments

And 141 CAL FIRE employees

November 5, 2020 | 4:17 p.m. MST

At least 219 U.S. Forest Service personnel involved in firefighting have tested positive for COVID-19 so far this year, according to Stanton Florea, a Fire Communications Specialist for the agency.

Since early March, 141 employees of the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection have tested positive, said Alisha Herring, Education, Outreach, and Engagement Officer for the agency on November 5.

Jim Gersbach, Public Information Officer for the Oregon Department of Forestry, told Wildfire Today that “among all wildland firefighters in Oregon this summer – not just ODF personnel — seven tested positive.”

Wildfire Today has also learned from other sources that more than half a dozen members on one of the teams managing wildland fires have also tested positive in recent weeks. In the interests of privacy we will not identify the team.

Two months ago the Forest Service reported 122 positive tests. The Bureau of Land Management had 45 which at the time included one person in critical condition and one fatality from the virus.

No deaths were reported among fire personnel in the U.S. Forest Service, Oregon Department of Forestry, or CAL FIRE.

As this was written at 4:17 p.m. MST November 5, the National Park Service and the Bureau of Land Management had not provided updated numbers of their fire personnel that have tested positive.

For the most part wildland firefighters have adapted to the reality of working with the continuing threat of COVID-19. Here are examples of mitigation measures taken by wildland fire organizations:

Physical distancing and wearing face coverings.
Daily self-assessments.
Only one person from a unit or module attend physical briefings; or,
Briefings by radio, rather than in large groups.
Distributed Camps and multiple staging areas, having a much smaller number of people than traditional Camps or Incident Command Posts. This puts an added burden on the Logistics section, but is safer for all.
Some crews have become virtually self-sufficient for days at a time, carrying enough equipment and supplies to prepare their own meals.
“Module as One”, means a crew is treated as a family, not individuals. When together and away from others, they would not have to physically distance or wear masks.
Crew Time Reports (CTR) showing the hours worked each day can be submitted and approved electronically.
Demobilization documents can also be emailed and signed remotely.
Email incoming resources a short in-brief with PDF maps, digital CTRs, digital time sheets.
Use QR codes to provide access to maps and Incident Action Plans.
Use a Unit Log to record all close human contacts outside of the Module As One, in order to facilitate contact tracing if someone tests positive.
Establish trigger points around COVID-19 for PPE, sanitation, and holding capacity. Don’t order more resources than you can sustain.
When feasible, Air Tankers work from a home base and return to that location at the end of each day. Before this year, especially when there have been less than 24 large air tankers on contract, they would often be repositioned for days at a time, frequently staying overnight in different cities.

Fire officials are discovering that some of the measures above might continue to be used after the pandemic since they can enhance efficiency and productivity.

One high-ranking fire official who spent much of the summer on fires told us that some incident management teams (IMT) are applying the mitigation measures to a greater extent than others. The Alaska IMT for example, is very careful and requires that incoming personnel from the Lower 48 states be tested before they travel and after they arrive in Alaska. Some teams are adamant about wearing face coverings while others are not.

There are anecdotal reports that the mitigation measures taken this year have reduced the occurrence of diseases that are sometimes common at large fires, such as respiratory and digestive disorders.

The video below, posted by the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center, shows an AeroClave, an automated no-touch decontamination unit. In addition to treating a meeting room it can be used to decontaminate engines, helicopters, and ambulances.

Report: Firefighter killed on August Complex was assisting with backfiring operation

Bill GabbertNovember 5, 2020January 13, 2022UncategorizedAugust Complex, California, lodd8 Comments

The firefighter was the engine boss on a contract engine from Texas working on the fire in Northern California

August Complex Fatality — Leslie Johnson / Cal Fire / San Francisco Chronicle

Additional information now available about the circumstances in which a firefighter was killed August 31 on the August Complex of fires in northern California reveals that the tragedy occurred during a backfiring operation. The San Francisco Chronicle reported details about the fatality after receiving documents from CAL FIRE obtained through a public records request.

Diana Jones Cresson Volunteer Fire Department, Texas — Diana Jones (Photo by Cresson Volunteer Fire Department)

Diana Jones, 63, from Cresson, Texas, was the engine boss of a three-person contract engine crew that was assigned to the fire on the Mendocino National Forest. Along with supervisors and at least one other engine they were on a 20-foot wide logging road igniting and holding a mid-slope backfire below the road.

When a spot fire occurred above the road at 2:15 p.m., Jones’ crew applied water on the fire. The spot fire continued to grow and then the fire in the drainage below the road intensified. The supervisor ordered the crew to “Get out of there!” but Jones could not hear the command. The driver got out of the engine to tell her that they had to leave, and then picked up a nozzle to knock down the flames.

At that time Jones got in the driver’s seat in order to move the truck but another engine farther up the road had turned around to come back to help. With the narrow dirt road then blocked by the second engine in the front and two other vehicles to the rear, the driver, still dismounted, told her to follow him or her toward the second engine.

From the San Francisco Chronicle:

As the engine’s back-up alarm beeped, signaling the vehicle was in reverse, Jones’ right wheels inched closer to the edge. The commander yelled over the radio: “E1, stop, stop, stop, stop … stop!”

The engine tumbled off the dirt shoulder, the report said, slamming into a tree about 15 feet below.

“Vehicle over side, in the fire,” a commander radioed, asking for air support.

The firefighter in the backseat tried to pull Jones out of the engine, as windows popped and shattered from the heat, but the temperature became too intense. The firefighter exited the driver’s-side rear door and crawled to the road with burns to the legs, arms, hands and face, the report said.

The task force leader put on breathing apparatus to search for Jones and the engine operator, but Jones suffered “fatal thermal injuries due to the engine burn over,” Cal Fire concluded. The report does not indicate whether the preemptive backfire or the larger conflagration ultimately burned Jones.

The Chronicle’s article had a little background information about Jones:

Jones had joined the Cresson volunteers five years ago after her husband died and she moved closer to her two sons. She had worked as a hairdresser and in logistics in the Middle East, said Ron Becker, chief of the small Texas fire department.

“She took to it aggressively and very well,” said Becker, adding she got her license as an emergency medical technician and certification in wildfire fighting. “I would never suggest to you that she didn’t know what she was doing and I’d never suggest that she wasn’t totally capable of what she was doing.”