An engine holds the Cold Fire at a road, April 2, 2016. South Dakota. Photo by Bill Gabbert.
The Defense Department’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center plans to use their sensor and automation capabilities to help provide intelligence about ongoing wildfires.
Below is an excerpt from an article at Nextgov.com:
…Defense has troves of sensor data, digital video data, digital infrared data and sonar data—all of which are attractive environments for machine-learning algorithms. Through this disaster-relief initiative, the agency plans to fly airborne sensors over wildfires in California and collect full-motion video data of the activity. At the same time, they are going to be automatically using a computer vision algorithm to detect which frames of the video have active wildfire.
Typically, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other disaster-relief entities try to disseminate maps of the fire to all relevant organizations involved in the efforts once per day.
“We believe we will be able to cut that to about once per hour distributed over an app,” Allen said. “By switching to this airborne sensor, applying an AI computer vision algorithm and converting that to geolocation data that is useful for a map application we are also developing, we’ll really be able to make an impact for our users in a short time frame.”
The agency expect to begin testing this capability within the next few months with the National Guard.
The article did not specify how the intelligence would be collected, such as by satellites, fixed wing aircraft, or Unmanned Aerial Systems.
CAL FIRE engines cross the border into Mexico to assist firefighters in the suppression of a wildfire west of Tecate, Mexico. CAL FIRE photo.
The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) has mobilized a strike team of fire engines to cross the international border in order to help firefighters in Mexico. They will be assisting in the suppression of the Border 8 Fire that has burned 1,500 acres very close to the border just west of Tecate, Mexico 23 miles southeast of San Diego.
The fire is a threat to cross the border in an area of the United States with steep topography and limited access. Keeping it from crossing the border would be the preferred option, rather than having to suppress a much larger fire in difficult terrain on the U.S. side.
The fire has been spreading to the east, generally toward the city of Tecate which has a population of 102,000 in its metropolitan area.
Air tankers have been dropping retardant in a few selected locations north of the border off and on since the fire started August 14, including S2T and C-130 aircraft from bases at Ramona and Hemet, California.
Photo from Otay Mountain showing the Border Fire at 5:44 p.m. PDT August 14, 2019, and the approximate location of the international border (white line).
CAL FIRE may decide to activate the unstaffed air tanker base at Brown Field Municipal Airport which is 1.6 miles north of the border and about 16 miles west of this fire. It is 31 miles south of the Ramona air tanker base and has a 7,972-foot runway which according to information from the USFS “provides ample length to meet safe takeoff requirements for the size and weight of a Next Generation Air Tanker with a full payload”. The runway at Ramona is too short to handle many of the large air tankers. The tanker base at Hemet, which also has a relatively short runway, is 80 miles north of the fire.
Screenshot from the ABC7 video below of the Deer Creek Canyon Park Fire southwest of Denver.
A wildfire that broke out Thursday at 4:30 p.m MDT caused evacuations to be ordered southwest of Denver. It was named “Deer Creek Canyon Park Fire” after the park by the same name. The fire appeared to have ignited about 250 feet south of a fire station for the Inter-Canyon Fire Protection District along Grizzly Drive south of 124. (see map below)
The video below shows the fire burning with a slow rate of spread through heavy brush, but it slowed even more when reaching grassy areas that still had a green component.
The closest structures that were affected by the evacuation are very large homes, most but not all with defensible space. Stacy Martin, Public Information Officer for the fire, said Friday at 9 a.m. that no residents took advantage of the designated evacuation shelters. The evacuation was still in effect Friday at 9 a.m. but she said fire officials hope to rescind the order “soon”.
Overnight the relative humidity rose to over 80 percent which along with a wind shift dampened the spread of the fire.
Map showing the location of the Deer Creek Canyon Park Fire.
Ms. Martin said the fire burned an estimated 20 to 25 acres and is surrounded by a hose lay. The 33-minute Denver 7 video below did not record any aircraft working the fire. A helicopter will be available today that flew in from Montrose, Colorado Thursday night. Approximately 130 firefighters have been assigned.
A spokesperson for the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department said the fire was human-caused, but that just means it was not started by lightning or a volcano. He said an explosion was heard around the time it started and juveniles were seen running in the area.
Deer Creek Canyon Park Fire. Photo by Jefferson County Sheriff Office.. Photo by Jefferson County Sheriff Office.
Thanks and a tip of the hat go out to Bean. Typos or errors, report them HERE.
Photo from Otay Mountain showing the Border Fire at 5:44 p.m. PDT August 14, 2019, and the approximate location of the international border (white line).
A large wildfire in Mexico west of Tecate is very close to the U.S. border and threatens to burn into California about 23 miles southeast of San Diego. It is spreading to the east, generally toward the city of Tecate which has a population of 102,000 in its metropolitan area.
The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, CAL FIRE, is monitoring the situation and has already started moving firefighting resources into the area, including aircraft.
Video from Channel 8 in San Diego showed air tankers, an S2 and a C-130 (T-134), making drops north of the border.
CAL FIRE may decide to activate the unstaffed air tanker base at Brown Field Municipal Airport which is 1.6 miles north of the border and about 16 miles west of this new fire. It is 31 miles south of the Ramona air tanker base and has a 7,972-foot runway which according to information from the USFS “provides ample length to meet safe takeoff requirements for the size and weight of a Next Generation Air Tanker with a full payload”. The runway at Ramona is too short to handle many of the large air tankers.
A 3-D map view of the area, looking east from Otay Mountain. The yellow line is the international Border. The area is similar to that seen in the photo from Otay Mountain, at the top of the article.Satellite photo showing smoke from the Border Fire at 5:44 p.m. PDT August 14, 2019.
The 10-year average for acres burned annually in U.S. #wildfires (not counting Alaska) is 5,666,000 acres.
— Wildfire Today ? (@wildfiretoday) August 14, 2019
Due to a decrease in wildfire activity throughout the country, the National Preparedness Level will be lowered to 2 at 2pm MDT today. pic.twitter.com/dPPpbMZqjF
The initial firefighting operations with Grass 5-1 and Grass 5-2. The green arrows indicate the direction of travel for the brush trucks. The red arrow is the direction the fire is traveling. The time is approximately 1124 hours. (NIOSH)
“Firefighter A” was one of three firefighters on a Brush Truck, Grass 5-1, that was initial attacking a grass fire on March 10, 2018 that was burning in two to three foot high Little Bluestem grass. He was riding on an open side step behind the cab when he fell off and was overrun by the fire. The firefighter was flown to a burn center but passed away March 23, 2018.
Below is an excerpt from the report:
“Grass 5-1 began attacking the fire from the burned “black” area. Grass 5-1 was attempting to extinguish the fire in the tree line and fence line while moving north. A bulldozer was operating north of Grass 5-1. A citizen was operating a private bulldozer independent of the fire department operations. The bulldozer was attempting to cut a fire break in the very northern part of the property ahead of the fire.
“Grass 5-2 arrived on scene at 1121 hours. Another fire fighter from Fire Station 5 had responded in his POV to the scene. He got in the cab of Grass 5-2 at the tank dam. Grass 5-2 went east in the field towards the fence line. The grass fire was near the POV owned by Fire Fighter “B” on Grass 5-1. Grass 5-2 extinguished the fire around the POV and moved north towards Grass 5-1.
“Grass 5-1 reached the head of the fire and lost sight of the bulldozer. The driver/operator of Grass 5-1 attempted to turn around and the wind shifted, causing the smoke to obscure his vision. The driver/operator inadvertently turned into the unburned grass. The driver/operator described the grass as two to three feet tall. The time was approximately 1124 hours.
“The wind shift caused the fire to head directly toward Grass 5-1. Grass 5-1 Fire Fighter “B” advised the driver/operator to stop because they were dragging the “red line” (booster line). Fire Fighter “A” and Fire Fighter “B” exited the vehicle to retrieve the hoseline. The driver/operator told them to “forget the line” and get back in the truck. Fire Fighter “B” entered the right side (passenger) side step and Fire Fighter “A” got back on Grass 5-1 on the side step behind the driver. Fire Fighter “A” had a portion of the red line over his shoulder. When the driver accelerated to exit the area, Fire Fighter “A” was pulled from the apparatus by the red line that remained on the ground due to the gate not being properly latched. Fire Fighter “B” started pounding on the cab of Grass 5-1 to get the driver/operator to stop the apparatus. Grass 5-1 traveled approximately 35 – 45 feet before the driver/operator stopped the apparatus. The time was approximately 1127 hours.
“When Fire Fighter “A” fell off of Grass 5-1, he fell into a hole about 6 – 12 inches deep and was overrun by the fire. The driver/operator and Fire Fighter “B” found Fire Fighter “A” in the fire and suffering from burns to his face, arms and hands, chest, and legs. They helped Fire Fighter “A” into the cab of Grass 5-1 with assistance from the two fire fighters on Grass 5-2. The driver/operator of Grass 5-1 advised the County Dispatch Center of a “man down”. Once Fire Fighter “A” was in the cab of Grass 5-1, the driver/operator drove Grass 5-1 to the command post, which was located near Tanker 5. Fire Fighter “B” was riding the right step position behind the cab of Grass 5-1. The time was approximately 1129 hours. At 1131 hours, the County Dispatch Center dispatched a county medic unit (Medic 2) to the scene for an injured fire fighter.”
The side step position on Grass 5-1 showing the gate latching mechanism and the short hoselines on each sided of the apparatus (NIOSH Photo.)
Instead of wearing the fire resistant brush gear or turnout gear he had been issued, Firefighter A was wearing jeans, a tee shirt, and tennis shoes.
Contributing factors and key recommendations from the report:
Contributing Factors
Lack of personal protective equipment
Apparatus design
Lack of scene size-up
Lack of situational awareness
Lack of training for grass/brush fires
Lack of safety zone and escape route
Radio communications issues due to incident location
Key Recommendations
Fire departments should ensure fire fighters who engage in wildland firefighting wear personal protective equipment that meets NFPA 1977, Standard on Protective Clothing and Equipment for Wildland Firefighting
Fire departments should comply with the requirements of NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety, Health, and Wellness Program for members riding on fire apparatus
The report referred to an August 17, 2017 tentative interim amendment to NFPA 1906, Standard for Wildland Fire Apparatus, 2016 edition with an effective date of September 4, 2017.
“NFPA 1906 Paragraph 14.1.1 now reads, “Each crew riding position shall be within a fully enclosed personnel area.”
“A.14.1.1 states, “Typically, while engaged in firefighting operations on structural fires, apparatus are positioned in a safe location, and hose is extended as necessary to discharge water or suppressants on the combustible material.” In wildland fire suppression, mobile attack is often utilized in addition to stationary pumping. In mobile attack, sometimes referred to as “pump-and-roll,” water is discharged from the apparatus while the vehicle is in motion. Pump-and-roll operations are inherently more dangerous than stationary pumping because the apparatus and personnel are in close proximity to the fire combined with the additional exposure to hazards caused by a vehicle in motion, often on uneven ground. The personnel and/or apparatus could thus be more easily subject to injury or damage due to accidental impact, rollover, and/or environmental hazards, including burn over.
“To potentially mitigate against the increased risk inherent with pump-and-roll operations, the following alternatives are provided for consideration: (1) Driver and fire fighter(s) are located inside the apparatus in a seated, belted position within the enclosed cab. Water is discharged via a monitor or turret that is controlled from within the apparatus.
(2) Driver and fire fighter(s) are located inside the apparatus in a seated, belted position within the enclosed cab, but water is discharged with a short hose line or hard line out an open cab window.
(3) Driver is located inside the apparatus in a seated, belted position within the enclosed cab with one or more fire fighters seated and belted in the on-board pump-and-roll firefighting position as described in a following section.
(4) Driver is located inside the apparatus in a seated, belted position within the enclosed cab. Firefighter(s) is located outside the cab, walking alongside the apparatus, in clear view of the driver, discharging water with a short hose line.
“Under no circumstances is it ever considered a safe practice to ride standing or seated on the exterior of the apparatus for mobile attack other than seated and belted in an on-board pump-and-roll firefighting position. [2016b].”
