Families of firefighting pilots killed in the line of duty in California have filed a lawsuit charging that officials in the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) intentionally misinformed them of their entitlement to death benefits.
According to the Sacramento Bee,
They “intentionally misrepresented to the survivors that the only available death benefit they might apply for was those available from” the federal government, the claim states. “Cal Fire executives made these representations knowing them to be false, and at the time they were well aware of the existence of benefits required to be paid under (state law).”
The lawsuit lists 14 pilots that were killed while fighting fires in California. Two of those were employees of DynCorp which has a contract to provide pilots and maintenance for the state’s S-2 air tankers. The other 12 worked for air tanker companies under contract to the U.S. Forest Service…
The Lake County Sheriff’s Office has released dash cam video shot during the early hours of the Valley Fire. Deputies struggled while the fire was spreading very rapidly to notify and evacuate residents. Four homeowners were killed and four CAL FIRE firefighters were entrapped and seriously burned in the fire that burned 76,000 acres and 1,200 homes in three counties 62 miles north of San Francisco.
At one point in the video you see deputies Rob Rumfelt and Kalen Brockwalder race toward a burning car, but had to turn back due to the intensity of the flames.
When California Governor Jerry Brown visited the site of the Rocky Fire that burned over 69,000 acres and destroyed 43 homes, he linked this summer’s large fires in his state to climate change, saying, according to the LA Times,
The fires are changing…. The way this fire performed, it’s not the way it usually has been. Going in lots of directions, moving fast, even without hot winds… It’s a new normal. California is burning.
Ms. St. John supported her argument by listing positions the Governor has taken on climate change, implying, therefore, that the Governor’s stance on climate change is “political”. Governor Brown previously encouraged presidential candidates to state their position on climate change, supported legislation to reduce gasoline use in California, and has spoken about climate change negotiations that culminate in Paris in December.
The article also includes information from fire experts who mention other factors that affect fire behavior, such as landscapes altered by a century of fire suppression, timber cutting, and development.
Ms. St. John wrote:
But climate scientists’ computer models show only that global warming will bring consistently hotter weather in future decades. Their predictions that warming will bring more forest fires — mostly in the Rockies and at other higher elevations, while fires may actually decrease in Southern California — also are for future decades.
The NOAA chart below, from an article we published in September, 2014, displays the average temperature in California for January through August of each year, from 1900 to 2014. It shows a clear trend in California of rising temperatures. Not “in future decades”, but for the last 115 years.
California, average temperature, January through August
Researchers are predicting that beginning 26 years from now the number of weeks in which very large fires could occur will increase by 400 to 600 percent in portions of the northern great plains and the Northwest. Many other areas in the West will see a 50 to 400 percent increase. The portions of California that have vegetation capable of supporting large fires will see increases of 50 to 300 percent or more.
If they are correct, the effects of climate change are not generations away. Firefighters starting out today will be dealing with this on a large scale during their careers.
The projected percentage increase in the number of “very large fire weeks”—weeks in which conditions are favorable to the occurrence of very large fires—by mid-century (2041-2070) compared to the recent past (1971-2000). (NOAA)
It is our position that unusual weather for one day, a month, a year, or even a decade does not prove or disprove a long-term climate trend. So when a senator brings a snowball onto the Senate floor or a governor talks about this summer’s fires to prove their cases that climate change does not or does exist, both are over stating their “evidence”. (In the first example, to a ridiculous extent.)
Both gentlemen need to consider much more data, such as the average size of fires over the last few decades or the California temperatures over the last 115 years.
And yes, there are factors other than weather that affect the size of fires, including decades of fire suppression in some areas. But not all large fires have burned in areas that have not been visited by fire in 50+ years. A careful analysis can’t discount the effects we are experiencing now — higher temperatures and longer fire seasons.
The U.S. Forest Service has released a preliminary report for the fatality of Dave Ruhl on the Frog Fire. Mr. Ruhl went missing the evening of July 30, 2015 while scouting the fire on foot, serving as incident commander during the initial attack in a very remote area of the Modoc National Forest 46 air miles east of Mt. Shasta, California. His body was found about 14 hours later approximately one-quarter mile from where he was last seen.
(Click on the image below, the timeline of the fire, to see a larger version.)
On August 4 the USFS said the autopsy determined that Mr. Ruhl’s death was attributed to “carbon monoxide poisoning and smoke inhalation”.
Not much information is in the report that sheds light on what led to his being entrapped by the fire, or what decisions were made or not made that led Mr. Ruhl to be in that spot at the wrong time. The wind direction did shift, which drove the fire in different directions, possibly resulting in his location becoming compromised.
The report’s narrative ends with this:
Although much will remain unknown about Dave’s decision making and complete route of travel, the final 100 feet of his route were accurately established. It appears he was cut-off and overcome by fire during the period of time that the fire spread shifted dramatically toward the west-southwest. Dave’s fire shelter was not deployed.
This document, called by the USFS a “learning review, preliminary report — narrative”, was released a little over two months after the fatality, a remarkably short amount of time for the agency. It comes after the USFS was extremely secretive during the first five days after the accident, refusing to divulge if a fire shelter was deployed, where the remains were found, or if the fatality was caused by a burnover, vehicle accident, lightning, or another type of accident.
The report confirms something that could be occurring at many fires — behind the scenes communications via cell phones. The Zone Duty Officer sent two text messages to Mr. Ruhl confirming that he was a TRAINEE Type 3 Incident Commander, and ordering him to clarify that over the radio to the others on the fire. The next text message sent to Mr. Ruhl was, “And I won’t text anymore. Sorry for that.” And finally, an hour and a half later after it became obvious he was missing, “I need you to call or text ASAP, we are very concerned on your status.” The screen shot of those four messages from the Zone Duty Officer’s iPhone did not include any replies from Mr. Ruhl.
The CAL FIRE engine that rolled over August 13, 2015 near Browns Valley, CA. Photos credit: CAL FIRE.
The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) has released a “Green Sheet”, a preliminary report on the rollover of one of their fire engines that occurred August 13, 2015 near Browns Valley, California about 50 miles north of Sacramento (map).
The accident involved two pieces of firefighting apparatus from CAL FIRE, but only the engine was damaged. Three firefighters received minor injuries.
The engine and a dozer transport truck were dispatched to the same fire. The dozer transport stopped on Marysville Road before turning left onto Bayberry Lane. With its turn signal on, it began to turn left but stopped again as the driver saw the engine approaching and attempting to pass. The driver of the engine swerved to avoid a collision and went off the shoulder of the road at approximately 45 to 50 mph. The engine then slid along the gravel shoulder for about 100 feet before rolling over and coming to rest 197 feet from where it left the pavement.
Entrapment site of firefighters on the Valley Fire. Photo from the CAL FIRE report. (click to enlarge)
The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) has released a report for an entrapment with injuries that occurred on the Valley Fire September 12, 2015. The fire burned 76,000 acres 62 miles north of San Francisco.
Four firefighters from a helitack crew that had arrived at the fire via helicopter were on the ground fighting the fire with hand tools when they were surrounded by the fire during initial attack operations and suffered serious burn injuries. Below is an excerpt from the report.
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“…FC1 directed FF3, FF4 and FF5 to get into the goat pen, which was clear to bare mineral soil. While in the goat pen they observed the fire behavior changing. There was an increase in the wind speed, and an increased number of spot fires in the pine needle duff and leaf litter surrounding them. FF3 saw fire sheeting and swirling across the dirt driveway on the northwest side of the goat pen; several pines torched on the west side of the steel garage.
From the location of RES2, FF2 observed increased fire behavior advancing toward Helitack A’s location. FF2 communicated the increased fire behavior using the radio; FC1 acknowledged FF2’s observation.
At approximately 1402 hours, the brush covered slope to their east completely torched into a wall of flame. The wall of flame sent a significant wave of radiant heat through the goat pen and onto the firefighters. They could feel their faces burning from the radiant heat and all four firefighters ran to the fence, climbed over, and ran towards the steel garage. At the steel garage Helitack A started to deploy their fire shelters.
“May-Day” was transmitted from FC1 and was heard over the radio. From the location of a third residence (RES3), FC2 could hear FC1 say over the radio, “Four have deployed their shelters, near a barn on the right flank.” FF4 had difficulty opening the fire shelter case from the Chainsaw Pack; the clear plastic covering of the fire shelter was soft and melted. FF4 had to remove the gloves to tear the plastic away from the aluminum shell of the fire shelter. FF3 couldn’t get the fire shelter out of the case because the clear plastic cover was melted to the white plastic protective sleeve. FF3 looked up and saw FF4 at the north side (D) of the steel garage. FF3 dropped the fire shelter on the ground and ran to FF4’s location. FF3 and FF4 shared FF4’s fire shelter and stayed together in a crouched position. FC1 and FF5 deployed their fire shelters on the east side (A) of the steel garage. The heat in front of the steel garage was too intense so they moved to the north side (D) of the steel garage with FF3 and FF4 where the atmosphere seemed to be cooler.
Helitack A huddled together shielding the heat away from their already burned faces and hands; each of them could see the visible burns to one another’s faces and hands. FC1 continued to use the radio requesting bucket drops from C1 on their deployment location to cool the atmosphere. FF5 attempted to drink the water from the hydration pack but the water from the mouth piece was too hot to drink. While crouched in their fire shelters next to the steel garage, Helitack A suddenly heard explosions coming from inside the now burning structure. As a group, Helitack A moved a safe distance from the structure. Helitack A eventually crouched along the dirt driveway, separating the dirt garden and the goat pen.
From the driveways of RES3 and a fourth residence (RES4), FC2 directed C1 to make bucket drops into Helitack A’s location at the top of the ridge. C1 orbiting above and was unable to get near their location at the top of the ridge due to the thick column of smoke convecting straight up into the atmosphere…”
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“Injuries:
FC1 suffered second and third degree burns to the head, face, ears, neck, back, arms, hands, legs and feet and has had several surgeries. FC1 remains in critical condition and is under the continued care of UCD Burn Center.
FF4 suffered first and second degree burns to the face, head, ears, arms and hands and is under the continued care of UCD Medical Center.
FF5 suffered first and second degree burns to the face, head, ears, arms, foot and hands and is under the continued care of UCD Medical Center.
FF3 suffered first and second degree burns to the face, head, ears, arms and hands and is under the continued care of UCD Medical Center.”
The report lists 13 “Safety issues for review and lessons learned”. Here are the first five:
“Crews must utilize L.C.E.S [lookouts, communications, escape routes, safety zones] when engaged in firefighting operations.
ALL Ten Standard Fire Orders MUST be obeyed at ALL TIMES.
Personnel MUST wear ALL CAL FIRE APPROVED PPE when engaged in firefighting operation.
Modifying Personal Protective Equipment can alter the protective properties.
Practice and prepare for shelter deployment in adverse and extreme conditions.”
