Report reveals actions taken after fatal helicopter crash on prescribed fire

One person was killed during aerial ignition operations in Texas March 27, 2019

Helicopter Flight Tracking Daniel Laird firefighter killed

A report has been released about the fatal helicopter crash that occurred on a prescribed fire in Texas, March 27, 2019. One of the passengers, Daniel Laird, was killed. The pilot and the other passenger were injured and transported to a hospital.

Tribute to Daniel Laird

Daniel, was born August 30, 1977 in Yuba City, California, the youngest of four siblings.

Daniel went to school at Grace Christian Academy, then on to Bridge Street School, and graduated from Yuba City High School in 1995. He joined the U.S. Forest Service after high school and worked his way up through the ranks to the position of Helitack Captain on the Tahoe National Forest. Daniel had served 23 years with the Forest Service.

Daniel was an avid fisherman, a staunch supporter of the Sacramento Kings, and a competitive golfer. He was also a Yuba City skateboarding icon. His greatest love and highest priority was always for his family.

Daniel’s complete obituary.

Daniel Laird memorial

Below are excerpts from the 33-page Facilitated Learning Analysis which goes into much more detail than seen here, and includes lessons learned. The excerpts are primarily from the viewpoint of Hailei who was in the front of the Airbus AS350B3 helicopter with Matthew, the pilot. Daniel Laird was in the back operating the Plastic Sphere Dispenser which dropped small spheres that ignite 30 to 45 seconds after being ejected from the machine. This was one of the methods used to ignite the prescribed fire that day, in addition to firefighters on the ground carrying hand-held devices.

It is common in reports like this to not use real names, but the document does not specify if they were changed.

The following events, from the time of the Mayday until the injured were transported to the hospital, occurred within a short amount of time, from 1409 to 1517. Those injured were actually receiving professional medical care on scene within 15 minutes of the Mayday. The excerpt begins at about 1408 just before finishing ignition on the prescribed fire.


Mayday – The On-Site Response

Hailei talked to Daniel and told him to get ready to turn off the Plastic Sphere Dispenser machine after they made the next turn. They were about to button the whole thing up. “We had one little piece we needed to do. We were 99.9 percent done. As soon as we made the turn, that’s when everything just stopped, and went silent,” Hailei recalls.

Hailei continues, “I looked at Matthew but I wish I would have looked back at Dan, too.” Matthew was fighting with the controls. She doesn’t remember doing it at the time, but Hailei asked Matthew, “What is happening?” He was busy with the controls. Hailei had the “push-to-talk” in her right hand. She keyed the mic and tried to say: “Kendall, we are going down.” But the only thing they heard on the radio was: “Kendall, we are going d . . .”

Hailei remembers hitting the tops of pine trees and then coming to. She later recalled, “I think I got knocked out. The last thing I remember, I was thinking of my daughter.”

Texas March 27, 2019 helicopter crash aerial ignitions
The March 27, 2019 incident in Texas. Photo by Sgt. Erik Burse/Texas Department of Public Safety.

Hailei said, “We [the helicopter] slid 50 feet down a live pine tree and rolled over onto our right side. I realized I was alive and then the pain hit. I undid my seatbelt and looked at [pilot] Matthew and saw a tree had come through between his leg and across his chest. I remember standing there and realized Matthew was alive because he was talking. He looked like he was hugging the pine tree. His head was laying on the PSD sphere bag. He said, ‘Help me move this bag.’ It seemed like forever to get the bag loose. As his seatbelt was unbuckled he fell out of the seat, but his foot was lodged. I had to crawl back in and twist his foot to get him loose.”

Hailei told Matthew: “We’ve got to go.”

She recalled seeing fire around them. She explained, “I wanted Matthew to get up but he couldn’t. I wanted him to get up so I could help him walk out. I wanted to get the fire shelters. I started thinking where the fire shelters were and started looking but couldn’t get to them.

Hailei continues, “I remember seeing Dan’s legs and thought ‘Please move your foot.’ But that never happened. I knew in my heart, he was gone. I thought about my training and remembered that fire extinguishers on board the aircraft are for people—not the aircraft. So I found the extinguisher and gave it to Matthew and said: ‘I have to go get help.’ The entire scene was very quiet for what had just happened.”

Hailei wanted her phone so she could call for help but couldn’t find it. Matthew was able to reach in the console and hand her his phone and she called FMO John. At that moment, John Kendall [Fire Management Officer on the Sam Houston National Forests] sees a Portland, Oregon phone number calling his phone. He remembered thinking that he didn’t recognize the number and he was trying to limit the time he was on the phone, but for some reason, he answered it.

It was Hailei on Matthew’s phone.

Hailei screamed for John to come get her. Hailei kept saying that she could not get the fire shelters from the helicopter. John told Hailei to move east away from the fire, but Hailei was unsure of where she was. Fire was spreading all around them. She told John, “We can’t get out of here.” Upon hearing this plural pronoun, John surmised that there must be at least two alive.

Right then, Hailei looked down and her phone was lying in the grass in front of her. She quickly hung-up with John and put the pilot’s cell phone in her pocket. She called her boyfriend with her phone and told him: “My helicopter crashed, I think one of my crew members is dead, please call my daughter. I don’t want her to find out about this on social media or the news.”

Hailei ends the call with her boyfriend, calls John back on her phone, and tells him that she could hear the UTV. He told her to hang up and call Robbie because he was closer to her.

She called [prescribed fire crewmember] Robbie from her cell phone. Robbie picked up the call. Hailei told him she heard the UTV drive past her. She told them to turn around, drive back, and pick her up.

Hailei remembers: “I thought I was going to have to walk through fire but a path opened up.” Robbie recalled seeing her through the fire. She was in an unburned pocket within the burn unit. Hailei recalls: “I got to Robbie who picked me up and carried me to the UTV where I had a meltdown. I then asked Robbie to stay with me.”

Prescribed Fire Crew Member, Brody, ran by. Hailei told him to hurry because fire was coming and she pointed toward the crashed helicopter. He headed that way and was first on scene at the helicopter. Then Jack, the firefighter who was serving as trail guard and weather observer, responded quickly. Robbie told him, “You need to grab a hand tool.” Jack grabbed a hand tool from the UTV and headed into the crash site following Brody’s path.

When Brody found the helicopter he saw pilot Matthew on his hands and knees under the ship. He recalled, “I asked if he was okay and he said ‘yes.’ I asked about Daniel, and the pilot didn’t know his condition. I ran around and looked and noticed the position of Daniel’s body and knew he was pinned. I knew the only way to help was to keep fire away. I helped the pilot up. I knew there was likely to be fuel everywhere, so I went out away from there and began to dig line.”

At about 1421, Jack met up with Brody at the helicopter as Brody was putting in a handline. Jack saw that Matthew was up and walking around. Jack asked Matthew if he could walk out. Matthew didn’t exactly answer his question, but explained that he didn’t have a fire shelter. Jack gave Matthew his fire shelter and said: “If we need to evacuate, I will open-up the fire shelter and we will leave together.”

Jack asked Matthew to “Show me the location of the PSD Operator so I can check him for signs of life.” Matthew pointed in the general direction and replied: “I don’t believe he made it.” He also informed,

“You can’t get to him.” Jack walked in that direction and quickly determined that, because of the helicopter’s position, he couldn’t get to Daniel.

Jack started helping Brody finish the handline and they started lighting a backfire with lighters. Jack was working on the fireline while having an ongoing conversation with Matthew.

Robbie started driving—very carefully—Hailei out on the UTV. She asked, “Where are we going? Robbie replied, “I want to get you a little better help.” She said, “Well, you can go a little faster.”

It took them about 10 minutes to get to the ambulance. While on the UTV, Robbie gently told Hailei that once he got her to the ambulance he would need to go back to help at the crash site. However, at 1426,  once they made it out to the ambulance, FMO John told Robbie to stay with Hailei because there were enough people at the scene and he wanted Hailei to know that she was supported.

Robbie gave Hailei a few minutes to calm down. Hailei called her supervisor, Toby, the Helicopter Program Manager, at 1430. He didn’t know the crash had happened and answered in a calm laidback voice, “What’s going on?” Hailei explained that the helicopter went down. She reported that she was fine and Matthew was fine but that she wasn’t sure about Daniel. She then handed the phone to Robbie. Toby asked Robbie about Daniel. Robbie informed that Daniel was still unconscious. Toby cancelled the scheduled post-burn recon for the Davy Crockett burn, had a conversation with his pilot, and both agreed to fly back to the Angelina airport. Toby then began to make his way to the hospital in Conroe.

At around 1507, Sam called Dispatch to say Hailei was in route to the hospital. Hailei recalls that Robbie rode in the front of the ambulance and it made her feel better to know that he was going with her. She also recalls that the Medic in the back of the ambulance also made her feel calm. She said, “I was mad because they cut my favorite pair of Nomex off me. I told them not to cut off my boots but to unlace them and tuck my socks in them! After all I went through, my concern at the time was that I didn’t want to get stuck by a needle. The Medic said, ‘You won’t even know’—and I didn’t. I was so impressed.”

While on the way to the hospital, the Medic was answering Hailei’s phone calls and responding to texts for her. One of these phone calls was from Hailei’s dad. The Medic was able to reassure and calm him about Hailei’s condition.

Honoring Daniel with the Utmost Respect and Dignity

The Montgomery Fire Department stabilized the helicopter with lifts that they had carried in. Based on their experiences, they had packed in quite a bit of stabilizing equipment. But because of the position of the helicopter, they only needed a few pieces of equipment to secure it.

While waiting for the Justice of the Peace to arrive, they decided that they would not remove Daniel until they were able to honor him with the utmost respect and dignity. A member of the Montgomery Fire Department requested an American flag be brought to the scene. At 1622, the Justice of the Peace confirmed that Daniel had expired.

Bob, the Angelina/Sabine Assistant Fire Management Officer (AFMO), recalls pulling up to the scene when everyone was waiting for Daniel to be brought out. He said, “We got in line and Daniel was brought out wrapped in an American flag. It was something to see.”

Surprisingly, Hailei was released within three hours of arriving at the hospital. Evan continued to stay with Matthew until James arrived late that night.

Conclusions

4 Crashes
16 Years
8 Lives Lost

The helicopter crash on March 27 that claimed Daniel Laird’s life has opened up old wounds from previous helicopter crashes, including: the 2003 space shuttle support crash (two fatalities, Charles Krenek and Buzz Miller); the 2005 Sabine National Forest crash (three fatalities, Jon Greeno, Charles Edger, and Jack Gonzalez); and the 2015 De Soto National Forest crash (two fatalities, Steve Cobb and Brandon Ricks).

There have also been numerous helicopter near-misses that have left a lasting impression on those involved. Some qualified personnel on the National Forests and Grasslands in Texas no longer want to be included in helicopter operations. These realizations have left employees asking large-scale questions about the nature of their work.

Thanks and a tip of the hat go out to Cory. Typos or errors, report them HERE.

BLM conducts 1,123-acre prescribed fire northeast of Billings, MT

BLM prescribed fire Billings Montana
BLM’s Kendall Coulee South prescribed fire northeast of Billings, MT on April 20, 2020. BLM photo by Colby K. Neal.

Bureau of Land Management firefighters conducted the 1,123-acre Kendall Coulee South prescribed fire northeast of Billings, MT on April 20, 2020.

BLM prescribed fire Billings Montana
BLM’s Kendall Coulee South prescribed fire northeast of Billings, MT on April 20, 2020. BLM photo by Colby K. Neal.

The BLM uploaded the video below, April 22, 2020: “Safely and successfully conducting a prescribed fire requires a great deal of planning and coordination. Addressing the additional health concerns we currently face adds to that challenge. The BLM Montana/Dakotas has developed an approach that is allowing firefighters to continue this important work.”

Not all federal agencies have postponed prescribed fires

BLM prescribed fire Salton Sea
BLM prescribed fire April 7, 2020. BLM photo.

The U.S. Forest Service cancelled or postponed all new ignitions on prescribed fires last month, but the Bureau of Land Management announced on April 7 that they conducted a prescribed fire in southern California:

BLM fire crews remain hard at work to prepare for this year’s fire season. Today, a crew from the BLM Palm Springs-South Coast Field Office conducted prescribed burns at the Dos Palmas Preserve near the North Shore of the Salton Sea.

These three photos were posted with the text on Facebook.

BLM prescribed fire Salton Sea
BLM prescribed fire April 7, 2020. BLM photo.
BLM prescribed fire Salton Sea
BLM prescribed fire April 7, 2020. BLM photo.

Forest Service Rocky Mountain Region postpones all prescribed fires

Safely fighting a wildfire during the pandemic this year and possibly next, is going to be extremely difficult

risk of prescribed fire during COVID-19 pandemic
The assessed risk of conducting prescribed fires based on COVID-19 pandemic conditions. By the Rocky Mountain Region of the U.S. Forest Service.

(UPDATED at 3:56 p.m. MDT March 23, 2020)

Wildfire Today confirmed on March 23 that the U.S. Forest Service has postponed all new ignitions on prescribed fires. The information came from Kaari E. Carpenter, Lead Public Affairs Specialist for the agency on March 23, 2020.


(Originally published at 9:43 a.m. MDT March 21, 2020)

The U.S. Forest Rocky Mountain Region, Region 2, has postponed all planned prescribed fires due to the conditions that exist during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Acting Regional Forester Jennifer Eberlien made the decision after an assessment was conducted that evaluated risks to employees and the public, as well as the ability to mitigate the risks. She consulted with Fire and Aviation Management staff, a leadership group of line officers, and members of the region’s Type 1 Incident Management Team.

U.S. Forest Service Regions map
U.S. Forest Service Regions

The Forest Service has also postponed all prescribed fires in California (Region 5) and the Southern Region (Region 8). Other Forest Service regions are considering or may have implemented similar prescribed fire postponements.

The Rocky Mountain Region’s assessment for the current situation identified risk factors and the ability to mitigate those risks (as shown in the illustration at the top of the article). They included:

Risk to Public of conducting prescribed fires during the pandemic

  • Extra holding resources may be brought in from areas where known COVID-19 community spread has occurred or is ongoing, bringing possible unknown infections into an area with little or no known infections.  No community spread occurring.
  • No real way to mitigate public interaction with the need to logistically provide for fire fighters working on allocated money not emergency funding.
  • Need for contingency resources from the local area may put additional stress on an already stressed system.
  • Increasing smoke with pandemic respiratory illness globally.

Risk to Employees of conducting prescribed fires during the pandemic

  • Resources will likely be required to travel and rely on restaurants, extra gas stops, public facilities, and stays in hotels.
  • No real way to mitigate interaction from the public at hotels, restaurants, gas stations, etc. This may increase odds of community spread.
  • Needed extra planning for medical facilities in the event we have community spread through our organization.
  • Briefings and face to face meetings are generally part of standard practice and required.

Ability to Mitigate risk of conducting prescribed fires during the pandemic

  • No known vaccine.
  • Unclear on actual risk factors.
  • Community spread known within the Region.
  • Unhygienic conditions.
  • No ability to separate from public and each other.

The factors above led to the decision to pause or postpone all prescribed fires in the Region.

A second risk assessment considered the conditions needed to allow prescribed fires to again be conducted. (as shown in the illustration below) It included:

Risk to the public of conducting prescribed fires after the pandemic situation has improved

  • Extra holding resources may be brought in from areas where known COVID-19 exists but little or no community spread has occurred or is ongoing. Thus, unlikely to bring possible unknown infections into an area with little or no known infections.  No community spread occurring.
  • There is little need to mitigate public interaction with the needs to logistically provide for fire fighters working on allocated money not emergency funding.
  • Scheduling or utilizing contingency resources from the local area will likely not put additional stress on the system.
  • Smoke Impacts on the public in communities will likely not increase acute illness or exasperate ongoing illnesses caused by the COVID-19.  By ensuring this we will likely be back within acceptable levels and normal operating circumstances.

Risk to Employees of conducting prescribed fires after the pandemic situation has improved

  • Resources will likely be required to travel and rely on restaurants, extra gas stops, public facilities, and stay in hotels with little community spread. Restaurants are functioning more under “normal” staffing.
  • Little need to mitigate public interaction with the needs to logistically provide for fire fighters working on allocated money not emergency funding.
  • No known need for extra planning for medical facilities in the event we have community spread through our organization.
  • Briefings and face to face meetings are generally part of standard practice and required.  Often these briefing are greater than 50 individuals with little known community spread. This risk will be negligible.

Ability to Mitigate risk of conducting prescribed fires after the pandemic situation has improved

  • Known vaccine.
  • Actual risk factors known, and facts are clear regarding spread, and treatment.
  • Community spread limited or halted within the Region.
  • No large scale needs to separate from public and each other.
risk of prescribed fire during COVID-19 pandemic
The assessed risk that would allow prescribed fires to be restored after COVID-19 conditions have improved. By the Rocky Mountain Region of the U.S. Forest Service.

Below is a statement issued March 20, 2020 by the Rocky Mountain Regional Office:


“The Forest Service remains focused on the safety and well-being of our employees and the public we serve across the U.S. and abroad. Our mission-critical work, such as suppressing wildfires, law enforcement, and other public service responsibilities, will continue within appropriate risk management strategies, current guidance of the Centers for Disease Control, and local health and safety guidelines. At this time, the Forest Service continues to remain open and operational, and we are committed to the continuity of our mission. In areas of community spread where telework has been maximized, we are working to exercise our technology capabilities where possible to ensure connection and service to the public. At this time, we encourage visitors to contact their local forest, grassland or ranger district for the latest office hours and availability.

“The decision to postpone [prescribed fire] ignitions will:

  • “Prevent any effects from smoke that might further endanger at-risk members of our communities, and
  • “Reduce exposure for Forest Service employees, cooperators and other resources assigned to the prescribed fire who would not be able to follow current guidance on unnecessary travel and social distancing.”

Our opinion

After going through the analysis above it becomes obvious that during the COVID-19 pandemic, fighting a wildfire is at least as risky as conducting a prescribed fire. It is actually more so since on a prescribed fire you have months to carefully plan and attempt to mitigate the risks in advance where possible, and you are managing a carefully controlled fire. When wildfire breaks out there are many unknowns during the emergency — where, when, the weather, fuel conditions, which firefighting resources will be there and where they will come from. Lives and property could be at risk which may lead firefighters to make decisions they could later regret.

Safely fighting a wildfire during a pandemic this year and possibly next, is going to incredibly difficult. I am not sure if it can be done safely even if everyone involved has been tested for the virus and squadrons of air tankers and helicopters are used to the max in numbers not previously seen.

air tanker Kincade Fire Sonoma County California October 2019 DC-10
A DC-10 air tanker, T-911, drops on the Kincade Fire in Sonoma County California, October 26, 2019. Kari Greer photo.

There will be two choices — fight the fire and put firefighters and possibly the public at risk of being infected by the virus as large numbers of firefighters assemble, or, attack it primarily from the air very, very aggressively, perhaps limited to point protection (high-value areas) — and otherwise let it burn.

An additional issue is how to protect the public during an evacuation. What would an evacuation center with hundreds of refugees look like while attempting to maintain a six-foot separation distance and isolating high-risk individuals and anyone that has been exposed to the virus? Testing everyone at an evacuation center for the virus would be helpful if the results could be obtained quickly.

Earlier this week we wrote more about fighting wildfire during a pandemic. And, in 2009 we covered the H1N1 or “Swine Flu” pandemic.

Midewin Hotshots assignment Missouri
The Midewin Hotshots on an assignment in Missouri, posted March 15, 2020.

Escaped prescribed fire burns 20 acres near Elsinore, CA

The spread of the South Main Fire was stopped by 286 firefighters and 4 aircraft

South Main Fire Cleveland National Forest map
The arrow on the 3-D map shows the approximate location of the South Main Fire on the Cleveland National Forest March 6, 2020.

A prescribed fire on the Cleveland National Forest in southern California escaped the intended project area on March 6 and burned an additional 20 acres. It occurred near the South Main Divide between Lakeland Village and a residential community west of the road.

The spread of the South Main Fire was stopped by 286 firefighters, 3 helicopters, and at least one S-2T air tanker.

South Main Fire Cleveland National Forest helicopter
A CAL FIRE UH1 helicopter drops water on the South Main Fire on the Cleveland National Forest March 6, 2020. USFS photo.
South Main Fire Cleveland National Forest
Smoke from the South Main Fire as seen March 6 from an HPWREN camera on Santiago Peak.

Report released for escaped prescribed fire northwest of Fort Collins, CO

The project was on private land, the Ben Delatour Scout Ranch

Elk Fire Map
Map showing the location of the escaped prescribed fire in northern Colorado, which was named Elk after the escape.

A five-page report described as an executive summary has been released for a prescribed fire that escaped on private land last fall in Colorado. As required by state law, the review was completed by a team of subject matter experts led by the Compliance and Professional Standards Office of the state’s Department of Public Safety.

The Nature Conservancy planned and executed the Elkhorn Creek Unit #4 prescribed fire that took place on the Ben Delatour Scout Ranch, private property located in Larimer County, Colorado 25 miles northwest of Fort Collins. It was part of a forest restoration effort aimed to reduce the impact of high severity wildfire on Elkhorn Creek, an important tributary of the Poudre River.

On day two of the project a spot fire occurred an hour after cloud cover moved out of the area. It was suppressed, but later two more ignited.

Below are excerpts from the report:


Located in dry, dead grass on a steep slope aligned with strong westerly winds, these two spots quickly grew together and began spreading rapidly away from the unit towards the Glacier View community to the east. Leadership personnel, quickly determining that on-site resources would not be able to contain the fire, immediately ordered ground and aerial resources and then declared the wildfire at 3:59 PM. In total, the fire burned 682 acres, with 118 acres outside of the planned boundaries of the project and 82 acres off the Scout Ranch property. One outbuilding was destroyed by the fire.

[…]

Recommendations for All Prescribed Fire Practitioners

1.  A strong understanding of fire weather is critical to mitigating risk and responding to changing conditions. Review fire weather concepts presented in the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) Intermediate Wildland Fire Weather Behavior (S-290) course and fire weather data acquisition and analysis concepts presented in the NWCG Intermediate National Fire Danger Rating System (S-491) course before each fire season utilizing an Incident Meteorologist (IMET), a Long Term Fire Analyst (LTAN), Fire Behavior Analyst (FBAN), or other knowledgeable individual, and incorporate these concepts into development of prescribed fire plans.

  • Review and remain diligent regarding the differences between 20-ft sustained 10 minute average winds, gusts, eye level, and midflame wind speeds.
  • Ensure on-site wind measurements are consistent with the type of wind parameters used in the prescribed fire plan, or ensure that accurate conversion techniques are accurately and consistently applied.

2. Apply “lessons re-learned” from the factors and best practices identified as being common between this prescribed fire and previous prescribed fires that were later declared wildfires.

Recommendations for The Nature Conservancy

3. Evaluate and refine the collaborative burning approach, including considerations for additional cooperative or partnership agreements to increase the experience level below that of overhead or trainee positions on high consequence prescribed fires.

4. Consider the full adoption of the DFPC Colorado Prescribed Fire Planning and Implementation Policy Guide as well as the Prescribed Fire Complexity Rating System Guide (NWCG PMS-424-1).

  • Adoption of these guides would increase consistency and support cooperation between The Nature Conservancy and DFPC and other Colorado partners.

Recommendations for the Division of Fire Prevention and Control

5. Evaluate all DFPC statutory and policy frameworks and craft solutions to align with all three co-equal goals of the National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy.

  • Changes to DFPC’s organizational focus and statutory authority may be necessary to reduce wildfire risk to communities and create resilient landscapes. In the face of an increasingly complex wildland fire environment, the ability to implement proactive measures must be part of a holistic strategy to reduce risk.