An After Action Review has been released for the Chimney Tops 2 Fire that spread from Great Smoky Mountains National Park into the city of Gatlinburg, Tennessee a little over a year ago killing 14 people, forcing 14,000 to evacuate, destroying or damaging 2,500 structures, and burning 17,000 acres. The AAR, completed by ABS Group, was commissioned by Gatlinburg and Sevier County.
Officially named the Horse River Fire, it burned 589,552 hectares (1.4 million acres) in 2016, destroyed 2,400 structures, and forced 80,000 to evacuate.
On August 31 the National Park Service released the long anticipated report (12 Mb file) about the wildfire that burned from Great Smoky Mountains National Park into the city of Gatlinburg, Tennessee. Five days after it started on November 23, 2016, the Chimney Tops 2 Fire spread into the eastern Tennessee city killing 14 people, forcing 14,000 to evacuate, destroying or damaging 2,400 structures, and blackening 17,000 acres.
The strategy used to manage the fire was controversial because very little direct action was taken to suppress the fire during those first five days until a predicted wind event caused it to spread very rapidly out of the park and into the city.
The report was presented to the public during a live Facebook feed which you can see below.
One of the first speakers was Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke who reminded the audience that he served in combat and then mentioned some recommendations:
The National Park Service should be more proactive about removing “dead and dying timber”;
The dozer lines built during the suppression of the fire could be put to good use, possibly as bike paths;
The interoperability of communications systems needs to be improved so that firefighters from different divisions within the NPS and also between other agencies can more easily communicate during an emergency.
Joe Stutler, qualified as a Type 1 Incident Commander and Area Commander, positions at the pinnacle of the incident management structure, read a lengthy statement that included what he and his team of investigators deemed to be the pertinent facts of the fire and the investigation.
Joe Stutler presents information in the report about the Chimney Tops 2 Fire that burned into Gatlinburg, Tennessee.Mr. Stutler began by saying the report was intended to not place blame on anyone, and would “avoid should have, could have, and would have, statements that frankly inhibit sensemaking and also inhibit continuing to learn from the event.”
Describing the actions taken or not taken on the fire, he said, “the review team found no evidence of negligence of anyone at the park. They did the very best they could when it came to their duty. They did the very best they could based on what was loaded in their hard drive”, he said as he pointed to his head.
Chimney Tops 2 Fire November 27, 2016. Photo by Brett Bevill.“Never in the history of this park or even in the surrounding area”, Mr. Stutler said, “had anyone seen the combination of severe drought, fire on the landscape, and an extreme wind event” occurring at the same time.
Combined with a wildland/urban interface, it was the “perfect storm”, he explained. The review team concluded that the fire management officials did not see the potential for the low-frequency, high-risk event.
The report made recommendations, including:
Revise the park’s fire management plan to reflect more aggressive strategies and tactics during extreme fire weather conditions.
Expand communications capacity to allow interoperability with responders outside the federal system.
The Fire Management Officer should be supervised by a single individual, not two.
Since no Red Flag Warnings were issued around the time of the fire, evaluate current Red Flag Warning and advisory criteria to reflect conditions experienced during the 2016 fire season.
The National Park Service leadership should embrace and institute change to create wildland fire management organizations that have the capacity and resilience to meet the realities of this “new normal” fire behavior.
Institute formal fire management officer and agency administrator mentoring and/or development programs.
Dozer burnover in Okeechobee County, Florida. April 16, 2017. Florida Forest Service photo.
The Florida Forest Service has released a report on the burnover of a dozer that occurred April 16, 2017 in Okeechobee County. As you may remember from our April 17 article, the operator, who was not injured, became entrapped while constructing fire line with the tractor plow and was overrun by the fast-moving fire.
You can read the entire report HERE, but below are some excerpts:
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Contributing Factors:
Initial tactics deployed by the first arriving units were based on limited knowledge and experience.
Incident Commander having minimal initial attack experience.
Operating equipment beyond its capabilities
Leaders intent, was not made clear.
Ineffective transfer of command to experienced leadership positions.
Loss of situational awareness with crews.
Lack of effective communication.
Minimal staffing in Communications Center during high fire danger.
Lessons to Share:
It is imperative to speak up when you are feeling uneasy, uncomfortable, or unsure.
Experienced firefighters should be mixed with those who are less experienced. This will necessitate a thorough briefing, ensure instructions are clear and understood and to keep firefighters from working alone when additional units are on scene.
Personnel accountability is extremely important, especially in complex initial attack circumstances that often require unique tactics and strategies. This helps ensure safety of all crews.
Operate equipment in appropriate speed settings (1.7-1.9). This will reduce equipment fatigue and failure.
Turn off air-condition unit if caught in flame front or heavy embers. This will help reduce the likelihood of the filters and cab catching fire.
Establish properly qualified and experienced leadership.
Incident Commander should limit his/her hands-on fire suppression activities to maintain effective situational awareness.
Limit radio traffic to the extent possible. This will improve the possibility that emergency traffic can be transmitted and received successfully.
Increase staffing in Communications Center on high fire days to help with the additional call volume and radio traffic.
Know and follow established policy and procedures for emergency radio traffic.
Thanks and a tip of the hat go out to Rob. Typos or errors, report them HERE.
Above: Engine 337 of the Tonto National Forest monitors the Juniper Fire, which started by a lighting strike on May 20, 2016 approximately 10 miles south of Young, Arizona. Photo courtesy of USDA Forest Service, Tonto National Forest.
Wildfires burned nearly 600,000 acres last year in a three-state region of the Southwest U.S., more than double the number of acres burned in each of the previous two years, according to a new report published this week detailing the 2016 fire season.
The report is the fourth in a series of annual overviews made available from the Southwest Fire Science Consortium and the Ecological Restoration Institute intended to serve as a summary for past years and allow for a comparison with previous fires.
Specifically, the report describes effects from the 12 largest fires — each larger than 8,000 acres — in Arizona, New Mexico and western Texas.
Twelve fires are examined in detail. Four occurred in New Mexico: the North, Dog Head, McKenna and Clavel fires; seven in Arizona: Cedar, Jack, Juniper, Brown, Fuller, Rim and Mule Ridge; and one in Texas: the Coyote Fire.
These 12 largest fires represent nearly half of the acres burned by wildfire in 2016.
